Family Policy and Public Attitudes in Germany and Israel

Noah Lewin-Epstein, Haya Stier, Michael Braun, and Bettina Langfeldt

This study examines attitudes towards policies of financial assistance to families in Germany and Israel. The unique circumstances of the last decade – unification in Germany and the immigration to Israel of the 'returning Diaspora' from the former Soviet Union – provide an opportunity to examine both systemic and cultural bases for attitudes towards family policy. The comparison of East Germans and immigrants to Israel with West Germans and native Israelis focuses on the socialist–capitalist polarity, and the comparison of Israel with Germany articulates traditional vs. less traditional family orientations. Data from the 1994 Family and Gender Roles module of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) are used for the empirical analysis. Multivariate regression and covariance analysis reveals group main effects as well as the differential impact of social and demographic variables in the various population groups. West Germans display the least favourable attitudes towards state financial support for the family and the greatest age and class differences. Religiosity has a major effect on attitudes in Israel, especially among veteran Israelis. Lastly, the socialist experience appears to have had a homogenizing effect, resulting in small age, class, and religiosity differences.

Childhood, Family, and Society

Childhood, as a separate stage of life, was 'discovered' in Europe in the period spanning the last part of the sixteenth century and the early decades of the seventeenth century (Ariès, 1962; Popenoe, 1988). By the nineteenth century a profound transformation was taking place which culminated in what Zelizer termed the 'economically worthless' but 'emotionally priceless' child. This metamorphosis, vividly portrayed by Zelizer (1985), in the case of the United States, was all but completed by the third decade of the twentieth century and it rendered the pragmatic pecuniary assessment of children's value not only impractical, but morally offensive.

Explanations for changes in the family and the value of children have been discussed at length by sociologists and historians of the family (Ariès, 1962; Degler, 1980; Furstenberg, 1995; Zelizer 1985) and are beyond the scope of the present discussion. What is of interest in the present study, however, is the relationship between the private and public spheres that emerged from this social and cultural transformation. As Grubb and Lazerson (1988: 78–85) aptly stated, the sacred child is a private luxury and parental willingness to spend lavishly on their children turns into miserliness when it comes to public programmes of child welfare.

Changes in the family and in the perception of children have been at the heart of the public debate concerning 'the proper balance between family and state to accomplish the joint responsibility of fostering children's well-being' (Furstenberg, 1997: 183). Three aspects of the state–family relationship have received particular attention: the extent to which the state should monitor and control the family; state economic support for children; and state support for working mothers and its relationship to gender

inequality. The monitoring (and support) of the family by governments is a comparatively new historical development by which the more traditional locus of child-care – the family – has in most countries been partially substituted by a rationalized locus of control—the state (Boli-Bennett and Meyer, 1978).

Concomitant with the increasing involvement of the state in family and child well-being there has been growing emphasis on issues of gender inequality and the need to rectify the social arrangements that sustain the subordinate position of women. These changes, while associated with the economic development and increasing affluence of the industrialized countries, are not natural or predestined outcomes of this growth. In fact, very different institutional modes of organizing economic activity and the welfare of the population have evolved in nations with quite similar levels of economic development. Consequently, the balance struck between state and family interests most likely represents political understandings that are embedded in particular cultural and social systems.

In democratic societies family policies, like other social policies, are largely dependent on societal support rooted in ideological as well as practical considerations. While attitudes may vary within a society depending on one's social position and demographic characteristics, attitudes expressed by individuals may also reflect the political and cultural milieu of a society. It is in this respect that the comparison of public attitudes towards family policy is of considerable interest.

The objective of the present study, then, is to examine public attitudes towards family policy in a cross-national perspective. In this regard, Germany and Israel provide a unique context for such a comparison. Both countries have developed economies with rather similar welfare systems. Yet, the traditional family is more prominent in Israel and fertility is substantially higher. Of even greater significance is the fact that in the past decade both Germany and Israel absorbed a large 'returning Diaspora' consisting of people who were raised under a socialist regime. While West Germany incorporated the former German Democratic Republic, close to 600 000 immigrants from the former Soviet Union arrived in Israel between 1989 and 1995. This represented the largest migration wave from a single country that Israel had ever experienced. By 1995 the population of recent immigrants constituted approximately 13 per cent of the entire Jewish population of Israel. Such a comparison may have a twofold contribution: first, to evaluate the relationship between systemic (socialist vs. capitalist) characteristics and public values as expressed in specific policy preferences; and second, to delineate distinctive cultural patterns in societies that have similar political economies.

Theoretical Background and Literature Review

Family-Related Public Policy

Although any government action that affects families, directly or indirectly, may be considered family policy, the term usually refers to a conscious, planned, and targeted intervention of public authorities in the structure and the functioning of families. Aldous and Duman (1990) offered a somewhat more precise, albeit narrow, definition, referring to family policy as 'objectives concerning family well-being and the specific measures taken by governmental bodies to achieve them' (p. 1137). In this section we will briefly outline the history of family-support policies and will then discuss a conceptual framework for the comparative study of the state–family relationship.

Although family allowances, on a limited basis, existed in some countries early in this century, more general schemes were widely introduced only during and after the Second World War. Universal family allowances became the cornerstone of state support for families in the second half of this century (Demeny, 1986; Gauthier, 1996). These policies were related to pro-natalist and pro-family considerations and aimed at 'encouraging parents to have more children [and] . . . were also aimed at reducing poverty among children' (Land and Parker, 1978: 346). Since differences in the well-being of children are partly linked to resource availability, family policy is strongly tied to political economy and the stratification order. In this regard '[material] resources are seen not only as ends in and of themselves, but also as means to other desired outcomes, or ends – family well-being, satisfaction, and

quality of life all being examples' (Zimmerman, 1992: 27).

Maternity benefits are another hallmark of family policy. Although in some countries maternity leave policies had been in place prior to the Second World War, it was the rapid growth of female labour-force participation in the second half of the twentieth century, and that of mothers in particular, which placed the issue high on the public agenda (Kamerman and Kahn, 1978). Maternity benefits were improved in many countries during the immediate post-war period to provide women with longer maternity leave. As a result, the last few decades have witnessed considerable increases both in the length of maternity leave and in the benefits provided (Gauthier, 1996; Hantrais and Letablier, 1996). As in the case of family allowances, maternity policies are firmly embedded in a society's ideology of state–family relations and they vary considerably across countries (Kamerman and Kahn, 1998). 'While the Nordic countries emerged as leaders in providing women with extensive schemes, no national paid scheme was adopted in the United States, Australia, and New Zealand where the responsibility of providing benefits for working mothers continued to be left to private employers' (Gauthier, 1996: 82).

