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Nationalizing States and the Constitution of ‘Hollow Citizenship’: Israel and its Palestinian Citizens

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ABSTRACT This paper claims that nationalizing states adopt political, economic and cultural policies that hollow out the citizenship of national minorities, rendering them devoid of substantive meaning, since these minorities, often by their mere existence, tend to challenge the basic vision of the state. To demonstrate these claims, this paper examines the relationship between the Israeli state and its Arab-Palestinian minority. Based on analysing recent political, economic and cultural policies, which make multidimensional analytical frameworks necessary in explaining nationalizing states—minority relations, the paper demonstrates that, in opposite to the liberalization thesis, common in certain Israeli academic circles, the Israeli state has emphasized its nationalizing character rendering the citizenship of the Arab-Palestinian community devoid of substantial meaning. The nationalizing policies of the Israeli state have led to the intensification of Arab demands for a comprehensive transformation in the structure and policies of the Israeli state, thereby feeding the conflict between the state and its minority.

Introduction

It could . . . be said, fearless of greatly being mistaken, that the Jewish majority in Israel treats all the Palestinian citizens as present absentees. Thus is how they are perceived in the Jewish consciousness, thus is how they usually reflected by the media: as an entity of lack of collectivity, as a group, which does exist, but is lacking face or names, one of homogenous features, most of which are negative. If on 1948 the Palestinians in Israel were ‘those who are gone, but in fact are present’ – they became, over the years, ‘those who are present, but in fact are gone’ (Grossman, 1992, p. 226).

In recent years we have witnessed a process through which Arab citizens of Israel appeal more assertively against the Israeli structure of dominance, despite the fact that their influence on Israeli politics remains marginal. As with other indigenous national minorities discriminated against within a given national context in other...
parts of the world, the Arab minority in Israel has been increasing its political mobility in recent years. Political and social movements and civil institutions act to transform the meaning of Israeli citizenship by demanding changes in the structure of the Israeli state that would result in civil equality and accommodate expression of the Arab identity in the Israeli public sphere. Instead of focusing merely on issues of resource distribution, Arabs increasingly stress the national–cultural dimension of the Jewish identity in Israel as the source of their dispossession, deprivation and marginalization (Saadi, 1992; Bishara, 1996; Ghanem, 1997; Rosenhak, 1998; Zidani, 1998; Saban, 2002). Hence, Arab elites in Israel are further focusing on the implications of their ‘Israeliness’, interlacing social justice, distributive equality and national–cultural recognition into a political formula that could bring about a meaningful change in the lives of the Arab community in a state with a Jewish majority.

One of the manifestations of this trend is a document entitled ‘The Future Vision of the Arab Palestinian in Israel’, which was published in December 2006 by a leading group of political and intellectual activists operating under the auspices of the National Committee for the Heads of Arab Local Authorities in Israel. Another manifestation of this trend is the ‘Democratic Constitution’, which was published by Adalah (2007), the leading legal Arab non-governmental organization in Israel. These comprehensive documents reflect, each in its own way, a broader process evident in the Arab community for some time. Although the documents and the lack of correspondence between them may reflect a differentiation and fragmentation process taking place in the Arab community, both documents introduce a general definition of the Arab-Palestinian community in Israel and define the relationship between this community and its environment, particularly with the state of Israel. The documents demand that the state recognize the Arab community as an indigenous national minority entitled to collective rights beyond the individual civil rights of each member of the community and include various types of demands encompassing the political, economic and cultural spheres.

Despite the differences embedded in the practical solutions presented by the two documents to the predicament of the Arab minority in Israel, their scope and timing and the changes they reflect in the political behaviour of the Arab community invite explanation. Although the study of the Arab community has become salient in Israeli sociology and political science, comprehensive explanations for the dialectics of majority–minority relations in Israel are still lacking. Such explanations could be of great empirical as well as theoretical value, for they could contribute to our understanding of the dialectics of contention in the relationship between indigenous national minorities and nationalizing states. States such as Sri Lanka, Estonia, Latvia, Turkey and Ecuador, among others, are also characterized by this kind of relationship with their indigenous national minorities and, although there are differences, they tend to share similar challenges.

This paper claims that the process of the hollowing out of Arab Israeli citizenship that has been taking place over the last decade and has led to the intensification of Arab demands for a comprehensive transformation in the structure and policies of the Israeli state. The political, economic and cultural policies of the Israeli state towards the Arab community over the last decade contradict the ‘liberalization thesis’ raised by several Israeli scholars (Peled and Navot, 2005) and have contributed to the intensification of nationalizing policies from among the Arab community. Arab intellectuals and politicians have successfully differentiated between the liberalization of the Israeli economy and the deepening of the Israeli ethnonational character (Jamal, 2007). They have also pointed out
the failure of the Israeli–Palestinian negotiations to lead to a Palestinian statehood in the occupied territories and the deepening of Israeli control over Palestinian territories as a major factor influencing Jewish–Arab relations inside the state of Israel.

Notwithstanding the importance of the broader Israeli–Palestinian context and the implications of the stalemate in the negotiations between the two sides on the relationship between Israel and the Palestinian citizens in it, in the following pages it is argued that there is a need for theoretical frameworks that incorporate political, economic and national–cultural factors in order to explain majority–minority relations in nationalizing states such as Israel. Nationalizing states, as demonstrated by Brubaker (1996, 2004), have special characteristics that make multidimensional analytical frameworks necessary in explaining state–minority relations. These states, conceived as complex institutional entities composed of legal, economic and cultural components, design and render the citizenship of indigenous national minorities into a ‘hollow citizenship’ that is devoid of substantive cultural, economic and political meaning, since these minorities, often by their mere existence, tend to challenge the basic vision of the state.

By suggesting a multidimensional analytical framework, this paper claims that it provides a better understanding of the dialectics of contention between the state of Israel and its Arab-Palestinian national minority. The paper goes beyond partial explanatory traditions that have been used to examine this topic in the past. Despite the peril of falling into inaccuracies and unjust deductions, this paper argues that the theoretical frameworks used to study state–minority relations in Israel to date belong to three broad traditions, each emphasizing different explanatory factors. These traditions are not homogenous, nor do they exclude each other completely. Nevertheless, each has its own theoretical underpinnings and set of concepts and interpretations that stop short of explaining the dialectics of state–minority relations in Israel.

The first centres on the state as an almost entirely autonomous actor generating inequality between Arabs and Jews (Jiryis, 1976; Lustick, 1980; Yiftachel, 1992; Rouhana, 1997; Ghanem, 2001). Despite much accuracy, this ‘state-centred’ tradition overestimates the structural–functionalist and administrative–institutional dimensions of the state, reifying its role and disconnecting it from the socio-economic classes that dominate its institutions, while simultaneously underestimating its symbolic and cultural dimensions (Rabinowitz, 2001).

The second tradition focuses mainly on the political economy, emphasizing the competition over material resources, the ethnic division of labour and the ethnic stratification in the job market as the main sources of national inequality (Zureik, 1979; Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov, 1993; Lewin-Epstein et al., 1994; Haidar, 1995; Shafir and Peled, 2002). The supporters of this ‘market-centred’ view assume that the control of material capital and the monitoring of public funding by the dominant ethnoclass constitute a main source of exclusion, marginalization and control of Arabs in Israel (Migdal, 2001). Supporters of this tradition reduce the state into a secondary player, dominated by a hegemonic ethnoclass.

