

Two Peoples – Two Stories: Anti-Immigrant Attitudes in Post-Socialist Russia

Anastasia Gorodzeisky¹ and Anya Glikman²

¹Tel Aviv University, ²Kibbutzim College, Israel

ABSTRACT

This article investigates mechanisms underlying anti-immigrant sentiment in post-socialist Russia in particular, and in societies undergoing a search for new national identity borders in general. We argue that when the borders of national identity are drawn and redefined, the forces that drive anti-immigrant attitudes differ meaningfully for members of the ethnic majority group and for members of the minority population. Our empirical analysis utilizes data obtained from a representative sample of the Russian population by the European Social Survey (2006-2012). Descriptive data reveal that the level of anti-immigrant attitudes among ethnic Russians (the majority population) is higher than among non-ethnic Russians (ethnic minority group), reflecting the fact that the crisis of national identity in post-socialist Russia has undermined, primarily, a sense of group position of ethnic majority. Our main findings demonstrate that in post-socialist Russia, as a society undergoing the critical period of the re-consideration of national identity, the anti-immigrant attitudes of the ethnic majority group rely mostly on perceptions of collective (state) vulnerability, while the anti-immigrant attitudes of ethnic minority groups rely to a greater degree on individuals' vulnerable socioeconomic position, and conservative views and ideologies (i.e., self-interests).

KEYWORDS: anti-immigrant attitudes; immigration; group position theory; Russia; prejudice.

A significant body of research conducted across Western societies (Western Europe, the United States, Canada) has consistently observed that individual-level attributes, especially socioeconomic vulnerability and conservative views and ideologies, are likely to increase hostility and antagonism toward immigrant populations (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Fetzer 2000; Raijman and Semyonov 2004; Schlueter, Schmidt, and Wagner 2008; Strabac and Listhaug 2008). Surprisingly, findings from post-socialist Russia differ considerably from those observed in Western societies. Results of recent studies (Bessudnov 2016; Gorodzeisky, Glikman, and Maskileyson 2015) revealed that in post-socialist Russia, the socioeconomic position of individuals—as well as conservative views and ideologies—are *not* effective in predicting anti-foreigner attitudes.¹ This is so despite the very high level of xenophobia and negative sentiments toward immigrants in Russia.

Direct correspondence to: Anastasia Gorodzeisky, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Tel Aviv University, Haim Levanon Street, 30, Tel Aviv, 6997801, Israel. E-mail: anastasiag@post.tau.ac.il.

1 Results from an additional recent study (Bahry 2016) also demonstrate that an individual's socioeconomic position together with demographic characteristics only explains a tiny part (between 2 and 3 percent) of the variance in anti-immigrant attitudes. Bahry

The high level of anti-foreigner attitudes in Russia is usually understood in the context of the dramatic geo-political and socioeconomic changes experienced by Russian society following the collapse of the former Soviet Union, a collapse that led to a deep crisis of national identity, and a rising need for the reconsideration of national self (Gudkov 2006; Malinova 2010; Pain 2007; Shlapentokh 2007; Warhola and Lehning 2007). Anastasia Gorodzeisky, Anya Glikman, and Dina Maskileyson (2015) suggest that the social climate of Russia in the first decade of twenty-first century, as a society in search of new national identity borders, has diluted socioeconomic and ideological divergences among native citizens with regard to attitudes towards immigrants. That is, in contrast to Western societies characterized by stable political and welfare regimes, in post-socialist Russia negative attitudes toward immigrants are likely to emerge regardless of natives' socioeconomic status or conservative ideology. If this is correct, what can explain anti-immigrant attitudes in post-socialist Russia in particular, and in societies passing through the critical period of the reconsideration of national identity in general? The present study aims to answer these questions.

We argue here that when the borders of national identity are drawn and redefined, the forces that drive anti-immigrant attitudes differ for members of the ethnic majority group and for members of the ethnic minority populations. In what follows, we contend that while anti-immigrant attitudes of the *ethnic majority group* rely mostly on perceptions of collective (state) vulnerability, the anti-immigrant attitudes of *ethnic minority groups* rely to a greater degree on individuals' socioeconomic vulnerability and conservative views and ideologies (i.e., self-interests). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the historically multi-ethnic Russian society consisted of a majority ethnic Russian population (80 percent); the remaining 20 percent represents more than 150 different ethnic groups (i.e., minority groups). Thus, Russian context provides us with a unique opportunity to develop and empirically test our argument.

In what follows, we first outline the theoretical framework that will guide us; second, discuss the social context of contemporary Russia, and develop a series of specific hypotheses; third, present an overview of immigration trends in post-socialist Russia; fourth, present empirical analysis and findings; and finally, conclude and discuss the findings in light of the theoretical framework. By so doing, we will be in a better position to evaluate the sources of anti-immigrant attitudes among minority and majority group members in societies undergoing social change and the quest for a redefinition of national identity.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: SELF-INTERESTS, CONSERVATIVE VIEWS, AND GROUP POSITION THEORY OF PREJUDICE

There are two established and repeatedly proven—in the context of Western societies—micro-level sociological explanations for anti-immigrant sentiment. Both refer to individual sociodemographic characteristics, and are viewed as rather complementary. The first highlights the role of individual socioeconomic attributes and self-interests, mostly but not exclusively in the economic arena. According to this explanation, socially and economically vulnerable individuals (the unemployed, low-income earners, those employed in blue-collar occupations) are more likely to express anti-immigrant sentiment, because they face higher competition (real or perceived) with out-group members for scarce social and economic resources (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Esses et al. 2001; Olzak 1992; Rajman and Semyonov 2004). The second explanation focuses on the role played by conservative ideologies and views. This explanation argues that the presence of out-group populations may constitute a threat to the cultural and national homogeneity of the society. Thus, persons who hold more conservative views and ideologies (e.g., older people, religiously observant individuals, and those of a right-wing political orientation) tend to embrace stronger negative attitudes toward

(2016) suggests that “social conservatism” tends to increase anti-immigrant attitudes in Russia. Note that “social conservatism” in the study is measured as attitudes towards gay and lesbian rights; in other words, as attitudes towards another minority group. At the same time, Bahry (2016) reported that when measured by “conservation” values (following Schwartz’s [1999] theory of cultural values), conservatism has no impact on attitudes towards immigrants.

immigrants, because they are concerned to a greater degree with the impact that foreigners may exert on the cultural homogeneity and collective identity of the state (Castles and Miller 2003; Fetzer 2000; Rajjman and Semyonov 2004; Schnapper 1994).

Another prominent sociological perspective for understanding the sources of anti-immigrant attitudes is drawn from Herbert Blumer's (1958) group position theory. This theory emphasizes the collective interests of the dominant group and structural conditions, rather than self-interests and individuals' sociodemographic attributes. The approach posits intergroup competition, which leads to anti-immigrant attitudes, as a zero-sum scenario: them against us (Blumer 1958; Bobo 1999). Accordingly, majority group members can be expected to express higher levels of prejudice towards out-group populations when the interests and conditions of their collective are undermined or threatened. A substantial number of studies that depart from Blumer's group position theory have examined the effect of objective measures of country-level characteristics (as indicators of structural threat) on anti-immigrant prejudice, from a cross-country comparative or longitudinal perspectives (for example, Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009; Quillian 1995; Schlueter and Davidov 2013; Semyonov, Rajjman, and Gorodzeisky 2006). Results related to the role of these structural conditions are not as consistent as the results related to the effect of individual-level attributes (described earlier); however, general tendency suggests that the increased size of the out-group population, poor economic conditions, and the popularity of extreme-right political parties in countries all tend to be associated with high levels of anti-immigrant attitudes.

According to Lawrence D. Bobo (1999), one of the limitations of this type of studies is that of reducing Blumer's group position theory to structural-level objective threat, while the theory underscores *perceptions* of threat. A few studies, which have focused on the majority's perceptions of structural conditions regarding a state's economic, social, and political conditions (as indicators of collective vulnerability), find a substantial effect of these perceptions on attitudes toward migrants and ethnic minorities.² For example, Moshe Semyonov, Rebeca Rajjman, and Gorodzeisky (2008) showed that the perceived (much more than the actual) size of out-group populations tends to prompt anti-immigrant attitudes in European countries; Jack Citrin and colleagues (1997) found that in the United States, anti-immigrant attitudes tend to rise in conjunction with pessimism about the current state of the national economy; and Geoffrey Evans and Ariana Need (2002) demonstrated that insecurity related to the political efficiency of the state tends to reduce support toward granting rights to minority populations in Eastern Europe.

