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1.3 Modernities

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Citizenship

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HISTORIANS OFTEN describe the breakdown of the feudal and corporate structures of medieval Europe as the beginning of Jewish modernity, when Jews sought entry as individual citizens into unified sovereign states. In Western Europe, Jews navigated the equivocal promise of inclusion in nation-states, and Eastern European and Ottoman Jews encountered modernity within empires that tended to cultivate, rather than suppress, diversity. In every region, however, a change in political status signaled the onset of modernization. Thus, historians who differ regarding when and where Jewish modernity began tend to concur that processes of political enfranchisement were decisive for the construction of modern Judaisms. In the modern period, all Jews—regardless of geographical location—were forced to wrestle with questions such as the following: What is the significance of formal political membership in an internationally recognized state? Does accession to equal citizenship improve Jews' economic prospects, social standing, and political power? Which modes of Jewish identity and practice are consistent with the civic loyalty expected (often demanded) of citizens?

Given the ubiquity of such questions, it is not altogether surprising that canonical histories have long identified accession to equal citizenship (e.g., “emancipation”) as the defining event of Jewish modernity. Yet, this canonical periodization invites sustained theoretical reflection. The reflexive equation of Jewish modernity with emancipation has become so familiar that we sometimes forget that the fixation on citizenship—and politics more generally—is not immediately obvious. Competing explanations might trace modernization to technological developments, economic dislocations, the decline of halakhic author-

ity, or changes in family structure. (Indeed, explanations of this kind have played a role in Jewish Studies scholarship.) When historians ascribe epochal significance to Jewish enfranchisement, they advance a claim—sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit—about the constitutive role of politics and the state in shaping modern Jewish existence.

In this chapter, I take the primacy that conventional periodizations accord to political developments—in particular, to the emergence of modern state structures—as the occasion for an exercise in political theory. This endeavor is inspired by the work of political theorists—many of them of Jewish extraction (Baruch Spinoza, Karl Marx, Hannah Arendt)—who treated Jewish emancipation as a test case. Following Spinoza, Marx, and Arendt, I use the study of Jewish enfranchisement (as reconstructed by twentieth-century historians) to evaluate the conditions for legal membership in modern states and the salience of political rights.

This juxtaposition of historiography and political theory is also inspired by the work of Jewish historians. Whether consciously or not, historians who identify enfranchisement as a catalyst to Jewish modernity are doing a kind of political theory. These historians are “doing political theory” in the sense that they make a distinctive “question of regime” the critical question for Jewish history and politics. Although few of the historians surveyed attempt a formal taxonomy, they all trace the dislocations, negotiations, and reinventions that characterize Jewish modernity to variations in state forms (e.g., nation-state vs. multinational empire). In this sense, historians who date Jewish modernity to emancipation pose what political theorists would call a “question of regime”: Of the many political regimes under which Jews have lived, which kinds of states are most hospitable (or most hostile) to Jewish flourishing?

In what follows, I amplify historians’ theoretical assumptions regarding the power of state structures to determine Jewish self-understanding. Using concepts borrowed from Spinoza and Marx, I foreground a claim about the specificity of Jewish citizenship running through emancipation historiography. In a paradoxical fashion, historiography that dates Jewish modernity to civic enfranchisement exposes the comparative insignificance of legal citizenship status. Throughout Jewish history, formal political membership has proved less consequential than the type of polity in which Jewish enfranchisement was or was not conceivable. Instead of asking whether terms of legal membership were full or equal or identical to those of non-Jews, contemporary scholars should focus on the ways that different regimes configured membership and the varying possibilities for Jewish existence they afforded.