The third tradition focuses on the cultural and symbolic dimensions of the Israeli entity, that is on ethnonationalism as expressed in Zionism, which is conceived to be the principal source of inequality between Jews and Arabs in Israel (Kook, 1995; Rabinowitz, 1997; Sadi, 1997). This tradition addresses the materialistic dimensions of Palestinian reality in Israel as a derivative of the symbolic and ideological order according to which the Israeli state and economy are structured.
The controversies between the supporters of the different traditions, which are not by any means mutually exclusive, mirror the complexity of the relationship between Israel as a nationalizing Jewish state and its indigenous Palestinian minority. This intricacy makes more comprehensive analytical frameworks necessary in order to transcend methodological and theoretical exclusions apparent in the traditions mentioned. This paper demonstrates that the explanatory variables of each of the three traditions, namely the political (the state), the economic (the market) and the national–cultural (Zionism), operate in tandem and are mutually interdependent, feeding each other reciprocally and forming a complex power system that discriminates, deprives and marginalizes. This power system is characterized by the special combination of political exclusion, distributive injustice and national–cultural misrecognition that intersects in the state to form a multilayered and complex discriminatory structure. The model developed by Fraser (1997) to explain the dilemmas of social and political injustice and the struggle of minority groups for equality, with some minor modifications as outlined below, provides a good starting point to explain the dialectics within such systems of control. Fraser’s (1997) model has to bring back the state, not as an autonomous actor but rather as state in society, as was outlined by Migdal (2001). For the purpose of providing empirical evidence for the theoretical argument of the paper, the following discussion combines original research and data from previous studies. Before delving into the empirical analysis, we shall begin by further exploring the relevancy and necessity of a multidimensional theoretical framework to explain the relationship between nationalizing states and their indigenous national minorities.

**Political Exclusion, Distributive Inequality and National–Cultural Misrecognition**

The Arab struggle for equality and social and political justice in Israel could be seen as an integral part of a global process. Processes of globalization on the stage of international politics have brought to the fore contentious patterns of struggle from among indigenous and national minority communities in various national contexts (Keating, 1996; Preece, 1998; Havemann, 1999). The existing body of research in this field indicates that indigenous and national minorities are employing a variety of modes and means in the struggle for the recognition and achievement of their rights, not merely as an assembly of individuals, but also as distinct collectives that maintain and share in common a unique cultural and national identity that requires both institutional and symbolic treatment. Many indigenous national minorities in different states, democratic, liberal or authoritarian, are not satisfied with the granting of individual rights only, but seek recognition of their collective rights (Keating and McGarry, 2001). Many political theorists consent with the fundamental argument that integrative political solutions based on individual rights are not only unable to address the right of national and cultural minorities to preserve their identity, but can also often offend these rights (Kymlicka, 1995). Collective rights, such as cultural autonomy or federal consociationalism can strengthen individual rights and liberties, but only if they are not subjected to inhibitory conditions that produce overcrowded minority ghettos in the subterfuge of self-government.

The theoretical discussion concerning collective rights illuminates the theoretical distinction between the cultural–symbolic sphere and the materialistic and institutional sphere of social reality. Indeed, the distinction is strictly theoretical, but it is essential for comprehending relationships between conflicting ethnic, national and cultural groups.
The distinction is particularly relevant in the context of states that represent a given ethnic nationality, as does Israel and that are comprised of cultural and national groups deprived of rights in the political, economic and cultural spheres. Nationalizing states are particularly active in the political, economic and cultural spheres, aiming at intensifying the bond between the dominant nation and its environment (Brubaker, 1996, 2004).

The contribution of the theorist Fraser (1997) to the debate on these issues is one of major significance. Referring to the issue of social justice in multicultural and multinational societies and to the motives behind the mobilization of social movements, Fraser (1997) contended that the struggle for social justice could theoretically be divided into two forms. One form aligns with the struggle for social recognition and legitimacy on the part of different identity groups seeking to be integral participants in the public sphere. In this regard, Fraser (1997) relied on veteran theoretical tradition, which considers reciprocal recognition of cultural identities to be a central component in establishing democratic political and social frameworks that rely on principles of rights and justice. She echoed, in this context, theorists such as Taylor (1992) and Honneth (1995), who argued that recognition of the cultural identity of certain groups is an important component of democratic rights and even constitutes a basic need of human groups. A key principle of the politics of recognition, as outlined by Young (2000), posits that ‘recognition is primarily a starting point for political interaction and contest, rather than its end’ (p. 61). Taylor (1992) saw lack of recognition as ‘a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being’ (p. 25). Honneth (1995) viewed recognition and confirmation of one’s identity on behalf of others as an integral part of the formation of self. Thus, lack of recognition could result in the imposition of serious restrictions on one’s positive self-realization, an insight acquired by intersubjective means (Honneth, 1995).

The second form of political mobilization among social groups centres around the issue of distributive equality. Socio-economic injustices can amount to severe violations of basic human rights and often form a central motive for the establishment of social movements struggling for distributive justice or equality. Distributive injustice includes exploitation, the marginalization of struggling groups on the edges of economic activity and the planting of institutional and economic barriers to the economic integration of certain minorities, steps that unavoidably lead to poverty in the community. Fraser’s (1997) contribution is in inferentially bonding the two sorts of discrimination, which in her opinion symbiotically sustain one another, as reality so often illustrates.

Fraser (1997) focused our attention on this symbiosis in social reality between the cultural–symbolic and the economic–social, underlining that any attempt to establish a just social order in multicultural societies entails solutions that would grant meaningful recognition and a just distribution of resources. Fraser (1997) warned against ‘superficial’ solutions. She elucidated how, for example, recognition of cultural identity as expressed by liberal multiculturalism falls short, since such recognition, in itself, is unable to provide a satisfactory solution for the initial misrecognition and its legacy of discrimination and deprivation. In her view, identity politics narrowly conceived cannot in itself replace or rearrange the cultural–ideological order that produces the misrecognition of and deprivation among identity groups. Identity politics considered in isolation could result in the formation of cultural ghettos and social enclaves that would erect obstacles to rational communication between different cultural groups and eventually serve the hegemonic cultural and political order. According to Fraser (1997), there is a need for
transformative solutions that would utterly change the cultural–ideological order. Providing cultural groups with the opportunity to design an autonomous and unique cultural space is positive, but only so as to serve as stable ground and cultural support for the participation of minorities in designing and participating in the overall public sphere as a legitimate element. Solutions of cultural recognition that perpetuate hierarchies of identities, in the name of alleged multicultural consent, are part of the problem of injustice and not a part of its solution.