Policies concerning cash benefits for families with children and maternity leave schemes adopted by particular countries do not always correspond. Indeed, a political regime may provide rather generous child allowance benefits, but only modest maternity leave benefits, or, as has become increasingly common, countries may provide extensive maternity leave periods and generous maternity payments, but rather modest child-support benefits. Nonetheless, the empirical ranking of over 20 (mostly) industrialized countries revealed a noticeable positive relationship between these policy areas (Gauthier, 1996). Scandinavian countries (Sweden and Norway) are ranked high in both areas, while the United States, New Zealand, Australia and Japan are at the opposite end. Continental European countries such as France, Germany, the Netherlands are somewhere in between, as is Israel, providing relatively high child allowances, but only modest maternity leave benefits.

Following a comparative review of family policies Furstenberg (1997) has recently suggested that models of family–state relations may be ordered on a continuum. At one extreme the family system remains unfettered by state interference, while at the other end are state–family models where kinship solidarity is viewed as insufficient to further collective interests. The former may be described as the *privatized model* of family–state relations, while the latter represents the *collaborative model* of family–state relations.

According to the above conceptualization, the United States anchors the end of the continuum that favours parental autonomy and authority – 'the privatized family'. Americans are largely committed to a free-market style of family management. Parents are regarded as consumers able to purchase goods and services for their children's welfare. There is weak support for public subsidies of education, health, and social services. The critical feature of the 'privatized system' is the degree of discretion which parents have in managing their children's well-being (Cherlin, 1996). Parents are accorded a high degree of responsibility and they are expected to manage their children's welfare mostly on their own. From the above perspective, growing family dissolution, childbearing out of wedlock, and maternal employment are all taken as manifestations of parental dis-investment in the well-being of their children. In the United States 'welfare' is viewed as the root of the decline of marriage and the rise of single parenthood.

The collaborative model of family–state relationship posits that the two social institutions – the family and the state – are engaged in a partnership with joint responsibility to promote the welfare of children. This model, according to Furstenberg (1997), is more likely to take root in societies that have a centralized political system where collectivist rather than individualistic approaches prevail. In these countries the state provides substantial economic subsidies to equalize children's circumstances. Furthermore, in societies that embrace the collaborative model the state intervenes in areas such as sex education or physical punishment, which in other societies are considered the domain of the family. The most radical efforts to abrogate parental prerogatives were carried out after the revolutions that led to the formation of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the century and of communist China.

In the Soviet Union and in the socialist republics of Eastern Europe attempts were made to reduce the influence of the parents and to usurp the power of the family in order to overcome cultural and historical obstacles to centralized authority. East German family policy, for instance, strove for a historically new type of family which would be socially oriented and where the state would 'run' family life (Winkler, 1990; Ostner, 1993). In this system the importance of child-care facilities was emphasized, rather than the mother–child relationship. Such state intervention was viewed as essential for socializing into socialist communal living (Hille, 1985). While the collaborative model of family–state relations characterized socialist countries to varying degrees, it is in the Scandinavian countries where a truly collaborative model is most fully developed. This is because in these countries the role of the family is respected in its own right. Hence a state–family collaboration is based more on partnership.

An important characteristic of the collaborative model are the economic policies aimed at supporting children, including public provision of daycare, child allowances, medical support, and other material benefits. In recent decades, most governments have come to view family-allowance programmes as means for achieving greater equity, not merely as an instrument for affecting fertility. Two factors have been identified as exerting pressure on family support policies, albeit in opposite directions. The transformation of the family and the growing number of children living in non-traditional families have generated calls for greater state involvement and improved benefits for families and equitable treatment of women by upgrading maternity leave schemes. On the other hand, growing concern over 'run-away' public expenditure and national budgets have had the opposite impact of constraining family benefits, especially cash benefits for children (Kitschelt, 1995; Pierson, 1994).

Family Policy in Germany and Israel

While both Israel and Germany may be viewed as family-centred societies, Germany appears to be located closer than Israel to the 'privatized' pole of family–state relations. The German *Grundgesetz* (constitution) grants the freedom and protection of the family. It asserts that the family represents an essential institution of the German State, and guarantees its protection against harmful public and social interference. Especially under conservative governments, family policy reflected the normative idea that the best environment for a child is an intact family, where issues concerning the education of children belong to the parents and are strictly private. The state supervises the fulfilment of these family issues, and only intervenes in the upbringing of children when education is concerned and in the case of neglect.

The traditional family, which is characterized by a clear division of labour and where the wife has the sole responsibility for the household and child-care, is still predominant in German public perception. Although Germany, like many other countries, has adopted supportive policies towards working parents, the limited provision of day-care for children under the age of 3, extensive child-care leave, and the tax system all favour a traditional housewife and breadwinner model. As for child benefits, they were extended to the first child in 1975, but legislation in 1983 reduced allowance rates for higher-income families (Gauthier, 1996). Indeed, the social welfare system in Germany relies on strong family obligation, which means that parents and their children have to provide for each other in cash and kind (Textor, 1991: 80).

Relative to Germany, Israel might be characterized as more traditional in its family orientation as indicated by higher marriage rates, lower divorce rates, and larger family size. In 1994 the rate of marriage in Germany was 5.4 per 1000 population and 6.0 in Israel. These figures, however, do not fully capture the differential exposure to marriage in the two societies. In 1996, for example, only 9.5 per cent of Israeli men and 7 per cent of women aged 35–39 had never married (Israel, 1997). Comparable figures for Germany indicate that 29 per cent of men and 20 per cent of women who were in their mid-30s in 1996 had never married (Engstler, 1997). The greater commitment to family life in Israel is also evident from divorce rates: in 1991 the divorce rate in Israel was 6.4 per 1000 married couples, compared with 8.3 in Germany.

Fertility is also higher in Israel than in Germany. In 1994, the total fertility rate (TFR) was 2.6 in Israel and 1.4 among West Germans (and less than 1.0

among East Germans: Engstler, 1997; Israel, 1997). The disparities in marriage rates and fertility between Germany and Israel are also reflected in the dissimilar household sizes in the two countries. The average household in Israel in 1994 consisted of 3.3 persons, whereas in Germany it was 2.2 – a difference of one person on average (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1997; Israel, 1997).

The strong family orientation is also evident in Israeli social policy. Throughout most of Israel's recent history increasing the Jewish population was a primary goal. This was often explained as a response to the decline in the number of Jews around the world (as a result first and foremost of the Holocaust, but also due to assimilation) and to the political situation involving conflict with Arab populations many times its size (Peres and Katz, 1991). In response to these concerns the state implemented measures aimed at supporting the family and encouraging childbirth.

The normative unit at the centre of Israel's family policy is still the conventional family, i.e. heterosexual, adult parents with children, living in a joint household. Married couples are granted unique benefits in the form of cheaper housing (for young couples) and other forms of housing assistance (Honig and Shamai, 1978). Married people also enjoy preferential treatment in income-tax deductions and with respect to child adoption regulations. Israel also has a stronger child orientation as exemplified in the existence of a government bureau dedicated to encouraging high fertility, both in public perceptions of the ideal number of children and in actual fertility behaviour.

