

Does the type of rights matter?

Comparison of attitudes towards the allocation of political versus social rights to
labor migrants in Israel

Anastasia Gorodzeisky

*This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article **accepted for publication** in **European Sociological Review** following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version:*

Anastasia Gorodzeisky

Does the Type of Rights Matter? Comparison of Attitudes Toward the Allocation of Political Versus Social Rights to Labour Migrants in Israel *European Sociological Review* (2013) 29 (3): 630-641

is available online at: <http://esr.oxfordjournals.org/content/29/3/630>

Does the type of rights matter? Comparison of attitudes towards the allocation of political versus social rights to labor migrants in Israel

Abstract

The paper contends that the attitudes of the majority population towards the allocation of political rights to out-group populations are distinct from attitudes towards the allocation of social rights. Data obtained from an attitudinal survey administered to a representative sample of Israeli adults show that the level of objection to the allocation of rights to labor migrants in the political sphere is twice as high as that found in the social sphere. Multivariate analysis demonstrates that attitudes towards the granting of political and social rights not only differ in the degree of objection, but are also differentially affected by the social and economic characteristics of the population. Further analysis examines the effect of perceived socio-economic threat, threat to national identity and prejudice on attitudes towards the allocation of rights. This analysis reveals that different mechanisms underlie the formation of attitudes towards the allocation of rights in the political and social arenas. The findings are discussed in light of previous research and theory.

1. Introduction

The growing body of research on public attitudes towards granting out-group populations (e.g. foreigners, immigrants and ethnic minorities) equal rights has demonstrated that public support for the exclusion of foreigners from equal access to various types of rights is widespread in a range of Western societies (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2009; Pettigrew, 2000; Scheepers et al., 2002; Raijman, Semyonov and Schmidt, 2003). The significance of public attitudes towards the allocation of economic, social and political rights to out-group populations is difficult to underestimate. Public opinion towards the allocation of such rights to subordinate populations may frame the context of reception, and, thus, the relations between the dominant group and out-groups, by both signaling whether out-groups are welcome or not and by influencing government policies with regards to the

exclusion/inclusion of foreign groups into society (Raijman, 2010; Hoskin, 1992). From an academic point of view, studying public attitudes towards the allocation of different types of rights to foreigners may help us more deeply understand what citizenship, in terms of rights, means for the majority group members.

Most previous studies on the topic have treated dominant groups' attitudes towards granting rights to out-groups in different areas (such as political, social, economic and others) as being one broad and mutual concept, both conceptually and empirically. However, no one has yet examined whether public support for the exclusion of foreigners from equal access to rights in different life areas is indeed unified and should *not* be differentiated. This omission is surprising and somewhat unfortunate in light of the repeated arguments in the citizenship literature, that citizenship matters relatively little in the area of economic and social rights, while political rights are those that most clearly define the boundaries between citizens (or full members of the polity) and foreigners in contemporary Western societies (Baubock, 2005; Brubaker, 1989; Hammar, 1990; Layton-Henry 1990; Leitner, 1995).

According to Brubaker (1989), there are two circles in which membership is organized in Europe and North America: the inner circle of the political community, and the outer circle of the social and economic community. To be a full member of social and economic communities and, thus, to be entitled to social and economic rights, one does not have to be a citizen. Legality of residence and/or work, for example, is a much more important criteria to access welfare benefits. On the other hand, to be a full member of the political community and to be entitled to the most significant political rights (i.e. the right to vote in national elections), one has to be citizen.

Voting rights - a central component of political rights - have traditionally been perceived as the core of democratic citizenship. It is by exercising their voting rights that citizens participate in collective self-government through voting for representatives and/or by running as candidates for public office (Baubock, 2005). In line with this view of political rights, it is reasonable to expect that majority group members would be much more reluctant

to grant foreigners political rights than social rights, since the former would allow foreigners to have a say in decisions that may affect the entire polity¹.

Raijman (2010) suggests that the level of willingness of members of the majority group to share national benefits and resources with different minorities can be viewed as the way that the majority group defines the boundaries of the collective. Following this logic, I argue that majority attitudes towards the allocation of different types of rights (*in particular social rights versus political rights*) to foreigners may demonstrate where the majority group members draw the line between “us” as nationals and “them” as non-nationals; or in other words, what citizenship (in terms of rights) means for majority group members.

Based on the discussion presented above in this paper I argue that, from a substantive point of view, public support for exclusion of foreigners from equal access to political rights versus access to social rights should be viewed as two distinct concepts. I will provide an empirical test for this argument and compare the levels and the sources of objection to the allocation of social versus political rights to foreigners among the majority population in the empirical part of the paper (sections 4 and 5). However, before proceeding to the analysis I outline the Israeli context in which exclusionary attitudes toward foreign labor migrants are examined (section 2), and review previous studies on exclusionary attitudes towards out-group populations, while focusing particularly on the sources of such attitudes (section 3).

2. The Setting-Israel

Since the establishment of the State of Israel, the country has predominantly been inhabited by Jews and Arabs. Currently about a third of the Jewish population of Israel are first-generation immigrants, and most others are the sons and daughters of immigrants. According to the Law of Return (1950) and the Law of Nationality (1952) every Jew and family member of Jewish immigrants has the right to settle in Israel and to be awarded Israeli citizenship upon arrival. Arabs constitute today approximately 20 percent of Israeli citizens.