The politics of recognition, according to Fraser (1997), must be addressed when tackling the issue of distributive inequality if we wish to settle social conflicts and promote justice. The structural deprivation, upon which the distributive inequality is based, is tightly connected to the politics of recognition. This is particularly true in states with a narrowly conceived national and cultural identity that fail to represent the range of identities among the citizenry living within their purview, a context that Fraser (1997) did not cover in her study. Fraser (1997) criticized liberal welfare policy as a political and economic structure that fails to provide any solution to situations of structural discrimination and deprivation. The welfare state, in her opinion, intensifies and reifies inequality, granting a gloomy reality a humane appearance. Partial allocations of resources for coping with poverty and unemployment do not change the economic structure that generates socio-economic gaps and creates deprivation and discrimination. Accordingly, Fraser (1997) suggested a more binding transformative solution that combines ‘universalist social-welfare programs, steeply progressive taxation, macroeconomic policies aimed at creating full employment, a large nonmarket public sector, significant public and/or collective ownership, and democratic decision making about basic socioeconomic priorities’ (pp. 25–26). In other words, Fraser (1997) claimed that socio-economic structures create deprivation and discrimination that can be resolved only via fundamental structural changes, not cosmetic ones. Since discriminative socio-economic structures are both sustained by and sustain the hierarchy of identities in the state, consistency requires transformations in both the economic and the cultural spheres of social reality.

One remarkable disadvantage of the progressive model developed by Fraser (1997) is its liberal presuppositions regarding the state and its function in establishing and furthering inequality. Despite the fact that Fraser (1997) did not ignore the role of the state in constructing inequality, she did not stress it sufficiently as a central agent in the formation of the socio-economic and cultural–ideological order in any political context and particularly in nationalizing states. In this regard, Feldman (2002) claimed that Fraser’s (1997) model focuses on the sphere of civil society. The state’s role as a central actor in constituting social identities and as a major regulator in the distribution of economic resources in society is downplayed, with the state reduced largely to an arena in which other actors constitute inequality.

In order to overcome the shortages in Fraser’s (1997) model, there is a need to reintroduce the state as an active player in explaining distributive and cultural inequality. This need is particularly salient when discussing states with clear ethnocultural identity agendas. As Brown (1995) argued, the treatment of justice and equality cannot ignore the structure of the state as an object for criticism. The state and the political dynamics of inclusion and exclusion it generates must be an integral part of any theory of justice since the state constitutes one of the central sources of deprivation and oppression (Stevens, 1999). Any disregard of the state’s role results in a ‘displacement of politics’
In this regard, Young (2000) reminded us that ‘those who wish to undermine injustice cannot turn their backs on state institutions as tools for that end’ (p. 8). These theoretical contributions make clear that the political, economic, and cultural should be integrated in one multidimensional model if we wish to explain the dynamics of national inequality in multinational states.

An additional disadvantage to Fraser’s (1997) model as constructed is her neglect of the dimensions of corrective justice. Theorists studying post-colonial realities have demonstrated that the recognition of national–cultural rights and a program for distributive justice must address the historical dimension of minorities in colonial contexts if a conflict between a minority and its state is to be resolved (Haveman, 1999; Ivison et al., 2000).

Injustice in colonial contexts stems first and foremost from a misrecognition of the rights of a given nation over a territory considered by it to be its homeland, rather than solely a misconception of its national–cultural identity. There is an intense bond between national–cultural affiliation and control over a territory that is considered to be someone’s homeland (Kymlicka, 1995a). Thus, moves towards national–cultural recognition and distributive equality, if enacted without addressing colonial history and its legacy, will rely on and often serve the existing power structure that originally generated the inequality. It is claimed that even the definition of the resources to be distributed in such situations is determined by the existing power structure that aspires to maintain itself. Therefore, inserting corrective justice as an integral component into Fraser’s (1997) model is an essential step in making it relevant to the analysis of the dynamics of national inequality in ethnic states.

**Political Exclusion: Ethnic Majority Despotism and Ineffective Representation**

As mentioned above, nationalizing states are not neutral agents or passive arenas in which different social and political actors pursue their interests, but are rather active players in constituting social relations, economic priorities and national–cultural identity. Israel is a nationalizing state driven by a clear and strict ethnonational ethos as elucidated in its founding Zionist ideology. The coming discussion of the field of legislation aims to demonstrate how recent state policies continue to lead to majoritarian despotism of the Jewish majority, the subordination of Arab citizens and the hollowing out of Arab representation in state institutions and of their citizenship from any substantive meaning.

Although Israeli leaders have for several decades reiterated its formal and universal character, Zionism has been always the ideology of an ethnic national movement promoting priorities determined by Jews aspiring to or forming a majority in Israel (Shafir, 1996). From the very start, the state was defined in exclusive ethnonational terms (Kamir, 2000). Israeli citizenship (in Hebrew ezrahut) was normatively subordinated to the national affiliation (in Hebrew leom) of the hegemonic Jewish majority (Peled, 1992). Public space in Israel was constructed to reflect the modern Hebrew national identity that has developed in the last century. Although this identity is by no means homogenous, most of the Jewish public supports an exclusive Jewish character for the Israeli state.

Jewish hegemony in Israel has not been limited to the symbolic level only. In the last two decades we have witnessed a gradual process by which the Jewish character of the state has been installed as a super-constitutional convention that dictates the boundaries of legitimate political behaviour or organizing in Israel (Kirshenbaum, 1985). The legal and judicial process was complemented by intellectual endeavours that sought to justify...
the superiority of the ethnic Jewish nationality in the Israeli polity. Different academics provided theoretical and moral justifications that legitimate the exclusive Jewish character of the state. Some of them developed theoretical conceptions such as ‘liberal nationalism’ (Tamir, 1993) or ‘ethnic democracy’ (Smooha, 1996) that camouflaged the Israeli reality in moral and normative discourse. Others have been bolder, stating simply that ‘we should acknowledge that even presently, some of the demands of the Jewish nationality justify hampering the progress of Arab Israeli citizens’ (Gavison, 2002, p. 59).

The Israeli political system has invested much energy in blocking any challenges to Jewish hegemony in and of the Israeli state. In the mid-1980s the Jewish majority in the Knesset made any challenge to the Jewish identity of the state illegal, thereby preventing any political player from raising this topic in the public sphere. In 1985, the Knesset passed an amendment to Basic Law: The Knesset. In paragraph 7a, the state fixes its Jewish and democratic identity as a ground value of constitutional status, to which other democratic values are subjugated. The Knesset determined that any list of candidates whose party platform, ends or deeds, explicitly or implicitly, negate Israel’s identity as the state of the Jewish people cannot participate in elections.²

This determination became a super-constitutional principle, as contended by the president of the Supreme Court, Aharon Barak, who said that ‘The Basic Laws of the State of Israel constitute its constitution. These laws are scaled, on the normative level, above usual legislation’ (Barak, 1999, p. 131). The significant meaning of this process is that, while the democratic character of the state is concerned with its political regime, the Jewish character of the state fixes this national normative system as a super-principle in all state institutions. Indeed, while the democratic principle is inclusive, it is concerned with the procedural level only, since democratic rights are subordinated to the preservation of the Jewish character of the Israeli state. The Jewish majority largely ignores the contradiction/tension between these two principles. Gavison (2002), for example, perhaps inadvertently exemplified this majoritarian despotism by stating that ‘precisely because of Israel’s self-definition as democratic state, it should be Jewish’ (p. 69).