Another indication of Israel's family policy orientation is the structure of child allowances, which constitute the basic element of family support. The first child allowance legislation in Israel was introduced in 1959. This legislation provided monthly allowances for families with four or more children under the age of 14 (Doron and Kramer, 1992). Since then several revisions have been introduced. In 1965 children's age for allowance eligibility was raised to 18, and in 1970 allowances were raised substantially for families whose members served in the armed forces.[1] Over the years the family allowance programme has remained progressive and the benefits increase considerably with the number of children.

The child allowance programme was reformed in 1975 and was made universal for the first time. It provided allowances from the first child. This programme is still in place although changes have been made from time to time (most noticeably eliminating child allowance for the first child in families with fewer than 4 children (Doron and Kramer, 1992)). It should also be noted that family policy in Israel provides full coverage of medical expenses connected with pregnancy and birth, and a birth allowance is provided to cover initial expenses associated with the new-born baby.

Turning now to the populations of East Germans and the immigrants who recently came to Israel from the former Soviet Union, both were socialized under socialist regimes with strong state intervention and public support. The two populations, however, also differ in several respects. Russian society remained more traditional than German society with essentially a matrifocal family structure (Gray, 1989; Poskanzer, 1995). In particular, the emergence of the three-generation woman-centred household – the *matryoshka* – may strongly depend on public financial support. Germany and Israel alike had strong interests in rapidly incorporating the new populations. In both cases they were immediately entitled to full citizenship rights and were provided with various forms of economic assistance. The immigrants to Israel were provided an 'absorption basket' upon arrival to cover living and housing expenses for the first 6 months and were offered extensive language preparation. All these forms of support, of course, did not eliminate the hardship associated with the transition from one society to another and in some cases created dependence on the state (Doron and Kargar, 1993). It is therefore of interest to examine the extent to which the attitudes of the immigrants towards family policy reflect the notion of extensive collective responsibility, or whether they have adopted the views commonly held by the veteran populations of Germany and Israel, respectively.

Family Policy and Public Attitudes – Propositions and Hypotheses

Attitudes towards family policy vary across societies and within population groups. These attitudes are

likely to be linked to more general value preferences associated with social and political cultures. For example, a study carried out in the United States in 1988 investigated attitudes towards state responsibility for children, among family services professionals (Zimmerman, 1992). The findings revealed that differences in attitudes were associated with the political culture of the states in which the professionals resided. Respondents who resided in 'individualistic' states were more likely than respondents from less individualistic states (the distinction was based on the extent of interventionist state legislation) to agree with the statement that 'parents should meet the needs of their children without help from government'. Concomitantly, these respondents were less likely to agree with the statement that 'government shares with families responsibility for meeting needs of children'.

Competing ideological orientations such as individualism and collectivism are likely to become evident in responses to attitudinal questions concerning family policy. For those who were raised and socialized in communist regimes the responsibility of the state towards the family may still appear natural and imperative. Among populations more accustomed to liberal or market economies, state responsibility, as well as intervention in family matters may be viewed as more controversial. Hence, we may state our first hypothesis as follows:

H1: Former East Germans and recent immigrants from the former Soviet Union will hold more favourable attitudes towards extensive family policies than West Germans and veteran Israelis.

Indeed, findings reported by Störtzbach (1995) revealed that East Germans had substantially more favourable attitudes than West Germans towards such policies as child allowances, day-care facilities for children under the age of 5, and improved maternity leave arrangements for working women.

Another dimension along which societies might be contrasted is traditionalism, as manifest in social institutions and the public sphere. Differences between Israel and Germany in this regard may be exemplified with respect to two major institutions – religion and the family. Israel is still one of the most family-oriented societies among the industrial nations. As described earlier, this is reflected in the high rates of marriage and the relatively low rates of divorce, the high fertility rates, and the small number of births out of wedlock (Goldscheider, 1996).

Among the societal factors that are responsible for preserving the traditional family in Israel, researchers frequently mention the constant threat of conflict with its Arab neighbours which tends to intensify family ties. Another important factor is the large immigration to Israel from traditional societies. During the early years of statehood many immigrants arrived from North-African and Middle-Eastern countries. Among these populations, the dominant family structure was authoritative patriarchy, religious observance was common, and fertility rates were high. While the second and third generations of those immigrants have largely adopted Western modes of behaviour, the impact on the size and structure of families as well as the intensity of family relations, are still substantial.

Religion is the third factor having an impact on the institution of the family in Israel. The influence of religion on family affairs is upheld by Israeli law, which delegated family matters such as marriage and divorce to religious courts. For this reason, the impact of religion extends far beyond the circle of believers (Peres and Katz, 1991). In line with the institutional differences between Germany and Israel, we may state the second hypothesis as follows:

H2: The Israeli population will display more positive views towards policies that aim to support and strengthen the family than is the case for the German population.

With respect to differences within population groups, our study will focus on three attributes: age, social class, and religiosity. Policies concerning family support have invariably focused on facilitating population growth and enhancing the well-being of children. Both child allowance schemes and maternal leave policies target a specific period of the family life-cycle, which is associated with a rather narrow age-span. From the point of view of resource competition in an era of declining public spending one might view such policies as supporting one segment of the population (parents and children) while excluding others in need of support – in particular, the growing segment of the elderly

population. Hence, age groups compete for societal resources and this issue is becoming more acute as life expectancy increases and the population of the elderly grows in both absolute and relative terms.

In his presidential address at the Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America, Preston (1984) linked the life chances of the young and the old when he noted that public policy decisions are the result of power struggles among special interest groups. As the elderly population grew and became more organized, its self-interest in enhancing its life-chances translated into public policies that produced economic and health benefits for the elderly. Not surprisingly, from this point of view, the Gallop poll (1983) revealed that 45 per cent of adults below the age of 50 responded favourably to the possibility of raising taxes in order to improve the funding of schools. At the same time, only 28 per cent of those above the age of 50 gave a favourable response. Along similar lines it might be argued that it is quite likely that unmarried persons (and particularly those who have never married) would hold less favourable views and would be less approving of policies that support the family than married persons. In the socialist system, however, goals and benefits were politically defined and were directly related to economic means, so that there was less of a sense of competition (Roller, 1995). This would tend to moderate group differences. Taking into consideration the divergent interests of the young and the elderly we may propose the following hypothesis:

H3: Age differences will exist in attitudes towards family policy. Additionally, we expect that these differences will be more pronounced in the populations associated with the capitalist systems (West Germany and veteran Israelis) than among East Germans and immigrants from the former Soviet Union.