Spinoza and Marx: Jewish Emancipation as a Case Study for Political Theory

Jewish emancipation has long served as a touchstone for political theorists studying the prospects for inclusion in modern states. Spinoza and Marx, two theorists with notoriously vexed relationships to their Jewish heritage, are the most prominent examples of this theoretical deployment. Writing at a time of epochal transformations in the global order, Spinoza defended the kind of state that could theoretically extend equal rights to Jews. In the nineteenth century, Marx criticized liberalism's limits while participating in contentious public debates on the emancipation of German Jews. Both thinkers used the Jewish case to examine the grounds for inclusion in a realm of formal equality, as well as the kinds of freedom such a regime affords. Without making any claims for direct historical influence (of Spinoza on Marx or of Spinoza and Marx on Jewish historiography), I invoke their respective engagements with the "Jewish question" for heuristic purposes to delineate the theoretical terrain that subsequent scholars of Jewish citizenship would (wittingly or unwittingly) traverse. Spinoza and Marx represent two approaches to theorizing the contours of a state that could conceivably extend full citizenship to Jews. Consequently, their work provides a handy (if stylized) schema for articulating the theoretical stakes of Jewish Studies scholarship.

Spinoza, who advances a democratic vision, makes visible the informal demands that citizenship places on Jews and Judaism. In the *Theologico-Political Treatise*—in which Spinoza uses the words "subject" and "citizen" interchangeably—the citizen is defined in contradistinction to the slave (who advances his master's interests) and the son (who remains under tutelage): "A subject . . . is someone who does what is advantageous for the collective body—and hence, also for himself—in accordance with the command of the supreme power."¹ Acting in accordance with the sovereign's command does not violate individual freedom, because living in a republic is conducive to rational self-development. In these abstract theoretical formulations, citizenship is egalitarian. Indeed, Spinoza celebrates democracy as "the most natural state" because citizens have an equal say in shaping the laws to which they are subject. Moreover, democratic states impose no religious tests for citizenship. Responding to critics of democracy, Spinoza adduces the example of Amsterdam to prove that free republics can thrive. Amsterdam has flourished economically, Spinoza contends, because citizens of all faiths are willing to transact business with any reputable merchant.

In practice, however, modern citizenship has proved highly exclusionary. These tensions between equality and exclusion color theoretical articulations of modern citizenship. Like many of sovereignty's canonical exponents, Spinoza narrows the class of people eligible for citizenship, denying women equal rights (*Theologico-Political Treatise*, 603). Because women are naturally weaker than men, Spinoza contends, they have fewer rights and must submit to male rule. Given the theoretical underpinnings of the social contract tradition—that is, voluntary consent between naturally free individuals—the question of women's enfranchisement becomes almost unavoidable. As Spinoza demonstrates, however, theorists found myriad ways to resist the egalitarian implications of contractarian premises.

Just as women's enfranchisement becomes conceivable in a theoretical framework grounded on formal equality, so does Jewish enfranchisement emerge as a theoretical possibility. As in the case of women, however, tendentious assessments of Jewish political mettle mitigate against automatic enfranchisement. In the *Theologico-Political Treatise*, Spinoza famously entertains the possibility that Jews might establish a modern state: "If the foundations of their religion did not make their hearts unmanly, I would absolutely believe that someday, given the opportunity, they would set up their state again" (124). In the grips of an emasculating religion, Jews occupy the same marginal position to citizenship as do women. Unlike women, however, (male) Jews can graduate to become fit political subjects by assimilating norms of proper masculinity. Yet overcoming "the foundations of their religion" involves not only a gender overhaul but also requires a thoroughgoing renovation of Jewish existence. In Spinoza's state, the sovereign demands exclusive political loyalty and is the lone source of law. Non-state normative systems, such as halakhah, lack legal standing and are recast as private religious confessions. Like any other citizen, the Jew's *political* identity and allegiance are to the state—not to the Jewish people.