This reification of Israel’s identity as a Jewish state was reinforced by immutable legislation in the form of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, which determined, in its introductory paragraph on the objectives for this legislation, that ‘This Constitutional Law is meant to protect human dignity and liberty (or freedom of occupation), in order to anchor in the Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state’ (www.knesset.gov.il).

These principles give a clear normative priority to the Jewish essence of the state over the democratic one and define, in Saban’s (2002, p. 245) terms, some ‘taboo territories’ into which Arab citizens are not allowed to step. The sum of the legislation translates into the eviction of the Palestinian minority from effective democratic participation and the fixing of its inferior status in the conceptual normative order of the state. The Basic Laws have eliminated any option of the minority for appealing through the democratic process against the hegemonic definition of the state by the Jewish majority. The laws have determined that Israel is, ‘the state of the Jewish people, and the Jewish people only’, as claimed by Justice Menchem Elon, former deputy president of Israel’s Supreme Court.

In 2002, the Jewish majority further exacerbated the legal restrictions imposed upon political players in the Israeli democracy and expanded the realm of the ‘taboo territories’. In May 2002, the Knesset passed amendments to all election laws in order to redefine the limits of the parliamentary field and the boundaries for freedom of expression.
Since the parliamentary field constitutes a main arena in the Arab struggle for equality in Israel, the amendments of the law aimed at neutralizing the practical ability of Arab citizens to use democratic means for appealing against state characteristics that discriminate against them. Paragraph 7a of Basic Law: The Knesset was reformulated to set new restrictions and conditions that party lists and personal candidates are obliged to meet if they wish to participate in elections. Paragraph 57 of the Law of Elections was also amended, exacerbating the meaning of the amendments made in the former law.

The Knesset did not settle for merely blocking access to the Knesset for political players who undermine the world-view of the Jewish majority regarding the character of the Israeli state. It also confined the manoeuvring space of existing Knesset members who managed to bypass the obstacles of former laws by amending the Law of Immunity of the Knesset Members, their Rights and Duties, 1951. Amendment 29 of the law outlaws any expression or conduct by a Knesset member that ‘Negates the existence of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people; negate[s] the democratic character of the state; instigate[s] racism due to one’s skin color or racial affiliation or national–ethnic origin; support[s] armed struggle of an enemy state or terror actions against the State of Israel or against Jews or Arabs or for one’s being Jewish or Arab, in Israel or abroad’.

Although these amendments in the law were formulated in general terms and in the last clause cited even refer to the protection of Arab citizens, they were introduced mainly in order to obstruct any attempts, including those of democratic means, that aim at promoting a civic identity for the Israeli state, as opposed to the ethnonationalist identity as expressed in Zionism. These amendments in the law were preceded by an offensive from political, judicial and academic circles on the idea of ‘the state of all its citizens’ and on the notion of collective rights that revealed a wide-scoped ambition amongst a considerable portion of the Palestinian minority in Israel (Sheftan, 2002). Any attempt on behalf of Arab parties or public to challenge the exclusive Jewish character of the state is now defined as illegal. The new laws are not content with merely banning attempts to change the character of the State of Israel, but further demand those who do not identify with its reified ‘Jewish’, ‘democratic’ character and/or are even offended by it to declare faithfulness to it. The affidavit required from Knesset members states ‘I undertake the obligation to keep faith to the State of Israel, and avoid acting against the principles of paragraph 7a in the Basic Law: the Knesset’. As phrased in amendment number 46 to the Law of Elections, this demands that members of the Knesset, including Arabs, be loyal to the principles of paragraph 7a of the law, which define the State of Israel as a Jewish state. Smooha (2000) expressed the practical meaning of these amendments as ‘emptying Arab representation in the Knesset from any serious substantial meaning, limiting the job of Arab MKs to a struggle for better distributive deals only. Any demand for national recognition that challenges the state’s identity may end in criminal charges based on the spirit of the new law amendments’ (p. 596). Smooha’s (2000) statement illustrated how the concept of ‘hollow citizenship’ for indigenous national minorities put forward by this paper is a primary consequence of the policies adopted by nationalizing states. It also exemplifies how transformative political solutions based on corrective justice are necessary for any serious treatment of demands raised by indigenous minorities.

Without such recognition of the requirements of corrective justice, the striving of Arab citizens for recognition as a indigenous national minority entitled to collective rights, the activation of their citizenship and full participation in running the government in Israel are considered to subvert the foundations of the State of Israel as a Jewish state.
De-ethnicizing the state is currently perceived by the Jewish majority as offending the right to self-determination of the Jewish people and, therefore, by extension, threatening the State of Israel’s right to exist. The official and broader public reactions to the publication of ‘The Future Vision of the Arab Palestinian in Israel’ and the ‘Democratic Constitution’ documents by leaders of the Arab community, which some commentators dubbed ‘a declaration of war’, mirror the discursive and legislative attempts to limit Arab demands to the distributive level. The Israeli political system is not willing to make any distinction between the right to self-determination of the Jewish people and exclusive Jewish hegemony over all public spaces with a complete prohibition on democratic appeal against this hegemony (Gans, 2006). This point of view was pronounced in the lead-up to Knesset elections in January 2003 and March 2006 when major attempts were undertaken to disqualify Arab lists and parties from running. These efforts illustrate the acute damage caused by these amendments to the constitutional rights of Arab citizens. This damage is the consequence of the Jewish majority’s transformation of attitudes and opinions that regard as illegitimate the definition of the State of Israel as a Jewish state into a political position forbidden by law. The criminalization of a broadly shared opinion among the Arab population increases tension and mistrust between the hegemonic majority and the subordinate minority. The Jewish majority views the national rights of the Palestinian people to be met in the future in a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. Therefore, the demand of Arab citizens of collective national rights inside Israel is considered illegitimate. The fact that a Palestinian state is not yet established, the Jewish majority believes, results from the unwillingness of the Palestinian leadership to reach a historical compromise, a position strengthened after the rise of the Hamas movement to power in the Palestinian Authority (Ben Ami, 2006).

The changes in the laws have clear economic and cultural–symbolic implications. The de-legitimization of Arab representation in the elected institutions of the state weakens the former’s capability to influence policies of resource distribution. On the one hand, any attempt to challenge the discriminatory economic policies of the state that implicates Israeli ethnonationalism, that is Zionism, is viewed as challenging the ideological and institutional infrastructure of the whole political system. On the other hand, Arab representatives, who are excluded from all decisive positions and bodies in the Knesset and the government, are completely disconnected from the bureaucratic infrastructure of the state, which in practical terms determines daily policies. As a result, Arab representatives cannot provide solutions to their constituencies in the same way that Jewish representatives do.

The cultural–symbolic implications of these amendments to the law find reflection in the interconnectedness between the official de-legitimization of Arab leaders and their negative representations in Israeli media. When Arab leaders were disqualified from running in the sixteenth Knesset elections by the Central Elections Committee, which is composed of politicians proportionally representing the balances of power between the parties in the Knesset, the media played a central role in justifying this decision (Jamal, 2005). Arab leaders were accused of being a prime source of threat to the security of the state and a serious challenge to its Jewish character, despite the fact that Arab Knesset members compose only 8% of its total members. This trend became even clearer during and after the second Israeli war on Lebanon in 2006, where much of the Israeli frustration regarding the misconduct of the Israeli army against Hizballah was directed against the Arab population and its leadership, accused of cooperating with the enemies of the state (Rekhes, 2006). The accusations were voiced clearly in all media
outlets despite the fact that the Arab population was paying a heavy price in the war. Almost half (18) of the 39 civilians killed in the rocket shelling of Israeli cities were Arab citizens who paid with their lives for the lack of public investment in shelters in Arab towns and villages.

