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HANDBOOK OF ISRAEL: MAJOR DEBATES

VOLUME 1



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19. We and the Others: Majority Attitudes toward Non-Jews in Israel

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Immigration has become a major challenge to most Western countries for economic, political, and moral reasons. In most immigrant-receiving societies an intense debate is raging over issues of justice and fairness in immigrants' entitlement to social goods. Disagreements as to what is just and fair are common in diverse societies in light of the fact that the dominant groups are likely to view immigrants as out-group populations and as competitors for scarce socioeconomic resources.[1] Foreigners are often regarded by citizens as a potential threat to economic success, national identity and the social order, and are likely to become a target for hostility, prejudice and discrimination.[2]

The literature suggests that the relative position of an immigrant group in a society is greatly influenced by both public attitudes and government policies. Although the two factors are interdependent, both form the context of reception, which in turn affects the nature and character of ethnic relations in society.[3] Therefore, public attitudes toward immigrants are a key factor in the creation and reproduction of patterns of ethnic inequality and general inter-group tension. First, public opinion toward immigrants transmits signals to them as to whether they are wanted or feared. Second, public sentiments may be contagious, spread to others and be accepted as fact, thereby influencing government policies.[4] Thus, the question about what nation-states owe to immigrants has become one of the major debates in countries with large-scale immigration in general and in Israeli society in particular.

In this chapter, we examine attitudes of Jewish respondents toward labor migrants in Israel, a group of non-Jewish immigrants that started arriving in Israel in the early 1990s, when Israel began the massive recruitment of foreign workers. In this undertaking, we rely on a more comprehensive comparative analysis, which includes, in addition to majority group attitudes toward labor migrants, also majority group attitudes toward ethnic (Jewish) immigrants and non-ethnic (non-Jewish) immigrants, both arriving under the provisions of the Law of Return and acquiring Israeli citizenship upon arrival. By this means, we aim to disentangle the interwoven

1 Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006.
2 Pettigrew 1998; Fetzer 2000.
3 Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Raijman 2010.
4 Hoskin 1992; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Raijman 2010.

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roles played by the ethno-national origin and citizenship status of the out-group populations in the majority group's willingness to allocate social and political rights to them. Our findings shed light on the perception of different degrees of membership and the relative position assigned to different groups within the regime of incorporation of Israeli society.

Theoretical discussion and social context

Israel as a de facto immigration country

International migration has become one of the most important features of modern Western countries in general, and of Israeli society in particular. Israel is a society of immigrants and their offspring, where at the end of 2012, 27% of the Jewish majority was foreign-born.[5] Migration flows had an impact on the size of the Jewish population, and they shaped the social, cultural, political and economic structure of the society. The character and composition of immigration flows and immigration policies are a key factor for understanding patterns of social and ethnic stratification in Israeli society.[6]

The beginning of the 1990s marked a turning point in the migration history of Israel for two reasons. First, the massive waves of immigrants entering the country throughout the 1990s were reminiscent in their intensity and suddenness of the large and formative immigration waves of the 1950s. They involved three main groups: (a) a mass exodus from the Former Soviet Union (FSU); (b) Ethiopian Jews (many of them brought to Israel through two special operations); (c) massive overseas labor migration.[7] Second, the ethnic composition of immigrants shifted from its predominantly Jewish component to an increasing number of non-Jewish immigrants, who for the first time began arriving in sizable numbers. By 2012, the number of non-Jewish migrants is estimated at approximately 580,000 people. Paradoxically, over 60% of them arrived under the provisions of the Law of Return (1970 amendment) (primarily entrants from the FSU and Ethiopia)[8] and 40% entered the country as temporary labor migrants through active recruitment (by employers and manpower agencies) and as undocumented workers[9] or asylum seekers.[10]

5 Central Bureau of Statistics 2013, Table 2.8, 108.
6 See, e.g., Semyonov and Gorodzeisky 2012.
7 To these groups arriving since the 1990s we need to add a recent flow of African asylum-seekers crossing the Egyptian border since 2006.
8 See, e.g., Cohen 2005; Raijman and Pinsky 2013.
9 Raijman and Kemp 2002.
10 Yacoby 2010.

