Welfare Regimes, Family-Supportive Policies, and Women’s Employment along the Life-Course

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This article examines women’s employment patterns during the child-rearing period and the consequences of those patterns for earnings later in life, in 12 industrialized countries. This study proposes an analytic framework that combines “welfare regime” and gender-specific policies to explain country differences. The findings presented here suggest that institutional arrangements mediate the costs to women’s part-time and intermittent employment. Within welfare regimes, employment continuity is highest among countries in which the state provides support for working mothers. Furthermore, this study finds that lower support for mothers’ employment is associated with higher wage penalties to employment discontinuity.

INTRODUCTION

Women’s employment patterns along their life cycle are related to family events and, in particular, to the presence and age of children. Many women tend to drop out of the labor force after giving birth and to return to full employment only later in life. In recent years, however, a growing number of young mothers have maintained continuous labor market activity, either by maintaining the jobs they held before giving birth or by shifting

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1731
into part-time employment (Spain and Bianchi 1996; Main 1988; Stier 1998; Sundstrom 1992).

The periodic separation of women from work is seen by proponents of human capital theory as the major determinant of the gender wage gap and of occupational sex segregation (Polachek 1975; Mincer and Ofek 1982; Duncan and Prus 1992). This is mainly because intermittent employment is assumed to result in skill atrophy, which, in turn, reduces productivity and thus wages. Workers who interrupt their employment are also perceived by employers as having lower commitment to work. Consequently, they are less likely to gain access to the high-paying, more attractive jobs (Gronau 1988; Stafford and Sundstrom 1996).

Studies that focused on the consequences of women’s employment patterns along the life cycle for their labor market rewards have adopted, for the most part, a microlevel approach. While this approach explains many aspects of the labor market, it generally ignores institutional and normative arrangements that structure women’s work and that may mediate the effect of intermittent or part-time employment on market outcomes. In recent years, a growing number of studies have focused on comparing women’s employment situation across industrialized countries (e.g., Rosenfeld and Kalleberg 1990; Gornick and Jacobs 1996, 1998; Gornick, Meyers, and Ross 1998; Hansen 1995; Blau and Kahn 1995). These studies document the variation in market behavior and market consequences in relation to gender issues and emphasize the importance of the institutional context within which women operate, for understanding labor market outcomes at the individual, as well as societal, level.

Our study aims to probe the variations across countries in women’s employment pattern along the life course and their earnings consequences. We introduce an explanatory framework that links the country differences to structural arrangements associated with distinct welfare regimes. Comparison of countries, which represent different welfare regimes and labor market arrangements, permits us to explore variations in market returns to women’s employment pattern. In particular, we focus on the effect of institutional settings on earning outcomes of part-time and intermittent employment during the child-rearing years. In the process, we also identify the social-political contexts in which “penalties” for reduced employment of women (i.e., working part-time instead of full-time during child-rearing years) are minimized.

We start by outlining the variety of institutional contexts in which women are employed, as they are manifest in 12 industrialized countries, including Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Italy, Israel, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States. We then introduce our expectations concerning the pattern of women’s work and their outcomes in the different settings. This is followed by an
analysis of women’s work behavior, the costs associated with the different employment patterns, and the structural characteristics that are related to them.

THE CONTEXT OF WOMEN’S MARKET ACTIVITY

Several social institutions are said to influence employment in general and women’s employment in particular. Brinton (1988), for example, focused on the role of the family, the educational system, and the labor market in mediating processes of decision making and achievements at the individual level. Others pointed to the importance of market regulations by state policies, or the interaction between the market and the welfare state, as the major institutions that affect employment outcomes (see, e.g., Blossfeld 1997; Diprete et al. 1997). To the extent that these institutions and their interrelationships vary from one country to another, the context in which women’s employment takes place will differ substantially.

Addressing the institutional context in generalized terms, Esping-Andersen (1990) has proposed a typology of welfare regimes that pertains to country differences in social policies regarding citizen rights and the organization of work. The current study uses this typology as a point of departure. According to Esping-Andersen’s typology, three models of welfare regimes can be differentiated: the social-democratic welfare state, the liberal welfare state, and the conservative-corporatist welfare state. The first model is characterized by a universalistic approach to social rights, a high level of de-commodification, and an inclusion of the middle class in social programs. The liberal model, at the other extreme, provides only limited social insurance. Its social programs are directed mainly toward the working class and the poor, and means-tested assistance is prevalent. In the conservative-corporatist welfare regime, social principles prevail in most areas, based, however, not on egalitarian standards but rather on eligibility dependent upon social statuses (mainly family, class, and religion) and traditions.

Each of the welfare models represents a distinct relationship between the state and the market. The liberal regime is based on the predominance of the market. Its basic ideology is that economic well-being is best achieved through the unfettered operation of the market (i.e., via market wages). State involvement takes place only when the market fails (Esping-Andersen 1990; Gustafsson 1994). In the social-democratic regime, on the contrary, the state is fully responsible for assuring the welfare of its citizens irrespective of market forces in general and the citizens’ own market activity in particular. Indeed, the social-democratic welfare state aims to buffer individuals from market uncertainties and to weaken the links
between market and life chances. The conservative regime represents a third model in which the state, the market, and other institutions—mainly the family and the church—share responsibility for citizens’ welfare. Welfare rights are not universal but rather depend on particularistic statuses.

In his discussion of women’s employment, Esping-Andersen focused on the extent of female labor force participation and the magnitude of sex-segregation in the labor market. He argued that female labor market participation would vary across the three welfare regimes. The differences are related mainly to the variation in structure of the labor market and, particularly, the size of the public sector. More specifically, Esping-Andersen anticipated a high rate of female labor force participation in the social-democratic countries, a somewhat lower rate of economic activity for women in the liberal countries where the market controls the demand for labor, and a low rate of participation in the conservative countries, in which women are marginal to the economy. While Esping-Andersen did not discuss explicitly the employment behavior of women along their life course, some expectations can be derived using the underlying principles of the three welfare regimes. In the following section we outline these expectations, regarding three main topics: women’s participation in paid employment, part-time employment, and the pattern of work along the life course and its economic consequences.