In recent decades, however, the ethnic composition of the Israeli labor force has changed due to the massive entry of foreign labor migrants. Starting from late 1980s, Israel began to allow the entry of non-citizen workers, mostly for low-paying menial jobs in construction, agriculture and service sector industries. Currently the number of foreign labor migrants in Israel is estimated to be around 200,000 (comprising approximately nine percent of the total Israeli work force; Bank of Israel, 2007), and half of them are believed to be undocumented. The labor migrants have been drawn to Israel from a variety of places, including several African countries, Latin America, Thailand, the Philippines, China, Turkey and Romania.

Although foreign labor migrants form an integral part of the Israeli economy, they suffer from the worst working conditions in the country; their wages are considerably lower than those of Israeli citizens, and, in many cases, below the minimum wage. Most foreign labor migrants live in the poorest neighborhoods (mostly in South Tel Aviv); and the undocumented workers are under constant threat of deportation from the country (Kemp and Raijman, 2008; Rosenhek 2000).

Previous studies show that objection to the allocation of various types of rights to foreign workers is a widespread phenomena among the majority group population in Israel. However, these studies either focus on attitudes towards the granting of a wide range of social rights, or treat attitudes towards rights in different areas of life as a single-dimension concept (Raijman and Semyonov 2004; Raijman, Semyonov and Schmidt 2003; Raijman 2010). There is no study that distinguishes or compares attitudes toward the allocation of political versus social rights.

The study of majority attitudes towards the granting of political versus social rights to out-group populations is especially illuminating within the context of Israeli society, due to the ethno-national character of the Israeli state. Ethnic nationalism rejects the granting of political rights to non-citizen residents (i.e. foreign labor migrants). "It conceives the nation as a community of culture, imagined descent, and destiny that has a right to self-determination.

A nation's membership need not coincide with the resident population of a state where this nation is dominant. It is therefore... legitimate to exclude non-citizens from access to political rights" (Baubock, 2005, p.765).

The issue of the allocation of political rights to foreign workers in Israel has become even more crucial and complicated in light of the Israeli regime of immigration. This regime is based on the exclusion of *non*-Jewish immigrants (while encouraging Jewish immigration) and leaves them with hardly any possibility of becoming citizens. At the same time in Israel, unlike in most European countries, foreign labor migrants have barely had access to the Israeli welfare system or state health services, and rarely benefit from the union protection that is provided to Israeli citizens (Kemp and Rajjman 2008; Rosenhek 2000).

3. Sources of support for exclusion from rights: Previous theory and research

Previous studies on exclusionary attitudes towards out group populations (as reflected in the inclination to deny out-groups equal access to the system of rights) have emphasized three complementary sets of sources underlying such attitudes. The first stresses competition and fear of competition over economic and social resources, the second emphasizes the threat posed by out-groups to the national identity of a society, and the third focuses on the role of prejudicial views in explaining support for exclusion of out-group from the system of rights.

According to the concept of 'competitive threat', exclusionary attitudes towards foreigners are prompted by natives' anticipations of negative consequences (due to the presence of immigrants) for their own group socio-economic interests; in other words, by the perceived socio-economic threat at the collective level (e.g. Rajjman, Semyonov and Schmidt 2003; Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders 2002; Semyonov, Rajjman and Gorodzeisky, 2006; Stephan, Renfro and Davis, 2008). Likewise, a threat to socio-economic self-interests leads people holding vulnerable positions in the labor market to object to the allocation of equal rights to foreigners (Semyonov et al., 2004; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2009). Previous research in Israel, like in other societies, demonstrate that individuals of

lower socio-economic status and lower education endorse more exclusionary policies towards out-groups probably because they realize that these exclusionary policies can protect their own vulnerable position in the labor market (Raijman and Semyonov 2004; Raijman, 2010).

At the same time, out-group populations are often perceived by the majority as posing a threat not only to their socio-economic interests but also, no less importantly, to the cultural homogeneity and national identity of the society (Leitner, 1995; Fetzer 2000; Schnapper 1994). In states which have traditionally been characterized by ethnic and cultural homogeneity, citizens are most likely to be concerned about the impact that new ethnic groups may exert on the national identity of their societies (Castles and Miller 1993). According to this approach, majority members who perceive an out group as threatening a society's national identity may support the exclusion of the out-group by denying the group equal access to rights. Since natives holding conservative views (mainly expressed in right-wing political ideology) are usually more concerned with the potential threat that aliens may pose to national and cultural homogeneity, they also tend to express higher levels of exclusionary views. Indeed, previous research in Israel found exclusionary attitudes among Jews to be strongly associated with the sense of threat to national identity and to the Jewish character of the state; additionally, such attitudes were found to be pronounced among more conservative natives (Canetti-Nisim and Pedahzur, 2003; Raijman and Semyonov, 2004; Raijman, 2010).

