Mechanisms of Governmentality and Constructing Hollow Citizenship

Arab Palestinians in Israel

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Israel has managed to fragment the Palestinian people and to convince most countries involved in promoting Israeli-Palestinian peace that a comprehensive solution of the Palestinian problem is neither feasible nor appropriate. The various Palestinian communities, which were dispersed and forced to live in various localities, due to Israel’s creation and ongoing policies, are asked to accept different solutions, including partial statehood in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, settling some of the refugees in these areas, and maintaining the current marginalized status of Palestinian citizens who live in Israel. Despite various forms of Palestinian resistance to such a strategy, it seems that the political developments of the last two decades demonstrate that Israel has managed to impose this approach as the most “realistic” one for the near future. Israel has used various means to achieve this state of affairs. Part of its effort was directed toward convincing the Palestinians that they have no choice but to accept what is offered to them by the Jewish state. Within this effort, Israel has sought to alter the geography, topography, and demography of Palestine. In areas under its sovereignty, whether recognized or not, the Israeli state has sought to reshape the consciousness of the Palestinian inhabitants. This process started before 1948 and took new forms after the establishment of the state.

This chapter explores Israel’s efforts to contain and subjugate those Palestinians who remained within its borders. Although this topic has already been addressed by several scholars, this chapter claims that it is necessary to analyze this question anew and explore a longer period of time in state–minority relations in order to identify particular state practices that reflect the complexity of Israeli mentalities of rule (Zureik 1979). In this chapter, I claim that understanding recent programmatic, legal, and judicial
policies and practices of the state toward the indigenous Arab minority necessitates examining the initial framing of the relationship between the state and the minority. The chapter aims to demonstrate that the Israeli state manifests itself not only through repressive forms, but also through other means of power practices and procedures in order to penetrate, contain, and control the Palestinian community residing within its borders and to transform this community from an indigenous people that can collectively assert the Palestinian national claim of injustice into a marginal social group that enjoys ineffective civic rights that obscure continuous efforts to construct inferior subjectivities through "modernizing" "democratic" means. The chapter explores the forms of power practices that facilitate political surveillance and social engineering on the cultural and sociological levels and thereby bypass the classical form of repression. This effort may help us clarify how Israel manages to pass as a "vibrant democracy" in the world order, despite its internal physical and cultural colonization policies. The chapter shows how the Israeli state becomes what it is through what it does, rather than the other way around. In other words, the practices of the state are what construct its identity, without entirely ignoring its vigorous characteristics. It incorporates the indigenous Palestinian community into democratic practices, but then commits itself to rules of conduct that legitimize the hollowing out of the substantial dimensions of their citizenship.

In order to explain this process, it is vital to import the concept of governmentality, as introduced by Michel Foucault and later developed by other scholars (Foucault 2003a; Garland 1997; Jessop 2007; Lemke 2001; Mckee 2009; O'Malley, Weir, and Shearing 1997; Scott 1995). This conceptualization demonstrates that power relations are sometimes more clearly examined beyond the narrow meaning of repressive forms. It is helpful to illustrate how power is introduced without being fierce in the physical sense. Power relations cannot sometimes be reduced to mere repression of the subjugated (Jessop 2007). They could be established through incorporating social groups in a system of representation that renders their presence a mechanism of surveillance and supervision, through soft forms of subjugation (Nye 2004). In this sense, power manifests itself as the management of consciousness, especially of those whose mere practicing of themselves, as such, counter the wished for identity of the powerful.

The state as practices of mentalities of rule could be manifested in various ways; the chapter follows only three areas of state–minority relations in Israel. I chose to focus on these three areas because they help illustrate the special characteristics of state power as it operates through discursive practices and control over actions that represent the exercise of freedom, such as electoral participation and engagement in public discourse. The first area is the mental framing of minority political consciousness through expectations, the re-engineering of societal structures via the proletarianization of the agrarian family structure, and the inscription of a new authoritative "justice" system. The second area deals with subjugation through soft power mechanisms, aiming at the domestication and taming of the Palestinian subject in the new Jewish space. The third area is legal discourse, where the law forms an effective tool of disciplining and imposes clear boundaries of political and cultural legitimacy.

Before delving into these three areas, the chapter opens with a brief theoretical framing of power relations, as disciplining discursive practices, seeking subjugation and the way they are relevant to the understanding of state–minority relations. The chapter then goes on to address the three areas outlined earlier. In the second part, the chapter addresses the cultural and material practices of Israeli citizenship vis-à-vis the Arab-Palestinian minority. The chapter then explores one of the most understudied areas of state–minority relations in Israel, namely the role of the media in promoting the construction of "quiescent Arabs," which did not succeed very much. Finally, the chapter addresses Israeli legal practices, exploring how they are used as a means of delegitimization of Arabs and as a mechanism that renders Arab representation in state institutions not only ineffective, but actually counter-representational. Exploring the three areas helps to elucidate practices of subjugation that, I argue, have led to the construction of a kind of hollow citizenship for Arabs in Israel, a citizenship that runs counter to the common ethical understanding of the term as it is used in political science and democratic theory. Such an analysis points to the existence of a huge gap between the formal manifestations of citizenship and its substantial representational meaning for Arabs who are citizens of Israel. This citizenship and its practices legitimate the representational system of the state without having any chance to impact its policies.

Theoretical Framing

Studies of the state have usually focused on its repressing power and dominating mechanisms. This chapter departs from that approach by reducing attention on the repressive dimensions of power and instead emphasizing the disciplining and subjugating practices of the state.
The chapter follows the lead of Foucault's understanding of power. In his view:

If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us a force that says no; it also traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network that runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression. (Foucault 2003c:307)

Accordingly, one ought to pay attention to the ways in which states wield power without their subjects' awareness of their subjugation. The chapter reiterates Jessop's note that "[o]ne should study power where it is exercised over individuals rather than legitimated at the center; explore the actual practices of subjugation rather than the intentions that guide attempts at domination; and recognize that power circulates through networks rather than being applied at particular points" (Jessop 2010:16).

Accordingly the state is an emergent player rather than a foundational, universal subject with an operational apparatus. As Foucault (1979:92) claims:

An analysis in terms of power must not assume that state sovereignty, the form of the law, or the overall unity of domination, is given at the outset; rather, these are only the terminal forms power takes ... power must be understood in the first instance as a multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and that constitute their own organizations.