An additional significant feature of Blumer's group position theory (one that has not received enough attention in the recent research literature) is its emphasis on the importance of specific social context and historical processes in shaping groups' collective identities, assessment of interests, and prejudice (Bobo 1999; Bobo and Hutching 1996). The theory highlights that the sense of group position is a product of socially constructed meanings (Bobo 1999); this sense is formed by a running process in which the dominant group "defines and redefines the . . . subordinate group and relations between them" (Blumer 1958:5), based on major related issues in the public arena.

2 Another line of research, also departing from Blumer's group position theory, directly examines majority members' perceptions of the threat posed by immigrants to the interests of their collective in different spheres (job availability, welfare services, national identity, etc.) on attitudes toward immigration policy and granting rights to immigrants (Jackson et al. 2001; McLaren 2003; Rajjman and Semyonov 2004; Rosenstein 2008; Semyonov, Rajjman, and Yom-Tov 2002). However, this research literature is beyond the scope of the present study, since the goal of the present research is the investigation of the factors that explain anti-immigrant attitudes (as a general concept) in the unstable social and political context of societies in search of new national identity borders, rather than an examination of the complex relationship between different types of such attitudes, namely perceived threat posed by immigrants and objection to allocation rights to immigrants or attitudes toward immigration policy. At the same time, it should be noted that one of these studies (Semyonov et al. 2002) suggested that different mechanisms underlie support for economic discrimination against labor migrants among ethnic minority (Arabs) and ethnic majority (Jews) in Israel. The study suggested that the endorsement of economic discrimination of labor migrants among ethnic minority can be explained by the perceived threat immigrants pose to individual's labor market interests, while among the ethnic majority group, this endorsement seemed to be motivated partially by such threats, but also by degree of national identification and ethnocentric sentiments.

If a threat has a perceived nature, and the sense of group position is dependent on major societal issues related to the dominant group's definition of subordinate groups, it is reasonable to suggest that collective threat (and as a result also individual self-interests) may play divergent roles in shaping negative attitudes towards "outsiders" among the ethnic majority group as compared to the attitudes of ethnic minorities (who can also, in turn, be defined by the majority as subordinate "outsiders"). Indeed, specific social contexts, such as a period of national identity redefinition, may differently affect the importance of perceived collective vulnerabilities and the state's socioeconomic and political conditions in the emergence of anti-foreigner attitudes among majority, as compared to minority, groups. The context of contemporary Russia is especially interesting and relevant for testing this argument. Thus, in the next section, describing the social context of post-socialist Russia and departing from the theory of group position, we develop our specific hypotheses for explaining anti-immigrant attitudes in a society in search of new national identity borders.

CRISIS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY AND EXPLANATIONS OF ANTI-IMMIGRANT SENTIMENT

At the beginning of the twenty-first century (a decade after the collapse of Soviet Union), Russia faced a deep crisis of national identity, one that occurred in the context of tremendous political, economic, and state-structural changes. The crisis of national identity and cultural self-determination was prompted by the need for the reconsideration of the national self, given new geo-political and social borders (Blakkisrud 2016; Gudkov 2005, 2006; Kolsto 2016; Malinova 2010; Pain 2007). The research literature views this social context as fertile ground for the diffusion of anti-foreigner sentiment, since in times of crisis and disorganization everyone who does not belong to majority group, members of religious or ethnic minority groups or immigrants are viewed as a threat to a now precarious social order (Wimmer 1997). A turn in the Kremlin's rhetoric toward resentment—"nationalism driven by pervasive and strong sense of grievance" (Breslauer 2009:370)—at the second half of the first decade of the twenty-first century (Breslauer 2009; Richter and Hatch 2013; Smith 2012) intensified the importance of national identity idea and of national solidarity (Blakkisrud 2016). According to Andreas Wimmer (1997), the search for a collective identity, generally, revives historical myths and beliefs that help to reassert the national self and its boundaries. In Russia, the search for a new national self led to the restoration of a sense of pride in the Soviet Union's accomplishments, and the re-writing of the Soviet Union's history in a positive light (Leykin 2015; Mendelson and Gerber 2008). This process has contributed to the intolerance of "others" in general, and to hostility towards immigrants—whom have continued to arrive in increasing numbers—in particular. At the same time, the 2008 economic crisis threatened the sense of economic stability that some strata of the Russian population had felt during the first years of the twenty-first century. Thus, negative attitudes towards immigrants in Russia at the turn of the first decade of the twenty-first century should be understood in light of the critical process of national identity redefinition, accompanied by periods of economic instability and the Kremlin's nationalistic resentment rhetoric.

Departing from Blumer's group position theory, we suggest that natives' perceptions of the state's economic, political, and social conditions (as indicators of perceived sociopolitical and economic vulnerability of the collective) should play a crucial role in explaining anti-immigrant sentiment during the critical period of national identity formation and extreme importance of national solidarity. If prejudice is a defensive reaction to a perceived threat to the collective position, then, at the period of national identity formation, collective interests and vulnerability will become even more important in shaping natives' attitudes toward "others." At the same time, as suggested by Gorodzeisky and colleagues (2015), the social climate framing the extreme importance of national solidarity—in which advocates for foreigners are seen as traitors to such solidarity—may dilute the role of natives' socioeconomic and ideological attributes in shaping their attitudes toward "others." To sum, a search for new national identity borders might strengthen the role of perceived collective interests (and/or

threat), but may also weaken the role of self-interests in shaping attitudes toward immigrants in post-socialist Russia.

However, we claim that the argument formulated above is relevant only for the ethnic majority group in Russia. The role played by concerns over the state's economic, social and political position in prompting anti-immigrant sentiment among ethnic minority populations in Russia seems to be rather minor. It appears that in Russia in the beginning of twenty-first century, only ethnic Russians, as a majority ethnic group, were "allowed" to take part in the process of re-building the national identity, while actually excluding ethnic minorities (native-born population) from the new borders of the collective. Thus, during the first decade of the twenty-first century, despite the multi-ethnic character of the society, the idea of "Russia for Russians (ethnic Russians³)" was supported, in one way or another, by more than half of the native Russian population (Blakkisrud 2016; Gudkov 2006; Pain 2007; Tipaldou and Uba 2014). Moreover, scholars argue that in the recent decades, national identity in Russia has undergone a fundamental shift from a mainly statist to a mainly ethno-nationalist nature (Blakkisrud 2016; Kolsto 2016). More specifically, "the national self [has been] redefined from a predominantly civic understanding based on citizenship and identification with the state to a more ethnic one, based on Russian language and culture, one in which ethnic Russians take a center stage" (Blakkisrud 2016:250). In these circumstances, it is reasonable to suggest that collective (state) interests and vulnerabilities should rather play a secondary role in shaping ethnic minorities' attitudes toward immigrants. Since ethnic minorities are barely involved in the process of the reconsideration of the national self, their self-interests and personal socioeconomic vulnerabilities should play a more important role in explaining anti-immigrant attitudes than their perceptions of collective position and vulnerability (in terms of state interests).

In sum, we *expect* that the anti-immigrant attitudes of members of the ethnic majority group would rely mostly on their perceptions of the state's economic, welfare, and political insecurity (collective vulnerability), and hardly on their own socioeconomic position and conservative ideologies (self-interests). By way of contrast, anti-immigrant attitudes of members of ethnic minority groups would rely on their own socioeconomic position and ideologies (self-interests) to a greater extent than on their perceptions of the state's economic, welfare, and political insecurity (collective vulnerability). In addition, we expect that the level of anti-immigrant attitudes among the ethnic majority population would be higher than that among ethnic minorities, since the crisis of national identity has undermined, primarily, a sense of group position among the ethnic majority (ethnic Russians).

IMMIGRATION TRENDS IN POST-SOCIALIST RUSSIA

Russia has experienced not just massive emigration but also massive immigration since the collapse of Soviet Union. Consequently, by 2010 the immigrant population as a proportion of the country's total population reached 7.8 percent (United Nations 2015).⁴ The immigration flow to post-socialist Russia should be understood in light of the country's geographical location in the center of Eurasian space; labor market size and wage levels, which are higher than those of other countries in the area; and the negative population trends that makes Russia dependent on labor migrant inflow (Iontsev, Ivakhnyuk, and Soboleva 2009).