Prejudice also fuels exclusionary attitudes, since rejection and derogation of an out-group population may lead people to advocate the denial of equal access to rights (Bobo 2000; Dustmann and Preston 2004; Pettigrew 2000; Stephan, Renfro and Davis 2008). However, prejudice has long been viewed by social science researchers not only as a source of exclusionary attitudes, but also as a defensive reaction to the perceived threat posed by an out-group population to the interests of the dominant group (Blumer, 1958; Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders, 2002; Halperin, Canetti-Nisim and Pedahzur, 2007;

Schlueter, Schmidt and Wagner, 2008). Thus, prejudice, may, in fact, not only affect exclusionary attitudes but also intervene in the relations between threats and exclusionary attitudes. The revised version of Integrated Threat Theory (Stephan, Renfro and Davis 2008) posits negative stereotyping, hostility as well as opposition to policies favoring the out-group among other potential outcomes of threats, and empirical studies based on this theory test relations between different outcomes of threats. Following the logic embodied in this theory, it is reasonable to assume that prejudice as a response to perceived threat, also lead natives to deny foreigners access to rights, or, in other words, mediates the relations between threats and exclusionary attitudes. However, prejudices may not only mediate, but also intensify the effect of perceived threats on support for the exclusion from equal access to rights. Thus, Gorodzeisky (2011) argues that majority members have to hold prejudicial views in order to be willing to exclude foreigners from equal access to social rights.

. To sum up, based on the theoretical discussion presented above, the level of objection to granting social and political rights to foreign workers are expected to rise together with the level of both types of threat and prejudice. The latter is also expected to intervene in the relations between perceptions of threat and support for exclusion from rights. However, if attitudes towards the allocation of political rights are a distinct concept from attitudes towards the allocation of social rights (as I argued at the outset) I would expect attitudes towards the granting political versus social rights to be differentially affected by individuals' attributes. I expect also to find differences in the role that threats and prejudice play in mechanisms underlying exclusionary attitudes in political versus social arenas.

Specifically, I hypothesize that attitudes towards the granting social rights would be mostly influenced by persons' socio-economic position and perceived threat to their own collective socio-economic interests. Following the theoretical discussion presented above, it is reasonable to suggest that majority members who feel threatened by out-group in socio-economic arena (either at individual or at collective level) would be most reluctant to share

socio-economic resources with the out-group. At the same time, since objection to grant foreigners political rights could be seen as a desire to protect collective from political influence of 'others' that threatening any interest and privilege of the collective, attitudes towards the granting political rights would be influenced by persons' ideology, perceived threat to national identity of society as well as perceived threat to the collective socio-economic interests.

4. Data, Operationalization and Descriptive Overview

The data for the present analysis were obtained from an attitudinal survey regarding worker groups administered to a representative sample of Israeli adults. The survey was conducted in 2007² by the B.I. and Lucille Cohen Institute for Public Opinion Research at Tel-Aviv University. From this data set, a series of background variables were selected to represent the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents and attitudinal variables to represent respondent's views toward foreign labor migrants (e.g. foreign workers). The final sample for the analysis consists of 668 Jewish citizens aged 24-60 who were born in Israel or who immigrated to Israel prior to 1989, and, thus, represents members of the dominant group in Israeli society.

4.1. Dependent Variables

The dependent variables in the analysis are respondents' attitudes towards the allocation of political/social rights to foreign workers. The variables were measured on a 1-7 scale based on responses regarding the level of agreement/disagreement with the sentences displayed below. All responses regarding the granting of rights were recorded such that 7 reflects the highest level of objection to granting a certain right; or in other words, the highest level of support for exclusion from access to a right. Three items captured attitudes towards granting social rights:

- The State should grant foreign workers health services ($\bar{\chi} = 2.95$)

- The State should grant foreign workers welfare services ($\bar{\chi}=3.43$)
- Minimum wages for foreign workers should be protected ($\bar{\chi}=2.77$)

Two additional items captured attitudes towards granting political rights:

- Voting rights should be given to foreign workers ($\bar{\chi}=5.45$)
- All political activities should be prohibited for foreign workers living in Israel ($\bar{\chi}=5.07$)

Figure 1 presents the percentage of respondents who objected to granting a certain right to foreign workers (responses ranging from 5 to 7 on a scale of 1 to 7).

FIGURE 1 IS ABOUT HERE

The results show that the opposition to granting political rights to foreign workers is much more prevalent than the opposition to granting social rights. About two thirds of Israeli majority members support the denial of political rights (voting rights and the right to take part in any political activities) from foreign workers, while between roughly a quarter and a third of the interviewees would deny granting foreign workers various kinds of basic social right. More specifically, 22 per cent of respondents thought that minimum wage of foreign workers should not be protected; while 26 and 33 per cent of the respondents would deny foreign workers access to the state health and welfare system, respectively.

In the theoretical section of the paper I argued that objection to the allocation of political versus social rights are two different concepts. To test the possibility that the two concepts are empirically distinct I perform confirmatory factor analysis with two latent constructs using AMOS procedure (Arbuckle, 2008). The confirmatory factor analysis (presented in Figure 2) lends firm support to the theoretical argument that the two latent constructs measure two distinct concepts. The data provide a good fit to the measurement model⁵ in which two latent variables (attitudes towards granting political rights and attitudes

towards granting social rights) are not even interrelated, with the ratio of χ^2 to the degrees of freedom lower than 2, RMSEA below 0.05 level, and all other fit indices well exceeded the 0.90 level which is considered highly acceptable (Arbuckle 2008). As a preliminary test, I ran a measurement model assuming inter-correlation between the two latent variables (attitudes towards granting political versus social rights); however the correlation was so weak that I made a decision to delete it. Indeed, the findings to date indicate that people differentiate between denying an out-group population political rights, and denying them social rights.