This understanding highlights the importance of the rationalization of government practices in the exercise of political sovereignty, especially where specific governmental practices and regimes are articulated into broader economic and political projects. This understanding renders the coherence of power relations unthinkable, since power is practiced at various levels that do not always seem to have clear relations. The state's shaping of public consciousness and construction of historical imagination do not easily lend themselves to a legalistic and formalistic political understanding of power relations. On the other hand, the former cannot be disconnected from legal and judicial measures made to render cultural and symbolic policies possible.

Mckee's (2009) suggestion to combine discursive and realist forms of governmentality is a constructive way to understand power relations. This means that discursive analysis alone cannot demonstrate how power relations operate and reveal the centrality of the state, on the one hand, and resistance to top-down politics, on the other. An empirical dimension has to be added in order to overcome the reification of discursive power. The examination of specific government actions and policies could help us understand how power can be subtly or invisibly exercised in a context that is ostensibly "free," thus achieving surveillance and control that are ultimately far more effective than restrictive, openly repressive policies. One has to attend to the empirical concerns of state policy by examining particular mentalities of governance in its context; in this way, it becomes possible to render visible the actual effects of governing practices, and from that to derive their true intent. In this regard, Mckee (2009) and Lemke (2001) draw our attention to the importance of the discursive field in which the exercise of power is rationalized and actual intervention practices are promoted through their translation into actual programs and techniques by which individuals and groups are governed. This means that power is also about "the management of possibilities." It is about the ability to influence subjects' actions in a way that presupposes their freedom and ability to act and resist (Foucault 2003b:138). This form of power is reflected through disciplinarity, which emphasizes the taming of bodies and souls in order to subjugate them to acquiesce to a dominant political order. It refers to explicit programs for reorganizing institutions, rearranging spaces, and regulating behavior (Foucault 1980:9). Invoking this understanding of power, this chapter follows Mckee's (2009) suggestion and applies an analytical approach that combines these two forms of governmentality throughout the examination of this case. The chapter aims to demonstrate that through changing strategies of structuring and deploying power relations, states seek control and domination. State power is asserted through combining thought and modes of governing.

This understanding of power looks at government as "the effect, the profile, the mobile shape of incessant transactions which modify, or move, or drastically change, or insidiously shift sources of finance, modes of investment, decision-making centers, forms and types of control, relationships between local powers, the central authority and so on" (Foucault 2008:77). In the context of Israel, this understanding helps delineate the sophisticated state–minority dynamics that was constructed upon the establishment of the state and remains powerfully
Disciplining through the Politics of Expectations

Expectations play a major role in politics (Brady, Lehman-Schlozman, and Verba 1993). Recruiting people through "rational prospecting" is a well-known phenomenon that renders acquiescence possible (ibid.). This pattern of expectations is widely known in political economy as well (Ladner and Wlezen 2007). Political preferences are deeply related to economic expectation, reflecting the basic urge for security and well-being (Borup, Brown, Konrad, and Van Lente 2006; Ladner and Wlezen 2007). Having said that, one could argue that the strategic nourishing of expectations for a better life through economic incentives in time of insecurity and need is a strong disciplinary mechanism in the hands of state agencies. Israeli policies of expectations shed light on state mechanisms of governing the Palestinian homeland minority after the Nakba.

The breakdown and shattering of Palestinian society as a result of the Nakba have left those Palestinians who remained in Israel full of mistrust and lacking in self-confidence (Sa’di 2003). Most Palestinians who stayed did not believe that the state would allow them to remain in their own residences, after they had seen hundreds of thousands of their brethren either expelled or fled to safe areas (Jamal 2010). This mindset was fully evident to the leaders of the Israeli security forces and to the state establishment. It was also fully exploited in order to ensure the total submission of the Palestinian community to Israeli priorities (Ozacky-Lazar 2002). In a situation of total defeat and shocking loss, most Palestinians who remained in the state submitted to the prevailing reality for a long time (Lustick 1980; Rouhana 2007). State agencies propagated expectations that ought to be followed and respected, as a guarantor for the safety of the remaining Palestinians (Cohen 2010). These expectations were not always formalized, but were very effective at establishing a collective wariness, supported by practices and rules that all Palestinian citizens were to follow. The educational system played a major role in propagating this atmosphere (al-Haj 1995; Mari 1978). In other words, the main message was that Arab citizens have to not only fear the state, but also trust its potential capability to benefit them if they demonstrate their loyalty to it. Although no communal trust was expected and therefore no identification with state symbols was expected, calculus-based trust was encouraged, especially among the young generation (Rousseau 1988).

As the Israeli declaration of independence demonstrates, state representatives expected the remaining Palestinian minority to accept the political realities resulting from the 1948 war and gradually detach from their national past (Ozacky-Lazar 2002). The state began constructing political, educational, and disciplinary policies that aimed at creating a new minority collective imagination, as "Israelis Arabs" (Rabinowitz 1993). Israeli citizenship was introduced as a safety net, protecting from a tragic and ambiguous future (Leibler and Breslau 2005). It marked the rebirth of those Palestinians who remained under Israeli jurisdiction, especially after the signing of ceasefire agreements with all Arab states that had fought against the newly established Jewish state. History then started anew for Israel's Palestinian citizens, whose collective past had to be remolded to match the new reality (Bishara 1993). The politics of fear became a disciplining mechanism to facilitate the resocialization process taking place in the official educational system, which was fully under the control of Jewish educators (Abu-Asbe 2007; al-Haj 1995; Bäuml 2007).

Citizenship became a "control mechanism" through exchanging safety and survival in the homeland for ceremonial loyalty and political patriotism (Ben Amos and Bar-Tal 2004). Sentiments toward the Palestinian past or sympathy with the Palestinian cause, especially concerning the historical injustice and the miserable reality of the refugees, were recast by state authorities as a serious security threat and betrayal of the commitments entailed within citizenship. State agents constructed the Israeli-Arab identity as a clear possessive affiliation framework, where the legal affiliation to the Israeli state was to determine not only the priorities but also the worldview of the Palestinian minority. In this atmosphere, Arab calls were expressed to draft Arab citizens to army service in the mid-1950s (Cohen 2010; Jirjis 1976). Although citizenship did not ultimately protect the minority from severe state interference and penetrations of state agencies into its material and symbolic resources, it managed to marginalize the political and sentimental identification with Palestinian nationality and facilitate the rise of a broader identification consciousness, affiliated with Arab culture (Yifachel 2006).
The Arab-Palestinian minority was expected to adapt to the priorities set by the state concerning the absorption of a growing number of Jewish immigrants and the discriminatory allocation of resources in the areas of housing, settlement, development, education, and so on. The state viewed these priorities as both natural and necessary in order to realize its character as the nation-state of the Jewish people. The Arab-Palestinian minority, who are the indigenous inhabitants of the land, was expected to accept the official material and symbolic priorities and act accordingly, as "good Arabs," "positive Arabs," and "quiet Arabs" (Cohen 2010; Jamal 2010; Lustick 1980; Rouhana 2007).