While the immigration flow to Russia immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union (between 1991 and 1996) was mostly comprised of ethnic Russian repatriates from former Soviet Union (FSU) republics, subsequent 1990s immigration flows were characterized by the growth of labor migration—both documented and undocumented. During the 1997-2000 period, due to a relatively laissez-faire migration policy and a flourishing domestic economy, Russia became a regional

3 There are two distinct words in the Russian language for "Russians": one of them, *Russkie*, refers to Russians as an ethnic group; and the other, *Rossiiane*, refers to Russians as citizens of Russia. The slogan "Russia for Russians" (*Rossia dlia Russkikh*) explicitly refers to Russians as ethnic group.

4 This number also includes ethnic Russians who arrived in Russia from the former Soviet Republics.

“migration magnet.” Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova were the main source countries, but labor migrants also arrived from Central Asia and the Caucasus FSU Republics, as well as from Turkey, China, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Somalia, and North Korea. The estimated number of immigrants who had entered Russia by 2000 was 13 million at most (Heleniak 2002; Molodikova 2007; Supyan 2000).

The first years of the twenty-first century, with Vladimir Putin as Russian president, were characterized by a radical turn to a strict migration policy and tight migration control, intended to deal with illegal immigration and to protect national security. A series of measures, including laws regulating labor migrant activities, were implemented in order to demonstrate the tough anti-immigration line of the regime (Molodikova 2007). About 800,000 immigrants arrived in Russia between 2001 and 2005, a third of them from three Central Asian countries: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan (Chudinovskikh et al. 2010). A rapid decrease of migration flows, from about 2.5 million between 1996-2000 to 800,000 between 2001-2005 (Chudinovskikh et al. 2010), alongside a demographic crisis, led to a dramatic shortfall in the labor force of the country. As a result, in the following years the Russian government again shifted its migration policy, this time from prohibition and control to legalization and liberalization of access to the labor market for migrants from the Commonwealth of Independent States (Chudinovskikh et al. 2010; Molodikova 2007). More than a million immigrants arrived in Russia during the 2006-2009 period. The share of labor migrants from Central Asian countries (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan) in the total inflow increased, and by 2010 exceeded 50 percent. The main source country beyond the Commonwealth of Independent States was China; the share of labor migrants from China in the total inflow by the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century was 12 percent (Chudinovskikh et al. 2010).

In general, the share of unskilled migrant workers to Russia had increased throughout the first decade of the century. Most labor migrants in Russia work in low-skilled manual jobs in the fields of construction, industry, transport, and agriculture, as well as in the retail and domestic service sectors (Vishnevskiy 2011). It has been estimated that about two-thirds of labor migrants are employed in the “twilight” economy, and that their average hourly wage is about 40 percent lower than that of the natives (Lebedeva and Tatarko 2013; Tipaldou and Uba 2014).

Previous studies have shown that public attitudes toward immigrants in Russia are far from welcoming (Malinkin 2013; Pain 2007) and significantly more negative than in most other European countries (Gorodzeisky et al. 2015; Gudkov 2006). While the level of anti-foreigner sentiment is quite high among the general population, ethnic Russians and Muscovites are consistently more hostile and less tolerant toward immigrants than non-ethnic Russians and residents of other parts of the country (Alexseev 2010; Bessudnov 2016; Gerber 2014).

DATA, VARIABLES, AND DESCRIPTIVE OVERVIEW

Data for the present study were obtained from four rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012), which Russia participated in. The data were collected via face-to-face interviews from a nationally representative samples (age 15 and above). The analysis reported here was restricted to respondents who were born in Russia and who held Russian citizenship. The total sample includes 9,390 respondents: 1,305 belong to ethnic minority groups, and 8,085 are members of the ethnic majority group (e.g., ethnic Russians). This division of ethnic minority and ethnic majority groups is based on respondents’ self-definition. The respondents were asked whether they belonged to a minority ethnic group in Russia. We believe that self-definition is the most suitable operationalization of ethnic minority/majority variable for the purpose of the present research. Appendix Table A1 includes descriptive statistics for all the variables included in the study for the pooled sample (four rounds altogether) for ethnic majority and ethnic minorities separately.

The dependent variable anti-immigrant sentiment index was constructed as a mean score of the responses to three questions regarding respondents’ views on the impact that immigrants exert on




Figure 1. Anti-immigrant Attitudes: Percent of Respondents Who View Immigrants' Impact in Negative Terms (percent of responses from 6 to 10) by Year and in Polled Data Set

Note: The mean differences between ethnic minority and majority groups were found to be statistically significant ($p < .05$) in all items in each year and in pooled data, except perceived impact on economy in 2010.

society. The questions were: “Would you say that [country]’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?”; “Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s economy that people come to live here from other countries?”; and “Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?” Responses were coded according to an 11-point scale, ranging from 0 (most positive impact) to 10 (most negative impact). In the present data, Cronbach’s alphas were .872 for the majority group and .877 for the minority group.

The descriptive results demonstrate that, in general, members of the majority group, ethnic Russians, viewed foreigners’ impact on Russia in more negative terms (mean = 6.45) than members of ethnic minority groups, non-ethnic Russians (mean = 5.96). This difference was statistically significant ($t = 7.99, p = .00$).

The results related to the perceived impact that immigrants exert on each aspect (culture, economy, and country in general) in each year and for the pooled sample are displayed in Figure 1. The level of anti-immigrant attitudes in Russia during the period under study was quite high; it decreased slightly between 2006 and 2008-2010, but had returned to 2006’s level by 2012.⁵ As expected, members of ethnic majority group consistently expressed negative perceptions of the impact immigrants exert in each sphere of life—culture, economy, and country in general—and in higher proportions than ethnic minority members. The difference in the level of anti-immigrant attitudes was especially pronounced in the cultural realm.

According to the pooled data (2006-2012), members of the ethnic majority group perceived the impact of foreigners on the cultural realm in more negative terms than their impact on the economic sphere: 62 percent of ethnic Russians reported that immigrants undermined the cultural life of the country to some degree, while about 56 percent claimed that immigration was bad for the economy of the country. In comparison, 50 percent of non-ethnic Russians reported that foreigners

5 It is interesting to note that according to the *Racism and Xenophobia Report*, published by the SOVA center in October 2012: “the main achievement of previous reduction of racist- and neo-Nazi-motivated violence is clearly lost in 2012.” The number of victims by such violence during summer 2012 was higher than during summer 2011 (Yudlina and Alperovich 2012).

undermined cultural life of Russia and viewed the impact of immigrants on the economy in negative terms. Both ethnic majority and ethnic minority members expressed the most negative opinions on immigrants when asked about their general impact on the country (as compared to the impact in specific spheres): 65 percent of the ethnic majority group, and 56 percent of ethnic minority respondents evaluated the impact of immigrants on Russia in general as negative.

Perceived collective (state) vulnerability was measured by four indicators: the respondent's level of dissatisfaction with the (1) country's present state of economy, (2) way that national government is doing its job, (3) country's education system, and (4) country's health services. Responses were measured according to an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (highest level of satisfaction) to 10 (highest level of dissatisfaction). Each one of the four items refers, in a straightforward manner, to respondents' evaluation of the state's position in various realms, or in other words, to perceptions of collective/state vulnerability. Ben-Nun Bloom and colleagues (2015) used the same items (related to economic situation and health services) as predictors of attitudes toward immigrants in Europe, while Citrin and colleagues (1997) used respondent's assessments of the state's economic condition as a predictor of anti-immigrant attitudes in the United States. To test whether the four indicators captured one latent construct, we performed a confirmatory factor analysis on the pooled sample, based on the moment structural AMOS procedure (Arbuckle 2008). The results are presented in Appendix Figure A1. The analysis provided sufficient—although not very strong—support for the possibility that the four indicators belong to one concept. Since bivariate correlations between the indicators were found to be not very high (between .419 to .667), in the multivariate analysis we applied two strategies: first, we included in the models each indicator of perceived state vulnerability separately, and second, we included in the models the perceived state vulnerability index constructed as a mean value of the four indicators.