FIGURE 2 IS ABOUT HERE

In light of the findings presented above, I constructed two dependent variables: objection to granting social rights (SOCIAL) and objection to granting political rights (POLITICAL) using principal factor component analysis. Both variables are standardized with mean 0 (standard deviation 1).

4.2 Independent Variables.

Perceived threat to the socio-economic interests of the collective was measured on a 1-7 scale based on responses regarding the level of agreement/disagreement with the following three statements:

- Foreign workers are a strain on the welfare system ($\bar{\chi} = 3.68$)
- Foreign workers take jobs from Israelis ($\bar{\chi} = 4.01$)
- The presence of foreign workers lowers Israeli's wage level ($\bar{\chi} = 4.02$)

These three items were combined to construct an index of 'socio-economic threat' (SETRHEAT) using principal component analysis in order to reduce dimensionality of the dataset and to capture the variation that is common to all original indicators.

Threat to national identity of a society (NTHREAT) was constructed as an interaction term between responses regarding the level of agreement/disagreement with the following two statements:

- In the future the proportion of foreign workers would be so high that they would be a threat to the Jewish majority of the State (4 point scale) ($\bar{\chi} = 2.25$)
- Israel should be a Jewish State (7 point scale)

Thus, the interaction term captures the sense of threat posed by foreign workers to national homogeneity of the society weighted by the level of commitment to preserve the ethno-national character of the state.

Prejudice was measured by one of its most popular measurement scale components: tendencies of social distancing³, and based on responses (measured on a 7 point scale) to the questions: It would be pleasant or unpleasant for you to have:

- a foreign worker as a neighbor ($\bar{\chi} = 4.54$)
- a foreign worker to marry into your family ($\bar{\chi} = 6.21$)
- a child of a foreign worker in your children's school-class ($\bar{\chi} = 4.54$)
- a foreign worker as a boss ($\bar{\chi} = 5.07$)

These four items were combined to construct an index of PREJUDICE using principal component analysis.

SETHREAT, NTHREAT and PREJUDICE variables are standardized with mean 0 (standard deviation 1)⁴.

The demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of respondents included in the analysis are: age (in years), gender (male=1), marital status (married=1), ethnicity (European-American origin =1), education (academic degree=1), labor force position (a set of dummy variables distinguishing white collar occupations, blue collar occupations, not in the active labor forces and unemployed) and political orientation (in 5 ordinal categories, with

left-wing orientation=1). Descriptive statistics for socio-demographic variables are presented in Appendix Table A.

5. Multivariate analysis

In order to examine the extent to which socio-demographic characteristics, both types of perceived threat and prejudice affect objection to granting different types of rights to foreign workers, I estimate a series of OLS regressions⁶. In model 1a/1b the objection to the allocation of political/social rights is taken as a function of socio-demographic attributes and both types of perceived threat (threat to national identity and threat to group socio-economic interests). In models 2a/2b perceived threats are replaced with prejudice. Model 3a/3b includes both types of threats and prejudice together in order to examine the effect of each of them, net of others. To model 4a/4b I add interaction terms between perceived threats and prejudice, assuming that the effect of perceived threats on objection to the allocation of political/social rights may not only be mediated by, but also intensified by prejudice; or, in other words, might vary across different levels of prejudice.

TABLE 1 IS ABOUT HERE

The coefficients in Model 1a suggest that objection to the allocation of social rights to foreign workers tends to be more pronounced among unemployed persons (as the statistically significant positive coefficient implies: $b=0.60$), and less pronounced among people with an academic education (as the statistically significant negative coefficient implies: $b=-0.35$). However objection to allocation of political rights tends to increase with age ($b=0.01$) and right wing political ideology ($b=0.08$), and to be higher among married persons ($b=0.22$), as presented in Model 1b. Neither gender nor ethnicity exerts a significant effect on support for exclusion from social rights; nor on support for exclusion from political rights. As was expected, the findings demonstrate that socio-economically vulnerable Israeli natives (unemployed and lower educated) are more likely to object to the allocation of basic

social rights to foreign workers; however, they do not differ in their attitudes towards granting political rights from their higher educated and employed compatriots. At the same time, more conservative natives (older and right-wing politically oriented people) tend to express a higher level of objection to the allocation of political rights to foreign workers, regardless of their position on the socio-economic ladder. Therefore, different social groups in Israel object to granting foreign workers different types of rights. These results provide additional backing to the argument that support for the exclusion of foreigners from access to political rights and support for the exclusion of foreigners from access to social rights are, indeed, distinct dimensions.