Women’s Participation in the Labor Market

In all industrial countries, women still bear the major responsibility for child rearing, independent of welfare regime and specific family and child policies. In fact, none of the public policies (not even in the most egalitarian countries) has been effective enough to change the household division of labor between the genders (Sainsbury 1996). Thus, family obligations and especially the presence of children restrict women’s involvement in the economy. The rates of women’s labor force participation, however, and especially their pattern of work, differ in accordance with welfare regime and are affected by specific family and gender-oriented policies.

In a society based primarily on “market principles,” such as the United States, market criteria determine who will work and who will take care of the children. Having a stronger position in the market and being free of child-care responsibilities (normatively, as well as practically), men are expected to allocate most of their time to labor market activity. Women are constrained in their time allocation decisions and are compelled to weigh the costs and benefits of market activity against household responsibilities and obligations (Gronau 1977; Becker 1981). Consequently, a strong selection of women into the market is anticipated, based on expected rewards and on their orientation toward work (Blakemore and
Women’s Employment

Drake 1996; Hansen 1995). Child-care arrangements, which free women to allocate more of their time to the labor force, largely depend in the United States on private initiatives and thus are subject to forces of supply and demand (Gustafsson 1994) and could further enhance the selection into paid employment.

In a social-democratic welfare regime, the “social regulation” overrides market principles, and the state is committed to increasing equality among all citizens. Under this regime, there are basically two ways for women to gain equality with men. One way is to participate in the labor force in a similar manner to that of men. In such a case, the state assumes responsibility for the children, mainly by providing state-subsidized child-care facilities, and enforces gender-equality measures in the labor market. This is what Esping-Andersen (1999) defines as “de-familialization.” The anticipated consequence is a high participation rate of women, and especially mothers, in the labor force. Nonetheless, a universal benefit system for parents, while aimed to enhance women’s labor force participation opportunities, may also promote the incorporation of less committed workers into the labor force (Hansen 1995). This has implications for the types of jobs women will choose and explains in part the higher concentration of women in the public sector and in female-dominated occupations (Hansen 1995).

A second route to improving women’s economic position and to protect their economic independence is for the state to provide monetary remuneration for child care (and housework). This is done through family-related policies such as maternity and paternity leave (for pay), child allowances, tax relief for children, and so on (Gauthier 1996). According to this latter strategy, women are not necessarily encouraged to participate in the market, but rather they are compensated by the state for the time invested in child care.

The conservative-corporatist regime supports a traditional division of labor between the genders, both normatively and institutionally. Although a certain degree of decommodification does take place, there is no attempt on behalf of the state to eliminate gender inequalities. Rather, the expectation is that the traditional family, with the male breadwinner, will provide for all family members (Esping-Andersen 1999). The state intervenes (through public assistance programs) when the family fails. Women in these countries are perceived as the main caretakers of children and families, and family-related policies, including the tax regime, encourage women to withdraw from (or limit their involvement in) market activity, especially when they have young children. This portrayal is very much in line with Sainsbury’s (1994, 1996) “breadwinner model.”
American Journal of Sociology

Women’s Part-Time Employment

Part-time employment is an important means of incorporating women into the market in all countries, irrespective of welfare regime. Part-time employment is perceived by women as a way to cope with their multiple roles as mothers and workers. Employers too see advantages in women’s part-time employment since it reduces absenteeism and increases their flexibility (Beechey and Perkins 1987; Duffy and Pupo 1992). Nonetheless, the three welfare regimes differ in the types of jobs open to part-time employees and in the public perception of part-time employment.

Within the liberal welfare regime, part-time employment constrains women’s ability to gain access to the better jobs, which grant high earnings and opportunities for career advancement (Beechey and Perkins 1987; Duffy and Pupo 1992; Sundstrom 1992). This is mainly because part-time employment is concentrated in a limited number of occupations and in dead-end, temporary jobs. Furthermore, part-time employment is generally taken to signal lower commitment to work than full-time employment (Kishler and Alexander 1987). As a result, women who work part-time are often denied entry into positions of authority and responsibility. We expect, therefore, that in countries with liberal welfare regimes, where there is strong selection of women into paid employment, only a minority of women will be in part-time employment.

The situation differs in other welfare regimes. The social-democratic welfare regime is committed to promoting women’s labor force participation. In this framework, part-time employment is offered as a way to maintain the continuous involvement of mothers in the labor force. It is assumed that part-time employment during early motherhood is a transitional stage, and women will return to full-time employment. Concomitantly, employment conditions in part-time jobs are similar to those in full-time employment. This includes employment benefits, union protection, access to good jobs, and an easy transition into full-time employment later in life (Sundstrom 1997).

Part-time employment is of special significance under the conservative welfare regime. It is perceived as a solution to the incorporation of mothers into the labor force, without altering the gendered division of labor. Since in these societies women are expected to give higher priority to their parental role, part-time employment has a more permanent nature and is highly concentrated in female-type, secondary sectors of employment. Because of the dominance of social principles in the conservative regime, however, part-time workers enjoy employment benefits and union protection similar to full-time workers. High rates of part-time employment among women, especially among young mothers, are therefore expected in these societies.
Continuous Employment and Its Economic Consequences

The variation among welfare regimes in women’s labor force participation rates and their involvement in part-time employment has implications for their lifelong pattern of work and its economic consequences. Continuous employment is expected primarily in countries characterized by social-democratic welfare regimes, which are committed to enhancing gender equality through market work. Transition into part-time employment, during certain periods of life, is likely to have little negative consequences, since such a mode of employment is fully supported by labor market institutions and since it is not taken as an indication of a lack of commitment to work. Thus, part-time employment is an alternative for employment interruption, and it operates more as a “bridge” to full-time employment later in life than as a “trap” in marginal employment (Natti 1995). Indeed, work interruption is discouraged and is therefore expected to be penalized both in terms of women’s ability to return to their previous job and in terms of earnings.