To the amendments of the Israeli election laws outlined above, one should add the fundamental change to Israeli citizenship laws, first introduced in July 2003 and confirmed as constitutional by the Israeli High Court in May 2006, as another clear indication of the role of the state in reducing the status of Arab citizenship in Israel. For the first time since 1948, Israel designed and implemented a law that limits the right of Arab citizens to live with their spouses, if those spouses reside in Palestinian areas occupied by Israel in 1967. Whereas Israel’s Citizenship Law enables a gradual process of naturalization for aliens (non-Jews) who marry Israeli citizens, this right is denied to Palestinians who currently reside in the Palestinian occupied territories. Since Israeli citizens of Palestinian origin are those most likely to marry a Palestinian from the occupied territories, the amendment of the law is a clear indication that Israeli legislators targeted a particular group of people based on their national affiliation (Kohn, 2006). This change to the law is the culmination of a process in which the basic rights of Palestinian citizens are emptied of substantive meaning by the state based on their national affiliation (Peled and Navot, 2005). In November 2006, the government proposed to extend the validity of this amendment to the Citizenship Law and even expand its restrictions. The new proposal seeks to restrict intermarriage between Arab citizens of Israel and Arab nationals of states conceived to be enemies or rivals of the state of Israel (Haaretz, 29 November 2006).

There is little doubt that state policy in this regard is an integral part of its attempts to denude Arab citizenship of substantive meaning. When the spirit of the law is compared to the liberalism of the Law of Return, which allows those with one Jewish grandparent, a Jewishness in question when judged by traditional halakhic definitions, to immigrate to Israel and acquire Israeli citizenship, as did hundreds of thousands of immigrants from the former Soviet Union, the real intentions behind Israeli policies towards the citizenship of the Arab population are clear (Jamal, 2007). Instead of political devolution that might empower the Arab population, increase its trust in state institutions and meet its expectations for equal citizenship, the state is primarily engaged with planning how to face the Arab population as a demographic threat that should be eliminated (Sofer, 2001). The integration of the ‘Yisrael Beitenu’ party of Avigdor Liberman into the Olmert Government in October 2006 without much public protest, is a clear indication of the treatment of Arab citizenship in Israel. Liberman’s plan to revoke the citizenships of hundreds of thousands of Arab citizens and transfer them and their limited landholdings to the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority in exchange for official annexation of large Israeli settlements in the West Bank to Israel was met with ease in the Israeli public (Arieli et al., 2006). While Israeli citizenship for Jews confers extra-territorial rights carried with them into the occupied lands in which they reside, Israeli citizenship for Arabs residing in Israel can be stripped away in order to accommodate those same Jews’ rights – a clear indication of what this paper earlier dubbed ‘hollow citizenship’.

Distributive Injustice and the National Economy

Two arenas that best illustrate distributive inequality between Jews and Arabs in Israel and Jewish hegemony over the state, despite the ‘liberalization’ process (Peled and Navot,
2005) that took place in the 1990s, are those of space and planning on the one hand and access to the labour market on the other. Both demonstrate the interrelationship between the political, economic and cultural and reflect the need to address all three spheres in one multidimensional framework, if any solutions to national inequality in Israel are to be found.

**Space and Planning**

One of the major policies adopted by the state of Israel upon its establishment was the dissolution of the physical and cultural bond between the remaining Arab population and its homeland. For the purpose of controlling its new geopolitical space, the state confiscated the majority of privately held Arab lands, establishing a new ‘land regime’ by which it ended up controlling over 93% of the territory under its jurisdiction (Yiftachel, 1996). For the purpose of transferring Arab lands to Jewish control, the state has adopted diverse legislative and administrative means (Kidar and Forman, 2004; Kidar and Yiftachel, 2006). This policy outline has facilitated the ‘trapped minority’ status described by Rabinowitz (2001).

Considering the fact that land was the only asset in Arab ownership that could generate income, expropriating land has a direct socio-economic effect on most Arab citizens that goes far beyond the institutional and political influence it had at the national level. Average Arab citizens have to work at least several years in order to be able, if ever, to return the worth of 1 acre of their confiscated land. Furthermore, the transfer of land from Arab to Jewish hands, which continues by varied means to this very day, has led to the erasure of its Palestinian identity and characteristics and the renaming of the whole ‘new’ space to reflect Jewish history and national collective imagination.

According to Yiftachel (1998), the policy of space planning in Israel is comprised of several dimensions, central of which are the territorial, procedural, socio-economic and cultural. There is an essential connection between these four dimensions that is generally aimed towards strengthening Jewish existence at the expense of the Arab population living in this territory. The connection becomes evident in the determination of regions for development in planning policy and construction on the grounds of ethnic affiliation, limiting the opportunities for natural development of the Arab population (Kernochan, 1999). Planning and construction regulations in Israel remain institutionally and ideologically alien to Arab housing culture, which explains the phenomenon of ‘illegal house building’ in Arab towns and villages that leads to the intense policy of house demolition by the state (Khamaisi, 1993). The state utilizes all bureaucratic means possible to restrict Arab development plans. Road infrastructure planning and the projected locations for industrial and commercial areas in the current Israeli Government’s development plans for the Galilee and Negev regions demonstrate the patterns by which Arab citizens are excluded from the development maps. Most of the governmental investment that has been confirmed for allocation to the Negev region by the Olmert Government on 27 November 2006 is directed towards Jewish towns and infrastructures, despite the fact that the Arab Bedouin population of that region is the most unfortunate population in Israel (*Haaretz*, 28 November 2006).

One of the best examples to illustrate the political, economic and cultural implications of Israeli land policies is the building of highway number 6, called ‘Chutze Yisrael’ (Cross-Israel Highway). Planning for the construction of this road began in the 1970s,
with implementation delayed until the late 1990s. It is supposed to cross Israel from the south to north but is still not yet completed. The purpose of the road is to connect the Israeli periphery to the metropolitan centre, lower traffic on the main coastal highway and move some of the industrial infrastructure from main cities to areas along the road. It also integrates Israeli settlements in areas annexed from Palestinian territories in the West Bank to the Dan metropolitan area into this massive infrastructural project. Derech Eretz was selected as the project concessionaire to design, execute and operate the central section of the highway, from the Sorek Interchange in the south, up to the Eyron Interchange in the north, to be operated as a toll road. According to Derech Eretz, the highway is supposed to reach 300 km in length. The central section that has been completed ‘covers about 86 km, and includes 10 interchanges, 94 bridges, 2 tunnels, each 455 m long, 100 km of agricultural service roads and 44 km of lateral roads integrated into the project’ (www.kvish6.co.il). For the purpose of building this section of the road, almost 20 000 dunams of land were confiscated, 2400 dunams of which were privately held lands. Arab citizens held the vast majority of the private land confiscated (2100 dunams). This has led to much frustration among the Arab population, who have already lost much of their lands in the confiscation waves of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s and this is compounded by the fact that the road serves primarily Jewish rather than Arab communities and needs. Furthermore, the location of the road on the borders of small Arab towns and villages was viewed as another manipulation by the state to achieve two goals: first, to gnaw at remaining Arab land resources and, second, to separate Arab villagers from agricultural lands lying just outside their villages. Despite much Arab protest, the road has been partially built and continues to be built, while the ecological and economic repercussions on Arabs in the Triangle region are already evident.