Another factor hypothesized to affect attitudes towards family policy is class position. Past research has revealed that persons located higher in the class system hold less favourable views towards public spending in general, and towards family assistance in particular (Svallfors, 1997). Families in lower class positions stand to gain from such policies and indeed family support may be an important component of their family budget. In capitalist systems competition is linked to different interests and it is more overt. According to this line of argument, we hypothesize that:

H4: Within the population groups studied, class position will have a negative effect on attitudes, controlling for other compositional factors. The effect of class will be stronger in populations with capitalist regimes (West Germany and Israel) than among populations that resided in socialist regimes.

A third attribute, which is hypothesized to affect attitudes towards family policy, is the degree of religiosity. We anticipate divergent patterns of relationships in Germany and in Israel.

H5: We hypothesize that there will be a negative relationship between religiosity and family policy attitudes in Germany and no relationship (or possibly a positive relationship) between the two in the case of Israel.

This is because in Germany, religiosity is expected to be associated with a disposition towards reducing state intervention in family matters. In this respect, children and family are viewed as private matters and public policies are seen as means for state intervention in family choices and the private sphere. In Israel, the most religious elements of the Jewish population have increasingly come to rely on the state for their economic well-being. The primary activity of a high proportion of ultra-religious men is continuous learning of religious texts, to the exclusion of income-generating activities. Some rely on the employment of spouses, but most depend on public support (from both the state and charitable organizations). Hence, policies such as child allowances and maternal leave are viewed as important means of support. Such policies are not viewed as a threat to family structure and gender relations, but rather as supporting them. This is due primarily to the near monopoly that religious institutions have regarding marriage and divorce.

Data and Methods

Data Sources

Data for this study are from the survey Family and Changing Gender Roles which was conducted in

Germany and in Israel as part of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP).[2] The survey included questions on a wide range of family-related attitudes and behaviours. These included attitudes towards marriage and divorce, attitudes towards children and child policy, gender-role attitudes, and items concerned with the division of labour in the family. Additionally, respondents were asked to provide detailed demographic and socioeconomic background information. The data were collected by drop-off supplements to the German General Social Survey, and in face-to-face interviews (in the case of Israel).[3]

The population of (the former) East Germany (GDR) was over-sampled and separate data-sets were constructed for East Germany and West Germany. The sample for East Germany includes 1097 respondents and for West Germany 2324 respondents. In Israel, the population survey which covered the veteran Jewish population, was supplemented by a special survey (carried out in 1996) of the immigrant population that arrived from the former Soviet Union between 1989 and 1995. The samples of the veteran population and the recent immigrant groups consist of 1159 respondents and 803 respondents, respectively. Here, as in the case of Germany, the study design makes it possible to compare the attitudes of the veteran population with those of a population brought up under a communist regime.

Variables and Measurement

The central dependent variable in the present study is the attitude towards natality and family policy (*family policy* for short). This attitude was measured by two items: 'Working women should receive paid maternity leave when they have a baby' and 'Families should receive financial benefits for child care when both parents work'. The response categories for these items range from 'strongly agree' (1) to 'strongly disagree' (5). As additional child-related items were available in the questionnaire (concerning the importance of children in marriage and divorce decisions and the contribution of children to adults' happiness), we conducted factor analysis to determine empirically whether the two items form a distinct dimension. The results confirmed this structure and indicated that the two items constitute a separate and well-defined factor (eigenvalue greater than 1). The other items were unrelated to social policy issues and they were dropped.

The factor loadings of the two items were quite similar: 0.52 for paid maternity leave and 0.59 for financial benefits for working parents,[4] hence, the attitude scale was constructed as the simple average of the two items after reversing the order of the response categories.[5] High scores, then, represent a positive disposition towards public (state) support of families with children, while low scores indicate the opposite.

Our main interest is to examine attitudes towards family policy in different settings; hence, our primary independent variable is the population group – *West Germany*, *East Germany*, *Israeli veteran*, and recent immigrant from the former Soviet Union (*immigrant*, for short). Since our hypotheses pertained to the way in which policy attitudes were affected by age, religion, and class position, these variables were also included in our analysis. *Age* was measured in years. *Religiosity* is a dichotomous variable measured (with one exception) in terms of behaviour. It was derived from the response to the question: 'How often do you attend religious services?'[6] Respondents who attended once a month or less were given a value of 0 and respondents who attended more frequently were given a value of 1.[7] *Social class* is the respondents' subjective evaluation of class position on a five-point scale, ranging from lower class (1) to upper class (5).

Several additional variables were also included in this analysis. These are education, marital status, and attitude towards children. *Education* was measured in years of schooling. Three dichotomous variables were constructed in order to denote marital status: *never married*, *divorced*, and *widowed*. The reference category was presently married. In order to identify the family life-cycle phase, families were coded '1' if at least one *child 12 or younger* was present, and '0' otherwise.

Respondents' general attitude towards children was measured by responses to the statement that 'Watching children grow up is life's greatest joy' (*children greatest joy*, for short). The original response categories ranged from 'strongly agree' (1) to 'strongly disagree' (5), but for the purpose of our

analysis the order was reversed so that high scores represent a pro-children attitude.

Findings

Descriptive Overview

Before turning to the analysis, a short description of the sample is in order. The mean values (or proportions), standard deviations, and the range of all variables included in the analysis are presented in Table 1. The means and standard deviations, as well as the lowest and highest values for each variable, are provided separately for the four population groups. Turning first to the dependent variable, the mean value is quite high in all population groups given that the potential responses ranged from 1 to 5. West Germans have the lowest average scores while the average score in the populations that lived under the communist regime (both East Germans and the immigrants from the former Soviet Union) are the highest (4.4 points). The difference between West Germany, on the one hand, and East Germany and the immigrants to Israel, on the other hand, is slightly lower than one standard deviation (0.8) in the entire sample.

Turning now to the background characteristics of respondents, it is evident that women are slightly over-represented in the sample (53 per cent) with considerable differences among the four groups. Specifically, women comprise two-thirds of the immigrant sample as compared with approximately 50 per cent in all other groups.[8] As is evident from Table 1, the average age of respondents, across all population groups, is 45.2, with almost six years difference in the average age of the East German and