Model 1a demonstrates, surprisingly, that neither types of threat (SETHREAT and NTHREAT) exert significant effect on support for exclusion from social rights. These findings are not in line with most of prior research on the topic. There are two possible explanations for this divergence. First, the dependent variable in this model focuses only on support for the exclusion of foreign workers from access to basic social rights (access to the state health and welfare systems and protection of the minimum wage); while most previous studies in Europe and in Israel (e.g. Pettigrew, 2000; Raijman, Semyonov and Schmidt, 2003; Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders, 2002; Raijman, 2010) have treated the inclination to exclude foreigners from various types of rights (for example, civil, political, social, and other rights) as one broad concept. Current results imply that perceived threats do not directly increase the level of objection to granting foreigners basic social rights. The second explanation is related to the 'perceived socio-economic threat' concept. In contrast to most previous research in Israel (e.g. Raijman 2010; Raijman and Semyonov, 2004), the latent variable 'perceived socio-economic threat' in this study does not include items related to sense of threat "in social domains where such threat are not rationally grounded (e.g. children's education and housing conditions)" (Raijman, 2010, p. 95; for further discussion see also Gorodzeisky, 2011a, 2011b).

By way of contrast, and in line with the current research hypotheses, both types of threats exert a significant effect on attitudes toward the allocation of political rights (Model 1b). Objection to the allocation of political rights tends to increase with perceived socio-economic threat ($b=0.12$) and with threat to the national identity of society ($b=0.10$). Introducing both types of perceived threats into the model does not substantially alter the effects of socio-demographic variables. Regardless of the threat perceptions, right-wing politically oriented and older respondents are more likely to oppose granting political rights to foreigners.

The results of Models 2a/2b show rather clearly that prejudicial views tend to be linked with objection to the allocation of both types of rights: social and political. Inclusion of prejudicial views in the models has barely changed the effect of socio-demographic characteristics on the exclusionary attitudes in the social sphere. Unemployed people and those who have no academic education are more likely to object to granting foreign workers basic social rights, regardless of their level of prejudicial views. On other hand, prejudicial views mediate the effect of political ideology on exclusionary attitudes in the political sphere, as is evident from the statistically insignificant coefficient of political ideology in Model 2b. Apparently, right-wing political ideology does not exert an effect on objection to grant foreigners political rights over and above the effect of prejudice.

The results presented in Models 3a/3b, incorporating both types of threats and prejudice, are quite similar to the findings presented in the previous models, with only one meaningful exception. The effect of 'perceived threat to national identity' (NTHREAT) on support for exclusion from political rights (in Model 3b) becomes statistically insignificant, implying that prejudice fully mediates the effect of NTHREAT on the objection to grant political rights. This finding, however, should be treated with caution because of the measure of NTHREAT. While all attitudinal variables in the study are constructed using principal factor analyses and based on several items, NTHREAT is a single measure indicator (due to data limitations). This may bias the results in favor of finding relations between exclusionary

attitudes with socio-economic threat and prejudice relative to observing significant relations between exclusionary attitudes and threat to national identity; especially when all concepts are included in one model.

The results also show that prejudice only slightly mediates the effect of perceived socio-economic threat (SETHREAT) on support for the exclusion of foreigners from access to political rights. The magnitude of the effect of SETHREAT after the inclusion of prejudice in Model 3b remains almost unchanged (although the coefficient is on the border of acceptable level of statistical significance).

Models 4a/4b incorporate interaction terms between both types of threats and prejudice. Statistically significant and positive interaction terms between variables SETHREAT and 'prejudice' ($b=0.122$) implies that the impact of perceived socio-economic threat on the inclination to exclude foreigners from social rights is activated by prejudicial views against the out-group. In other words, among majority group members with relatively high levels of prejudicial views against foreigners, sense of socio-economic threat tends to increase objection to the allocation of basic social rights. However, if majority group members do not hold prejudicial views (or their level is relatively low), the sense of socio-economic threat does not prompt support for exclusion from basic social rights (as is evident from the insignificant coefficient for SETHREAT in Models 1a, 3a and 4a). Statistically insignificant interaction term between prejudice and NTHREAT along with insignificant main effect of NTHREAT implies that NTHREAT does not affect support for exclusion from basic social rights among Israelis with any level of prejudice. In general, these findings support the hypothesis according to which perceived socio-economic threat more relevant than threat to national identity for the rise of exclusionary attitudes in the social arena.

There is no evidence for an interaction effect between prejudice and NTHREAT or between prejudice and SETHREAT on attitudes towards granting political rights (the coefficients are statistically insignificant). This finding implies that the effect of both types of

threats on attitudes towards the granting political rights does not vary across different levels of prejudice.

6. Conclusions and discussion

In the present article I contend that majority attitudes towards the allocation of political rights to out-group populations are distinct from attitudes towards the allocation of other types of rights in general and social rights, in particular. This claim is theoretically based on the repeated arguments in the citizenship literature suggesting that political rights but not others (e.g. economic or social rights) most clearly define the boundaries between citizens (or full members of the polity) and foreigners in recent Western societies (Baubock, 2005; Brubaker, 1989; Hammar, 1990; Layton-Henry 1990; Leitner; 1995).