Appendix Table 1 displays the distribution of the population in Israel by citizenship status, origin, and migration status in 2012. The data show that of the total population of Israel (citizens and non-citizens), Jews comprise only 73%, Arabs 20%, non-Jewish non-Arab citizens (immigrants arriving under the provisions of the Law of Return) 4%, and labor migrants and asylum seekers 3%. Thus, Israel now provides a particularly illuminating setting to examine the ways the majority population perceives the presence of non-ethnic immigrants in the society. That is because non-Jews are considered a threat not only to the social and ethnic composition of the nation, but also to the Jewish character of the state. As recent public debates on reforming the citizenship and immigration laws indicate, these new patterns of immigration are likely to leave their imprint on Israel's regime of incorporation and society. Next we provide a brief overview of non-Jewish migration flows to Israel: labor migrants and non-Jews arriving under the provisions of the Law of Return.

Labor migration in Israel

In the early 1990s Israel enacted a managed migration scheme for low-skilled foreign workers to replace Palestinian commuters from the occupied territories mainly in the construction and agriculture sectors. From 1993 the proportion of foreign workers in the Israeli labor market grew constantly and rapidly, exceeding the highest number of Palestinian commuters ever reached previously.[11] By 2011 labor migrants comprised 9% of the total labor force, ranking Israel among the industrialized economies that rely most heavily on foreign labor.[12]

The bulk of legally recruited migrant workers are concentrated in three main sectors: construction (workers mainly from China, Bulgaria and the Former Soviet Union), agriculture (mainly from Thailand), and long-term care (LTC) (mainly from the Philippines, but also from Sri Lanka, India and Bulgaria). While in 1996 the construction sector was the largest employer of migrant workers (58% of all work-permit holders), by 2010 most permits were issued for the caregiving sector, which accounted for over half the total permits granted that year. By the end of the 2000s the agricultural sector had increased its share to a quarter of all permits allocated.[13]

11 Kemp and Raijman 2008.
12 Idem 2014.
13 Ibid. Official recruitment of foreign workers also opened a "backdoor" to the inflow of undocumented migrants arriving mainly from Eastern Europe, South Asia, Africa and South America, who became employed primarily in the services sector. By the end of 2012, 95,000 undocumented foreign workers (who entered as tourists and remained in the country) and 14,000 labor migrants overstaying their visa resided in Israel, comprising 46% of the non-citizen population (see Table 1, bottom panel, first column).

Labor migration in Israel is based on contractual labor and is temporary, with no expectations of permanent settlement or citizenship rights for the migrant. Work permits are granted to employers or manpower agencies but not to the migrants, which maximizes employers' and the state's control of the foreign population; the state does not allow residence without a work permit or recognize the right of family reunification; it practices a stringent deportation policy, which at any time allows the detention and expulsion of undocumented migrants by a simple administrative decree.[14] Note also that unlike in most European countries, foreign labor migrants in Israel have barely had access to the state's welfare system or health services, and rarely benefit from the union protection that is provided to Israeli citizens.[15]

Non-Jews arriving under the Law of Return

As stated, the 1990s waves included for the first time an increasing number of immigrants who were not Jewish according to *Halakha* (Jewish religious law that classifies a Jew only by a matrilineal definition) but entered Israel under the Law of Return. This law creates a legal framework that grants Israeli citizenship to Jews and their children immediately on arrival; since the 1970 reform, the "Right of Return" has been extended to grandchildren of Jews too, and their nuclear families (even if not Jewish).[16] Paradoxically, this amendment created a new oxymoronic category of "non-Jewish *olim*" (Hebrew, plural for *oleh*, designating Jewish immigrant, from the Hebrew word *aliyah*, literally 'ascent'). Some of these immigrants belong to families where the father was Jewish and the mother non-Jewish; they were considered Jewish in their countries of origin (e.g., FSU) and only after arrival in Israel did they "discover" that they are not Jewish according to the religious law and that to become Jewish they must endure a lengthy process of conversion.[17]

The new status of non-Jewish *oleh* has substantial stratifying effects on the materialization of various social and civil rights in the context of an ethno-national state like Israel. They face difficulties in enjoying some civil rights such as marriage, burial and family unification. This is due to the monopoly of the religious institutions in matters of family and burial.[18] The ethno-national axis is thus relevant for understanding the unique status of non-Jewish olim in Israel.