Table 1. *Descriptive statistics for all variables included in the analysis*

	Total sample		West Germany	East Germany	Israel	Immigrants
	Minimum Maximum	Mean (S.D.)	Mean (S.D.)	Mean (S.D.)	Mean (S.D.)	Mean (S.D.)
Family policy – attitude	1	4.2	3.9	4.4	4.2	4.4
	5	(0.8)	(0.8)	(0.6)	(0.7)	(0.5)
Gender (female=1)	0	0.53	0.49	0.52	0.54	0.67
	1					
Age	18	45.2	45.9	47.1	41.3	46.3
	93	(16.5)	(17.1)	(16.6)	(15.6)	(15.3)
Religiosity (observant=1)	0	0.15	0.23	0.06	0.16	0.06
	1					
Education	1	11.4	10.2	10.4	12.6	14.5
	30	(3.4)	(2.9)	(3.1)	(3.0)	(2.7)
Social status	1	2.7	2.8	2.4	3.3	2.1
	5	(0.8)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.8)	(0.9)
Never married (proportion)	0	0.16	0.18	0.12	0.16	0.15
	1					
Divorced (proportion)	0	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.11
	1					
Widowed (proportion)	0	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.04	0.06
	1					
Children 12 and under (proportion of households)	0	0.31	0.23	0.28	0.44	0.40
	1					
Children are a joy	1	4.3	4.2	4.6	4.2	4.4
	5	(0.7)	(0.8)	(0.6)	(0.8)	(0.7)
Number of cases		5288	2189	1105	1191	803

veteran Israelis. The proportion of respondents who defined themselves as religiously observant (based on the frequency of church, or synagogue, attendance) also varies considerably among the four populations. It is highest in West Germany (23 per cent) followed by veteran Israelis (16 per cent) and is very low in the previously agnostic societies of East Germany and Jewish immigrants to Israel (6 per cent in both populations).

Judging by years of education, the population of Israel is more educated than the population of Germany – both West and East – with an advantage of over 2 years of schooling. This difference is probably the result of the less structured education system in Israel, which permits large numbers of young people to continue to higher academic and non-academic education (Müller and Shavit, 1998). The highest level of education is found, however, among the recent immigrants to Israel. This reflects the fact that Jews in the former Soviet Union placed very strong emphasis on educational achievement and an unusually high proportion of the Jewish population acquired a professional education (in engineering, medicine, or music, for example).

In addition to education, subjective social class is used in this study to gauge one's position in the social hierarchy. Although the tendency towards the middle category is evident in all population groups (see Evans and Kelley, 1992 for a discussion of this phenomenon), there appear to be some interesting group differences. Veteran Israelis tend to perceive their class position as higher than do members of the other population groups. In fact, 28.0 per cent of Israeli respondents described their class position as upper-middle or upper, as compared to 12.0, 3.0, and 3.2 per cent, in West Germany, East Germany, and the immigrant group, respectively (figures not shown in the table). Both in Germany and in Israel, the 'receiving' populations of West Germans and veteran Israelis report a higher average class standing than is the case for the 'incorporated' populations. In this respect it is noteworthy that the mean class score for the immigrant population is the lowest (2.1); one standard deviation lower that the mean for veteran Israelis. This reflects the fact that most immigrants experienced downward occupational mobility upon their arrival in Israel (Flug *et al*., 1997; Paltiel *et al*., 1997). Hence the immigrants' comparison of their present situation with their past position as well as with veteran Israelis leads to a low subjective evaluation of class position. Correspondingly, East Germans fare worse than West Germans, especially with respect to income and assets.

Although a difference in the proportion of never married persons is evident among the four population groups, the most striking discrepancy appears in the proportion who have experienced divorce. The figures are 11 per cent among the immigrants, compared to 5 or 6 per cent in the veteran Israeli as well as East and West German samples. It seems likely that the immigrants are a somewhat selective population with an over-representation of divorced women (and as we shall see) with children who sought refuge and economic support in Israel following the collapse of the Soviet regime. The proportion of widowed persons is highest in East Germany and lower among veteran Israelis, and seems to reflect the differences in the age structure between the population groups.

Large differences in the age composition of households are evident among the populations under study. The proportion of households with at least one child age 12 or younger is lowest in West Germany (23 per cent), followed by East Germany (28 per cent). This differs considerably from Israel, where 44 per cent of the veteran respondents reported a child 12 or younger in the household. The proportion of households with young children is also high among the immigrants (40 per cent), but this may be due, to some extent, to the fact that many immigrants adopted multi-generation living arrangements upon arrival in Israel in order to cope with economic difficulties. It should be noted, however, that the basic view of children (as one of life's greatest joys) is shared by all population groups, with a mean score of 4.2 in West Germany and Israel, and slightly higher scores among immigrants and East Germans (4.4 and 4.6, respectively).

Determinants of Attitudes towards Family Policy

As pointed out at the outset of the paper, the purpose of the present analysis is to examine the importance of age, religiosity, social class, and regime ideology in determining attitudes towards

family policy in Germany and Israel. For this purpose multiple regression (OLS) and covariance models were estimated for a pooled sample of the four population groups – West and East Germans, veteran Israelis, and recent immigrants from the former Soviet Union. Coefficient estimates for a number of models are presented in Table 2. In interpreting the results, it should be recalled that the dependent variable (attitude towards family policy) ranges from 1 (most negative) to 5 (most positive) attitude.

The first model in Table 2 (Model 1) provides a comparison of the mean attitudes in the four population groups. Since West Germany is the omitted category its mean attitude score is represented by the intercept of the model (3.93). The coefficients for the dummy variables representing the other three groups are all positive and statistically significant, indicating stronger pro-state-policy attitudes. A further comparison among the three coefficients in the model indicates that the coefficient for Israel (b=0.25) is significantly smaller than the coefficients for the East Germans and the Israeli Immigrants (b=0.51, in both cases). Hence, as hypothesized, respondents from former socialist systems exhibit the strongest positions in favour of state intervention in family matters, West German are the least in favour, and veteran Israelis are somewhere in between.

Model 2 considers, in addition to the main effects of group membership, the relationship between attitudes and various social and demographic characteristics. Women favour family policy slightly more than men and more educated persons are more favourably disposed than less educated people (b=0.008). Older people have less favourable attitudes than younger persons, and the same is true in the case of respondents who never married, when compared to married persons. Divorced and widowed persons, however, do not differ in their attitudes from currently married respondents.

Class position is negatively associated with pro-state-policy attitudes, so that the higher the class-position the lower the mean support for state financial assistance to families. Given that the social class measure has 5 categories and that the magnitude of the coefficient is b=−0.10, the mean difference between the lower and the upper classes (controlling for population group and social and demographic characteristics) is 0.5 points. This is slightly less than one standard deviation (the standard deviation for the pooled sample is 0.8 as indicated in Table 1). It should also be noted that when social and demographic characteristics are included in the model the population group coefficients are slightly altered (especially that for Israeli Immigrants), but they remain statistically significant.

Two additional variables are added in Model 3. The first is a dichotomous variable indicating whether a child (12 years old or younger) is present in the household. The second is an attitudinal variable regarding the intrinsic pleasure derived from children. It captures respondents' general orientation towards children. It is hypothesized that the attitude towards pro-family state policies is partly constructed on the basis of specific interests associated with the presence of children and the general view of the value of children. As evident from the coefficients in Model 3, the presence of young children in the household is positively association with pro-family policies, but the effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels. A positive view of the value of children, however, is positively and significantly related to attitudes towards state policy (b=0.132). A comparison of the overall fit of Model 2 and Model 3 also reveals that the two variables improve the model of attitude formation. Interestingly, once the orientation towards children is controlled, the magnitude of the coefficient for religiosity increases (from b=−0.05 to b=−0.07) and becomes statistically significant. Other things being equal, then, religious people are less favourably inclined than non-religious people towards state support of children and mothers.