In Spinoza's thought, the political template that makes Jewish enfranchisement conceivable (e.g., the sovereign state) recasts earlier forms of Jewish political community as anomalous or even pathological. Spinoza wrote in a period when Jews' economic clout in Amsterdam derived from their legal status as a foreign mercantile community operating without a charter.² Confronted with a community that "arrogated to itself virtually all the powers of an autonomous community or Kehillah," Spinoza predicated enfranchisement on Judaism's reconstitution as a private religious confession (29). Thus, it is scarcely surprising that European Jewish enfranchisement was not "self-evident," in the words of Paul Mendes-Flohr.³ Enfranchisement often lagged behind the

adoption of modern concepts of citizenship and was only gained after protracted political struggle—the achievements of which were partial and reversible. The prospect of citizenship changes everything, in Spinoza's work, because it entails the creation of new forms of (Jewish) religiosity consonant with the state's demand for exclusive political allegiance.

Marx, by contrast, downplays or even dismisses the significance of formal political membership. In "On the Jewish Question" (1843), Marx seeks to reframe debates about the terms of Jewish inclusion that roiled the German intelligentsia.⁴ From 1815 to 1850—the period of most intense public debate—thousands of articles were published advocating positions ranging from outright opposition (absent conversion), conditional or incremental emancipation, to the demand for full civic equality.⁵ Against those who debate whether the Jews are (or could become) worthy of citizenship in nominally secular states, Marx asks whether the conferral of equal citizenship actually merits the name "emancipation." Although "*political* emancipation certainly represents a great progress," Marx concludes, "it is not, indeed, the final form of human emancipation" (35). Extending equal rights to Jews would not liberate the Jews (or society as a whole), Marx contends, because the state can only confer an abstract, partial form of freedom. In the kind of state that entertains the possibility of Jewish enfranchisement, formal equality in the public sphere is eminently compatible with egregious inequality in the various spheres now deemed private:

The state abolishes, after its fashion, the distinctions established by *birth, social rank, education, occupation*, when it decrees that birth, social rank, education, occupation are *non-political* distinctions; when it proclaims, without regard to these distinctions, that every member of society is an *equal* partner in popular sovereignty, and treats all the elements which compose the real life of the nation from the standpoint of the state. But the state, none the less, allows private property, education, occupation, to *act after their own* fashion, namely as private property, education, occupation, and to manifest their *particular* nature. (33)

Indeed, the state is parasitic upon these distinctions—which it ostentatiously "disregards" when conferring political rights, thereby confirming the universality of the political. Thus, accession to citizenship will not free Jews from antisemitic discrimination, which continues to "act after its own fashion" in civil society. (Of course, Marx was scarcely concerned with antisemitism and sought rather to precipitate humanity's emancipation as a species-being.) According to Marx, the fixation of emancipation proponents and opponents on formal

political membership is misplaced, diverting attention from inequality and subordination in the private sphere.

Joining the controversy surrounding Jewish emancipation, Marx formulates a more general criticism of the kinds of freedom available in a liberal state. In his analysis, Jewish emancipation “certainly represents a great progress,” but when considered from an emancipatory standpoint the conferral of rights effectively changes nothing, leaving intact the oppressive “framework of the prevailing social order” (35). If Spinoza demands a comprehensive rehabilitation of Jewish masculinity, liberal states ask nothing of those petitioning for inclusion. Indeed, Marx upholds the likely persistence of Judaism (as one instance of benighted religion) post-emancipation as a testament to the provisional nature of political liberation: “The man was not liberated from religion; he received religious liberty” (45). In Marx’s analysis, one should neither ascribe epochal significance to changing citizenship regimes, nor should one expect a radical transformation, emancipatory or otherwise, to follow Jewish enfranchisement. Emancipation would change nothing then, because the liberal state institutes formal equality only to give hierarchy and subordination free rein in civil society.