The Arab-Palestinian minority was expected to play according to the rules of the democratic process and accept policies based on majority rule. The fact that the minority was ethnically based and preserved through demographic engineering went unnoticed in the political arena. As expected in deeply divided societies, the democratic processes of majority decisions have been translated into ethnic majoritarian despotism, instead of grand coalition politics, leading to the minority's loss of tangible influence on policy making, especially in matters related to its well-being and interests (Jamal 2009; Lijphart 1977; Mill 2003). This pattern of politics in Israel has intensified in the last decade, contrary to claims of liberalization and democratization, leading to the hollowing out of Arab-Palestinian citizenship from any substantive meaning (Jamal 2007; Navot and Peled 2009). The ethos of defensive democracy—protecting democracy from its "internal enemies"—has been utilized in order to justify such politics, despite the fact that the Jewish majority in Israel has absolute power over state mechanisms and an automatic majority that is able to pass any decision it wishes (Pedazor 2004).

The mechanism of facilitating the political interests of the Jewish majority through the discourse of defensive democracy remains one of the characteristics of governmentality, utilizing the majoritarian system to exclude the Arab-Palestinian community from policy making and equal share in public resources.

Another major component of disciplining the subjects to fulfill expectations is to lead its Arab-Palestinian citizens to accept their Israeli citizenship as the major determinant legal and cultural frame of their political behavior in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in an attempt to minimize or eradicate the perception that they, as Palestinian nationals, were victims of state policies. Expecting them to take a minor and neutral position vis-à-vis the national aspirations of the Palestinian people has been an important official Israeli position. Any counter-position was propagated as betrayal of the political order that guaranteed Palestinian citizens' safety in the first place (Reiter 2009; Shiftan 2011).

Another important expectation has been accepting their secondary civil status in the Jewish state as the upper limit of their political ambitions. This expectation has frequently been expressed by Israeli leaders, who have claimed that the national rights of all Palestinians are to be fulfilled in a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, once it is established (Levy 2011). Arab-Palestinian citizens are expected to sever their national political bonds with their brethren and localize their political aspirations in a time when Israel, by contrast, seeks to deepen the relationship between the Jewish majority in Israel and the rest of the Jewish people in the entire world (Lainer-Vos 2011). Major efforts and material resources are invested to host Jewish Americans and Europeans for lengthy visits to Israel, aiming to tie them to the Zionist ideology and goals, as the Taglit venture and the Masa program demonstrate, at a time when Palestinian citizens are denied even the right of family unification if they are married to another Palestinian in the occupied territories (Adalah 2012).

The system of expectations developed by the state was translated into policy outlines, aiming at turning the above mentioned expectations into realities. The policy outlines were developed in various fields and were coordinated either by the Prime Minister's Office through the advisor on Arab affairs or, later, by the Israeli minister of Arab affairs. Many studies of state-minority relations in Israel have focused attention on the politics of control of the minority. These studies have made an enormous contribution to our understanding of the micro-politics of control perfected by the Israeli state, and the mechanisms used to penetrate this society and its social formations. It is important to demonstrate, along the theoretical lines of this chapter, as depicted earlier, that the policies of control were complemented by policies of neglect, which are best manifested through the politics of de-development and underdevelopment of Arab regions in the name of the development of Israeli society (Brzezinski 1956; Smith 2003). For the sake of developing the Galilee and the Naqab (Negev), for instance, Arab lands were expropriated under the cover of public interest, although the services and infrastructures built by state agencies served mostly, if not exclusively, Jewish immigrants. New settlements and roads were established, leaving Arab villages and towns outside the development plans (Forman 2006). Housing projects and building spaces in Arab areas were dragged out for years, falling short of the demand in rural villages and towns (Yaakoby and Cohen 2007).
One of the most important policy outlines has been establishing the economic dependence of the Arab-Palestinian minority on state institutions and on Jewish markets, while constructing a Jewish national material and symbolic space manifested in the land regime of the state and the exclusion of Arabs from it (Haidar 1995; Levin-Epstein and Semyonov 1993; Yashiv 2012; Yiftachel 2006). This policy was translated into expropriating Arab agricultural private lands, which were the main source of income for most Arab families, and establishing the exclusive Israeli Jewish land regime with its material and symbolic dimensions (Benziman and Mansour 1992; Holzman-Gazit 2007). This has been the main policy pursued by various legal and administrative means and until today it remains the dominant policy, as manifested in the recent legal changes in the laws that regulate new membership in community housing and the enactment of the Admission Committees Law (ACRI 2011). This law enables residents of Jewish community settlements to reject candidates who wish to live there for "lack of suitability to the sociocultural makeup" of the settlement (Adalah 2012; Friedman 2011).

The governmental investment in the development of Arab society has been minimal (Hasson and Karayanni 2006). The government utilized the official allocation of resources to nourish loyalty and patronage relations with local political forces (Cohen 2010). No industrial infrastructures were developed in Arab towns and villages, something that aimed at intensifying the proletarianization of Arab society and its dependence on Jewish economic infrastructures (Levin-Epstein and Semyonov 1993; Yashiv 2012). This policy, still in effect today, has turned most Arab workers into a cheap labor force, serving the priorities and interests that are set by Jewish entrepreneurs. The rise of a new Arab middle class and the development of local Arab business markets in Arab towns and cities in the last three decades have been taking place despite state policies rather than as a result of them.

The Arab economy in Israel suffers from strong structural impediments that are mostly caused by official policies (Gharrah 2012). There is hardly any governmental investment in the Arab economy or in developing industrial zones in Arab localities (ibid.). The number of Arab families living below the poverty line is much higher than in Jewish society. In 2011 there were 442,200 families (1,838,600 persons) living below the poverty line in Israel (Andbald, Berkley, Gotleb, and Froman 2012). When we look at poverty based on national affiliation we find that whereas 14% of Jewish families live below the poverty line (18.1% of children), we see that 46.5% of Arab families (55% of children) live under the same conditions (Andbald, Heler, Gotleb, and Berkley 2013).