The descriptive results (presented in Figure 2) show the level of perceived collective vulnerability for both ethnic majority and ethnic minority groups is quite similar. There were no statistically significant differences between groups in most of the indicators across all four years, and existing differences did not reveal any trends. The absence of such trends was reflected in the very similar levels of perceived state's vulnerability among both the ethnic minority and majority groups in the pooled data (2006-2012). In general, then, the results demonstrated that dissatisfaction with the condition of the state in a range of realms was quite widespread among both ethnic Russians and non-ethnic Russians. Both groups expressed the highest level of dissatisfaction in connection with the country's economy situation, and its health services: 62 percent and 65 percent respectively among majority group members, and 63 percent and 62 percent among minority group members, were dissatisfied, to some extent, with the country's condition in these realms. 52 percent of members of both groups were dissatisfied with the present state of the country's educational system. By comparison, the level of dissatisfaction with the national government was lower: 47 percent of both the ethnic minority and ethnic majority respondents perceived the way government carried out its functions in negative terms to some degree.

Two main sets of the sociodemographic characteristics of individuals, referring to *self-interests* and traditionally used in the research literature as predictors of anti-immigrant attitudes, are included in the multivariate analysis.

The first set pertains to individuals' *socioeconomic position*: education (in years), subjective income (insufficient versus sufficient), and a series of dummy variables representing labor force position (professionals, technicians and managers; clerks and sales; blue-collar; unemployed; not in the labor force, students).

The second set pertains to individuals' *conservative views and ideologies*: level of religiosity (on an 11-point scale), a series of dummy variables representing membership in a religious denomination (Eastern Orthodox as titular religion, Islam, other religions, and those who do not belong to any religious confession), and political orientation as a series of dummy variables representing a "particular political party [the respondent] feels closer to than all the other parties" (United Russia – the ruling




Figure 2. Perceived Collective Vulnerability: Percent of Respondents Who are Dissatisfied With . . . (percent of responses from 6 to 10) by Year and in Polled Data Set

Note: The mean differences between ethnic minority and majority groups were found to be statistically significant only for economy in 2006, education in 2010, health in 2010 and 2012, and pooled data.

party; CPRF – Communist Party of Russian Federation; LDPR – Liberal Democratic Party of Russia; Rodina/Motherland or Fair Russia; other parties; and no party). It is worth noting that Eastern Orthodox identity in post-socialist Russia is a sign of cultural rather than religious identity, as “Eastern Orthodox” does not necessarily hold a theological meaning (Warhola and Lehning 2007). It was suggested earlier that in the context of religious resurgence and the collective identification crisis, deliberate self-identification with a titular religious denomination in post-socialist Russia may reflect conservative views related to national identity and culture (Gorodzeisky et al. 2015). As to the measure of political orientation, the division of political orientation into “right” and “left,” as used in research in Western countries to capture conservative ideologies, cannot be applied in the Russian context. Initially, in post-socialist Russia, the idea of Russian nationalism was less widespread among Russian defenders of the liberal economy associated with the political right. Furthermore, previous research has demonstrated that the traditional divisions of political “right” and “left” had lost its meaning in Russia by the beginning of the twenty-first century (Gorodzeisky et al. 2015; Pain 2007). Due to the above-mentioned reasons, we used “a party respondent feels closer” instead of “right-left” scale to capture conservative political ideologies related to nationalism. The LDPR, Rodina/Motherland, and Fair Russia are parties that express such nationalist (what is called in Western countries “far right”) ideologies.

Additionally, the models include the following sociodemographic variables (referring to self-interests): age, gender, rural versus urban place of residence, and perception of neighborhood safety. In the immigration research literature, older age and rural residence are usually associated with more conservative views, and, thus, higher level of anti-immigrant attitudes. Perception of neighborhood safety allowed for taking into account the criminal threat often associated with the presence of immigrants (Ceobanu 2011; Ivleva 2009) as an additional source of anti-immigrant attitudes.

The descriptive statistics results (presented in Appendix Table A1) demonstrate some differences in sociodemographic composition of ethnic minority and ethnic majority groups, mostly related to residential patterns and religiosity. Specifically, a much higher percentage of ethnic minority members (43.7 percent) lived in rural areas, as compared to ethnic majority members (21.4 percent). Forty-six percent of ethnic majority group members, as compared to 33.8 percent of ethnic minority members,

did not belong to any religious denomination. Almost half of ethnic majority group, and a fifth of the ethnic minority group members, considered themselves as Eastern Orthodox, while 41.6 percent of ethnic minority group members belonged to Islam as compared to one-half of one percent of ethnic majority members. Regardless of religious denomination, the ethnic minority population tended to be more religious than the ethnic majority population. A somewhat higher share of the ethnic minority population (61.5 percent) reported insufficient household income, as compared to 56.7 percent of the ethnic majority population. In terms of level of educational achievement, labor market position, and political orientation, ethnic Russians and non-ethnic Russians were quite similar. In the multivariate analysis that follows, we examine whether the above-mentioned differences in sociodemographic composition may explain the differences in the level of anti-immigrant attitudes between the ethnic minority and majority populations.

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

In order to examine whether, and to what extent, self-interests and perceived collective vulnerability affect anti-immigrant attitudes among ethnic majority versus ethnic minority populations, we estimated three series of linear regression models: first, for ethnic majority; second, for ethnic minority; and third, for the total population. All models presented in [Table 1](#) and [2](#) are estimated on the pooled data and include year of survey for control purposes. Model 1 (for ethnic majority and for ethnic minority groups) includes sociodemographic characteristics (age, gender, rural versus urban residential area, and perception of neighborhood safety), indicators of socioeconomic position, and conservative views and ideologies (as proxies of self-interests). Model 1 for the total population also includes an ethnic minority status dummy variable. To Models 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d (for ethnic majority and for ethnic minority groups), we added an indicator of perceived collective (state) vulnerability in the areas of economy, government functioning, educational system and health services, respectively. In order to test whether the size of perceived vulnerability effect varies between ethnic majority and ethnic minority population, Models 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d for the total population also include interaction terms between respective indicator of perceived vulnerability and ethnic minority status (as well as minority status itself). In Model 2 (for ethnic majority, for ethnic minority, and for the total population), an indicator of collective vulnerability in one realm is replaced with perceived collective vulnerability index.

This strategy allowed us to estimate whether self-interests and perceived collective vulnerability exerted a net effect on anti-immigrant attitudes, to compare the explanatory power of the two sources, and the effect size of perceived collective vulnerability between majority (ethnic Russian) and minority (non-ethnic Russian) populations. We did so, examining perceived collective vulnerability, first, in each realm separately, and second as general concept. To streamline the presentation of plenteous results and for the sake of brevity, in [Table 1](#) we present all regression coefficients from Model 1 and Model 2; in [Table 2](#) we display only the coefficients for “ethnic minority,” an indicator of “perceived vulnerability” in the respective realms and an interaction term between them from Models 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d.

We first discuss results related to the explanatory power of the models, and then proceed to interpretations of the regression coefficients. The results presented in [Table 1](#) (Model 1) and [Table 2](#) (Models 2a-2d) reveal that each indicator of the perceived state’s vulnerability explained a bigger share of the variance in anti-immigrant attitudes among ethnic Russians than the entire set of characteristics related to self-interests included in the study (as implied by *R* square and changes in *R* square). Specifically, the explanatory power of each indicator of collective vulnerability was almost twice as high as the explanatory power of socioeconomic position, conservative views and sociodemographic characteristics altogether. For example, 7.6 percent, 6.6 percent, 6.6 percent and 5.6 percent of the variance of ethnic majority anti-immigrant attitudes were explained by a perceived vulnerability related to economic conditions, government work, education system, and health services, respectively, as compared to the 3.6 percent variance that was explained by all indicators of socioeconomic position, conservative views and sociodemographic characteristics. The results related to the

Table 1. Regression Coefficients (S,E) for Predicting Anti-immigrant Attitudes Among Ethnic Majority, Ethnic Minority, and Total Population in Russia