Arab fears of the road were intensified when it became clear that the commercial areas built along the road were to be given exclusively to Jews, despite the fact that Arabs shared in the heavy price of building the road. Derech Eretz licensed the establishment of only one commercial area in the Triangle region, which has a large Arab majority population (78%). Despite Arab demands for licenses to establish commercial areas along the road, Jewish citizens were exclusively chosen to operate the licensed commercial areas.

The building of the Cross-Israel highway demonstrates that space-planning policies have cultural and political implications beyond the economic dimension. The interrelatedness between political, economic and cultural policies becomes even clearer when we consider the fact that transferring land from Arab to Jewish hands leads to the renaming of spaces and places according to what is called ‘Hebrew Map’ (Benvenisti, 1997). Almost every Arab site incorporated into the highway project has been renamed according to Jewish collective imagination, thereby displacing Palestinians symbolically after they were displaced physically.

Another good current example for illustrating the interrelationship between economic deprivation and national-cultural misrecognition and the politics of exclusion is the limits put on Bedouin land use in the Negev desert and the efforts to concentrate all Bedouins in state-constructed townships (Shamir, 1999). Government efforts to this end began in the 1960s and continue to this very day, neglecting the nomadic and semipastoral culture and customs of the Bedouin and failing to recognize existing villages as legitimate residential areas, entitled to basic infrastructures and services. The state’s attempts to impose its sovereignty over the Negev region have led to the use of poisonous materials to eliminate wide agricultural areas planted by Bedouins in that region and
which form their main and only source of income (Shamir, 1999). The state continues to exploit the deprivation of the Bedouin community, utilizing an array of bureaucratic means in order to control the Negev lands owned, at least *de facto*, by the Bedouin community and claimed by the state to be, at least *de jure*, state land (Swirski and Hasson, 2006). It is here that we might reflect on how such resource planning policies in nationalizing states, conceived out of national–cultural misrecognition, further feed such misrecognition. National–Cultural misrecognition in nationalizing states extends far beyond abstract identity issues to impact on the actual physical existence of indigenous national minorities, denying the land rights of the indigenous Bedouin and colonizing their space, physically and symbolically, as in the above example. This ‘hollowing out’ of Arab citizenship in Israel, which is also evident in the example presented just below, underlines the importance of accounting for the special characteristics of nationalizing states via the use of a multidimensional model.

In the recent plans presented by the Israeli Government to develop the Negev and Galilee regions, most resources are directed to support Jewish towns and infrastructures and empower Jewish communities. In the case of the Galilee region, despite governmental statements acknowledging that the Lebanon war has caused harm to both Arab and Jewish communities and pledges to invest resources equally to develop both communities, only a small portion of the investments reach the Arab community, who constitute more than half the population of that region. According to *Haaretz* newspaper only 10% of the resources directed to the Galilee region have been invested in Arab towns. This policy as practised serves another official policy position of the Israeli Government to ‘Judaize the Galilee’, a project propagated by the office of the deputy prime minister Shimon Peres, who has been entrusted to invest all energies possible to change the demographic balance in this region, mostly populated by Arabs.

The Labour Market

The policy of land expropriation led to an intense proletarianization process in the Arab labour force (Zureik, 1979). By 1970 most of Arab labour force (71.5%) was comprised of wage earners (Lewin-Epstein *et al.*, 1994) and by 1990 the figure had reached 83%. This process increased Arab dependence on the Jewish economy. The integration of Arabs into the Jewish economy was fraught with social and economic disadvantages in the sense that Arab workers were generally hired for jobs located on the bottom of employment scale (Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov, 1993). The lack of a broad employment infrastructure in Arab towns and the evident preference of Jewish employers for Jewish workers over Arab workers caused income gaps, inequality and clear differences in standard of living indices for the two communities.

Modifications to the job market in the 1980s and 1990s further highlighted the structural inferiority of the Arab labour force in Israel. The expansion of labour force opportunities in the scientific, academic and service sectors and the reduction in the number of people employed in manual work, including the agricultural sector, made discrimination against the qualified and professional Arab labour force even more conspicuous. In 1999 50.5% of the Ashkenazi Jews (descendants of parents from European–American origins) and 23.7% of Mizrahi Jews (descendants of parents from Asian–African origins) were engaged in academic, professional or administrative professions. On the other hand, only 14.7% of the Arab labour force occupied the same fields that year. Most Arabs with an academic
background are employed in the field of Arab education as teachers and headmasters. In 2002 65% of the Arab labour force was still defined by skilled and unskilled workers in the fields of construction, light industry and services (Fares, 2002). The absence of Arab workers in many lucrative fields, such as high-technology, informatics, aviation and communication, clarifies the structural inequality that the Arab labour force is facing. In addition, we should consider the marginal presence or complete absence of Arab workers in most governmental offices and state companies, such as the Electric company, Mekorot (administrator of the water economy in Israel), Bezeq (which was the national telephone company), Solel Bone (a construction corporation), Amidar (a public housing company), etc. Of the 59,938 workers in the state’s services in January 2000 only 2,835 (5%) were Arabs, most of whom worked in either the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Education.10

The discrimination against Arab citizens includes serious income gaps. According to the National Insurance Institute, comparisons between the average wage data from Arab and Jewish settlements indicate that the average Arab income is 60% that of the average Jewish income (Bendleck, 2002). Recent information about the equality index released by the Adva Center in December 2006 noted that the average income of an Arab employee was 72% that of the average urban employee income in Israel (Swirski and Konor-Attias, 2006). It is important to note that the same study puts the average income of a Jewish employee of oriental origin at 100%, while the average income of a Jewish employee of Ashkenazi origin is 139%. These data mirror the large income gaps between Jews and Arabs without considering that the differences might become even greater when we evaluate income from capital investments or the inter-generational transfer of wealth.

A troublesome phenomenon that has resulted from the ethnic stratification in the Israeli job market is the ceaseless exit of Arab men aged 45–65 years from the job market. The extremely high rates of unemployment amidst men who in other societies are considered to be in the peak of their productivity have deep social and cultural consequences. Since Arab society is characterized by large families dependent on a single wage earner, the dropping out of men aged 45–65 years from the job market translates directly into increased poverty and dependence on welfare and the assistance of state institutions.