14 Kemp and Raijman 2014.
15 Idem 2008.
16 The percentage of non-Jews entering under the Law of Return rose over time since the 1990s. For example, the number of non-Jews among immigrants from the FSU (the largest group arriving since the 1990s) increased from 6% in 1989 to 56.4% in 2006; see Raijman and Pinsky 2013.
17 Ibid.
18 Shafir and Peled 2002.

In sum, the 1990s brought new kinds of immigrants hitherto unknown in the Israel context, transforming the ethno-national mosaic of Israeli society. The changing composition of the ethnic landscape poses new challenges to both the collective identities in Israel and patterns of social inequality based on citizenship and ethno-national origin.[19] The Israeli regime of incorporation reflects a double standard: an exclusionary model for non-Jews versus an "acceptance-encouragement" model for Jews. The current immigration regime is highly exclusionary regarding non-Jews not covered by the amended Law of Return (e.g., labor migrants and asylum seekers), removing a priori any possibility of incorporation into the society and the polity.[20] Unwillingness to accept non-Jewish immigrants who do not enter under the Law of Return is expressed through exclusionary immigration policies (especially restrictions on family reunion and refusal to grant residence status or refugee status) and restrictive naturalization rules. The citizenship axis is thus relevant to understanding the marginal status of labor migrants in Israel.[21]

Immigration and the challenge of membership

Migration poses an essential challenge to nation-states because the massive presence of immigrants has compelled these states to reconsider how they think about political and social membership.[22] The logic of nation-states as closed systems implies the existence of "boundaries that distinguish those who are members of a community from those who are not."[23] However, although the rhetoric of the welfare state within its boundaries is universal, its practice sometimes is not.

Possession of full formal citizenship does not prevent the development of many disadvantaged minorities as a consequence of multiple levels of formal rights and obligations for different groups in the state.[24] Thus, the ways states handle the membership question determine the very fabric of the nation. As Freeman pointed out, "[i]t is precisely in the specification of the conditions under which membership may be acquired by outsiders that all states confront the limits of their generosity and universalism."[25]

Recent scholarship on membership in Israeli society has raised concerns about differential rights and varying levels of citizenship status for the different ethnic

19 Raijman and Kemp 2010; Raijman 2010.
20 Shafir and Peled 2002; Kemp and Raijman 2008.
21 Raijman 2010.
22 Brubaker 1992; Joppke 1998.
23 Freeman 1986, 52.
24 Migdal 2006; Shafir and Peled 2002.
25 Freeman 1986, 53.

groups.[26] Research has suggested that membership in the nation-state needs to be considered as a relational entity in which different groups (both citizens and non-citizens) accede to different degrees of inclusion. According to Shafir and Peled, "[t]he true nature of a community is revealed as much by who has been denied full membership in it as by who has been wholeheartedly included."[27] This relational approach helps to highlight the internal stratification of membership by showing that "in practice, full citizens, second- and indeed third- and fourth-class citizens, as well as non-citizens may exist under a single democratic political authority."[28]

So far, most scholarship on the concept of membership in Israeli society has developed at the macro level of analysis through laws and public policy. We suggest that a different way of looking at what "membership" means is through examination of the way majority group members (in a given society) define the boundaries of the collective – in this specific case through the level of majority group members' willingness to share their national benefits (e.g., social and political rights) with minority out-groups. Israel provides an especially illuminating setting for testing attitudes of the majority group to immigrants (Jews as well as non-Jews). As the number of non-Jewish migrants has continued to grow in Israeli society, questions about the rights of migrant minorities and the viability of a multicultural society are becoming more crucial than ever before.[29]

Attitudes to granting political versus social rights

A growing body of research on public attitudes toward granting out-group populations equal rights has demonstrated that public support for the exclusion of foreigners from equal access to various types of rights is widespread across a range of Western societies.[30] Most previous studies have treated majority group's attitudes toward granting rights to out-groups in different areas (political, social, economic, etc.) as being one broad and mutual concept, theoretically and empirically. However, Gorodzeisky[31] demonstrates that in Israel the majority group's attitudes toward allocation of political rights to labor migrants are distinct from their attitudes toward allocation of social rights. Theoretically, this claim derives from the citizenship literature argument suggesting that citizenship matters relatively little in the area of socioeconomic rights, while political rights are those that most clearly define