In addition to the elimination of agricultural infrastructure in Arab society, the land expropriation policy aimed at narrowing the geographic spaces under Arab control. The territories under the jurisdiction of Arab municipalities were limited to a minimum, thereby restricting development and leading to the ghettoization of Arab towns and cities (Jamal 2008; Khamaisi 2002). National planning and zoning policies and intensive Jewish-only settlement development have turned most Arab towns and cities into islands within geographical spaces controlled by Jewish cities or Jewish-dominated regional councils. Two major aims were pursued by these planning, zoning, and settlement policies: First, Judaizing the land, by facilitating the migration of Jewish citizens from the center of the country to the Galilee and Negev areas in the North and South, and the establishment of Jewish cities and communal settlements with high standards of living (Falah 1989). The "national priority plan" promoted by the government illustrates its intentions, insofar as Arab towns were hardly included (Adalah 2012). These plans include massive governmental investment in infrastructure to facilitate purchase of lands for housing, reduction of taxes that reach 68% on purchase of lands, and reduction in income and other taxes (ibid.). The second aim has been to secure Jewish control over all routes that connect Arab towns and cities and fragment the areas in which Arabs have a demographic majority. When looking at the settlement and road map in the Galilee, for instance, it becomes more than clear that roads cut between Arab towns and bypass them, leaving them as islands in a sophisticated network of highways (Rabinowitz and Vardi 2010; Yaakoby and Cohen 2007). When looking at the settlement plans and at the fact that Jewish settlements not only control huge swathes of land for future development, but they are also built mostly atop hills and mountains, especially in Arab areas, one cannot but think that there must be a master plan behind this pattern. From a security perspective, one can assume that the aim is to segregate and fragment areas of dense Arab population, such as in the Galilee, and to take over areas in which Arabs have a so-called "distorting" presence, such as in the Naqab area, as the Prawer Plan clearly demonstrates (ACRI 2011).

The state established a tradition of discriminatory allocation of resources to Arab municipalities and educational and welfare institutions (Ghanem and Azaiza 2008). Most prime ministers in the last two decades have admitted that the state has discriminated against Arab citizens in its
allocation of resources. The Israeli Supreme Court has admitted that state policies of allocation have marginalized Arab needs and diverted unequal resources to the Arab municipalities and other institutions (Saban 2005). The Official Or Commission appointed by the Ehud Barak government after the October 2000 events outlined the well-institutionalized discrimination against Arab citizens in the allocation of resources (Or et al. 2003). Although none of the above has admitted that such discrimination was based on racial grounds, one cannot ignore the fact, admitted by the Or Commission report, that such a structured discrimination was the consistent default policy. The discrimination in the allocation of state resources is a well-established and intended policy until this very day (ACRI 2011). It cannot be explained as a result of an administrative miscalculation or technical deviation from the formal policy. Discrimination against Arab institutions has been a well-established policy that aims to maintain the gaps between a modern Jewish society and an underdeveloped and neglected Arab society.

Another major policy outline the state pursued toward the Arab-Palestinian minority is suppressing attempts to establish an effective national Arab leadership and delegitimizing Arab efforts to challenge state policies by popular means. The state invested major efforts and resources in order to co-opt leaders of the Arab minority and fragment Arab political forces in order to prevent coordinated national political mobilization by the Arab minority (Jamal 2006; Lustick 1980). The state has never recognized the Arab Higher Follow-Up Committee, despite the fact that it is a coordinated political body that includes all political parties and representatives from all major Arab institutions and movements. Political and religious leaders who “diverted” from expected and accepted behavior were tamed by various means, especially legal and judicial. Although a majority of the Arab-Palestinian population still participates in Knesset elections and views the participation of political parties in parliamentary politics as normal, the dominant Jewish Zionist political parties have steadily reduced the spaces Arab parties have to maneuver and set new restrictive limits on their political participation (Jamal 2012a).

In Israel, majoritarian rule has become an effective instrument to impose laws that counter the basic rights of the minority to influence decisions related to its own basic rights. Thus, majority decisions have been translated into a tyranny of the majority. The fact that the Arab-Palestinian parties have never been integrated in any of the governmental coalitions and their participation in crucial national decisions has come to be viewed as illegitimate, and even aligned with betrayal – as happened, for example, in the confirmation of the Oslo Accords in 1994 – is a major indication that Arab participation in the Israeli political system has been turned into a “fig-leaf” (Ghanem and Mustafa 2009).

These expectations and policies outlined briefly thus far demonstrate some of the disciplining practices that have fundamentally shaped state–minority relations in Israel. The state manifested itself through practices that render the Arab-Palestinian minority subject to rules of behavior set almost fully by the Jewish majority. Spaces of freedom are defined in order to promote surveillance and control rather than to empower the Arab-Palestinian community and transform its representative bodies into legitimate players that can influence official policies. When zooming in on one of the central areas used to discipline the Arab population, such as the media, one can begin to elucidate the efforts the state has made to construct a new collective consciousness in the Arab-Palestinian community that serves the expectations and priorities of state agents.

Manufacturing “Quiet Arab Citizens”

The disciplining policies as discursive power manifesting the complexity of state formation are a long-dated phenomenon. Despite the fact that the state did not manage to fully subjugate the Arab-Palestinian minority, its power was manifested through soft practices. As argued elsewhere, the state is manifested through material as well as cultural practices. The following section concentrates on cultural practices.

Previous studies have examined the cooperation between Israeli intelligence organizations and local Arab collaborators, who were nicknamed “good Arabs” (Cohen 2010). These were Arab residents or citizens who assisted the Israeli intelligence services in return for benefits such as permission for one’s family, who had become refugees during the 1948 war, to remain in the country, or for significant monetary remuneration, enabling them to support their families.

The importance of the aforementioned research studies is that they revealed patterns of activity the state used to control and supervise its internal homeland minority, which authorities persistently defined as a “security threat.” However, these studies were limited, because they involve only a small group of collaborators, and therefore could potentially be misleading. The state invested considerable effort to
achieve control of the entire Arab-Palestinian community by "soft" means in order to pacify its presence in the physical as well as mental environment of the community. Because these state-framing policies have not been thoroughly studied in the past, their examination provides access to the symbolic and cultural dimension of state disciplining power.