This reality has serious and direct cultural implications. The father, generally the primary authority figure in Arab families, loses one of his central sources of power. Beyond the psychological impact of such a process on the individual, it has a major cultural impact on youth who look to this generation for a model to be followed. To this, it should be added that, since most Arab workers who do find work are often obliged to take jobs outside their town of residence, most commute long distances and come back late to sleep in their village, only in order to leave to work the next morning. This process has intensified the deflation in the status of men without supplying mechanisms and tools that enable replacement of this authority by a constructive alternative, which may explain the rise in criminality and social deviations among Arab society in Israel, such as alcoholism, drug use, violence, vandalism, etc.

**Ethnonationalism and the Politics of Misrecognition**

The final dimension of the analytical framework utilized in this analysis of Jewish–Arab relations in Israel is the cultural–symbolic. As mentioned earlier and as has become clear
over the course of this discussion, this dimension interrelates with the political and economic spheres and issues of political exclusion and distributive inequality. The cultural–symbolic dimension is deeply related to the distributive–materialist in terms of allocations of resources and employment as outlined above and is related to deliberate state policies that foster national–cultural misrecognition, as should become clear in the examples examined in the following pages.

To illustrate the characteristics of misrecognition of the national identity of Arab society in Israel and its economic and political implications this paper utilizes the biased educational policy of the Ministry of Education on the one hand and, on the other, the media’s betrayal of its role as protector of democratic values and as the public sphere in which all social voices are supposed to have a chance to express their interests and represent their identity.

Education and De-nationalization

The Arab educational system is separate from the Jewish educational system in Israel. Some Israeli scholars view this fact as representing a collective right granted by the state to its Arab citizens (Saban, 2002). However, a deeper, more realistic examination of the Arab educational system in Israel demonstrates that it is utilized as a control mechanism and an ideological apparatus, tightly supervised by the Israeli General Security Service, the Shabak. Jews hold the senior positions in the Ministry of Education, particularly those that are concerned with determining the contents and dictating the didactic and pedagogic concepts of instruction policy (Abu-Asbah, 1997). Only in recent years have a few Arabs been assigned major roles in the Arab education system, while still executing policies determined from above. The system suffers a severe shortage in resources (Al-Haj, 1995). Despite modifications made in recent years and attempts undertaken to reduce the gaps, there are still significant shortages in basic educational infrastructure, such as schools, teachers and instruction hours (Lavi, 1997; Abu-Asbah, 2004). In the lead-up to the 2005–2006 and 2006–2007 school years, major shortages in school buildings and classrooms were reported in the news.11 The gaps between the Jewish and Arab educational systems are largely responsible for the relatively low scores of Arab students in Israel in the psychometric examinations necessary to enter the university system and the accompanying economic and cultural implications of such an outcome.

Scholars whose focus is the Arab education system in Israel have demonstrated that some modifications have been made in recent years. Nonetheless, these changes remain subjugated to a philosophical framework that strives to sustain an alternative Arab Israeli identity, alienated from its historical, cultural and national past (Al-Haj, 1994; Abu-Asbah, 2004). The emphasis put on the issue of loyalty to the state and the stress on the uniqueness of Israeli Arabs as a community separate from the rest of the Palestinian people, bear sufficient evidence to the ideological and political intentions of the Israeli Ministry of Education. Mari (1978) demonstrated that the Arab education system ‘is a tool by which the whole minority is manipulated by a powerful reward and punishment system, based on the quality of political behavior rather than the merit of Arab teachers’ (p. 58). Examinations of the contents of the Arab educational curriculum have found that they aim at creating a submissive Arab, who is willing to accept his inferiority against the superiority of the Jews and, consequently, at weakening and eliminating the Arab-Palestinian identity (Al-Haj, 1995; Abu-Asbah, 2004).
A study recently conducted on civic education in Arab schools found that the resonating goal of this education is promoting Israeli patriotism and lack of critique of the political system, rather than nourishing civic consciousness and active citizens (Jamal, 2005). Arab children are taught that the Israeli political system is democratic, bearing liberal values, without much reference to their secondary status. Furthermore, Arab children are exposed to the formal structures of the Israeli political system without much reference to its practices. The gap between the formal structure and the daily translations of its policies in practice is never explained, feeding a kind of cognitive dissonance in most Arab children. This type of education creates the illusion that discrimination against Arabs in Israel is a temporal or circumstantial flaw, rather than part of an institutionalized policy tied to the identity of the Arab children as Palestinians. This identity is misrepresented in civic education in order to justify the status quo and legitimate the system, which deprives these same children of basic financial resources for study in conditions similar to that of their Jewish compatriots (Jamal, 2005). Moreover, the misrecognition of Arabs and their identity in the contents of school textbooks finds reflection in the physical conditions of Arab schools when compared to Jewish ones.

The Hebrew Media and Arabs in the Public Sphere

It is customary to regard the mass media as a central institutional player in modern societies, especially when concerned with social conflicts (Hoffmann-Riem, 1996; Wolfsfeld, 1997; Jacobs, 2000). The media is a key actor in determining the public agenda and designing public opinion on a variety of issues. A study conducted recently based on a representative sampling of the adult Arab population in Israel regarding media consumption habits found that a majority of Arab citizens (65%) mistrust the Israeli Hebrew-language media (Jamal, 2006). A majority of Arab society (48.9%) believes that it is treated unfairly in the Hebrew-language media and, as a result, a majority of Arab society (58.4%) feels that the Hebrew-language media fails to represent it (Jamal, 2006). Accordingly, Arab citizens consume Hebrew-language media in low amounts. When they do turn to Hebrew-language media sources, it is mostly for news rather than entertainment and the information is balanced against alternative media sources, such as satellite news broadcasts from the Arab world. This raises many questions as to why, after 57 years of being Israeli, Arab citizens express deep mistrust of Israeli media.

Since the establishment of the state in 1948, the authorities aspired to develop media institutions that could help in controlling and influencing the Arab public sphere in Israel (Jamal, 2005). The state was directly involved in establishing Arabic-language newspapers immediately after 1948. Since the late 1960s, mainly after the foundation of the Israel Broadcasting Authority, there has been an official Arabic-language radio station and an Arabic-language television programme of a few hours in length on the publicly owned station, Channel One. The main goal of these media outlets was not to represent Arab needs as much as to set the public social agenda of this population and frame its consciousness in line with Israeli interests12 (Jamal, 2005).

Today Israel has a well-developed communications system that consists of daily newspapers of wide circulation, ramified television and radio broadcasts and many digital and electronic communication networks (Caspi and Limor, 1999). Until the late 1990s, there had not been any serious examination of the representation of Arabs in the Hebrew-language media. In the last several years, a number of scholars managed to test and
evaluate how Arab citizens are portrayed in the Israeli media (Abraham, 2001; Dor, 2004). One important characteristic of the findings of these studies is the fact that there is no significant difference between national or publicly owned media and privately owned media concerning modes of framing and representation of Arab citizens. Most studies indicate that the Israeli media is deeply influenced by official policy towards the Arab population (Jamal, 2005). Hence, the framing of Arab citizens introduces them as ‘strangers’ in good cases, as ‘suspicious’ in some cases and as ‘dangerous’, ‘outlaws’ and ‘troublemakers’ in most cases (Wolfsfeld et al., 2000). The Hebrew media utilizes different frames to intensify the sense of threat among Jewish society as to the danger posed by the Arab population (Dor, 2001).