Employment patterns along the life course in countries with conservative welfare regimes are expected to differ from the patterns discussed above. First, higher rates of intermittent employment are expected, since women’s traditional roles are promoted and only limited market opportunities (especially for young mothers) are offered. Those who will return later in life to market activity will most likely find part-time, secondary employment. Work interruption, however, may not be costly to women, since most mothers work in secondary jobs, which do not offer high economic rewards. Also, due to a structured labor market and the operation of social principles in market rewards, the penalties for noncontinuous full-time employment will be low.

In the liberal welfare regime, market opportunities for women will affect their pattern of work. Those who have lower wages and higher costs of child care will interrupt their employment; those who can “afford” child care will continue their employment. In this case, part-time jobs provide an inadequate solution, as we argued above. Women who do not change their occupation concomitant with the move into part-time employment can preserve their skills and move later on to full-time employment. On the other hand, those who change occupations will be trapped in part-time (mainly secondary) jobs and will not be able to improve their position in the labor force in the long run. In general, in market-based political economies, work interruptions are expected to result in high economic costs, both because interruptions involve skill atrophy and because employers interpret it as a signal regarding the employee’s commitment to work (Duncan and Prus 1992; Mincer and Ofek 1982). A stringent selection of women into full-time employment is expected to contribute, as
American Journal of Sociology

well, to inequality among women in the economic rewards associated with work behavior.

COUNTRY VARIATION IN FAMILY AND WORK POLICIES

Esping-Andersen’s typology was criticized by feminist writers for its rather exclusive focus on the relationship between the market and the state, while the family and the gendered division of labor were addressed only partially (Daly 1994). It was argued that although his analysis was concerned with the employment trajectories of men and women, Esping-Andersen neglected to discuss the relationship between the state and gender-specific policies and orientations. Lacking, in particular, is a systematic treatment of the division of labor and women’s role in the family and how these affect women’s employment (Bussemaker and Kersbergen 1994; Daly 1994; Sainsbury 1994, 1996; O’Connor 1996). In his recent writings, however, Esping-Andersen (1999) considers the state/family relationships more systematically by introducing the concepts of familialization and defamilialization to differentiate between countries in which traditional family dependencies still prevail and those in which the role of the family is minimized. His main conclusion, however, is that this distinction largely corresponds to the threefold welfare regimes.2

The welfare typology notwithstanding, considerable country variation in women’s employment exists within each of the three regimes. Countries differ, for example, in the general orientation toward women’s work. Norms and attitudes will affect how women structure their life-course employment pattern, deciding whether to work when children are young and whether to take full-time employment. Similarly, economic factors, such as the cost of living and men’s level of earning (e.g., the ability of a household to maintain the aspired standard of living with only one paycheck) may affect women’s employment choices. In this article, we focus on another institutional aspect that affects women’s employment pattern, that is, family-oriented policies and practices. These do not necessarily overlap with the more general labor market policies enacted by states. Specifically, within each regime, countries differ with regard to policies concerning mothers’ employment, partly as a result of perceptions regarding female employment and partly because of different historical and contextual developments.

In a recent comparative study of family policies, Gornick, Meyers, and

2 According to Esping-Andersen’s (1999) analysis, social-democratic countries have achieved a high level of defamilialization, while conservative countries preserved the role of the male breadwinner and the dependency of women on the family rather than on the state.
Ross (1997) examined policies that support mothers' employment in 14 OECD countries. Their study demonstrated considerable variation in employment-related policies concerning women within each welfare cluster. For example, based on several indicators of policy (i.e., maternity leave policies, child-care arrangements for various ages of children, school schedule, etc.), they categorize Sweden as having a highly encouraging policy for mothers' employment, while Norway, another social-democratic country, is ranked at a lower level. A lower level of support for mothers' employment is also apparent in the Netherlands, where the welfare state was modeled largely along the lines of the social-democratic regime (Pfau-Effinger 1998). Taking yet another example, Canada's policies regarding female participation in the labor market are more extensive and supportive compared to other countries with liberal welfare regimes. Differences are also evident within the conservative cluster, with France and Italy exhibiting a highly supportive policy for mothers' employment and Germany and Austria providing a lower level of support.

In this article, we adopt Gornick, Meyers, and Ross (1996) categorization of countries according to the level of their employment-supportive policy. We add this dimension to the welfare regime typology in order to enhance our understanding of women's employment patterns and their expected economic consequences. By way of summary, we present in table 1 the distribution of the 12 countries included in our study along the lines of welfare regimes and employment-supportive policies. The two dimensions are clearly related but do not fully correspond to one another. Accordingly, most countries with a liberal welfare regime have a low level of state support of mothers' employment. Only one country in this regime (Canada) has an intermediate level of support, and no country falls into a category of liberal welfare regime and high support for mothers' employment. In countries with conservative or social-democratic welfare regimes, mothers' employment receives intermediate or high support from the state. Correspondingly, none of these countries fall into the "low support" category.

Our study aims to explore this intraregime variation by examining

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3 According to their scheme, countries were categorized into three levels of employment-supportive policies: high, intermediate, and low. They constructed an index based on several indicators of public parental leave schemes (e.g., legislated job protection, weeks of paid maternity leave, wage replacement rate, coverage of policy, availability of extended leave, and paternity benefits) and child-care policies (including tax relief for child care, guaranteed child care for age groups 0–2 and 3–5, child care expenditures, percentage of children ages 0–2 in publicly funded child care, percentage of children 3–5 in publicly funded child care, percentage of children age 5 in preprimary school, and percentage of children in public after-school programs). For a detailed discussion of this index, see Gornick et al. (1996, 1997).
TABLE 1
CATEGORIZATION OF COUNTRIES BY WELFARE REGIME AND THE LEVEL OF SUPPORT FOR MOTHERS’ EMPLOYMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Welfare Regime</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Intermediate</th>
<th>High</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social democratic</td>
<td>Norway, the Netherlands</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>United States,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>United Kingdom,</td>
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<td>Australia, New Zealand</td>
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women’s employment pattern along their life course and the economic costs associated with interrupted employment and transition to part-time employment. Making use of the two dimensions—welfare-state regimes, on the one hand, and policies supportive of female employment, on the other hand, we derive hypotheses concerning these costs. Our main expectations regarding the employment pattern of women in each institutional arrangement and the costs associated with intermittent employment—either a transition to part-time employment or exit from the labor force—are outlined below.