To the best of my knowledge the present paper is the first attempt to distinguish (both theoretically and empirically) and to compare exclusionary attitudes in two arenas: political and social. The findings indicate that the exclusionary attitudes towards foreign labor migrants are quite prevalent among Jewish Israeli population. About two-thirds of Israeli majority group members support the denial of political rights (voting rights and the right to participate in any political activities) from foreign workers; while between a quarter and a third of the interviewees would deny granting foreign workers basic social rights (access to state welfare and health systems and protection of minimum wage). Indeed, the data show that the majority group in Israel expressed much stronger objections to the idea of allocating out-group access to political rights; that is, to the granting foreigners the opportunity to have a say in decisions that may affect the entire polity than to the granting them equal access to state welfare and health systems.

Multivariate analysis demonstrates that the opposition to grant social rights to foreign workers is higher among socio-economically vulnerable population (e.g. lower educated and unemployed); while the opposition to grant political rights is more pronounced among conservative natives (the elderly and right-wing politically oriented). Indeed, different social

groups in Israeli society object to the allocation of different types of rights. In line with 'competitive threat' theoretical argument and the current research hypotheses, economic threat at individual level due to vulnerable position in the labor market was found to be a motivator of support for the exclusion from access to rights in the social arena; while political conservatism was found to be a motivator for the political exclusion of foreigners.

The analysis also reveals the following differences in the mechanisms underlying the denial of rights in the social versus the political arena from foreign labor migrants. Neither the perception of socio-economic threat at a collective level, nor perceptions of threat to national identity of society directly affect support for the exclusion of foreigners from access to basic social rights. At the same time, prejudice against foreigners not only increases the level of objection to granting social rights but also activates the effect of the perceived socio-economic threat. Apparently the perception of foreign labor migrants as threats to the socio-economic interests of the majority population increases the level of objection to granting foreigners basic social rights only among natives who hold relatively high levels of prejudicial views.

By way of contrast, both types of threat tend to prompt objection to the allocation of political rights to foreigners. While the effect of threat to national identity on support for the exclusion of foreign workers from access to political rights seems to be fully mediated by prejudice; the belief that foreign workers threaten natives' socio-economic interests (in the welfare system and the labor market) affects support for exclusion from political rights over and above the effect of prejudice. In general, the results suggest that the perceptions of threat to the interests of the dominant group in the socio-economic and national identity arenas play a more important role in the inclination to deny political rights than in the inclination to deny social rights.

As was suggested in the theoretical discussion of this article, it seems that the objection to grant political rights to foreigners is motivated by the desire to protect the national community from any political influence of "others" who are perceived as threatening

in-group interests, status and privileges. At the same time, it is reasonable to suggest that attitudes towards granting basic social rights (which are not directly affected by the perception of threats) are rather influenced by other beliefs, for example, democratic values and the commitment to human rights. The latter could also be seen as additional explanation as to why public support for granting foreigners basic social rights is much more prevalent than public support for granting foreigners political rights. Israelis would grant to foreign labor migrants basic social rights, since the allocation of such rights to foreigners may not be seen by them as granting membership in the collective or in the State, as it was viewed in the classical model of citizenship by Marshall (1964), but as commitment to general human rights.

In future research it would be interesting to test differences in the levels and the mechanisms underlying exclusionary attitudes in the political versus social arenas in socially different but theoretically relevant contexts; for example with regards to European citizens' attitudes towards labor migrants.

Notes

1. There are, of course, other types of political activities in which foreigners are entitled to participate, like meetings, protests or even local elections in which some groups of foreigners have a right to vote in certain societies (although in Europe, for example, this phenomena is mostly limited to nationals of another EU member state). However, participation in national elections, which is still regarded as a central activity to exercise political rights, has remained the exclusive privilege of citizens, with very few exceptions for specific foreign groups across the world (Baubock, 2005).

2. The information was obtained through face-to-face interviews in respondents' homes, lasting on average 40 minutes. The response rate was 57.5%. The above presented response rate is calculated as the minimum response rate following the recommendation of the American Association for Public Opinion Research report.

3. Following a long theoretical tradition and previous empirical research, I consider "desire for social distance" to be one of the principal indicators of prejudice and one of the explanatory factors for exclusionary attitudes (Coenders et al., 2001 Hadad, 2004; Kessler and Freeman, 2005; Pettigrew 1998). At the same time, there is alternative opinion in the research literature that views 'desire for social distance' as an expression of exclusionary attitudes. To provide empirical proof that 'desire for social distance' and attitudes toward granting rights are different concepts, I ran explanatory principal factor analysis. The results, presented below, show clearly that 'desire for social distance' and attitudes toward granting rights (either social or political) are different concepts:

Rotated Component Matrix (loadings below 0.3 are not shown):

Voting	---	---	.833
All political activities	---	---	.780
Minimum wage	---	.818	---
Health services	---	.908	---
Welfare	---	.861	---
Social distance-neighbor	.855	---	---
Social distance-family	.674	---	---
Social distance-child in class	.862	---	---
Social distance-boss	.822	---	---

4. A confirmatory factor analysis with two latent variables (SETHREAR and PREJUDICE) and measured variable NTHREAT using AMOS procedure (Arburckle, 2008) demonstrates that the three concepts are empirically distinct in the present data (the results are presented in the Appendix, Figure A).