26 Migdal 2006; Shafir and Peled 2002; Raijman 2010.
27 Shafir and Peled 2002, 8.
28 Ibid.
29 Raijman 2010.
30 Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2009; Pettigrew 1998; Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Coenders 2002; Raijman, Semyonov, and Schmidt 2003.
31 Gorodzeisky 2013.

the boundaries between citizens and foreigners in contemporary Western societies.[32]

According to Brubaker,[33] in Western countries membership is organized in two circles: an inner circle of the political community and an outer circle of the social and economic community. In most Western societies, migrants who hold legal residence status have no need to acquire citizenship to be entitled to social and economic rights, hence to become full members of the socioeconomic community. On the other hand, one has to be a citizen to be entitled to the most significant political rights (i.e., the right to vote in national elections) thereby becoming a full member of the political community. In line with this view of political rights, it is found that Israeli majority group members are much more reluctant to grant labor migrants political rights than social rights – apparently because the former would allow foreigners to have a say in decisions that may affect the entire polity.[34]

The level of willingness of members of the majority group to share national benefits and resources with different minorities can be viewed as the way that the majority group defines the boundaries of the collective.[35] Majority attitudes toward granting immigrants political rights versus social rights show the place where the majority group members draw the line between "us" as in-group and "them" as out-groups, that is, what full membership means in terms of rights for majority group members.[36] Following this view, the present chapter examines majority members' attitudes toward granting out-group populations political rights versus social rights as two distinct concepts.

The study of majority attitudes toward granting out-group populations political versus social rights is especially illuminating in the context of Israeli society due to the ethno-national character of the Israeli state. Ethnic nationalism rejects the grant of political rights to non-citizen residents – labor migrants in the Israeli case. "It conceives the nation as a community of culture, imagined descent, and destiny that has a right to self-determination. A nation's membership need not coincide with the resident population of a state where this nation is dominant. It is therefore [...] legitimate to exclude non-citizens from access to political rights."[37] However, as we shall see, the arrival of non-Jewish *olim* – non-ethnic immigrants who enter Israel under the Law of Return and who are granted citizenship upon arrival – has further complicated the issue of the allocation of political rights to out-group populations (in terms of citizenship status and ethno-nation origin) in Israel.

32 Bauböck 2005; Brubaker 1989; Layton-Henry 1990.
33 Brubaker 1989.
34 Gorodzeisky 2013.
35 Raijman 2010.
36 Gorodzeisky 2013.
37 Bauböck 2005, 765.

Explanations of exclusionary attitudes

Two theoretical approaches have been suggested to explain the mechanisms underlying exclusionary attitudes toward immigrant groups in host societies: the competition model and the cultural model. The central tenet of the competition model is that attitudes toward migrants are shaped by group identifications and the struggle between groups for power, resources, benefits and rewards.[38] The logic of this model suggests that majority group members see out-group populations as competitors for scarce resources (e.g., jobs, wage rates, welfare services). Thus, dominant group members who perceive out-group population as threatening interests of their own collective in social and economic arenas tend to express higher negative attitudes toward the out-group population. The perception of threat or fear of competition rationalizes the exclusion of out-group populations (e.g., labor migrants, ethnic immigrants, non-ethnic immigrants) from equal access to societal and material goods (i.e., social and political rights).

The central tenet of the cultural model suggests that immigrant groups are usually perceived as posing a threat to the society's cultural and national homogeneity. The sense of cultural/national threat reflects fear of the intrusion of values and practices perceived as both alien and potentially destructive to the national culture. Such feelings stimulate prejudice, which leads to discrimination against out-groups. It has been suggested that questions of national identity tend to mobilize popular sentiments even more than issues of labor-market competition. Hence, the perception of threat to cultural and national homogeneity may give rise, for example, to discriminatory attitudes and anti-immigrant sentiments.[39]

In what follows we aim to contribute to the literature on exclusionary attitudes by examining the relationship between socioeconomic and national threat and the willingness of the majority (Jewish) population to grant social and political rights to ethnic and non-ethnic immigrants. In so doing, we attempt to shed light on the nature and meaning of membership in Israeli society.