During the first decades of its existence, the state of Israel, like other hegemonic regimes, turned the mass media into a central mechanism, second only to the educational system, of resocialization, acting to promote consent and to form a collective common imagination among citizens (Negbi 1999; Yu and Cohen 2009). In practice, the Hebrew press, both party-controlled and private newspapers, and the national radio station, Kol Yisrael (The Voice of Israel), were strongly linked to information organs operating from the Office of the Prime Minister, from the Foreign Ministry, and from the Israeli Army (Frenkel 1994; Lebel 2005). Thus, even if there were differences among them, most Hebrew media organizations were mobilized concerning anything to do with security or foreign policy, a tendency which has traditionally continued with varying levels of intensity until the present day (Caspi and Limor 1999; Cohen and Wolsfield 1993; Elbaz 2013; Liebes 1997).

A policy of manufacturing consent by means of stringent submission, discipline, and policing was quickly imposed on Palestinian citizens who had remained within the state following the Nakba (Bäuml 2007; Gopher and Ben Porat 2013; Jamal 2009; Peled 1992; Reiter 2009). One of these, whose central objective was to achieve a monopoly over consciousness formation in Arab society, was the media, manifested in establishing a number of newspapers in Arabic (Jamal 2005a). These newspapers, which were controlled by the Histadrut, the second-largest employer and simultaneously the main workers' union in Israel at the time, and by the Zionist parties Mapai and Mapam, were directed toward the Arab-educated elite and aspired to become the primary source of information and commentary in Arab society, seeking to establish a majority of "quiet Arabs." The goal was to reframe Arab consciousness to enable the normalized recognition of Israel as the Jewish state in the region, so Arabs would accept Israel's existence as an accomplished fact, as a permanent part of the natural order of their environment (Jamal 2012b).

The policy of information and consciousness disciplining toward the Arab-Palestinian community during the state's early decades was led by "Arab-Jews" (Meir-Glitzenstein 2004; Shohat 1988; Wurmser 2005). Many educated Middle Eastern Jews (Mizrahim), whose cultural background was Arab and who spoke Arabic with authentic imagery, chose to join the Information Office and other media institutions as they were established, thus supplying a new type of service to the state that no other group of elite Jewish Israelis could supply. These Jews behaved as though their main goal was "to serve" the needs of the Arab community, but they actually constituted part of the disciplinary power system of the state, both for the Arab population and for other Mizrahi Jews who were exposed to the literary and media products of this elite (Jamal 2012a).

An instructive example of state-controlled media was the daily newspaper al-Yom (Today), which was first issued in 1948 by the Arab unit of the Histadrut from the former offices of Filasteen, a Palestinian newspaper that had appeared in Jaffa in 1920s-1940s and had ceased publication as a result of the 1948 war. Al-Yom was later integrated into the Arab Publishing House of the Histadrut, which published a number of journals, including the biweekly al-Yom for children, the biweekly Sada al-Tarbiya (Educational Echo), the monthly al-Hadaf (The Objective), and the quarterly Leka'a (Meeting). Some of these are still being published today. In addition, the publishing house was responsible for the production of textbooks for Arab schools and, thus, controlled the income from these books and, in cooperation with the Ministry of Education, determined their content, which was responsible for the socialization of Arab youth (Bäuml 2007).

Al-Yom employed Jewish-Arabs whose mother tongue was Arabic, who were known for their attraction to and affection for the Arabic language and literature, and who had some kind of journalistic experience. Among the key personalities in this group were Menachem Zarur (who was known by his nickname, Abu Ibrahim), who had served as the editor of the newspaper al-Balad (The Homeland) in Baghdad before his immigration to Israel; Meir Jarakh, an Iraqi who worked in the Information Center of the Prime Minister's Office and was a connecting link between the Information Center and the prime minister's advisor on Arab affairs, and at the same time, a member of the newspaper editorial staff; and Nissim Rejwan, a noted author whose books were published in English and in Arabic, and who wrote a weekly column in al-Yom and later became its editor. Rejwan, who had worked as a journalist for The Baghdad Times during the 1940s, used this experience to advance the influence of al-Yom in Arab society, and actually became a leading figure in the Israeli information machine. Tuvia Shamsh, of Syrian extraction, was the editor of al-Yom for 20 years and also translated fine literature from Arabic to Hebrew – for example, Season of Migration to the North by al-Tayyib Salih and Eight Eyes by Sufi
Abdallah – and was one of the leading figures in determining the editorial policy of the newspaper and giving it a more “authentic” tone in language and content for the average Arab reader (Eitan 2013; Jamal 2012b).

The content of the newspapers tried to disseminate a cognitive framework wherein Israel was to be accepted as an immutable fact, and Arabs were subtly warned that if the state were forced to adopt a harsh policy, they would be sorry. At a meeting of the newspaper’s Advisory Committee on April 1, 1963, it was noted:

The newspaper would penetrate into the readers’ consciousness that the State of Israel was an established fact by focusing on how it was becoming stronger culturally, economically, politically and militarily.

(ISA, 3551/5, N.d.)

In addition, Al-Yom published ideas and opinions whose objective was to create the sense that Israel was a permanent fixture and to recommend integration of the Arab community in the country. In a summary of the newspaper’s Board of Directors’ meeting with the representative of the Prime Minister’s Office on September 5, 1962, it was suggested that:

The newspaper should provide its readers with values of good citizenship, and general and Israeli culture, while safeguarding and respecting the religious heritage, the ethnicity and the national feelings (but not negative nationalism) of the reader. Thus, the newspaper should encourage integration of Arab citizens in the State of Israel and to contribute to the understanding and to the good relations among all the sectors.

(ISA, 3551/5, N.d.)

Opening the newspaper to Arab voices reflected attempts by the state to create the impression that it was making every effort to improve the living conditions of Arab citizens. The responsibility for the defeat of 1948 and for the unfortunate situation of the Arab citizens was placed on the “irresponsible” Arab and Palestinian leadership who were concerned with their own narrow interests, while the Arab public was forced to pay a heavy price. The newspaper presented its worldview in a sophisticated manner and in accessible language to the average Arab reader, taking care not to arouse antagonism among the Arab public. Accordingly, the newspaper editors invested great care in giving the impression that the newspaper intended to serve the basic interests of the Arab community. The objective was to appeal to Arab citizens and to manipulate Arab public opinion in Israel, as a component of the aspiration to control the Arab self. This can be understood from the words of Shmuel Toledano,

a former advisor on Arab affairs, which imply the aim of the daily newspaper:

In contrast to the prevailing opinion, I don’t see a problem or implications, even from the viewpoint of the Arab reader, in the fact that this was a government newspaper. It’s illogical to attempt to conceal the link between the newspaper and the government ... The orientation of the newspaper should ... like the broadcasts of the Arab Israeli radio programs, relate to foreign policy and attitudes towards Israel. Special emphasis should be focused on information about Arabs in the country and how their special needs are handled.