	Model 1			Model 2		
	Majority	Minority	Total	Majority	Minority	Total
Constant	6.56* (.21)	6.65* (.46)	6.62* (.19)	4.78* (.20)	5.95* (.46)	4.86* (.19)
Men	-.01 (.06)	-.38* (.13)	-.06 (.05)	-.02 (.05)	-.34* (.13)	-.08 (.05)
Age	.00 (.00)	.01* (.00)	.01* (.00)	.00 (.00)	.01* (.00)	.00 (.00)
Rural residence	-.10 (.06)	-.05 (.13)	-.10 (.06)	-.03 (.06)	-.11 (.13)	-.05 (.05)
Unsafe neighborhood	.21* (.05)	.24 (.13)	.22* (.05)	.16* (.05)	-.22 (.13)	.17* (.05)
Education	-.03* (.01)	-.03 (.02)	-.03* (.01)	-.05* (.01)	-.06* (.02)	-.05* (.01)
Insufficient income	.33* (.05)	.23 (.13)	.31* (.05)	.10* (.05)	.02 (.13)	.08 (.05)
Labor force position						
(reference category: blue color occupations)						
Professionals, technicians, and managers	-.17* (.09)	-.15 (.21)	-.17* (.08)	-.09 (.08)	-.06 (.21)	-.08 (.08)
Clerks, sales and services workers	.02 (.09)	.10 (.23)	.04 (.09)	.07 (.09)	.14 (.22)	.09 (.08)
Unemployed	.05 (.14)	-.28 (.29)	-.01 (.12)	.06 (.13)	-.25 (.29)	.00 (.12)
Not in the labor force	-.04 (.09)	-.47* (.20)	-.12 (.08)	.09 (.08)	-.39* (.19)	.00 (.08)
Students	-.44* (.11)	-.31 (.25)	-.41* (.10)	-.15 (.10)	-.20 (.24)	-.16 (.09)
Religious denomination						
(reference category: no denomination)						
Eastern Orthodox	.20* (.06)	.21 (.19)	.21* (.06)	.17* (.06)	.21 (.18)	.18* (.06)
Islam	-.66 (.37)	-.09 (.17)	-.23 (.12)	-.91* (.34)	-.14 (.17)	-.37* (.11)
Other religion	.52 (.27)	-.31 (.39)	.25 (.22)	.26 (.25)	-.31 (.38)	.08 (.21)
Level of religiosity	-.07* (.01)	-.12* (.03)	-.08* (.01)	-.04* (.01)	-.11* (.03)	-.05* (.01)
Party respondent feels closer to						
(reference category: United Russia)						
CPRF	.28* (.11)	-.36 (.20)	.17 (.10)	-.11 (.10)	-.63* (.24)	-.20* (.09)
LDPR	.85* (.13)	-.13 (.35)	.73* (.12)	.50* (.12)	-.25 (.34)	.42* (.12)
Rodina/Fair Russia	.56* (.20)	.08 (.47)	.44* (.18)	.20 (.19)	-.11 (.46)	.10 (.17)
No party	.20* (.06)	.08 (.14)	.18* (.06)	-.03 (.06)	-.07 (.14)	-.03 (.05)

(continued)

Table 1. Regression Coefficients (S.E) for Predicting Anti-immigrant Attitudes Among Ethnic Majority, Ethnic Minority, and Total Population in Russia (continued)

	Model 1			Model 2		
	Majority	Minority	Total	Majority	Minority	Total
Minority	—	—	-.23* (.08)	—	—	.85* (.19)
Perceived state's vulnerability index	—	—	—	.39* (.01)	.23* (.03)	.39* (.01)
Minority* perceived state's vulnerability index	—	—	—	—	—	-.17* (.03)
R square change	.036	.054	—	.102	.032	—
R square	.041	.056	.045	.143	.088	.134

Notes: All models include a series of dummy variables representing years of survey, as well as dummy variable for missing cases in "belonging to religious denomination" variable and for "other parties or no response" category in "party feels closer to" variable (the coefficients are not presented). R square change in Model 1 refers to the model that includes only year controls, R square change in Models 2 refer to Model 1.

*p < .05 (two-tailed tests)

Table 2. Regression Coefficients (S.E) for Predicting Anti-immigrant Attitudes Among Ethnic Majority, Ethnic Minority, and Total Population in Russia

	Model 2a			Model 2b			Model 2c			Model 2d		
	Majority	Minority	Total	Majority	Minority	Total	Majority	Minority	Total	Majority	Minority	Total
Constant	5.17* (.21)	5.81* (.47)	5.19* (.19)	5.56* (.20)	6.20* (.46)	5.62* (.19)	5.56* (.20)	6.43* (.47)	5.56* (.19)	5.39* (.21)	6.29* (.46)	5.47* (.19)
Minority	-	-	.46* (.18)	-	-	.35* (.15)	-	-	.87* (.16)	-	-	.48* (.17)
Perceived state's vulnerability regarding												
Economic conditions	.28* (.01)	.21* (.03)	.29* (.01)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Government work	-	-	-	.24* (.01)	.15* (.02)	.24* (.01)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Educational system	-	-	-	-	-	-	.24* (.01)	.08* (.02)	.24* (.01)	-	-	-
Health services	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.23* (.01)	.14* (.03)	.23* (.01)
Minority*economic conditions	-	-	-.11* (.03)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Minority*government work	-	-	-	-	-	-.11* (.02)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Minority*educational system	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-.19* (.02)	-	-	-
Minority*health services	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-.11* (.02)
R square change	.076	.037	-	.066	.026	-	.066	.007	-	.056	.018	-
R square	.117	.093	.115	.107	.082	.104	.107	.063	.102	.097	.074	.094

Notes: All models include sociodemographic characteristics, indicators of socioeconomic position, and conservative views and ideologies (same variables that are included in Model 1), and a series of dummy variables representing years of survey (the coefficients are not presented). R square change in all models refers to Model 1.

* $p < .05$ (two-tailed tests)

explanatory power of the models among the ethnic minority group mirrored the results among the majority group. The share of the variance in ethnic minority anti-immigrant attitudes explained by set of the variables related to self-interests (5.4 percent) was substantially higher than that explained by each indicator of the perceived state's vulnerability (3.7 percent, 2.6 percent, .7 percent and 1.8 percent by perceived vulnerability related to economic conditions, government work, educational system, and health services, respectively).

The differences in the explanatory power of the indicators of self-interests and perceived collective vulnerability between ethnic minority and ethnic majority populations were very consistent and substantially bigger in models estimated for each year separately (presented in Appendix Table A2). In each year, the explanatory power of self-interest indicators was found to be higher in the models for ethnic minorities (ranging between 10.8 to 18.4 percent) than for ethnic majority (ranging between 3.8 to 7.8 percent), while the explanatory power of perceived collective threat indicators was much higher in the models for the ethnic majority than for ethnic minorities.

Returning to the pooled data, the results of Model 2 in Table 1 demonstrated that the index of perceived state vulnerability (calculated as a mean value of four indicators) added 10.2 percent to the explained variance of anti-immigrant attitudes among the ethnic majority population as compared to only 3.2 percent among the ethnic minority population.

Altogether, these results are in line with our theoretical expectations, suggesting that in contemporary Russia perceptions of collective vulnerability play a more important role in explaining anti-immigrant attitudes among the ethnic majority group than among the ethnic minority groups. At the same time, self-interests are more influential in explaining anti-immigrant attitudes among the ethnic minority groups than among the majority group.⁶

We now turn to the discussion of the regression coefficients (presented in Table 1). The results presented in Model 1 reveal that higher educated ethnic Russians tended to perceive immigrants in slightly less negative terms, as implied by a negative and statistically significant coefficient of years of education ($b = -.03$). However, the size of the effect was extremely small. In terms of standardized coefficient, a change in years of education by one standard deviation tended to be associated with an average change in the level of anti-immigrant attitudes by only a .04 standard deviation. The effect of subjective income was also in the expected direction, with ethnic Russians reporting insufficient income expressing higher levels of anti-immigrant attitudes. Likewise, respondents employed in white-collar occupations and students expressed views that were more tolerant than those employed in blue-collar jobs. The results also revealed that negative perceptions of foreigners were more pronounced among respondents who belonged to the Eastern Orthodox confession (titular religion in Russia), in comparison to those who did not see themselves as belonging to any religious denomination ($b = .20$). The degree of religiosity exerted a statistically significant effect, negative but marginal in size, on anti-immigrant sentiment. With regard to the effect of political orientation (reflected by "party respondent feels closer to"), the results obtained in Model 1 revealed that ethnic Russians who felt closer to the United Russia (the ruling centrist party) expressed less negative views than all others. The results regarding the effects of socioeconomic position and conservative views should be

6 An anonymous reviewer suggested that to make our results more convincing, we should present the same analysis but in connection with a country *not* undergoing a process of reconsideration of national identity. Unfortunately, we could not replicate the same analysis with a Western European country using ESS data, because the number of respondents who defined themselves as ethnic minority but who were not immigrants, or the sons or daughters of immigrants, in these countries' samples was quite small. However, we estimated comparable models for the ethnic majority population in four Western European countries and Russia, using pooled data for four years. The first model in this analysis includes sociodemographic characteristics and socioeconomic position (we did not include either the religiosity or the party closeness indicators, to make the models strictly comparable across countries). To the second model, we add perceived state vulnerability index (mean values of four indicators). In Russia, among the ethnic majority population, sociodemographic characteristics together with socioeconomic position explained a much lower proportion of anti-immigrant attitudes' variance than perceived collective vulnerability; however, in the four Western countries we examined, the picture was opposite. The explanatory power of sociodemographic characteristics, together with socioeconomic position was much higher than that of perceived state's vulnerability. For results, see Table A3 in the Appendix.

interpreted in the light of the very low explanatory power of these indicators in predicting anti-immigrant attitudes among ethnic Russians.