In general, we expect high continuity of employment in the social-democratic countries and a fast return to full employment. We also expect lower earning penalties to (long-term or short-term) shifts into part-time employment but higher penalties to employment interruptions (withdrawal from the labor force). In conservative countries, we expect a relatively higher level of employment transition to part-time or out of the labor force, since women are not generally encouraged to participate in the labor market when family demands are high. Consequently, the penalties for employment interruption and for a transition to part-time will be low. Finally, the highest level of a continuous full-time employment and the highest levels of penalty to deviation from this pattern are expected in countries with liberal welfare regimes.

Welfare regime notwithstanding, the variation in policies supporting mothers’ employment implies that within each welfare regime the employment pattern and employment consequences will differ. In countries with high levels of support for mothers’ employment, the penalty associated with the transition into part-time jobs will be low, since this form of employment maintains women’s attachment to the labor market. Employment interruption, however, is a less agreeable behavior in this context and will entail a higher level of penalty. An intermediate level of support
suggests lack of appropriate conditions that facilitate mothers’ employment continuity. In this case, it is expected that women will either reduce their involvement in the labor market (i.e., move into part-time jobs) or completely withdraw from employment when they have young children.

Applying these expectations to the classification in Table 1, we hypothesize higher continuity of employment in Sweden compared to Norway and the Netherlands and a faster return to full-time employment. This is so since these social-democratic countries differ in the level of institutional support given to mothers’ employment. We further expect a lower earnings penalty in Sweden for a transition into part-time employment compared to the two other countries. In the three countries, nonetheless, women will be penalized similarly for employment interruptions.

In the group of countries with conservative regimes, German and Austrian women are expected to interrupt their employment (for a short or a long period) more often than Israeli or Italian women, since the former have lower institutional support for employment. However, German and Austrian women are less likely than women in Italy or Israel to face high penalties for their employment interruptions or for a transition to part-time employment. Variation in employment patterns and the penalties associated with them are expected also among the liberal countries. Since Canada has the highest support for mothers’ employment, Canadian women are expected to work continuously, either full- or part-time, and to have lower penalties for their work interruptions than women in other countries with liberal welfare regimes.

DATA AND MEASUREMENTS

For the purpose of the cross-national analysis, we use data obtained from the ISSP 1994 survey on “family and changing gender roles” (Zentralarchiv fuer Empirische Sozialforschung 1997). The ISSP (International Social Survey Program) is conducted as a collective effort by participating nations aimed at ensuring high comparability. There were 24 countries that participated in the “gender-role” module. Within each of the countries, a national representative sample of the adult population was drawn, and respondents were presented with identical questionnaires. Our analyses are based on 12 of the 24 countries included in the ISSP “family and gender-role” module. The selection of countries was based on theoretical and empirical reasons. We decided to exclude all former-communist countries from the analysis because the relationship between family and women’s employment pattern was historically embedded in the socialist regime and is still in the state of flux. Japan and the Philippines were also excluded because they do not easily fit into the welfare-regime ty-
pology. Among the European countries, Spain and Ireland were not included due to data problems: the Spanish data had no information on either the extent of work (full- or part-time) or on weekly working hours. Thus it was impossible to include Spanish women in the analysis of wage penalties. In the Irish sample, too few women participated in the market.

In addition to attitude items, respondents were presented with an extensive set of questions on past and present family and work status. This unique feature of the data allows us to compare, in the most reliable way, women’s employment patterns and their consequences. To measure women’s employment pattern, we used information concerning women’s work activity during different stages of their family life cycle. These included information on work behavior after marriage but before having children, when preschool children were at home, when the children were in school, and when the children left home.

In the present analysis, we focus on employment status during two periods that represent high family demand on women’s time: when women had preschool children and when they had school-age children. In accordance, we limited the sample to include only women who went through these phases. For each of these periods, female respondents reported whether they were employed full-time, part-time, or were out of the labor force. Based on this information, we constructed the employment-pattern variable. Since there are three possible states at every family life-course stage, there are theoretically nine possible employment patterns. Due to empty cells, we collapsed the nine possible combinations into five meaningful employment patterns: continuous full-time employment, continuous part-time employment, continuous nonemployment, those who worked part-time (including very few who did not work) in the first period but worked full-time in the second, and those who did not work in the first period and worked part-time in the second. This typology will be put to use, both as a dependent and as an independent variable, in the different parts of the analysis.

The analytic section of the article comprises two parts: first we examine women’s pattern of work, utilizing multinomial logistic regression models in which the employment-pattern serves as a dependent variable and the welfare and policy regimes serve as the main independent variables. The models control for women’s age and education. In the second part, we evaluate the effect of the employment-pattern along the life course on current earnings, within each institutional context. Earnings are measured in country-specific currency and in different units (e.g., monthly income,

Women who are still in the second stage of child rearing (i.e., they have school-age children at home) were also included in our final sample.
annual income). To achieve comparability and to overcome the differences in the unit of measurement, we standardized the earnings using a measure of relative earnings. Accordingly, for each country, we calculated the relative distance of respondent's income from work from the maximum earning reported in the country-specific sample (for a discussion of this procedure, see Gornick et al. 1996). In addition to the employment-pattern, the wage equations include as control variables: education, age, hours of work, whether the woman is in a professional, managerial, or technical (PTM) occupation, and whether she has a position of authority at work. Due to the selective nature of women's employment and especially the differential selectivity across countries, we employ the Heckman (1979) estimation procedure in order to control for sample selectivity when estimating the earnings of women in the labor force.

FINDINGS

Family Life Cycle and Women's Employment

We begin our analysis with a description of women's employment status at three points in time: (1) after marriage but before children, (2) when the children were young (preschool children), and (3) when the children were in school. Figure 1 presents the employment patterns for the 12 countries included in the study. The first panel of figure 1 refers to women's employment patterns before they had children. The striking feature of these data is the similarity across countries. With the exception of the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent Italy, the majority of women in all countries reported working full-time prior to having children. Sweden and Canada exhibit the highest figures, with 76% and 81%, respectively. Dutch women, by way of contrast, have an exceptionally low level (44%) of full-time employment prior to having children.