Findings

Data, sample and methodological notes

The data for the present analysis were obtained from the "Attitudes toward Minority Workers Survey" administered to a representative sample of Israeli adults. The sur-

38 Blumer 1958; Quillian 1995; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006.
39 Schnapper 1994; Fetzer 2000; Raijman and Semyonov 2004.

vey was conducted by the B.I. and Lucille Cohen Institute for Public Opinion Research at Tel Aviv University in 2007. The sample for the analysis consists of 668 Jewish citizens aged 24–60 years who were born in Israel or who immigrated to Israel prior to 1989, and thus represents members of the majority (dominant) group in Israeli society.

The exact wordings of questionnaire items are presented in Appendix Table 2. In the following analysis, percentages of respondents who object to granting specific immigrant groups (Jewish olim, non-Jewish olim and labor migrants) social and political rights and view the immigrant group as a socioeconomic threat are based on percent of responses (to the relevant question) from 5 to 7 on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 refers to most positive attitude and 7 to most negative attitude. The only exception is the variable "threat to Jewish character of the state," which was measured on a 4-point scale: respondents who say that they "very much agree" or "agree" with the statement form the percentage of those who view an out-group as a threat to national homogeneity. Percentages of respondents who express feelings of social distance from an out-group are based on responses (to the relevant question) from -3 to -1 on a -3 to +3 scale, where -3 refers to a possible contact with member of out-group as very unpleasant and +3 refers to a possible contact as very pleasant.

In the analysis that examines the association between "perceived threat" and "objection to granting rights," the average level of objection to granting social rights is based on a mean score of responses to the questions referring to different social rights, and the average level of objection to granting political rights is based on a mean score of responses to questions referring to different political rights. In the same analysis, a sense of threat to the Jewish character of the state is weighted by the level of commitment to preserve the state's ethno-national character (e.g., level of agreement with the sentence "Israel should be a Jewish state").

As the first step in our empirical analysis, we examine the majority's attitudes toward granting various immigrant groups social versus political rights, as one of the main dimensions of exclusionary attitudes. Next, we explore an additional dimension of exclusionary attitudes, namely feelings of social distance from immigrant groups. After that, we present data on two of the most important mechanisms underlying the inclination to exclude out-groups from access to different types of rights: perceived socioeconomic threat and cultural threat emanating from the presence of out-group populations. Finally, we examine the association between perception of threat and exclusionary attitudes toward immigrants on the part of the majority population.

Objection to allocation of rights to immigrant groups

Before examining attitudes toward granting political versus social rights to immigrants, we describe majority attitudes toward granting equal rights as general concept. Figure 1 shows marked differences in the willingness of the Jewish population in Israel to grant equal rights to different immigrant groups. Opposition is least regarding ethnic immigrants – Jewish olim: only 6% of the Israeli majority group members oppose granting them equal rights. Opposition is much higher to granting equal rights to non-ethnic (non-Jewish) immigrants. More than a third of Jewish respondents oppose granting equal rights to non-Jewish olim – immigrants who arrive under the Law of Return and acquire citizenship upon arrival; and about half of the Jewish respondents oppose granting equal rights to labor migrants. These preliminary findings already suggest that exclusionary attitudes to out-groups are affected by both the "citizenship status" and the "ethno-national origin" of the out-group population.



Fig. 1: Percentage of Israelis who object to granting an immigrant group equal rights

Figures 2a and 2b display findings related to the level of objection to grant political versus social rights to the immigrant groups. The majority group's members express much stronger objection toward allocating any immigrant group access to political rights, that is, to granting them the opportunity to have a say in decisions that may affect the entire polity, than granting them various social rights. The percentage of respondents who deny granting labor migrants and non-Jewish olim any rights in political sphere is at least double the percentage of respondents who deny granting them any rights in the social sphere. About two thirds of respondents object to the allocation of political rights to labor migrants, and about half of the respondents object to such rights being allocated to non-Jewish olim. By contrast, the level of objection to the granting of political rights to Jewish olim is dramatically lower (15%–17%) and the differences in levels of objection to granting Jewish olim political versus social rights is quite small.