Model 1 for the ethnic minority population reveals that non-ethnic Russian men tended to express less negative views toward immigrants than women. As expected, the level of anti-immigrant sentiments was more likely to rise with age ($b = .01$). At the same time, education did not exert any statistically significant effect on anti-immigrant attitudes among non-ethnic Russians in Model 1, but it did exert an effect, statistically significant and consistent in size, in all other models. The results also demonstrated that ethnic minority members who were not in the labor force expressed less negative views than those employed in blue-collar occupations. Controlling for religious denomination, the level of religiosity exerted a statistically significant effect, negative and quite substantial in size ($b = -.12$), on anti-immigrant attitudes among non-ethnic Russians. The higher the level of religiosity among non-ethnic Russians, the lower their level of negative attitudes towards immigrants.

As evident from the results presented in Model 1 for the total population, ethnic minority status exerted a negative effect on the level of anti-immigrant attitudes. Taking into account differences in the sociodemographic characteristics, socioeconomic position, and conservative views, members of ethnic minority groups were still less likely to express anti-immigrant attitudes than members of the ethnic majority group (as implied by statistically significant coefficient $b = -.23$).

The results of Models 2a through 2d (presented in Table 2) reveal that perceived state vulnerability in every realm (i.e., economy situation, government functioning, educational system, and health services) tended to increase the level of anti-immigrant attitudes among ethnic Russians, as implied by the statistically significant and positive coefficients for each indicator. The higher the level of dissatisfaction with the present economy situation (Model 2a), government functioning (Model 2b), educational system (Model 2c), and health services (Model 2d) among majority group members, the higher their level of anti-immigrant attitudes ($b = .28$, $b = .24$, $b = .24$, and $b = .23$, respectively). The perceived state vulnerability in each one of the four realms tended to increase the level of anti-immigrant attitudes also among non-ethnic Russians (minority population); however, it did so to a lower extent (as implied by the smaller size of the respective coefficients in Models 2a-2d for ethnic minority: $b = .21$, $b = .15$, $b = .08$, and $b = .14$). The negative and statistically significant interaction terms between ethnic minority status and each indicator of perceived collective vulnerability (in Models 2a-2d for the total population) demonstrate that the perceived state vulnerability in each sphere, indeed, affected ethnic majority anti-immigrant attitudes to a greater degree than ethnic minority anti-immigrant attitudes. Consequently, in Model 2 (Table 1) the effect of the perceived collective (state) vulnerability index was found to be bigger on anti-immigrant attitudes among ethnic Russians ($b = .39$) than on such attitudes among non-ethnic Russians ($b = .23$). Statistically significant and negative interaction term between ethnic minority status and the index of perceived collective (state) vulnerability ($b = -.17$) in Model 2 (for the total population) affirms the expectation that the perceived collective vulnerability exerts a stronger impact on the anti-immigrant attitudes of ethnic majority members than on the anti-immigrant attitudes of the ethnic minority population.

Moreover, comparison of the results of Models 1 and 2 (for the ethnic majority population) demonstrate that perceived collective (state) vulnerability meaningfully intertwines into the relationship between self-interests (as captured by socioeconomic position) and anti-immigrant attitudes among the ethnic majority population (ethnic Russians). Once the perceived collective vulnerability of ethnic Russians is taken into account, the differences in anti-immigrant attitudes between persons with sufficient and insufficient income became much smaller (the coefficients decreased by a factor of three), while the difference between white-collar workers and blue-collar workers and between students and blue-collar workers became statistically insignificant.

The inclusion of the perceived state vulnerability index in the model for the ethnic majority group also changed the coefficients related to the effect of political orientation (Table 1). Once the level of the perceived state's vulnerability is included, most differences in the level of anti-immigrant views between ethnic Russians who felt closer to United Russia (the ruling party) and those who felt closer to

other parties, or had no party which they felt close to, disappeared. However, ethnic Russians who felt closer to LDPR (rather nationalist party) still expressed higher level of anti-immigrant attitudes than those who felt closer to the ruling party, although the size of the effect decreased.

In contrast, among ethnic minority members, the inclusion of the perceived state's vulnerability index into the model uncovered differences between those who felt closer to the Communist party and those who felt closer to United Russia (these differences had not been evident in the model without perceived state's vulnerability). It would seem that among ethnic minority members with the same level of perceived state vulnerability, those who felt closer to the Communist party tended to be more tolerant toward immigrants than those who felt closer to United Russia (the ruling party). The inclusion of perceived vulnerability index has not lead to any other meaningful changes in the coefficients of the models for ethnic minority population.

CONCLUSIONS

In this article, we contend that in societies undergoing a search for new national identity borders, the forces that drive anti-immigrant attitudes differ meaningfully for members of the ethnic majority group and for members of the ethnic minority population. Specifically, we argue that in the critical period of national identity redefinition, the anti-immigrant attitudes of ethnic majority group rely mostly on perceptions of collective (state) vulnerability, while the anti-immigrant attitudes of ethnic minority groups rely to a greater degree on individuals' vulnerable socioeconomic position, and on their conservative views and ideologies (i.e., self-interests). We tested this theoretical argument empirically in the context of the historically multi-ethnic society of Russia at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Descriptive data reveal that the level of anti-immigrant attitudes among the majority population (ethnic Russians) is higher than among ethnic minorities (non-ethnic Russians). Previous research in Russia (Alexseev 2010) found comparable differences in anti-immigrant attitudes between ethnic and non-ethnic Russians. Our findings also demonstrate that differences in the level of anti-immigrant attitudes among majority and minority populations are especially pronounced with regard to perceptions of the impact of immigrants on the cultural realm. These results are in line with theoretical expectations because the crisis of national identity in post-socialist Russia has undermined, primarily, a sense of group position of ethnic majority.

The multivariate analysis demonstrates that in post-socialist Russia, sociodemographic characteristics, socioeconomic position and conservative views explain a lower share of the variance in anti-immigrant attitudes among ethnic majority population than among ethnic minority population. At the same time, and strongly in line with our theoretical argument, the results demonstrate that in contemporary Russian society, perceptions of state/collective vulnerability play a more important role in explaining anti-immigrant attitudes among the ethnic majority than among ethnic minority. Dissatisfaction with the state's conditions in each one of four realms—economy, government functioning, educational system, and health services—and as mutual concept tends to increase anti-immigrant attitudes among ethnic Russians to a larger degree than among non-ethnic Russians. Moreover, perceived state/collective vulnerability possesses a substantially higher explanatory power for predicting anti-immigrant attitudes among the ethnic majority than among ethnic minority populations.

The present study highlights the importance of two focal features of Blumer's group position theory—the *perceived nature* of group threat, and the importance of *specific historical context*. The latter has received little attention in recent research. The results of our study demonstrate that these features cannot be ignored, especially while testing Blumer's theory in relatively "new" and understudied social contexts. Since group position—and as a consequence, group threat—can be perceived and defined differently by ethnic majority and minority populations, dependent on specific societal and historical processes, attitudes toward foreigners among majority and minority groups may be driven by different mechanisms. Indeed, our study suggests that when the borders of national identity are redefined and nationalistic resentment rhetoric is sounded, perceived collective/state threat

becomes a more prominent source of anti-foreigner sentiment than individual self-interests (e.g., socioeconomic position, conservative ideologies) among the ethnic majority population; self-interests, however, still plays a more important role in prompting anti-foreign attitudes among ethnic minorities, whom are rarely “included” in the process of the re-building of national identity.