About a third of all women in Italy and the Netherlands, and over a quarter of the women in Germany, Australia, the United States, and Norway were not in the labor force before having children. The figures

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5 Germany and Israel were the only countries to provide information on net monthly income.

6 Education was measured as an ordinal variable including the seven ordered categories provided by each country. Alternative formulations (e.g., dummy categories of school level, years of schooling) yielded similar results.

7 The probit equation for the selection model included age, education, marital status, whether the woman ever worked while having children, and two attitudinal indicators. The latter items were based on the extent of agreement with the following sentences: "A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works" and "Family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job."
for other countries, however, were substantially lower. Correspondingly, only a minority of women in all countries held a part-time job. It is important to note that country disparities in part-time employment and no employment prior to having children do not necessarily indicate differences in women’s disposition toward labor force participation. The observed employment behavior could be affected by other factors, such as school enrollment, which may be more prevalent at this stage of life in some countries than in others. We will address this point subsequently.
Women's Employment

Employment patterns when family demands are high are probably more revealing with regard to the constraints on women’s labor force behavior than their experience early in the family life cycle. For this reason, we examine country differences in the employment patterns of women with preschool children. These are presented in the second panel of figure 1. There is a dramatic shift in women’s employment patterns with the arrival of preschool children in the family. This shift gives occasion to the emergence of large country variation. Over one-third of women with preschool children in Israel, Italy, the United States, Austria, and Canada (in that order) engaged in full-time employment. In all other countries, however, less than 20% engaged in full-time employment, with the lowest level found in the Netherlands (4.5%) and New Zealand (6%). Concomitantly, the Netherlands, Germany, Australia, and New Zealand have the highest levels of nonemployment when mothers have preschool children (over 60%), followed closely by Britain, Norway, and Austria (above 50%).

The lowest levels of nonparticipation were found in Israel (31%) and Sweden (40%). Sweden also had the highest rate of part-time employment (43%), followed by Norway and Israel. It is noteworthy that in five of the twelve countries (United States, Canada, Israel, Italy, and Austria) most women who participated in paid employment during this stage of the family life cycle worked on a full-time basis. With the exception of Austria, these are countries in which the overall rate of employment among mothers of preschool children remained rather high.

For the sake of illustration, we contrast the employment distribution, before and after having children, in the Netherlands, Sweden, and Israel. In the Netherlands, the proportion of women working part-time remained unchanged (comparing the top and the middle panels), whereas the proportion of women working full-time dropped to less than 5%. In fact, the overwhelming majority of women withdrew from the labor force when they had young children. By way of contrast, the most noticeable feature in the Swedish data is the decline in proportion of full-time employment and substantial increase in part-time employment when women have preschool children. A certain proportion of women is out of the labor force during this phase of the life cycle, but the proportion is not nearly as high as in the Netherlands. Israel exhibits yet another pattern. Although part-time employment grows when mothers have preschool children, a large proportion of women are employed full-time during this phase. Concomitantly, only a small portion of mothers does not participate in the labor force.

The finding that stands out in the third panel of figure 1 is the return of women to the labor force when children are of school age, albeit with a different mix of full- and part-time employment. If we compare the top and bottom panels, we find that the magnitude of nonparticipation is only
slightly greater in the third phase, but the extent of part-time employment is considerably higher in most countries. Nonetheless, country differences in women's employment patterns remain substantial. When we compare the second and the third panels, we find that the shift into full-time employment is especially salient in the United States, where 54% of the women with school-age children worked full-time (compared to 35% in the previous phase of the family life cycle). No significant change, however, is evident in the rate of part-time work between the two time periods. Israel shows a very similar pattern—an increase in full-time but very little change in part-time employment.

In Sweden, part-time as well as full-time employment increased as most women returned to labor market activity. A similar shift took place in most other countries (except for Italy), albeit with a varying proportion remaining out of the labor force. Italy is the only country in which the pattern of female employment remained as it was in the second period. Although in most countries, then, the labor force participation of women was higher when children were of school age, they clearly did not return to the level of economic activity they had prior to having children.

The number of women out of the labor force during this third stage of the family's life cycle was considerably lower than in the previous stage. Nonetheless, half of all Dutch and German women and over a third of Austrian, Italian, and Australian women were still out of the labor force. Swedish women show the lowest level of nonparticipation with only 12% of all mothers of school-age children being out of the labor force. In all other countries, the rate of nonparticipation ranged between one-fifth and one-quarter of all mothers of school-age children.

Transitions and Emerging Employment Patterns

To this point, we considered the static features of female employment during different points in the family life cycle, from a comparative perspective. Such a perspective is incomplete, however, since it fails to capture the dynamic aspect of actual shifts in labor market position, which is necessary for an understanding of different paths that women take. To address this point, we examine the shift or stability in employment states at the microlevel. We focus on two points in time—when women had preschool children and when the children were in school.

As pointed out in the data and measurement section, there are five meaningful employment patterns: continuous full-time employment, a shift from part-time to full-time, continuous part-time employment, a shift from no employment to part-time employment, and continuous nonemployment. The distribution of women across the five-category employment pattern is presented in figure 2. The frequencies of the various patterns
Fig. 2.—Distribution of employment pattern along the life course by country

are presented as a stacked bar for each of the countries, with the pattern of full-time employment in both phases at the bottom, followed by other employment arrangements, and ending with no labor force participation in either period at the top.

Taken as a whole, the figures suggest that the relationship between the institutional arrangements (i.e., the welfare regime and the level of employment-supportive policies), and employment patterns is not straightforward. The highest level of full-time continuous employment is observed in Israel, Italy (two conservative countries with high support for mother’s employment), the United States, and Canada (liberal countries that differ in their level of employment support). They are followed by Austria—another conservative country, but with a lower level of employment support policies. Women in the United States and Canada also return to full-time employment sooner than do other women. Thus, about half of all women in these two countries worked full-time by the time their younger child went to school. The lowest level of continuous full-time employment is noted in the Netherlands and in New Zealand, which, again, fall into two different categories of institutional arrangements.