A central reason for such negative portrayals is the fact that the Hebrew media in Israel rely on official figures for its sources, which usually give one-sided pictures based on expectations rather than facts. A study on the function of the Hebrew media during the first intifada revealed that the press fulfilled the role of an agent transferring messages from the government, or the Jewish establishment to Israeli Arabs . . . The newspapers have become a sort of educational tool . . . highlighting deterring and sometimes even threatening messages from both identified and unidentified sources in the Israeli regime’ (Asia, 2000, p. 31).

This role on the part of the Hebrew media in Israel remains the norm, as recent research conducted by the Israeli Second Broadcasting Corporation has also demonstrated the marginality of the Arab population in Israeli electronic media (Abraham et al., 2004). The study examined primetime television programming at the two main privately owned stations in Israel, Channel 2 and Channel 10. Arabs occupied marginal space (3%) in primetime programmes at both Israeli television channels and were dominant only in 2% of the news items, where in most cases they were pictured in negative terms.

Examining the portrayal of Arabs in one of the leading ‘reality’ programmes on Israeli television, ‘A Leader is Needed’, revealed the ideological encoding of the national Jewish discourse in universal statements, such as fair and equal competition between young and enthusiastic leaders (Jamal, 2006). Despite the fact that the competition between the leaders was framed in liberal and universal terms, the Arab candidate faced major gaps between her Israeliness and the Israeliness of her Jewish competitors. Not behaving according to the expectations of the dominant majority and not respecting its political identity as expressed through the Israeli national anthem, which is completely and exclusively Jewish, led to her expulsion from the competition. Although the competition was declared to be nationally and politically neutral, deviation from the Israeli-Jewish consensus by the Arab candidate led to her exclusion from it on national grounds (Jamal, 2006). Furthermore, the marginality of Arabs does not stop on the screen. It also lies behind the screen, where one rarely finds Arabs working in Hebrew media institutions, neither as journalists nor as technicians, a fact that once again reveals the interrelatedness between distributive inequality and national–cultural misrecognition.

Towards Conclusion
This study has tried to illustrate how in nationalizing states the three spheres, the political, the socio-economic and the cultural, generate structural inequality interchangeably. They
feed off and promote one another in such a way that makes the treatment of any one of them in isolation ineffectual in comprehensively explaining majority–minority relations in Israel. Political exclusion, distributive inequality and national–cultural misrecognition have to be viewed as three interrelated dimensions of the same analytical framework if we wish to explain the complexity of nationalizing state–indigenous minority relations in Israel, escaping methodological reductionism and theoretical partiality. When inequality between social groups has political, material and cultural dimensions, a dialectic relationship between them is forged. As illustrated in this paper, the deprivation of a national minority’s identity in the public sphere, expressed in distributive inequality in the state’s policies, results in further dispossession of the minority’s culture in other public spaces.

The Israeli case provides an outstanding example of the theoretical insight made by Brubaker (1996, 2004) that nationalizing states are active central players in generating social inequality and enforcing one cultural identity in the public sphere, while partially excluding subordinate social groups from the political game. This makes any attempt to promote political justice and solve social conflicts difficult or even impossible if the structure of the nationalizing state is not transformed.

Examination of the Israeli case has demonstrated that reducing the politics of justice to cultural recognition and distributive equality cannot answer problems raised by the state as a political agent. Indeed, one must be cautious of making the Zionist state or ideology a sole comprehensive category for explaining the marginality of Arab society in Israeli politics. As the paper has demonstrated the labour market and the media, which operate outside the direct control of the state, still play a major role in explaining the marginality and subordination of Arab citizens. Nevertheless, it is impossible to treat the formation and location of the Arab indigenous national minority in Israel without devoting a great deal of attention to the Jewish state’s role in creating socio-economic and cultural–ideological structures that discriminate, deprive and dispossess Arabs. This leads us to the conclusion that Fraser’s (1997) framework is of great importance in explaining the dynamics of inequality, especially if developed to include the state as a central political player within society, as delineated by Migdal (2001a) in his state-in-society model.

Combining the three dimensions mentioned so far into a comprehensive theoretical model might also be a good tool for explaining the patterns of mobilization of minorities against their deprivation and marginalization. The Arab public in Israel and mainly its current leadership aspires, in Fraser’s (1997) terms, for transformational solutions that integrate the three elements of discrimination against them into one unified disposition. This aspiration, which is expressed in ‘The Future Vision of the Arab Palestinian in Israel’ and the ‘Democratic Constitution’ documents, illustrates the significance of the treatment of the three components presented in the preface of this article, not only for understanding the dynamics of inequality in Israel, but also for analysing the modes of struggle used by discriminated minorities against the mechanisms responsible for their marginalization. Despite the internal differences within Arab society, it seems that any future solution to Arab problems in Israel must address the political exclusion, distributive injustice and national–cultural misrecognition to which they are subjected. In other words, the challenge that these Arab demands set for the Israeli state and its hegemonic Jewish majority could be overcome by giving their hollow citizenship a substantive political, economic and cultural meaning. A multicultural power structure that expresses the collective rights of all national groups inside Israel, agreed upon by Jewish and Arab elites, may be a necessary formula to overcome the predicament of Jewish–Arab relations in Israel.
The tragic flipside, however, is that the Jewish majority considers such demands to be indicators of disloyalty to the state and to constitute attempts at renouncing Jewish rights to statehood, thus leading to further deprivations aimed at undermining already limited Arab sources of power. The Jewish majority’s response to the ‘The Future Vision of the Arab Palestinian in Israel’ (2006) and the ‘Democratic Constitution’ (2007) reflect an inherent suspicious position towards Arab demands for collective national rights, considering them as an indirect strategy to undermine Israel’s right to exist as a state that expresses the Jewish right for self determination. This suspicious position vis-à-vis Arabs’ demands is usually interrelated with political changes taking place in the Palestinian Authority, thereby fuelling the hollowing out policies adopted by the Israeli state thus far.

Notes

1. See a special issue of the journal Citizenship Studies, 7(4) (December 2004).
3. The new condition forbids implicit or explicit support of any candidate or party list for armed struggle by a state or a terrorist organization against the state of Israel. This formulation was designed to block Arab support of Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
4. On the political plan of the Liberman party, see its website linked to the Knesset website at www.knesset.gov.il.
5. On 2 March 2003, the state destroyed 18 houses in Kfar Kassem. Another 150 houses have been defined by the authorities as illegal and are destined for demolition. See the report of the Arab Human Rights Association http://www.arabhra.org/pressrel030305.htm; Al-Ittihad, 9.3.2003, Al-Ahali, 10.3.2003, Al-Sennara, 7.3.2003, Al-Akhabar, 7.3.2003, Fasl Al-Maqal, 7.3.2003.
6. The Mossawa Center in Haifa released a report demonstrating that, out of the $4.25 billion directed to develop the Galilee, only $400 million is to be given to Arab towns, despite the fact that Arabs comprise 50% of the population in the region. Haaretz, 21 December 2006.
12. See the letter of intentions written by Samuel Bar-Haim regarding the issuing of newspapers in Arabic to the Arab public in Israel, 18 September 1958. See file G 5498/12 in the Governmental Archives in Jerusalem.

References

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