Opposition to granting social rights is lowest for Jewish olim and highest for labor migrants; it is in-between for non-Jewish olim, suggesting that both citizenship status and ethno-national origin stand as important axes in the Jewish majority's cognitive map of membership status. However, the level of opposition toward granting social, and more especially, political rights to non-Jewish olim is much closer to the level of opposition toward granting such rights to labor migrants than to the level of opposition toward granting such rights to Jewish olim. These findings are especially interesting considering that Jewish and non-Jewish olim are granted Israeli citizenship on arrival while labor migrants are non-citizens and have almost no chance of acquiring Israeli citizenship. These results suggest that immigrant group's ethno-national origin rather than citizenship status is crucial in the majority's willingness to allocate social, and especially political rights to the out-group population. Put differently, ethno-national origin seems a more important factor than citizenship status in shaping the majority group's opinion as to who are and who are not full members of the collective. However, differences in the level of support to excluding Jewish versus non-Jewish olim from political rights are much higher than those differences regarding social rights.



Fig. 2a: Percentage of Israelis who object to granting an immigrant group political rights



Fig. 2b: Percentage of Israelis who object to granting an immigrant group social rights

Social distance

In this section, we discuss an additional dimension of exclusionary attitudes, namely, feelings of social distance from specific out-groups. Figure 3 displays percentages of Israeli Jewish citizens who express a desire to maintain social distance from the three immigrant groups.



Fig. 3: Percentage of Israelis who feels it would be unpleasant to have a member of an immigrant group (as) neighbor; marry into their family; child in their children's class; boss

Levels of desired social distance from non-ethnic immigrant groups (i.e., labor migrants and non-Jewish olim) expressed by Israeli Jews are extremely high. Over 40% feel that it would be unpleasant to have a labor migrant or a non-Jewish oleh as a neighbor, or have the child of a labor migrant or non-Jewish oleh in their child's class. About 80% of respondents do not want a labor migrant or non-Jewish oleh to marry into their family. By contrast, levels of social distance from Jewish olim reported by the majority group are rather low. Only 6% of respondents are unwilling to have a Jewish oleh as a neighbor or their child sharing the classroom with Jewish olim children, and only 12% do not want a Jewish oleh to marry into their family or be their boss.

In sum, exclusionary attitudes toward non-ethnic immigrants are a very widespread phenomenon among majority group members in Israeli society. Specifically, support for denial of political rights and a desire to keep non-ethnic immigrant groups, regardless of their citizenship status, socially distant from the Israeli collective are highly prevalent among majority group members. As expected, the tendencies to exclude ethnic immigrants, namely Jewish olim, are substantially less pronounced.

Perceived threat

Figure 4 displays the majority group's perceptions of threat, namely the extent to which the presence of an immigrant group is perceived as having negative consequences for the majority group interests. A comparison of attitudes toward the different immigrant groups demonstrates that Israeli Jews perceive relatively lower levels of threat from Jewish olim but are more likely to feel threatened by non-Jewish olim than by labor migrants.



Fig. 4: Percentage of Israelis who perceive an immigrant group as a threat in different areas

Only a fifth of majority group members believe that the presence of Jewish olim threatens their collective interests in the socioeconomic arena. By contrast, feelings of threat emanating from the presence of labor migrants are much higher: approximately 40% of majority group members perceive them as a threat to their collective's interests in the socioeconomic sphere. Specifically, 38% of respondents claim that labor migrants are a burden on the state's welfare system; about 45% believe that labor migrants take jobs from Israelis and reduce their wage level. A comparison of attitudes toward different non-Jewish immigrant groups reveals that Israeli Jews are more likely to feel threatened by non-Jewish olim than by labor migrants. The difference is especially pronounced in the level of perceived threat in the welfare realm and with regard to job competition (52% and 49% of the majority population, respectively). Note too that the presence of non-Jewish immigrants is perceived as a threat to the Jewish character of the state but it is much more pronounced with regard to non-Jewish olim than to labor migrants. Specifically, one third of majority group members perceive the presence of the labor migrants in the country as a threat to the Jewish character of the state, while more than half of them hold this perception concerning non-Jewish olim.

Perceived threats and opposition to allocating social versus political rights

The next figures display the level of opposition to granting political and social rights to labor migrants (Figure 5) and non-Jewish olim (Figure 6) across two groups of respondents: those who do and do not feel threatened by the immigrant group in the socioeconomic/national identity realms.

Figure 5 shows that respondents who do and do not perceive labor migrants as a socioeconomic threat do not differ in the level of their support for excluding labor migrants from access to basic social rights. Likewise, respondents who do and do not view labor migrants as a threat to the Jewish character of the state have similar levels of exclusionary attitudes to granting them social rights.