Continuous part-time employment is most prevalent in Sweden, Norway, Israel, and in two of the liberal countries—the United Kingdom and New Zealand. These countries also exhibit an early return from nonemployment to part-time (a pattern prevalent in the Netherlands and Australia as well). Separation from market work is highest in the Netherlands and Germany, followed closely by Austria—three countries with an in-
termediate level of support for mothers' employment. The rate of long-
term withdrawal from market work is also high in Italy, which has more
supportive employment policies. Countries that represent the liberal model
exhibit similar rates of female nonparticipation in the labor market. These
rates are higher than in Scandinavian countries but lower than the rates
common in nations with a conservative welfare regime.

Although the variation across countries in women's employment pat-
terns shows only partial correspondence to the institutional contexts in
which women's work is organized, the analysis of change in employment
states along the family life cycle reveals an important relationship between
welfare regimes and women's employment. In Israel, Italy, and, to a lesser
extent, Austria—all with conservative welfare regimes—we find large
proportions of women in continuous full-time employment and continuous
nonemployment. These are mutually exclusive categories, which implies
heterogeneity of the female population. This mirrors the institutional du-
ality of these countries, where there is a strong family orientation but also
social policies supportive of women's work. This distinguishes Israel and
Italy from Germany (and probably the Netherlands), where there is little
support for female employment and indeed a very high proportion of
women in continuous nonemployment.

In the social-democratic countries—specifically, Norway and Swe-
den—we find that the categories of continuous full-time employment and
continuous nonemployment are rather small. This means that there is
greater homogeneity in the population of women. Most women work part-
time when they have young children, or they shift from one state to
another, so that practically all women are employed either full- or part-
time at one time or another. These patterns are also evident in Australia,
New Zealand, and the United Kingdom—countries characterized by a
liberal welfare regime—but continuous nonparticipation is higher in these
countries, as might be expected in systems with weak family-support
policies.

Variation in employment patterns within institutional contexts may
reflect differences in the composition of the female workforce (mainly its
age and education). Our first task is, therefore, to test the hypothesis
regarding the effect of institutional arrangements on the pattern of em-
ployment along the life course, taking into account women's socio-
demographic characteristics. We hypothesized that the likelihood to be in
each employment category will vary across welfare regimes and employ-
ment support policies. More specifically, we expect higher rates of con-
tinuous full-time employment under the liberal welfare regime compared
to the other two welfare regimes, and in countries with higher support
for women's employment, within each regime.

In order to test these hypotheses, we estimated a set of multinomial
## TABLE 2

**MODELS EXPLAINING WOMEN’S EMPLOYMENT PATTERN ALONG THE LIFE COURSE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$-2 \text{ Log Likelihood}$</th>
<th>$df$</th>
<th>$\chi^2$ Change</th>
<th>$df$ Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Base model</td>
<td>16,180.78</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Model 1 + welfare regime</td>
<td>15,807.12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Model 2 + employment supportive policies</td>
<td>15,671.69</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Model 3 + welfare regime × employment supportive policies</td>
<td>15,607.92</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Model 4 + country specific effect</td>
<td>15,188.17</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comparisons:**
- Model 2 vs. model 1 ........................................ 373.66*  8
- Model 3 vs. model 2 ........................................ 135.43*  8
- Model 4 vs. model 3 ........................................ 63.77*  4
- Model 5 vs. model 4 ........................................ 419.75*  24

* $P < .05$.

Logistic regression models in which the employment pattern is the dependent variable (with continuous nonemployment as the omitted category). The analysis starts out with a simple model, which includes the age and education of women and then adds the welfare regime and characteristics of employment supportive policies. Model statistics for various specifications are presented in table 2. Model 1, which includes age and education as explanatory variables, serves as the base model. This model assumes no variation across welfare and policy regimes in women’s patterns of employment. Model 2 tests the effect of welfare regime, while model 3 adds the effect of family policy to the previous model. Model 4 tests the full set of interactions between the two dimensions—welfare regime and policy level. In the final step, we fitted model 5, which assumes country-specific effects on the employment pattern. The top half of table 2 presents the goodness of fit for each model, and the bottom panel shows the statistics for model comparisons.

A comparison between model 2 and model 1 reveals that type of welfare regime significantly affects women’s employment pattern. The likelihood statistic ($-2\text{LL}$) decreased from 16,180.78 to 15,807.12 ($\chi^2 = 373.66; df = 8$). The comparison of model 3 with model 2 reveals that employment-supportive policies also have a significant effect on the employment pattern. Model 3, which includes both welfare regime and employment policies, improves on model 2 ($\chi^2 = 135.43; df = 8$), indicating that the two dimensions are important for understanding women’s employment pattern. Model 4 includes the full set of interactions between welfare regimes and policy level. The $-2\text{LL}$ value associated with this model is signifi-
cantly lower than in model 3 ($\chi^2 = 63.77$; $df = 4$). This attests to the fact that the level of support for mothers’ employment affects women’s employment patterns differently depending on welfare regime.

Last, we tested a model with an indicator for each of the 12 countries to capture the total variation across countries. The model statistics for the difference between model 5 and model 4 are significant ($\chi^2 = 419.75$; $df = 24$). It is clear from these findings that there are important country idiosyncrasies and that country-specific institutions and norms uniquely affect the employment patterns of women. Nonetheless, the analysis underscores the fact that welfare regime and female employment policies go a long way to explain the differential patterns of women’s employment along the family life course. Consequently, model 4 is our model of choice for evaluating the effects of employment support policy and welfare regime on women’s employment patterns. The coefficient estimates associated with this model are presented in table A1 in the appendix.

In order to facilitate the evaluation of the results and their bearing on our hypotheses, we calculated the expected probabilities of the various employment patterns for each of the six institutional contexts. The probabilities were derived from the multinomial logistic results of model 4 and were calculated for a woman age 40 with a high school education. The results are presented in graphical form in figure 3. In general, employment-supportive policies increase the probability of working full-time continuously while family demands are high and reduce the probability of withdrawing from market work. As evident from figure 3a, the probability of continuous full-time employment within each welfare regime is higher where employment supportive policies are extensive. For example, the probability of continuous full-time employment in the liberal context is 0.30 for women whose employment is supported by the state and only 0.18 for those with a low level of support. The pattern is similar in the conservative regime. The probability of continuous full-time work is 0.39 where policies are highly supportive and 0.30 where support is low. The same is true for the social-democratic regime (0.17 vs. 0.10, respectively). When comparing across welfare regimes, we find that women in conservative countries have a significantly higher probability to work full-time continuously compared to women in social-democratic regimes.