5. In order to fit the model correlations between measurement error of 'voting' and latent variable 'social rights' and between measurement error of 'welfare' and latent variable 'political rights' were allowed, although the correlations were very low. Values of fit measures (such as GFI, AGF and RSMEA) for the model without those two correlations also indicate acceptable fit of the theoretical model.

6. Although fully determining the causal relations using non longitudinal data is somewhat problematical, I estimate the models under the premises that have been developed from well-established theoretical arguments

on causal relations between: a) perceived threat and either exclusionary attitudes or prejudice, and b) prejudice and exclusionary attitudes. It should also be noted that Schuelter, Schmidt and Wagner's (2008) study provides longitudinal evidence that perceptions of threatened group interests are causally antecedent to out-group derogation as suggested by the conventional 'competitive threat' theoretical model. No support is found for the assumptions of the reverse or of the reciprocal model.

References

- Arbuckle, J. L. 2008 *AMOS 17.0 User's Guide*. SPSS, Chicago.
- Baubock, R. (2005) Expansive citizenship-voting beyond territory and membership. *PS: Political Science and Politics*, **38**, 683-687.
- Blumer, H. (1958) Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position. *Pacific Sociological Review*, **1**, 3-7.
- Bobo, L. (2000) Race and beliefs about affirmative action. Assessing the effects of interests, group threat, ideology and racism. In Sears, D.O., Sidanius, J. and Bobo, L. (eds) *Racialized Politics*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 137-164.
- Brubaker, W., R. (1989) Membership without citizenship: The economic and social rights of non-citizens. In Brubaker, W.R. (ed.) *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America*. University Press of America, Lanham MD.
- Canetti, D. and Pedahzur, A. (2003) Contributory Factors to Xenophobic Exclusion in a multi-cultural society: The case of Israel. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, **27**, 307-333.
- Castles, S. and Miller, M. (1993) *The Age of Migration. International Population Movements in the Modern World*. Guilford Press, New York.
- Coenders, M., Scheepers, P., Sniderman, P., and Verberk, G. (2001) Blatant and subtle prejudice: Dimensions, determinants, and consequences; some comments on Pettigrew and Meertens. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, **31**, 281-297.
- Dustmann, C. and Preston, I. (2004) *Racial and Economic Factors in Attitudes to Immigration, CreAM Discussion Paper Series 0401*. Center for Research and Analysis of Migration, University College London.
- Gorodzeisky. A. (2011a) Mechanisms of Exclusion: Attitudes toward Allocation of Social Rights to Out-group Populations, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, DOI:10.1080/01419870.2011.631740
- Gorodzeisky, A. (2011b) Focus groups as a tool in the construction of questionnaires: The

- case of discriminatory attitudes, *Quality & Quantity*, **45**, pp. 1217-1231
- Gorodzeisky, A. and Semyonov, M. (2009) Terms of exclusion: Public views toward admission and allocation of rights to immigrants in European countries. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, **32**, 401–423.
- Hadad, S. (2004) The origins of popular opposition to Palestinian resettlement in Lebanon. *International Migration Review*, **31**, 470-492.
- Halperin, E., Canetti-Nisim, D. and Pedazur, A. (2007) Threatened by the uncontrollable: Psychological and socio-economic antecedents of social distance towards labor migrants in Israel. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, **31**, 459-478.
- Hammar, T. (1990) *Democracy and the Nation State: Aliens, Denizens and Citizens in a World of International Migration*. Avebury, Aldershot.
- Hoskin, M. (1992) *New Immigrants and Democratic Society: Minority Integration in Western Democracies*. Praeger, New York.
- Fetzer, J. S. (2000) *Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the United States, France, and Germany*. Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Kemp, A. and Raijman, R. (2008) *Migrants and Workers: The Political Economy of Labor Migration in Israel*. Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishing House (in Hebrew).
- Kessler, A.E. and Freeman, G.P. (2005) Public opinion in the EU on immigration from outside the Community. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, **43**, 825-850.
- Layton-Henry, Z. (1990) *The Political Rights of Migrant Workers in Western Europe*, Sage Publications, London.
- Leitner, H. (1995) International migration and the politics of admission and exclusion in postwar Europe. *Political Geography*, **4**, 259-278.
- Marshall, T.H. (1964) *Class, Citizenship and Social Development*. Doubleday Anchor Books, New York,
- Pettigrew, T. F. (1998) Reactions toward the new minorities of Western Europe. *Annual*

Review of Sociology, **24**, 77-103.

Pettigrew, T., F (2000) Systematizing the predictors of prejudice. In Sears, D.O., Sidanius, J. and Bobo, L. (eds) *Racialized Politics*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 280-301.

Raijman, R., Semyonov, M., and Schmidt, P. (2003) Do foreigners deserve rights? Determinants of public opinion views toward foreigners in Germany and Israel. *European Sociological Review*, **19**, 379-392.

Raijman, R. and Semyonov, M. (2004) Perceived threat and exclusionary attitudes toward foreign workers in Israel. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, **27**, 780-799.

Raijman, R. 2010. Citizenship status, ethno-national origin and entitlement to rights: Majority attitudes towards minorities and immigrants in Israel. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, **36**, 87-106.