(ISA, 5948/12C, N.d.)

Al-Yom was distributed in all areas with a large Arab population, both in cities and in villages. The attempt to organize a permanent readership among Arab citizens led those who were responsible for the newspaper to utilize a number of channels: First, they took advantage of contacts that newspaper staff had with officials in various government offices to pressure Palestinians, who needed government permits, to subscribe. Second, they requested that government officials provide financial support for sectors of Arab society, to encourage them to subscribe. There were also attempts to identify potential readers from among the Arab educated elite. This included a request from the newspaper director to the Hebrew University to receive a list of names of Arab students in order to encourage them to read the newspaper (ISA, 3551/10, N.d.).

Despite the considerable efforts undertaken to enable Al-Yom to continue publishing, it ceased publication immediately after the 1967 war (Yu and Cohen 2009). The decision to close the newspaper and to establish an alternative was made by a committee of Information Directors. The principal reason was Al-Yom’s lack of success in drawing a large reading public, which would justify the economic investment by the Histadrut and the Prime Minister’s Office. The demographic change following the 1967 war and the addition of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians to Israeli control in the West Bank and Gaza required a significant change in the Israeli information dissemination policy. Those responsible for Israeli information provision decided to reorganize, including closing down Al-Yom and, a year after the end of the war, establishing the newspaper Al-Anba’a (The News), which had a new orientation and reputation (Jamal 2012a).

Al-Anba’a continued the policy guidelines of Al-Yom, but in a more sophisticated way, with the aim of making much more meaningful
inroads into Arab society and taking responsibility for determining its public agenda. The staff of the new newspaper defined al-\'Anba\'a as an official newspaper "which would represent the official position of the state" and would be directed to Arabs "in Israel, on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the Arab states," while, according to the founding staff, the target audience would dictate the newspaper's content and the editorial policy (Eitan 2013:76–77). Most of the editorial staff and reporters who had worked for al-Yom continued to operate at al-\'Anba\'a, but they were faced with new challenges in 1967 after the occupation of Palestinian territories, where hundreds of thousands of Palestinians live that are antagonistic to Israel's presence in the region. In practice, the editors of al-\'Anba\'a tried to create the impression among the Palestinians that the newspaper was a spokesman for the common people, and was established to serve its readers and to relate to their problems (Eitan 2013).

Like al-Yom, al-\'Anba\'a made great efforts to widen its circulation and to exploit personal connections between its directors and official bodies so as to create pressure on Arab citizens associated with the ruling party and governmental offices to read the newspaper (Jamal 2012b). The newspaper directors even tried to win the trust of the leaders of the Palestinian community in East Jerusalem and to turn them into regular readers of al-\'Anba\'a. To this end, they initiated meetings with key figures, such as Anwar Nusseibeh, in order to penetrate Arab society and to improve their competitive position against local newspapers, especially the daily al-Quds, the pro-Jordanian newspaper which was most widely disseminated in the West Bank and which was later known for its national Palestinian stance from the early 1970s (Jamal 2005b).

The objectives of al-\'Anba\'a can be summarized as follows: to establish the image of an open public sphere to which a variety of Arab voices were invited to participate in discussion regarding the relations between the state and the Arab minority who resided in the state, and with its Arab neighbors; second, to advance the acceptance of Israel as an established fact, which should be respected. Those in charge of the newspaper wished to present the state as aspiring to integrate the Arab-Palestinian population within the state structure, in the spirit of the Israeli Declaration of Independence. The newspaper propagated the idea that Israel was a state, one of many, which had won its independence in the late 1940s and thus it should be seen as a part of the wave of international decolonialization after World War II. This was meant to distract readers from the dominant Arab position during this period, in which Israel was viewed as a colonial occupying power. Regarding internal affairs, the newspaper emphasized public works efforts undertaken for "loyal" Palestinians, like connecting to the electricity network, paving of roads, and similar works while simultaneously blatantly neglecting to report about policies of land expropriation, arrests of national activists, and other harsh measures leveled against "disloyal" Palestinians. Furthermore, the newspaper encouraged Palestinians with opinions supportive of Israel to write articles that emphasized the advances in Jewish–Arab relations; special emphasis was placed on the praiseworthy attempt of official state bodies to solve local problems in Arab villages. The directors of the newspaper stated:

the newspaper will serve as an open platform for expressing opinions even if they are not in line with official opinions, but will make sure that "the last word" will be in the spirit of government policies ... but [the newspaper] would emphasize how Israel solves its internal problems (social, economic, scientific and others).

(ISA, 17084/13, N.d.)

In order to strengthen the pretensions of the newspaper to reflect Israeli pluralism and liberalism, the newspaper directors decided to publish a weekly column written by Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, who was a prominent Egyptian columnist close to Jamal Abdel Nasser in their Sunday edition, but maintained the right to react "from time to time to these articles and to refute what could be refuted." The newspaper targeted efforts at encouraging Arab citizens to adopt an appeasing attitude when dealing with their problems with the state. Or, as expressed by Shmuel Toledano, one of those responsible for publishing the newspaper, the paper's objective was to assist in developing "quiet Arabs" (ISA, 304/63, N.d.).

With the wane of the Histadrut and the beginning of privatization and liberalization of the Israeli economy initiated by Menachem Begin's first and second governments (1977–1981), and the withdrawal of the Prime Minister's Office from subsidizing the newspaper, al-\'Anba\'a was beset by severe financial difficulties. Finally, the end of official support for the newspaper led it to cease publication in 1984. However, even before its closure, in practice, its existence had become superfluous. This was due to its very small number of readers, but mostly because a large number of Palestinian citizens had already internalized the political rationale which the newspaper had been trying to advance, and particularly its basic assumption, that the Palestinians were a minority completely dependent on the state. Although one cannot claim that the newspaper alone was
behind this “success,” it helped in establishing the public atmosphere and collective mindset that supported it.

In summary, through the years, the existence of an Israeli state-sponsored media system in Arabic contributed to the illusion of a well-developed and liberal public sphere. An additional contribution was provided by the voices of loyal Arabs who emphasized the efforts of the state to aid in solving the problems of the Palestinian minority regarding road construction, water and electricity infrastructure, the educational system, and health and welfare facilities. Arab officials working in state bodies, especially school principals and Histadrut officials, were placed as leaders of public opinion, active in advancing governmental programs designed to penetrate and influence Arab society through its cultural gateways (Bäuml 2007). These constituted the dependable stratum of propagandists who provided the state with the internal legitimizing voice that it needed. However, the 1980s witnessed the rise of a new generation of Arab leaders who began changing the entire nature of the relationship between the Israeli state and its native national minority, a process that led to the development of new forms of subjugation, which will be addressed in the following section (Jamal 2006).