The probability of withdrawing from the labor force during the two time periods under study is higher in the conservative countries with intermediate level of support than in conservative countries with high support for mothers’ employment (fig. 3b). A similar pattern is found

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* When the dummy indicators for country effect are added to model 4, the terms for welfare regime and support levels (and their interactions) drop out. Hence, this model has 52 degrees of freedom associated with it.
Fig. 3.—Predicted probabilities of work pattern by welfare regime and employment support policy.
among the social-democratic countries (0.27 and 0.06, respectively, for intermediate and high support). Among the liberal countries, however, the employment policy level does not affect the probability of interrupted employment. A short-term work interruption followed by a transition to part-time employment is more prevalent in countries with a lower level of support for mother’s employment, within each welfare regime (figure 3c).

The other employment patterns are less consistent with our expectations (fig. 3d and fig. 3e). Specifically, the probability of working part-time during the entire period is similar for most categories. It is higher only for social-democratic countries with high support for mothers’ employment (0.44) and lower in the liberal regime with intermediate support. Finally, no meaningful differences are evident in the probability of working part-time for a short period.

It is important to keep in mind that, while representing well-defined points in the family life course, the work experience women reported may have spanned a long period of time. A 60-year-old woman and a woman in her 30s are likely to have had preschool children in quite different historical periods. In particular, it is not clear to what extent the welfare and employment-support classifications that pertain to rather recent circumstances are pertinent to the labor market older women experienced years earlier. Although a historical examination of policy changes in each country is beyond the scope of the present study, we addressed this issue by reanalyzing the data separately for four birth cohorts. This detailed analysis did not reveal any systematic cohort effects. More important, the patterns described earlier were revealed with varying intensity in each of the birth cohorts.9 We conclude, then, that although policies have changed during the last 30–40 years in most countries, the underlying ideology and basic institutional mechanisms of employment-supportive policies for women were probably already present and did not change substantially over this period.

Employment Patterns and Earnings
The last issue to be examined is the effect of the employment pattern along the family’s life cycle on women’s earnings later in life. Our purpose is to test the hypotheses concerning the effect of welfare regime and employment supportive policies on penalties to employment interruption.

9 The cut-off points for the four age groups were under 40, 41–50, 51–60, and above 60. The patterns were generally more pronounced in the younger age cohort but were still significant in the oldest age group. The detailed results may be obtained from the authors upon request.
### Table 3: Models Explaining Women’s Wage Rank by Employment Pattern Along the Life Course

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Model Description</th>
<th>-2 Log Likelihood</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>χ² Difference</th>
<th>df Change</th>
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<tr>
<td>2. Model 1 + welfare regime</td>
<td>3,027.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Model 2 + employment supportive policies</td>
<td>2,678.06</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Model 3 + welfare regime × employment supportive policies</td>
<td>2,665.90</td>
<td>41</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Model 4 + country interactions</td>
<td>2,484.26</td>
<td>71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparisons:
- Model 2 vs. model 1: 615.36*  (df = 10)
- Model 4 vs. model 2: 348.94*  (df = 10)
- Model 4 vs. model 3: 12.16*   (df = 5)
- Model 5 vs. model 4: 181.64*  (df = 30)

* P < .05.

For this purpose, we regressed earnings at the time of the survey on the pattern of past employment and the institutional context, controlling for age, education, hours of work, current occupation, and authority position. To control for women’s selection into paid employment, we applied the Heckman selection procedure. Various specifications were examined, and the model comparisons are presented in Table 3. The base model (col. 1) introduces the individual-level variables. The second model adds the welfare regimes, the third model adds the employment-supportive policies, the fourth model includes the full set of interactions between welfare regime and the level of employment-supportive policies, and the last model (model 5) adds an indicator for each country. In the lower half of the table, we evaluate the contribution of various models using χ² tests for the difference in the log likelihood.

The comparison of model 2 to model 1 reveals a large and significant improvement when welfare regime type is included (χ² = 615.36; df = 10). The additive combination of the two institutional indicators further improves the model, indicating a unique significant effect of level of support (evident from the comparison of model 3 to model 2, where χ² = 348.94; df = 10). Model 4 adds interaction terms for the combination of welfare regime and level of employment-supportive policies, which further...

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10 The analysis of income consequences is limited to women who participated in paid employment at the time of the survey. This limitation results in a sample of 2,436 women.
improves the estimation, but only marginally so ($\chi^2 = 12.16; df = 5$). The last model adds idiosyncratic factors, which are captured by a separate indicator for each country. The comparison of this model with the previous one ($\chi^2 = 181.64; df = 30$) indicates that in addition to welfare regime and employment-supportive policies, unique country characteristics also affect women’s employment pattern on their wage level.

Since model 4 best captures the systematic effects of the association between employment patterns, welfare regime, and employment supportive policies on earnings, we turn now to examine it more closely (table 4). The first and second columns of table 4 show the coefficient estimates and their standard errors, respectively. The comparison category used in the model is continuous full-time employment in the liberal regime with low support, so that the coefficients measure the deviation of each social context from this baseline.

Since we are interested in differences among employment patterns within each regime and employment policy type, we calculate the difference between the coefficient for each employment pattern and the coefficients for full-time continuous employment, in each institutional context. These differences may be interpreted as the “penalties” for interruption of employment during the family life course, within the various social contexts. The results are presented in the third column. For example, under the liberal regime with intermediate support, the coefficient for continuous full-time employment was 0.181, and the coefficients for a continuous part-time employment was 0.078. Hence, the calculated cost for a continuous part-time work will be 0.103 (0.181 - 0.078 = 0.103). Similarly, the cost of a long-term work separation in a conservative regime with intermediate level of support equals 0.073 (0.182 - 0.109 = 0.073).