Rosenhek, Z. (2000) Migration regimes, intra-state conflicts and the politics of inclusion and exclusion: Migrant workers and the Israeli welfare state. *Social Problems*, **47**, 49-67.

Semyonov, M., Raijman, R. and Gorodzeisky, A. (2006) The rise of anti-foreigner sentiment in European Societies, 1988-2000. *American Sociological Review*, **71**, 426-449.

Semyonov, M., Raijman, R., Yom-Tov, A. and Schmidt, P. (2004) Population size, perceived threat, and exclusion: A multiple-indicators analysis of attitudes toward foreigners in Germany. *Social Science Research*, **33**, 681-701.

Scheepers, P., Gijsberts, M. and Coenders, M. (2002) Ethnic exclusionism in European countries: Public opposition to civil rights for legal migrants as a response to perceived threat. *European Sociological Review*, **18**, 17-34.

Schnapper, D. (1994) The debate on immigration and the crisis of national identity. In Baldwin-Edwards, M. and Schain, M., A. (eds). *The Politics of Immigration in Western Europe*. Frank Cass & Co, Essex, pp. 127-39.

Schlueter, E., Schmidt, P. and Wagner, U. (2008) Disentangling the causal relations of perceived group threat and outgroup derogation: Cross-nation evidence from German and Russian panel survey. *European Sociological Review*, **24**, 597-581.

Stephan, W., G., Renfro, C., L. and Davis, M., D. (2008) The role of threat in intergroup Relations. In Wagner, U., Tropp, L. R., Finchilescu, G. and Tredoux, C. (eds). *Improving Intergroup Relations. Building on the Legacy of Thomas F. Pettigrew*. Blackwell Publishing, pp. 55-72.

Figure 1: Percentage of Israelis who object granting foreign workers social and political rights





Figure 2: Confirmatory Factor Analysis (standardized coefficients): Attitudes toward Granting Rights



chi-square=7,220 df=4
GFI=,996 AGF=,984 RMSEA=,035

Table 1: Regression equation coefficients^a predicting inclination to exclude foreign workers from social/political rights

	1a social	1b political	2a social	2b political	3a social	3b political	4a social	4b political
Constant	-0.12	-0.84*	0.07	-0.78*	0.18	-0.72*	0.15	-0.74*
Men	-0.15 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.13 (0.08)	0.004 (0.09)	-0.19* (0.09)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.17 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.09)
Age	-0.004 (0.004)	0.01* (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.01* (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.01* (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.01* (0.004)
European- American origin	-0.01 (0.10)	0.15 (0.10)	0.02 (0.08)	0.09 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.09)	0.15 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.09)	0.16 (0.09)
Married	0.16 (0.10)	0.25* (0.10)	0.09 (0.09)	0.19* (0.09)	0.11 (0.10)	0.23* (0.10)	0.13 (0.10)	0.25* (0.10)
Unemployed ^b	0.60* (0.24)	0.05 (0.24)	0.56* (0.23)	0.09 (0.24)	0.57* (0.24)	0.03 (0.24)	0.54* (0.24)	0.02 (0.24)
Not in the active labor force ^b	0.15 (0.14)	0.06 (0.14)	0.04 (0.12)	0.02 (0.13)	0.12 (0.13)	0.05 (0.13)	0.10 (0.13)	0.04 (0.13)
White-collar workers ^b	0.03 (0.13)	0.04 (0.13)	0.03 (0.12)	0.07 (0.12)	0.04 (0.13)	0.05 (0.13)	0.01 (0.13)	0.04 (0.13)
Left-right political orientation	0.03 (0.04)	0.08* (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)
Academic education	-0.35* (0.10)	-0.16 (0.10)	-0.32* (0.09)	-0.17 (0.10)	-0.38* (0.10)	-0.20+ (0.10)	-0.39* (0.10)	-0.21* (0.10)
NTHREAT	0.001 (0.05)	0.10* (0.05)	---	---	-0.05 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)
SETHREAT	0.03 (0.05)	0.12* (0.05)	---	---	-0.02 (0.05)	0.094+ (0.049)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.094+ (0.049)
PREJUDICE	---	---	0.21* (0.05)	0.18* (0.05)	0.26* (0.05)	0.16* (0.05)	0.25* (0.06)	0.14* (0.05)
PREJUDICE X NTHREAT	---	---	---	---	---	---	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)
PREJUDICE X SETHREAT	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.122* (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)
R ²	0.065	0.096	0.092	0.080	0.114	0.113	0.125	0.116

a. Standard errors are presented in parentheses


b. Blue-collar workers=omitted category

*p < 0.05 +p=0.057

Appendix Table A: Definition and descriptive statistics for socio-demographic variables

Variables	Definition	Mean (SD)/Per cent
Age	In years	41.7 (12.1)
Marital status	Married=1	67%
Gender	Men=1	44%
Education	Academic =1	31%
Labor force position:	White collar	45%
	Blue collar	19%
	Not in the active labor force	32%
	Unemployed	4%
Political orientation	In 5 ordinal categories, with left-wing orientation=1 and right-wing orientation=5	3.56 (1.29)

Appendix Figure A: Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Independent Variables



Chi-square=29,648 df=17
GFI=.989 RMSEA=.034