As a future line of research, it would be interesting to test our theoretical argument in other societies with certain degrees of similarity in social context, namely societies negotiating the critical period of national identity redefinition, accompanied (to some extent) by nationalistic rhetoric. Serbia, for example, matches this context.⁷ The processes of reasserting of the national self (after the break-up of the former Yugoslavia along national lines) via nationalist mobilization and the rhetoric of resentment are quite pronounced in this country (e.g., [Subotic 2011](#); [Todosijević 2008](#)).

APPENDIX

Table A1. Descriptive Statistics, Mean/Percent (weighted)

	<i>Ethnic Majority</i>	<i>Ethnic Minority</i>
Men (%)	41.4	41.6
Age	44.22	42.11
Rural residence (%)	21.4	43.7
Feeling unsafe in the neighborhood (%)	42.6	32.5
Years of education (%)	12.48	12.41
Insufficient income (%)	56.7	61.5
Labor force position		
Professions, technicians, managers (%)	22.2	19.7
Clerks, sales, and services workers (%)	13.2	13.4
Blue color workers (%)	19.4	17.2
Unemployed (%)	4.1	5.5
Not in the labor force (%)	30.4	32.5
Students (%)	10.7	11.7
Religious denomination		
Eastern Orthodox (%)	49.8	20.1
Islam (%)	.5	41.6
Other religion (%)	.9	2.6
No denomination (%)	46.1	33.8
No answer (%)	2.7	1.9
Level of religiosity (0-10)	4.29	5.18
Party respondent feels close to . . .		
United Russia (ruling party) (%)	24.6	25.6
CPRF (Communist Party of Russian Federation) (%)	7.6	7.9
LDPR (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia) (%)	4.5	3.4
Rodina/Motherland or Fair Russia (%)	1.8	1.7
No party (%)	59.2	59.3
Other party or missing (%)	2.3	2.1
Perceived collective/state vulnerability index	6.04	5.93
Anti-immigrant sentiment index	6.45	5.96
<i>N</i>	8,085	1,305

⁷ Unfortunately, Serbia has not taken part in the European Social Survey to date.

Table A2. Models Summary for Predicting Anti-immigrant Attitudes Among Ethnic Majority and Ethnic Minority in Russia by Year


	Ethnic Majority			Ethnic Minority		
	R ²	R ² Change	Sig. F Change	R ²	R ² Change	Sig. F Change
2006						
Model 1: socioeconomic position, conservative views, and sociodemographic characteristics	.078	–	–	.140	–	–
Models 2: Model 1 + perceived state's vulnerability regarding						
Model 2a: Model 1 + economic conditions	.124	.046	.00	.143	.003	.29
Model 2b: Model 1 + government work	.120	.041	.00	.141	.001	.49
Model 2c: Model 1 + educational system	.130	.052	.00	.145	.005	.17
Model 2d: Model 1 + health services	.126	.048	.00	.142	.002	.41
2008						
Model 1: socioeconomic position, conservative views, and sociodemographic characteristics	.038	–	–	.108	–	–
Models 2: Model 1 + perceived state's vulnerability regarding						
Model 2a: Model 1 + economic conditions	.111	.073	.00	.141	.033	.00
Model 2b: Model 1 + government work	.103	.065	.00	.150	.042	.00
Model 2c: Model 1 + educational system	.090	.052	.00	.110	.002	.36
Model 2d: Model 1 + health services	.080	.041	.00	.110	.002	.35
2010						
Model 1: socioeconomic position, conservative views, and sociodemographic characteristics	.040	–	–	.131	–	–
Models 2: Model 1 + perceived state's vulnerability regarding						
Model 2a: Model 1 + economic conditions	.127	.087	.00	.228	.097	.00
Model 2b: Model 1 + government work	.117	.077	.00	.164	.033	.00
Model 2c: Model 1 + educational system	.110	.070	.00	.174	.043	.00
Model 2d: Model 1 + health services	.103	.064	.00	.189	.058	.00
2012						
Model 1: socioeconomic position, conservative views, sociodemographic characteristics	.057	–	–	.184	–	–
Models 2: Model 1 + perceived state's vulnerability regarding						
Model 2a: Model 1 + economic conditions	.158	.101	.00	.230	.046	.00
Model 2b: Model 1 + government work	.141	.084	.00	.236	.052	.00
Model 2c: Model 1 + educational system	.144	.087	.00	.233	.049	.00
Model 2d: Model 1 + health services	.130	.073	.00	.239	.054	.00

Table A3. Models Summary for Predicting Anti-immigrant Attitudes Among Ethnic Majority by Country

	R Square Model 1 ^a	R Square Model 2 ^b	R Square Change
Germany	.179	.221	.041
France	.196	.222	.026
Netherlands	.118	.175	.057
Sweden	.166	.195	.030
Russia	.028	.137	.110

^aModel 1: socioeconomic position and sociodemographic characteristics

^bModel 2: Model 1 + perceived state's vulnerability index



chi-square=23.120 df=1
GFI=.999 RMSEA=.052

Figure A1: Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Perceived State Vulnerability

Note: To fit the model, correlation between e1 and e2 was allowed.

REFERENCES

- Alexseev, Mikhail A. 2010. "Majority and Minority Xenophobia in Russia: The Importance of Being Titulars." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 26:89-120.
- Arbuckle, James L. 2008. *AMOS 17.0 User's Guide*. Chicago: SPSS.
- Bahry, Donna. 2016. "Opposition to Immigration, Economic Insecurity, and Individual Values: Evidence from Russia." *Europe-Asia Studies* 68:893-916.
- Ben-Nun Bloom, Pazit, Gizem Arikian, and Gallya Lahav. 2015. "The Effect of Perceived Cultural and Material Threats on Ethnic Preferences in Immigration Attitudes." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 38:1760-78.
- Bessudnov, Alexey. 2016. "Ethnic Hierarchy and Public Attitudes Towards Immigrants in Russia." *European Sociological Review* 32:567-80.
- Blakkisrud, Helge. 2016. "Blurring the Boundary between Civic and Ethnic: The Kremlin's New Approach to National Identity Under Putin's Third Term." Pp. 249-74 in *The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity, and Authoritarianism*, edited by Kolsto, P. and H. Blakkisrud. Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press.
- Blumer, Herbert. 1958. "Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position." *Pacific Sociological Review* 3-7.
- Bobo, Lawrence D. 1999. "Prejudice as Group Position: Microfoundations of a Sociological Approach to Racism and Race Relations." *Journal of Social Issues* 55:445-72.
- Bobo, Lawrence and Vincent L. Hutchings. 1996. "Perceptions of Racial Group Competition: Extending Blumer's Theory of Group Position to a Multiracial Social Context." *American Sociological Review* 61:951-72.