Model 2 and Model 3 examine the mean relationship between social, demographic, and attitudinal characteristics, across the four population groups. In Model 4 the assumption of equal effects in all population groups is relaxed and covariance analysis of the effects of religiosity, age, and social class position is introduced. This is in order to test the general hypothesis that the group differences observed earlier are solely the result of the dissimilar population composition of the four groups. This model is more difficult to interpret. Specifically, the dummy coefficients for the population groups must be considered along with the group interaction terms. Likewise the coefficients for religiosity, age, and social class

Table 2. *Coefficients (standard errors) for OLS regression and covariance models predicting attitudes towards natality policy in Germany and Israel*

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
East Germany[a]	0.51*	0.46*	0.42*	0.21
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.15)
Israeli veteran[a]	0.25*	0.25*	0.24*	0.08
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.16)
Israeli immigrant[a]	0.51*	0.39*	0.34*	0.08
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.15)
Female		0.04*	0.04*	0.05*
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Religiosity		−0.05	−0.07*	−0.12*
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Age		−0.004*	−0.004*	−0.007*
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education		0.008*	0.01*	0.01*
		(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Never married[b]		−0.133*	−0.009*	−0.009*
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Divorced[b]		−0.001	0.008	0.01
		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Widowed[b]		−0.003	−0.010	−0.02
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Social class		−0.10*	−0.10*	−0.07*
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Child 12 or younger			0.04	0.05
			(0.027)	(0.027)
Children are a joy			0.132*	0.129*
			(0.015)	(0.015)
Religiosity–group interactions				
East Germany				−0.087
				(0.101)
Israeli veteran[a]				0.198*
				(0.073)
Israeli immigrant[a]				0.229
				(0.118)
Age–group interactions				
East Germany				0.005*
				(0.002)
Israeli veteran[a]				0.005*
				(0.002)
Israeli immigrant[a]				0.007*
				(0.002)
Social class–group interactions				
East Germany				−0.014
				(0.046)
Israeli veteran[a]				−0.028
				(0.040)
Israeli immigrant[a]				−0.032
				(0.040)
Constant	3.93	4.34	3.71	3.81
	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.12)
Adjusted R^2	0.09	0.10	0.12	0.13
R^2 change (F-statistic)		0.016*	0.016*	0.007*
		(11.37)	(45.54)	(7.00)

[a]West Germany is the reference category.
[b]Married is the reference category.
*$p < 0.05$.

presented in Model 4 now represent the effects in the West German population (the comparison group) rather than the average for the pooled population.[9]

Turning first to the effect of religiosity, we find that the main effect which represents the effect of religiosity on attitudes towards state policy in the West German population (the comparison group) is negative (b=−0.12). Religiously observant respondents have less favourable attitudes towards state support for families. We further observe that the interaction of religiosity and the East German category is negative but not statistically significant, indicating that the effect of religiosity is no different in this population than among West Germans. By way of contrast, the religiosity interaction coefficients for veteran Israelis and immigrants are both positive (although the latter is not statistically significant). If we combine the main effect of religion with the interaction coefficient for religion and veteran Israeli we obtain the effect of religiosity on attitudes towards state policy among Israelis which is positive (−0.12+0.198=0.078). Indeed, regression analysis conducted separately in each of the population groups revealed similar results: namely, more religious respondents have less favourable attitudes in both West and East Germany, whereas the opposite is true among veteran Israelis, and no significant relationship exists between religiosity and attitudes among the immigrants.

The interactions of age and population group are all positive and statistically significant. To derive the effect of age in each of these groups the relevant interaction coefficient should be combined with the 'main effect' of age (b=−0.008). When doing so, we find essentially no age effect on attitudes towards family policies in East Germany and in Israel. In West Germany, however, there is a negative relationship between age and support for family policy (represented by the main coefficient for age (b=−0.007). Finally, none of the social class interactions are significantly different from the main effect of social class (b=−0.07).[10] We may conclude that in all four populations higher status groups are less likely to support state family policy.

Although the models presented in Table 2 are linear and the effects of various factors are additive, the complex interaction specification makes it more difficult to evaluate the relevance of various characteristics for attitudes towards family policy in the different populations. To facilitate the examination, predicted attitude scores for a number of attribute combinations are presented in Table 3, based on Model 4 in Table 2.

The scores presented in Table 3 underscore the insights derived from the results in Table 2. It is clear from the figures that there is lower support for family policy among (West) Germans than among members of the other population groups. In fact, among older (West) Germans the average score is less than 4. The pattern of scores in East and West Germany is similar except that for every given socio-demographic profile, East Germans

Table 3. *Predicted values on family policy attitudes for selected characteristics*

		Religious		Non-Religious	
Groups	**Age**	**Low Class[a]**	**High Class[b]**	**Low Class[a]**	**High Class[b]**
West Germany	25	4.11	3.97	4.23	4.09
	65	3.78	3.63	3.90	3.75
East Germany	25	4.35	4.17	4.56	4.38
	65	4.23	4.05	4.44	4.26
Israel	25	4.45	4.27	4.38	4.20
	65	4.31	4.13	4.23	4.05
Immigrants	25	4.54	4.33	4.44	4.22
	65	4.51	4.30	4.41	4.19

[a]Class category 2 on the 5-class schema.
[b]Class category 4 on the 5-class schema.
Note: Prediction is based on Model 4 in Table 3 and is for married persons with 12 years of schooling. Proportion with children 12 or younger and attitude towards children are held at the overall mean.

exhibit more favourable attitudes. Furthermore, the differences among various profiles are narrower in East Germany than in West Germany. Hence, the lowest scores in both groups are found among older, higher class, religious individuals, while younger, lower class, non-religious individuals have the highest attitude scores. Among veteran Israelis religion has the opposite effect. The lowest level of support for public family policy is found among older, higher class, non-religious persons, and the highest mean score is found among young, low class, religious people. Among immigrants and (to a lesser extent) East Germans there are minor age and religiosity differences, and somewhat greater class differences.

Discussion and Conclusion

This study set out to examine public attitudes towards family and child policies in four population groups. These groups were distinguished along two dimensions: one dimension juxtaposes populations raised under socialist regimes against those accustomed to the capitalist welfare system. The other dimension represents a social-cultural distinction which places German and Israeli societies at different points on a traditional-less traditional continuum regarding the family. With respect to state–family relations it was argued that East Germany and the former Soviet Union represented a system of state intervention in family affairs and were closer to the collaborative model of state–family relations. While both Israel and West Germany also have a system of family and state collaboration, they are located closer to the privatized end of the family–state model.