Hollow Citizenship, Majoritarian Despotism, and Ineffective Political Participation

In his treatment of technologies of contemporary government, Nikolas Rose argues that the creation of freedom, where subjects are obliged to be free and are required to conduct themselves responsibly, to account for their own freedom is a central strategy of governing (Rose 1999). According to this understanding, the freedom ethic is a part of a particular formula of governing society (Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde 2006). Taking responsibility for freedom becomes an important form of disciplining the conduct of the individual and of society. As Rose et al. claim “the very ethic of freedom [is] itself part of a particular formula for governing free societies” (ibid.:91). This is true in the political and social fields.

A major question that comes to mind when discussing state-minority relations in Israel is, who is the sovereign of the Israeli state? Defining the sovereign is of crucial importance, since it reveals central characteristics of the political game. Answering this question could shed light on the complexity of the political reality of the Palestinian community in Israel and the complexities of Israeli politics. Since it is not possible to understand technologies of power without understanding the political rationality underpinning them, this section follows formal dimensions of the political practices, aiming at defining the tools of legitimization and spaces of political behavior allotted to the various political players, especially the Arab-Palestinian minority in the state.

The definition of the sovereign in the Israeli state is not a one-time act. It takes place every day, as manifested by various political and legal philosophers (Rousseau 1988). The first discursive act to externalize the sovereign was the Israeli Declaration of Independence, which became a central constitutional document in the Israeli political and legal culture (Barak 2006). This founding document states: “The Land of Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and political identity was shaped. Here they first attained to statehood, created cultural values of national and universal significance and gave to the world the eternal Book of Books.” The declaration indicates the exact sovereign in the newly established state asserting:

On the 29th November, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the establishment of a Jewish State in Eretz-Israel; the General Assembly required the inhabitants of Eretz-Israel to take such steps as were necessary on their part for the implementation of that resolution. This recognition by the United Nations of the right of the Jewish people to establish their State is irrevocable. This right is the natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate, like all other nations, in their own sovereign State. Accordingly, members of the peoples council, representatives of the Jewish community of Eretz-Israel and of the Zionist Movement, are here assembled on the day of the termination of the British Mandate over Eretz-Israel and, by virtue of our natural and historic right and on the strength of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, hereby declare the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz-Israel, to be known as the State of Israel.

It is made clear that the declaration speaks of a historical sovereign in a specific territory that has been restored after a long period of forced absence. The absence of the sovereign does not and should not have reduced or abolished the right over the land on which sovereignty is reasserted. The sovereignty of the Jewish people over the land – Palestine in which hundreds of thousands of Palestinians live – is asserted as a continuous transhistorical power that is not affected by historical and demographic realities on the ground. The historical, spiritual, symbolic,
and constitutional status of the declaration leaves no doubt as to the
exclusive character of the Israeli sovereign, especially when considering
the fact that part of the indigenous population of Palestine lives within
the borders of the Israeli state. The Jewish people have been constructed
as the eternal and exclusive sovereign, and the Zionist narrative becomes
the ultimate truth in state ideology and practices. This narrative renders
the Palestinians occasional visitors in their own homeland. The recent
engagement with the declaration and the emphasis put by Israeli leaders
on the Jewish character of the state make clear that the Israeli sovereign is
best articulated in ethno-national terms (Yiftachel 2006).

The second element to manifest the Israeli sovereign is through
decision-making that has to do with determining the strategic character
of the Israeli state. There is a prevalent consensus among Israeli Jews that
the state should invest all resources possible to preserve the hegemony
of Jewish culture in the public sphere, even if this means the exclusion of
non-Jews (Democracy Index 2012). Only Jews are viewed as fully
legitimate participants in determining the character of the state and its
major policies. A majority of the Israeli Jewish public would prefer if
Arabs were excluded from involvement in crucial decision-making
processes (ibid.). Anti-liberal tendencies among major proportions of
the Israeli Jewish public have been found in public opinion surveys that
demonstrated the narrow ethnic political culture and the lack of
tolerance toward the Arab population and the unwillingness to justify
their equal participation in the representative organs of the state (ibid.).

Recent developments in Israeli politics clearly demonstrate that the
Jewish majority in Israel seeks to delegitimize Arab representation in the
Israeli parliament, redefine the political field in which Arabs can play,
and redefine the meaning of their citizenship (Navot and Peled 2009).
This can be best demonstrated by law-making processes in which basic
and regular laws were amended twice in order to exclude or even render
illegal any attempt to challenge – legally – the Jewish character of the
state. The first time took place in the first Sharon government 2001–2003,
and the second during the second Netanyahu government, 2009–2012.

On May 15, 2002, the Israeli Knesset changed article 7(a) of the Basic
Law: The Knesset (Amendment No. 35) – 2002, Political Parties Law
(Amendment No. 13) – 2002, Knesset and Prime Minister Elections Law
(Amendment No. 46) – 2002 (Jamal 2011). These changes have led to
continuous attempts by the Jewish national parties to block the participa-
tion of national and religious Arab parties from participating in the
elections through constitutional and legal disqualification charges, the
last of which took place against The United Arab List and the National
Democratic Assembly toward the January 2013 elections. These attempts,
which have not succeeded so far as a result of the intervention of the
Israeli High Court, mark the efforts made by the Jewish majority in
the Knesset to set the boundaries of the legitimate participation in the
political game in Israel.

To this, one should add the 2003 “amendment” of the Citizenship and
Entry into Israel Law, which made it almost impossible for Palestinian
citizens of Israel to get permits for their Palestinian spouses and children
from the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) to enter and reside in
Israel for purposes of family unification (Adalah 2012). In 2007, the
law was amended again to prohibit spouses from “enemy states” – Syria,
Lebanon, Iran, and Iraq – to enter Israel as part of family unification,
in order to avoid charges that the law was racist since it is directed solely
and specifically against Palestinians (ibid.). These amendments, which
were declared by the Israeli High Court as constitutional, stand in sharp
contrast with the laws providing for any person of Jewish descent to
obtain automatic and rapid citizenship. In thousands of cases, people
with loose and unproven Jewish ancestry received automatic citizenship
in Israel, reflecting the racial discrimination embedded in the Israeli
citizenship law, aiming to cope with what has become known in Israel
as the “demographic threat.”