We then tested the statistical significance of these differences. With few exceptions, the figures support our expectation that high support for women’s employment minimizes the costs of employment interruptions and the transition to part-time. A reduction of wages due to work separation is apparent in all welfare regimes with an intermediate level of employment-supportive policies. For example, in the liberal regime, with intermediate support for mothers’ employment, short-term work interruption reduces the wage rank by seven percentage points. A long-term separation from paid employment reduces the wage rank by more than 19 percentage points (see the third column of liberal—intermediate support). The reduction is slightly smaller in the social-democratic countries (16 percentage points). Long-term work separation (out the labor force continuously) entails lower costs in the conservative countries with intermediate employment support (seven percentage points). Interestingly, and somewhat unexpectedly, continuous part-time employment reduces
<table>
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<th>Category</th>
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<th>Within-Group Difference</th>
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<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>.003</td>
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<td>Hours of work</td>
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<td>.033</td>
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<td>Lambda</td>
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<td>.015</td>
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Note.—The model is based on Heckman Procedure using maximum-likelihood estimator. Model $\chi^2 = 1,848.17; df = 41$.  
* $P < .05$.  


the wage rank by 8–10 percentage points in all countries, with an intermediate level of support for mothers’ employment.

Contrary to our expectations, no wage penalties are observed in countries with a liberal welfare regime and low employment support. It should be recalled, however, that the estimation models include type of occupation and authority position. When these attributes were excluded from the model (these analyses are not presented), effects of employment pattern on earnings did emerge. We infer from this that in the liberal market regime work is structured in a way that creates a strong linkage between employment pattern and type of occupation and position. These, in turn, largely determine economic rewards. How this is achieved cannot be determined from our data and requires additional investigation.

When employment policies are aimed to encourage mothers’ participation in paid employment, low costs or even no costs are associated with deviations from continuous full-time employment. Only in the social-democratic regime with high support for mother employment, women are penalized (by a reduction of nine percentage point) for a short separation from the labor force. Lower levels of support for female employment, however, do bring about penalties to work interruptions and to long-term transition to part-time employment.

CONCLUSIONS

Women’s low attainments in the labor market are commonly attributed to their employment patterns along the family’s life cycle. It had been argued that women’s interrupted employment while they have young children at home is largely responsible for their lower wages and their limited employment opportunities in the labor market. In this article, we focused on two institutional dimensions: Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare regimes and the level of mothers’ employment-supportive policies, suggested by Gornick et al. (1997), to scrutinize their effect on women’s employment pattern at the period when family demands are high; and the consequences of the employment pattern on earnings later in life. We anticipated variation in the level of employment interruptions and reduction of working hours along the lines of welfare regimes and employment-supportive policies. Moreover, we expected variations in the costs of discontinued employment and of the transition into part-time work among the institutional dimensions.

The empirical analysis confirmed the complex relationship between

---

11 This was not the case in any of the social context except for the liberal regime with low employment support.
institutional context and women’s employment patterns. We found that within all welfare regimes, employment continuity is highest among countries in which the state provides support for working mothers. That is, policy aimed toward supporting mothers’ employment facilitates their attachment to the labor market by providing the necessary conditions to participate in full-time employment on a continuous basis. In countries where the family assumes most of the child-rearing responsibilities (i.e., countries with conservative regimes and those who do not highly support women’s employment), women are compelled to interrupt their employment and rely on other sources of income—either through their spouses or through state mechanisms.

By affecting the way in which labor markets operate, the state, through policies and regulations, reduces the costs of women’s part-time and discontinued employment. We found support for the proposition that institutions mediate the costs of employment interruptions. Both in conservative and in sociodemocratic countries with lower levels of support for mothers’ employment, part-time and discontinuous employment reduce women’s earnings in the long run. This, however, is not the case in most countries that encourage mothers’ participation in paid employment.

Although many of the findings are in line with the propositions outlined at the outset, some inconsistencies emerged as well. For example, the rate of women’s full-time employment in conservative countries was higher than anticipated by the model. Likewise, the penalty to work interruptions (including transitions to part-time employment) in social-democratic countries with an intermediate level of support for mothers’ employment was relatively high. Moreover, no wage penalties were observed in liberal countries with low support for mothers’ employment. These deviations underscore the fact that idiosyncratic factors such as unique historical processes, or normative systems, operate at the country level.

Our findings have several important implications. First, they underscore the importance of institutional context in affecting women’s employment patterns. We found that welfare regime and employment supportive policy explain much of the variation in women’s employment patterns across countries. Policies directed toward women’s employment have the potential of encouraging or discouraging continuous full-time employment. These policies are related to, but do not necessarily coincide with, the welfare regimes (e.g., Sainsbury 1994, 1996; O’Connor 1996).

Second, against the common argument that part-time is detrimental to women’s market position, the cross-national comparison reveals a more complex reality. Societies have different means of incorporating women into paid economy and rewarding them. Some countries developed strong mechanisms for integrating women into the labor market through highly supportive policies. This has a twofold effect: first, it results in a more
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heterogeneous female labor force which is accommodated by diverse employment patterns and, second, since there is no “standard” employment pattern, no penalty is associated with intermittent or part-time work. By way of contrast, in countries that maintain the traditional gender division of labor and preserve women’s familial roles (providing only intermediate levels of support for their employment), continuous employment is less prevalent and the labor market penalties for “nonstandard” employment are the highest.

APPENDIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE A1</th>
<th>LOG-LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF EMPLOYMENT PATTERN ALONG THE LIFE CYCLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Full-Full</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>−.027*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.486*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal—intermediate support</td>
<td>.457*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.63)</td>
<td>(1.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative—intermediate support</td>
<td>.224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.25)</td>
<td>(1.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative—high support</td>
<td>.747*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.26)</td>
<td>(1.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social democratic—intermediate support</td>
<td>−.936*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.43)</td>
<td>(1.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social democratic—high support</td>
<td>1.036*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.23)</td>
<td>(2.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−1.396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.68)</td>
<td>(3.10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE.—N = 5,421; model χ2 = 1,227.87; df = 24.
* P < .05.

REFERENCES


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