Our study focused on attitudes regarding public family support as exemplified in child allowances and paid maternal leave. We hypothesized that the institutional context in which East Germans and immigrants from the former Soviet Union resided would bring about more favourable attitudes towards these policies than the attitudes found among West Germans and veteran Israelis. Additionally, we expected that the social and demographic characteristics of individuals would affect the attitudes within the four population groups. In this regard, our study focused on three major attributes: age, social class, and degree of religiosity.

The analysis we carried out revealed consistent and statistically significant differences in the mean attitude score of the four population groups. West Germans exhibited the least favourable attitude towards public support for families with children and working mothers, whereas East Germans and immigrants had the highest scores. Veteran Israelis were in between. The findings for Germany reinforce, and place in broader context, earlier research (Störtzbach, 1995), which indicated that East Germans were more strongly in favour of public support for the family than were West Germans. Although the attitudes examined in the present study do not touch directly on the issues discussed by Roller (1995), they do mirror the attitude patterns that he reported, concerning East and West Germans' attitudes towards redistribution. Our comparative analyses, which included additional units of comparison, suggests that attitudes regarding family policy derive to some extent from systemic characteristics that were shared by socialist societies. In this respect we may conjecture that as time passes, and especially in the second generation, the socialist/capitalist dimension of group differences will disappear while socioeconomic and demographic cleavages will surface.

Within-group analysis of the relationship between socio-demographic characteristics and attitudes towards the family uncovered a number of interesting patterns: Social class was inversely related to support for family policy. Respondents from lower classes tended to hold more favourable attitudes towards public family policy than did people from higher classes, in all populations except East Germans. Age differences in attitudes were also anticipated, but our hypothesis was only partially supported. An age effect was found in West Germany, but not in the other population groups. Older persons in West Germany were less supportive of state-initiated family policies than were younger persons.

The third social characteristic – religion – seems to have divergent effects in Germany and in Israel. Controlling for other factors, greater religiosity in Germany is associated with less favourable attitudes towards family policy. This is most pronounced in West Germany, but the difference

between West and East Germany is not statistically significant. By way of contrast, in Israel a high degree of religiosity tended to dispose respondents to a more favourable attitude towards family policy, and this is true for the veteran population and immigrants alike. We attribute this finding to the conjunction between state and religion in Israel. First, family matters such as marriage and divorce are delegated by the state to the religious jurisdiction, thus minimizing the threat that state policy would lead to normative intervention in family affairs. Secondly, the ultra-religious in Israel (approximately 5 per cent of the adult population) have developed a life-style in which men devote most of their time to religious learning while the wives often take the role of breadwinner. This arrangement is largely dependent on state support in the form of stipends, child allowances, and maternity leave benefits. Hence, the more favourable attitudes towards generous family support from religious rather than non-religious people.[11] In fact, the divergent fertility patterns of the very religious and the secular populations of Israel is likely to result in growing opposition among secular Jews to the generous family allowances.

The above discussion leads us to a final point of conclusion. Our analysis revealed the fact that family policy is likely to be supported by distinct population coalitions in the different social contexts. Specifically, it is the young, lower-class, non-religious population in West Germany who display the most favourable attitudes towards family support. In Israel, strongest support comes from the lower-class religious members of society and age does not appear to have much significance. Similar patterns were found among the immigrants to Israel from the former Soviet Union, although, as expected, they exhibit stronger support for financial assistance to families. Finally, among East Germans family support is primarily a class issue and as their economic situation improves, their attitudes are likely to converge with those of West Germans.

Notes

1. Enhanced child allowances were linked to service in the military for the specific purpose of excluding the Arab population of Israel. This population had high fertility, but the majority of its members did not serve in the armed forces (Doron and Kramer, 1992). Only in the early 1990s was this practice abolished.
2. For details concerning the administration of the surveys and the samples see study descriptions in the ISSP manual and codebook (Zentralarchiv für empirische Soziialforschung, 1997).
3. While we cannot be certain that the different modes of administration did not affect the results, we consider this unlikely. First, interviewers in Germany often remained with the respondents while they answered the questionnaire and assisted them if requested, so that the modes of administration were not that different. Secondly, the items used in this study are generally straightforward and not sensitive, so they are less susceptible to mode effects.
4. A similar factor pattern was revealed when the analysis was performed separately for each of the population groups. In West Germany the factor loadings were 0.49 for the maternity-leave item, and 0.63 for the benefits-for-working-parents item. In East Germany the figures were 0.50 and 0.74, respectively. In Israel, the maternity-leave item had a coefficient of 0.61 and the benefits-for-working-parents item had a score of 0.68 in the veteran population, and 0.54 and 0.41, respectively, in the analysis performed on the immigrant population.
5. The Pearson correlation between the two items is 0.52.
6. It is often the case that religiously observant Jewish women do not regularly attend religious services. Consequently, the behavioural item could not fully capture differences in religiosity among Jewish women. We therefore defined Jewish women as religious (a value of 1 on the dichotomous variable) either if they attended services more frequently than once a month, or if they defined themselves as religious on a self-rating item.
7. The frequency of church/synagogue attendance was the only religiosity item available in both the German and Israeli data-sets. Due to the distributional form of the variable and the fact that it is used to compare different religions, we used a dichotomy for greater reliability. An examination of the variable in the Israeli sample of men yielded a correlation of 0.67 with a self-rating religiosity variable available only in the Israeli data.
8. According to immigration figures women constituted 60 per cent of the population 25 years old and over that arrived from the former Soviet Union between 1990 and 1995. In this regard the sample unintentionally over-represents the female immigrant population.
9. An alternative approach would be to estimate regression models separately for each population group.

This procedure, however, would not provide a direct test of the difference in slopes (the differential effects of age, religiosity, and social status by population group) and is less efficient. Nonetheless, within-country analyses were also performed, in order to evaluate the interpretation of the patterns observed in the covariance model and to test its robustness.

10. In the separate analyses performed within each population group, the effect of social class in the East German population was weaker than in the other groups and did not reach statistical significance at the α=0.05 level. Hence, we cannot decidedly reject the hypothesis that social class has no effect on East Germans' attitudes towards family support policies.
11. It should be noted, however, that the positive religiosity effect in Israel is not due solely to extreme attitudes of the very-religious respondents. An examination of attitudes towards family policy by degree of religiosity revealed a steady increase from the 'mostly non-religious' through the 'traditional' and 'religious' to the 'very-religious'. Additionally, regression analysis on the Israeli sample, in which the very-religious were excluded, resulted in only slightly different coefficients compared to results for the entire Israeli sample.

Acknowledgements

This research was supported by grant no. I-347.048.04/94 from GIF – the German–Israel Foundation for Scientific Research and Development.

References

Aldous, J. and Duman, W. (1990) Family policy in the 1980's: controversy and consensus. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, **52**, 1136–1152.