Fig. 5: Mean level of objection to granting political and social rights to labor migrants by threat perception

However, the picture is quite different when we compare attitudes toward the allocation of political rights to labor migrants. Majority group members who feel that labor migrants pose a threat to the welfare system of the state tend to express higher levels of opposition to allocating them political rights than those who do not perceive labor migrants as such a threat.

Figure 6 shows that the level of objection to granting non-Jewish olim social as well as political rights is higher among respondents who feel threatened by non-Jewish olim in either the socioeconomic or national identity realm. At the same time, the differences between respondents who do and do not think that non-Jewish olim pose a threat to the collective interests of majority group are more pronounced in the inclination to exclude the immigrant group from access to political than to social rights.

Fig. 6: Mean level of objection to granting political and social rights to non-Jewish Olim by threat perception

In general, the results suggest that the perceptions of threat to the interests of the majority group in the socioeconomic and national identity arenas play a more important role in shaping attitudes toward the allocation of political rights than social rights.

Discussion and conclusions

Our chapter examined majority views in Israel toward different groups of immigrants, Jewish and non-Jewish. The arrival of non-Jewish immigrant groups beginning in the 1990s started to turn Israel into a *de facto* immigration society despite its own definition as a country of *aliyah* (Jewish immigration). Our analysis joins the general debate in the literature on immigration, citizenship and membership that focuses on the central question regarding what nations owe to immigrants in general and to those who do not share the same ethnic origin in particular.

Our study provided an opportunity to disentangle the interwoven effects of the out-group populations' ethno-national origin and citizenship status on the majority group's willingness to grant them political and social rights. The results shed light on the perception of different degrees of membership and the relative position assigned to different groups in the incorporation regime of Israeli society. The membership framework that guides Jewish respondents' positions on this issue is hierarchical, with two main membership discourses. First is the *ethno-national* discourse, which discriminates between Jewish and non-Jewish citizens and seems to be the most important axis for exclusion. As we have shown, the levels of socioeconomic threat and exclusionary attitudes to the three groups rank labor migrants and non-Jewish olim as the most excluded groups, in contrast to Jewish olim. Clearly, for the Jewish majority in Israel, access to rights depends more on ethno-national origin and less on citizenship. This clear distinction between Jews and non-Jews suggests that the impact of "ethnic origin" on exclusionary attitudes is

stronger than that of "citizenship status." The second discourse, the *liberal* one, which differentiates citizens (Jewish olim and non-Jewish olim) from non-citizens (labor migrants) in their entitlement to rights, is less marked. Still, from this point of view labor migrants are in the most vulnerable position as the levels of exclusionary attitudes toward them surpass those toward non-Jewish olim.

The exclusion of non-citizens from access to social rights re-affirms the already marginal position of labor migrants in Israel. Jewish citizens are clearly willing to benefit from the cheap labor, which non-citizens provide, but are reluctant to grant them equal access to equal rights.[40] Our data also show a clear picture of discriminatory attitudes toward non-Jewish olim,[41] suggesting that the possession of full formal citizenship does not prevent the development of many disadvantaged minorities as a consequence of macro and micro levels of discrimination.[42]

Our data show a markedly higher level of objection to allocating political rights as against social rights to both labor migrants and non-Jewish olim. These results imply the high importance of political rights (as compared with other social rights) for the majority population in delimiting the borders between "us" (as full members of the polity) and "them" as foreigners. In Brubaker's terms,[43] Israeli majority group members incline much more to exclude labor migrants (non-Jewish non-citizens) and non-Jewish olim (non-Jewish citizens) from the community's political inner circle than from its socioeconomic outer circle. Still, the level of inclination to exclude Jewish olim from the political community is only slightly higher than that excluding them from the socioeconomic community. Hence, the ethno-national origin of "others" has special importance in shaping Israeli majority members' attitudes toward granting them political (as compared to social) rights, that is, in majority members' willingness to allow any political influence of these "others" on the society.

Further results demonstrate that the levels of objection to grant political rights to out-groups (labor migrants and non-Jewish olim) is higher among majority members who sense a threat by the out-groups to their collective interests in the socioeconomic or the national identity realm than among those who do not sense such a threat. Differences in the level of objection to grant social rights are much less pro-

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40 Raijman 2010.