- Breslauer, George W. 2009. "Observations on Russia's Foreign Relations Under Putin." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 25:370-76.
- Castles, Stephen and Mark Miller. 2003. *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*. 3d ed. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave-Macmillan and Guilford Books.
- Ceobanu, Alin M. 2011. "Usual Suspects? Public Views About Immigrants' Impact on Crime in European Countries." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 52:114-31.
- Chudinovskikh, Olga, Mikhail Denisenko, Elena Tyuryukanova, and Nikita Mkrtychyan. 2010. "The Russian Federation." Country Report. SOPEMI Report.
- Citrin, Jack, Donald P. Green, Christopher Muste, and Cara Wong. 1997. "Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations." *The Journal of Politics* 59:858-81.
- Evans, Geoffrey and Ariana Need. 2002. "Explaining Ethnic Polarization Over Attitudes Towards Minority Rights in Eastern Europe: A Multilevel Analysis." *Social Science Research* 31:653-80.
- Espenshade, J. Thomas and Katherine Hempstead. 1996. "Contemporary American Attitudes Toward U.S. immigration." *International Migration Review* 30:535-70.
- Esses, Victoria M., John F. Dovidio, Lynne M. Jackson, and Tamara L. Armstrong. 2001. "The Immigration Dilemma: The Role of Perceived Group Competition, Ethnic Prejudice, and National Identity." *Journal of Social Issues* 57:389-412.
- European Social Survey (ESS). 2006. European Social Survey Round 3 Data [data file edition 3.5]. NSD -Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway [distributor].
- . 2008. European Social Survey Round 4 Data [data file edition 4.3]. NSD -Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway [distributor].
- . 2010. European Social Survey Round 5 Data [data file edition 3.2]. NSD -Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway [distributor].
- . 2012. European Social Survey Round 6 Data [data file edition 2.2]. NSD -Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway [distributor].
- Fetzer, Joel S. 2000. *Public Attitudes Toward Immigration in the United States, France, and Germany*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Gerber, Theodore P. 2014. "Beyond Putin? Nationalism and Xenophobia in Russian Public Opinion." *The Washington Quarterly* 37(3):113-34.
- Gorodzeisky, Anastasia, Anya Glikman, and Dina Maskileyson. 2015. "The Nature of Anti-immigrant Sentiment in Post-socialist Russia." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 31:115-35.
- Gudkov, Lev. 2005. "Smeshennaya Agressiya: Otnosheniye Rossiyan k Migrantam [Displaced Aggression: Russians' Attitudes Toward Migrants]." *Vestnik Obshchestvennogo Mneniya* 80:60-77.
- . 2006. "Xenophobia: Past and Present." *Russia in Global Affairs* 4:58-66.
- Heleniak, Timothy. 2002. "Migration Dilemmas Haunt Post-Soviet Russia." Migration Policy Institute, *Profile*, October 1. Retrieved May 17, 2017 (www.migrationpolicy.org/article/migration-dilemmas-haunt-post-soviet-russia).
- Iontsev Vladimir, Irina Ivakhnyuk, and Svetlana Soboleva .2009. "Immigration to Russia." Pp. 47-62 in *Immigration Worldwide: Policies, Practices and Trends*, edited by U. A. Segal, N. S. Mayadas, and E. Doreen. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ivleva, Irina. 2009. "Trudovyye Migranti v Gorodskoy Ekonomike [Labor Migrants in the Urban Economy]." *Zhurnal Sotsiologii i Sotsial'noy Antropologii* 12:128-49.
- Jackson, James S., Kendrick Brown, Tony N. Brown, and Bryant Marks. 2001. "Contemporary Immigration Policy Orientations among Dominant-Group Members in Western Europe." *Journal of Social Issues* 57:431-56.
- Kolsto, Pal. 2016. "The Ethnification of Russian Nationalism." Pp. 18-45 in *The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism*, edited by P. Kolsto and H. Blakkisrud. Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press.
- Lebedeva, Nadezhda and Alexander Tatarko. 2013. "Immigration and Intercultural Integration Strategies in Post-Soviet Russia." Pp. 179-94 in *Immigration: Policies, Challenges, and Impact*, edited by E. Tartakovsky. New York: Nova Science Publishers.
- Leykin, Inna. 2015. "Rodologia: Genealogy as Therapy in Post-Soviet Russia." *Ethos* 43:135-64.
- Malinkin, Mary E. 2013. "A WARY WELCOME: Varying Reception of Migrants in Russian Cities." Eurasian Migration Paper 7. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC.
- Malinova, Olga. 2010. "Simvolicheskaya Politika i Konstruirovaniye Makropoliticheskoy Identichnosti v Postsovetskoy Rossii [Symbolic Politics and Macro-Political Construction of Identity in Post-soviet Russia]." *Polis. Politicheskoye issledovaniya* 2:90-105.
- McLaren, Lauren M. 2003. "Anti-immigrant Prejudice in Europe: Contact, Threat Perception, and Preferences for the Exclusion of Migrants." *Social Forces* 81:909-36.
- Mendelson, Sarah. E. and Theodore. P. Gerber. 2008. "Us and Them: Anti-American Views of the Putin Generation." *The Washington Quarterly* 31:131-50.

- Meuleman, Bart, Eldad Davidov, and Jaak Billiet. 2009. "Changing Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe, 2002–2007: A Dynamic Group Conflict Theory Approach." *Social Science Research* 38:352-65.
- Molodikova, Irina. 2007. "Transformation of Migration Patterns in Post-Soviet Space: Russian New Migration Policy of 'Open Doors' and Its Effect on European Migration Flows." *Review of Sociology* 13:57-76.
- Olzak, Susan. 1992. *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Pain, Emil A. 2007. "Xenophobia and Ethnopolitical Extremism in Post-soviet Russia: Dynamics and Growth Factors." *Nationalities Papers* 35:895-911.
- Quillian, Lincoln. 1995. "Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group Threat: Population Composition and Anti-immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe." *American Sociological Review* 60:586-611.
- Raijman, Rebeca and Moshe Semyonov. 2004. "Perceived Threat and Exclusionary Attitudes Towards Foreign Workers in Israel." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 27: 780-99.
- Richter, James and Walter F. Hatch. 2013. "Organizing Civil Society in Russia and China: A Comparative Approach." *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 26:323-47.
- Rosenstein, Judith E. 2008. "Individual Threat, Group Threat, and Racial Policy: Exploring the Relationship Between Threat and Racial Attitudes." *Social Science Research* 37:1130-46.
- Schlueter, Elmar and Eldad Davidov. 2013. "Contextual Sources of Perceived Group Threat: Negative Immigration—Related News Reports, Immigrant Group Size and their Interaction, Spain 1996–2007." *European Sociological Review* 29:179-91.
- Schlueter, Elmar, Peter Schmidt, and Ulrich Wagner. 2008. "Disentangling the Causal Relations of Perceived Group Threat and Outgroup Derogation: Cross—National Evidence from German and Russian Panel Surveys." *European Sociological Review* 24:567-81.
- Schnapper, Dominique. 1994. "The Debate on Immigration and the Crisis of National Identity." *West European Politics* 17:127-39.
- Schwartz, Shalom. 1999. "A Theory of Cultural Values and Some Implications for Work." *Applied Psychology* 48:23-47.
- Semyonov, Moshe, Rebeca Raijman, and Anat Yom-Tov. 2002. "Labor Market Competition, Perceived Threat, and Endorsement of Economic Discrimination Against Foreign Workers in Israel." *Social Problems* 49:31-416.
- Semyonov, Moshe, Rebeca Raijman, and Anastasia Gorodzeisky. 2006. "The Rise of Anti-foreigner Sentiment in European Societies, 1988-2000." *American Sociological Review* 71:426-49.
- . 2008. "Foreigners' Impact on European Societies: Public Views and Perceptions in a Cross-national Comparative Perspective." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 49:5-29.
- Shlapentokh, Vladimir. 2007. "The Hatred of Others: The Kremlin's Powerful but Risky Weapon." *World Affairs* 169:134-42.
- Smith, Hanna. 2012. "Domestic Influences on Russian Foreign Policy Status, Interests, and Ressentiment." Pp 39-62 in *Russia and Its near Neighbors*, edited by M. F. Raquel and R. E. Kanet.
- Strabac, Zan and Ola Listhaug. 2008. "Anti-Muslim Prejudice in Europe: A Multilevel Analysis of Survey Data from 30 countries." *Social Science Research* 37:268-86.
- Subotic, Jelena. 2011. "Europe is a State of Mind: Identity and Europeanization in the Balkans." *International Studies Quarterly* 55:309-30.
- Supyan, Victor B. 2000. "Privatization in Russia: Phases and Effects." Pp. 11-28 in *Transitions to Capitalism and Democracy in Russia and Central Europe: Achievements, Problems, Prospects*, edited by J. M. Logue and D. M. Hancock. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Tipaldou, Sofia and Katrin Uba. 2014. "The Russian Radical Right Movement and Immigration Policy: Do They Just Make Noise or Have an Impact as Well?" *Europe-Asia Studies* 66:1080-1101.
- Todosijević, Bojan. 2008. "The Structure of Political Attitudes in Hungary and Serbia." *East European Politics & Societies* 22:879-900.
- United Nations. 2015. "Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2015 Revision." Retrieved June 26, 2017 (www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/docs/MigrationStockDocumentation_2015.pdf).
- Vishnevskiy, Anatoliy. 2011. *Naseleniye Rossii 2009. Semnadsatsiy Yezhegodnyy Demograficheskiy Doklad* [Population of Russia 2009: The 17th Annual Demographic Report]. Moscow: Izd. Dom Vysshey Shkoly Ekonomiki.
- Warhola, James W. and Alex Lehning. 2007. "Political Order, Identity, and Security in Multinational, Multi - Religious Russia." *Nationalities Papers* 35:933-57.
- Wimmer, Andreas. 1997. "Explaining Xenophobia and Racism: A Critical Review of Current Research Approaches." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 20:17-41.
- Yudlina, Natalia and Vera Alperovich. 2012. "Summer 2012: Back to Lessons Learned." Racism and Xenophobia Reports and Analyses 2012 October. SOVA – Center for Information and Analysis. Retrieved May 17, 2017 (www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-analyses/2012/10/d25621/).