Ariès, P. (1962) *Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life*. Vintage Books, New York.

Boli-Bennett, J. and Meyer, J. (1978) The ideology of childhood and the State: rules distinguishing children in national constitutions, 1870–1970. *American Sociological Review*, **43**, 797–812.

Cherlin, A. J. (1996) *Private and Public Families*. McGraw-Hill, New York.

Degler, C. N. (1980) *At Odds: Women and the Family in America from the Revolution to the Present*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Demeny, P. (1986) Pronatalist policies in low fertility countries: patterns, performance and prospects. *Population and Development Review*, **12** supl., 335–358.

Doron, A. and Kramer, R. M. (1992) *The Welfare State in Israel: The Evolution of Social Security Policy and Practice* (Hebrew). Am Oved, Tel Aviv.

Doron, A. and Kargar, H. J. (1993). The politics of immigration policy in Israel. *International Migration*, **31**, 497–512.

Engstler, H. (1997) *Die Familie im Spiegel der Amtlichen Statistik*. Bundesministerium für familie, Senioren, Frauen, und Jugend, Bonn.

Evans, M. D. R. and Kelley, J. (1992) Images of class: public perceptions in Hungary and Australia. *American Sociological Review*, **57**, 461–483.

Flug, K., Kasir, N. and Ofer, G. (1997) The absorption of Soviet immigrants into the labour market: aspects of occupational substitution and retention. In Lewin-Epstein, N., Ro'i, Y. and Ritterband, R. (eds) *Russian Jews on Three Continents: Migration and Resettlement*. Frank Cass, London, pp. 433–470.

Furstenberg, F. F. Jr. (1995) Family change and the welfare of children: What do we know and what can we do about it. In Mason, K. O. and Jensen, A. M. (eds) *Gender and Family Change in Industrialized Countries*. Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 245–257.

Furstenberg, F. F. Jr. (1997) State–family alliances and children's welfare: a research agenda. *Childhood*, **4/2**, 183–192.

Gallup, G. H. (1983) *The Gallop Poll – Public Opinion, 1982*. Scholarly Resources, Wilmington, Del.

Gauthier, A. H. (1996) *The State and the Family: A Comparative Analysis of Family Policies in Industrialized Countries*. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Goldscheider, C. (1996) *Israel's Changing Society: Population, Ethnicity, and Development*. Westview, Boulder, Colo.

Gray, F. (1989) *Soviet Women: Walking the Tightrope*. Doubleday, New York.

Grubb, N. W. and Lazerson, M. (1988) *Broken Promises: How Americans Fail Their Children*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Hantrais, L. and Letablier, M.-T. (1996) *Families and Family Policies in Europe*. Longman, London.

Hille, B. (1985) *Familie und Sozialisation in der DDR*. Leske & Budrich, Opladen.

Honig, M. and Shamai, N. (1978) Israel. In Kamerman, S. B. and Kahn, A. J. (eds) *Family Policy: Government and Families in Fourteen Countries*. Columbia University Press, New York, pp. 400–427.

Israel (1997) *Statistical Yearbook*. Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem.

Kamerman, S. B. and Kahn, A. J. (eds.). (1978) *Family Policy: Government and Families in Fourteen Countries*. Columbia University Press, New York.

Kamerman, S. B. and Kahn, A. J. (1998) *Family Change and Family Policies in Great Britain, Canada, New Zealand*

and the United States. Oxford University Press, London.

Kitschelt, H. (1995) *The Politics of European Welfare States*. Cambridge University Press, New York.

Land, H. and Parker, R. (1978) United Kingdom. In Kamerman, S. B. and Kahn, A. J. (eds) *Family Policy: Government and Families in Fourteen Countries*. Columbia University Press, New York, pp. 331–366.

Muller, W. and Shavit, Y. (1998) (eds) *From School to Work: A Comparative Study of Educational Qualifications and Occupational Destinations*. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Ostner, I. (1993) Slow motion: women, work, family and the state in Germany. In Lewis, J. (ed.) *Women and Social Policies in Europe: Work, Family and the State*. Edward Elgar, Aldershot, pp. 92–115.

Paltiel, A. M., Sabatello, E. F. and Tal, D. (1997) Immigrants from the former USSR in Israel in the 1990s: demographic characteristics and socio-economic absorption. In Lewin-Epstein, N., Ro'i, Y. and Ritterband, R. (eds) *Russian Jews on Three Continents: Migration and Resettlement*. Frank Cass, London, pp. 284–321.

Peres, Y. and Katz, R. (1991) The family in Israel: change and continuity. In Shamgar-Handelman, L. and Bar-Yosef, R. (eds) *Families in Israel*. Academon, Jerusalem, pp. 9–32.

Pierson, P. (1994) *Dismantling the Welfare State?* Cambridge University Press, New York.

Popenoe, D. (1988) *Disturbing the Nest: Family Change and Decline in Modern Societies*. Aldine de Gruyter, New York.

Poskanzer, A. (1995) The Matryoshka: the three-generation Soviet family in Israel. *Contemporary Family Therapy*, **17/4**, 413–427.

Preston, S. H. (1984) Children and the elderly: divergent paths for America's dependents. *Demography*, **21**, 435–457.

Roller, E. (1995) Ideological basis of the market economy: attitudes towards distribution principles and the role of government in Western and Eastern Germany. *European Sociological Review*, **10**, 105–117.

Statistisches Budesamt. (1997) *Datenreport: Zahlen und Fakten ueber die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. Statistisches Budesamt, Bonn.

Störtzbach, B. (1995) Germany: unification in attitudes? In Moors, H. and Rossella, P. (eds) *Population, Family and Welfare: A Comparative Survey of European Attitudes*, i. Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 122–138.

Svallfors, S. (1997) Worlds of welfare and attitudes towards redistribution: a comparison of eight Western nations. *European Sociological Review*, **13**, 283–304.

Textor, M. (1991) *Familienpolitik: Problems, Massnahmen, Forderungen*. Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, Bonn.

Winkler, G. (1990) (ed.) *Frauenreport '90*. Verlag Die Wirtschaft, Berlin.

Zelizer, V. (1985) *Pricing the Priceless Child: The Changing Social Value of Children*. Basic Books, New York.

Zentralarchiv für empirische Soziialforschung (1997) *International Social Survey Programme, Family and Changing Gender Roles II, Codebook – ZA # 2620*. Zentralarchiv für empirische Soziialforschung, Köln.

Zimmerman, S. L. (1992) *Family Policies and Family Well-Being: The Role of Political Culture*. Sage, Newbury Park.

Author's Address

Noah Lewin-Epstein, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Tel Aviv University, PO Box 39040, Ramat-Aviv, Tel-Aviv, Israel 69978. Tel.: +972-3-640-0271; fax: +972-3-640-9215; email: noah1@post.tau.ac.il.

Manuscript received: April 1999.