41 In-depth interviews conducted by the authors suggest that in the veteran Jewish population there was a general feeling that non-Jewish olim came to Israel using the "Jewish ticket" they do not deserve, and they are utilizing and abusing state benefits that only Jews are entitled to. Non-Jewish olim are perceived as those who have faked a Jewish identity to obtain their tickets to the Jewish state. Therefore, non-Jews are perceived as having no "legitimate" right to equal rights upon arrival, in contrast to the Jewish olim.

42 As demonstrated by the situation of the Arab population in Israel (see Shafir and Peled 2002) and the exclusionary attitudes toward them (see Raijman 2010).

43 Brubaker 1989.

nounced with regard to non-Jewish olim and do not exist at all with regard to labor migrants. That is, the objection to grant political rights to labor migrants and non-Jewish olim is associated with a desire to protect the ethno-national community from any political influence of the immigrant groups, which may threaten the ethno-national community interests and privileges. At the same time, it is reasonable to suggest that attitudes toward granting labor migrants basic social rights could be rather influenced by democratic values and the commitment to human rights.[44]

Overall, our findings suggest that unlike some Western European countries, which are experiencing a trend toward the de-ethnicization of citizenship and membership,[45] ethno-national origin in Israel still counts for the acquisition of substantive citizenship. The exclusionary regime of incorporation coupled with a similarly exclusionary social climate toward non-Jews make it a *de facto* multicultural country but with few prospects for multiculturalism.

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44 Gorodzeisky 2013.

45 Joppke and Morawska 2003.

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Appendix

Tab. 1: Population in Israel by Citizenship Status, Origin, and Migration Status – 2012

Citizens	**N**	**% of total citizens**	**% of total residing in Israel**
Jews	6,186,100	75	73
Arabs	1,709,900	21	20
Other (non-Jewish/ non-Arab)	356,500	4	4
Total citizens	**7,984, 500**	**100%**	**97%**
Non-citizens	**N**	**% of total non-citizens**	
Undocumented labor migrants (entered as tourists and did not leave the country)	90,000	40	1.1
Labor migrants with a valid permit	74,567	33	1.0
Labor migrants over-staying their visas	15,315	7	0.3
Asylum seekers	46,437	20	0.6
Total non-citizens	**226,319**	**100%**	**3%**
Total citizens and non-citizens	**8,478,819**		**100%**

Sources: Central Bureau of Statistics 2014; Population, Immigration and Border Authority 2015

Tab. 2: Questionnaire items of the "Attitudes toward Minority Workers Survey" 2007.

Variables	Statements
Objection to granting equal rights	Foreign workers/Jewish *olim*/non-Jewish *olim* should be given the same rights in all spheres of life in Israel as those given to (other) citizens.
Objection to granting political rights	1) All political activities should be prohibited to foreign workers/Jewish *olim*/non-Jewish *olim* living in Israel. 2) Voting rights should be given to foreign workers/Jewish *olim*/non-Jewish *olim*.
Objection to granting social rights	1) The state should grant health services to foreign workers/Jewish *olim*/non-Jewish *olim*. 2) The state should grant welfare services to foreign workers/Jewish *olim*/non-Jewish *olim*. 3) Minimum wages of foreign workers/Jewish *olim*/non-Jewish *olim* should be protected.
Perception of threat	1) Foreign workers/Jewish *olim*/non-Jewish *olim* are a strain on the welfare services system. 2) Foreign workers/Jewish *olim*/non-Jewish *olim* take jobs from Israelis. 3) The presence of foreign workers/Jewish *olim*/non-Jewish *olim* lowers Israelis' wage level. 4) In the future the proportion of foreign workers/non-Jewish *olim* would be so high that they would be a threat to the Jewish majority of the state.
Desire of social distance	1) It would be pleasant or unpleasant for you to have a foreign worker/Jewish *oleh*/non-Jewish *oleh* as a neighbor. 2) It would be pleasant or unpleasant for you to have a foreign worker Jewish *oleh*/non-Jewish *oleh* marry into your family. 3) It would be pleasant or unpleasant for you to have the child of a foreign worker/Jewish *oleh*/non-Jewish *oleh* in your child's class at school. 4) It would be pleasant or unpleasant for you to have a foreign worker/Jewish *oleh*/non-Jewish *oleh* as your boss.

Topic V: Social (In)Justice