The “war” waged against the Arab-Palestinian presence in Israel does
not stop at the gates of demography. It has always involved the cultural
and symbolic existence of Palestinians in the Jewish state. These efforts
have taken many avenues, one of which could be demonstrated through
what has become to be known as the “Nakba law,” which allows the
minister of education to withhold funds from official organizations that
commemorate the Palestinian tragedy of 1948 (ACRI 2011). This law is
a part and parcel of the grand policy of “epistemic violence” against
Palestinian history, memory, and consciousness, as manifested in
formal school books, literary and art policies, and even gastronomy
(Bar Tal 2013).

Constitutional and legal instruments are utilized to narrow spaces of
freedom for Arab-Palestinians. Israeli state institutions and policies are
not “color-blind” when it comes to issues of civil justice as well
as citizenship. Israel is a nationalizing state. It creates a range of burdens,
barriers, stigmatizations, and exclusions against the Arab indigenous
minority for being Palestinian. It is true that the Arab participation in
the Knesset creates the impression that Arabs are genuine participants in
The Israeli moral community and participants in the definition of the moral order that dominates Israeli public culture. This participation is part of a concealed coercion in which Arab participation is marginal, if not devoid of any meaning, especially when it comes to defining the moral order in Israel or the rules according to which the deliberations about such an order take place. The best example to illustrate this point is the recent law proposal made by right-wing politicians, aiming at guaranteeing a Jewish majority in any decision made in the Knesset concerning territorial compromises (Lis 2013).

Israeli representative politics are based on ethnic majoritarianism that translates into automatic Jewish majority for important decisions or disputes. Most of the crucial decisions are made in institutions, representational or administrative, in which there is Jewish hegemony. As a result, Arabs are excluded from real and effective participation in determining the political agenda and in defining the possible choices within it. Arab participation in the Israeli Knesset obscures deep moral and ideological disagreements that do not always find their way into the public sphere for serious discussion and determination. To the contrary, the majority tacitly presents Arab participation in electoral politics as an acceptance of the structure of the public order and the ideological ethos that legitimizes it. The presence of Arabs in the Israeli Knesset obscures the deep moral disagreements between Arabs and Jews in regard to the conception of justice that stands behind the whole Israeli system.

The representative institutions of the Israeli political system view themselves as major mechanisms in promoting the interests of the Jewish majority in the state. This fact is best illustrated through the laws enacted by the Knesset. The latter’s sovereignty does not derive from its representing the Israeli public only. There is a widely accepted underlying assumption among the Jewish majority that the Knesset is an articulation of the sovereignty of the entire Jewish people worldwide as the discussions of the proposed “nationality” bill demonstrate (Jamal, 2016). It therefore expresses the aspirations of Jews living in the United States, Canada, Australia, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and so on. This concept deprives the meaning of civic sovereignty of any meaning and replaces it with an ethnic sovereignty that extends far beyond state borders. This transethnic sovereignty renders the meaning of citizenship empty and replaces it with kinship as the main logic of sovereign power. No wonder that Jewish communities, especially wealthy Jews, feel that they can intervene and influence policies of the Israeli government, as if the state belongs to them, as much as – and even more than – some of its citizens.

The deep ethnic majoritarian character of the Israeli political system and its promotion of Jewish hegemony, while setting limitations on its representativeness in regard to the Arab-Palestinian citizens, demonstrate an intrinsically embedded Zionist bias and the need for an alternative rights system other than the one manifested in the current electoral system. Jews have an automatic majority in all fields of policy, while Arab-Palestinians are subordinated to priorities that view them as a threat. As a result, their well-being is jeopardized by their mere participation in a system that undermines their presence instead of empowering them as integral and equal partners. Israeli officials have utilized Arab participation in Knesset elections for propaganda purposes. Netanyahu spoke recently of the freedom of the Arab community in comparison to all other Arabs in the region in his speech to the U.S. Congress, aiming to praise the Israeli democracy.

This short depiction of the creation of freedom as one of the technologies of government shows that the Israeli state should not be understood in foundational terms. Government is achieved through asymmetrical relationships of power when the subordinate party has little room to maneuver because their margin of freedom is extremely limited. The mere participation of Arab citizens in the Israeli democratic game – the mere practice of freedom – renders them subjugated to a mechanism that renders their presence devoid of substantive meaning. The practice of freedom becomes imprisonment in a system of power that hollows out their citizenship and delegitimizes any attempt to exercise their power.

Conclusion

The three parts of this chapter explored the theoretical argument that rules of governments are various and not necessarily coherent. In the Israeli case, we have shown that the politics of expectations, the manufacturing of consent, and the hollowing out of citizenship run on various levels and comprise complementary mechanisms of governmentality. The disciplining of subjects and subjugation of citizens are achieved through the production of discourse. Power is practiced as a productive network that runs through the whole social body, as actual practices of subjugation. Nonetheless and in contrast to Foucault’s point of view, one cannot ignore the intentions that underlie attempts at domination. It is true that power circulates through networks rather than being applied at particular points. But when viewed from the perspective of state–minority relations, the end result is
a combination of control and neglect that serves and preserves the sovereign power. Although one cannot view the state or the sovereign in foundational terms, nevertheless it makes sense to speak about statecraft, without falling into “the assumption that the state is always-already there as some sort of master subject or super-machine” (Jessop 2010:67).

The Arab-Palestinian community in Israel faces various mechanisms of power, including social engineering, disciplining, taming, and delegitimization. Epistemic violence is utilized in order to define the Arab minority and delimit its maneuvering space. When mechanisms of discourse production are conceived to be inefficient, legal means are introduced in order to subjugate the Arab minority and compel it to submit to rules set by the hegemonic Jewish majority. This is done through “democratic” means, turning majority decision into majoritarian despotism. The political and legal developments of the last decade demonstrate that this mechanism is turned into a major component of the hegemonic political culture, rendering democratic procedures a mask for promoting anti-democratic substances that reach a peak with the hollowing out of citizenship from any substantive meaning and converting it into an efficient control mechanism. It seems that the efforts made by the Arab-Palestinian community to counter these efforts fall within the frames provided by the same governing rules that render these efforts ineffective, if not void. However, the internal fragmentation of the Palestinian community and the weakening of the broader Palestinian national movement open the way for continuation of the same Israeli disciplining policies under the cover of modernization, democratization, and development.

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