Of course, there are more points of intersection between Spinoza and Marx than this schematic opposition suggests. A staunch defender of freedom of thought, Spinoza would not countenance prohibitions on Jewish belief. As envisioned by Spinoza, citizenship does not require the abolition of Judaism or any other (non-seditious) belief system. In this sense, Spinoza provides support for Marx’s analysis of the liberal state, which refrains from making (formal) demands of citizens. Marx, by contrast, did not hesitate to call for the abolition of what he tendentiously called “Judaism.” Recycling stock tropes of European antisemitism, Marx predicates true human liberation, unattainable in the liberal state, on emancipation from “real and practical Judaism”; that is, “huckstering and money” (48). Indeed, Marx judges the promise of liberal citizenship paltry precisely because he aspires to revolutionary transformation. Here, Marx amplifies Spinoza’s informal demand for the refashioning of Jewish existence. The Jewish case allows Spinoza and Marx to expose the informal power relations that shadow formal rights discourse and—for Jews, at least—prove more consequential than rights themselves.

I present their divergent conclusions in stylized fashion—enfranchisement would change everything (Spinoza) and nothing (Marx)—to provide a theoretical framework for interpreting Jewish Studies scholarship. As we will see, the historiographical moves of scholars who made emancipation the defining

concept of Jewish modernity echo the claims of Spinoza and Marx. Suffused with disappointment, the field's founding texts trace an arc that moves from the Spinozist insight that enfranchisement exacted exorbitant concessions to the Marxist conclusion that these concessions did not materially improve Jewish welfare. The Spinoza/Marx mash-up yields an ambivalent picture in which the type of political regime under which Jews live proves more consequential than their formal citizenship status.

The Historiography of Emancipation: Citizenship as a Central Category for Jewish Studies

Since the founding of academic Jewish Studies in nineteenth-century Germany, the field has been dominated by historians. Political science has played a negligible role in its development, nor have political scientists exhibited much interest in Jews or Judaism. This absence is striking, given that the central theoretical insight that emerges from the historiography of Jewish emancipation is the power of state structures to refashion Jewish existence. Despite debates about the periodization and geographical scope of emancipation, many of the most influential scholars of Jewish modernity concur that this phenomenon was its founding event. When historians date modernity to Jewish enfranchisement, they ascribe decisive agency to politics and the state. According to canonical studies, the achievement (and loss) of citizenship did not merely alter the balance of civil rights and duties or the opportunities for participation in parliamentary politics. Enfranchisement, it is claimed, instigated a fundamental transformation of Judaism—turning what was formerly a nationality into a private religious confession. In any given period, the historiography of Jewish emancipation suggests that the hegemonic mode of political organization and the place of Jews therein establish the conditions of possibility for Jewish identity, practice, and communal organization.

Yet the historiography does more than advance a claim about political causality. Studies of Jewish emancipation are themselves influenced by the political ideologies and movements such as liberalism and nationalism that emerged in its wake. Following Gershom Scholem, most scholars view the founding of academic Jewish Studies as part and parcel of the struggle for emancipation. Although the historians who founded the *Wissenschaft des Judentums* school in Germany in 1819 professed scholarly objectivity, their political motivations are often transparent. In the preface to his 1832 history of Jewish homiletics, Leopold

Zunz yoked advanced Judaic scholarship to the imperatives of Jewish enfranchisement: “It is high time that the Jews of Europe, particularly those of Germany, be granted right and liberty rather than rights and liberties—not some paltry, humiliating privileges, but complete and uplifting civil rights.”⁶ Zunz enlisted Jewish Studies to fight for what Scholem called “external” and “internal” emancipation. On the external front, Zunz and his colleagues sought to prove that Jews (and Judaism) were worthy of full citizenship. Accurate and up-to-date historical research, Zunz contended, would dispel the prejudices that continue to impede civic equality. Addressing an internal Jewish audience, Zunz sought to craft a Judaism commensurate with the demands of the state and the ideals of enlightened modernity.

For many Jews, the liberal conceptions of citizenship championed by thinkers such as Moses Mendelssohn became less credible once citizenship rights were granted. The realization that enfranchisement did not always promote integration spurred new forms of political mobilization. Scholars have long depicted Zionism—especially the political Zionism of Theodor Herzl—as a response to the failures of emancipation. The persistence of antisemitic discrimination in liberal states led Herzl to conclude that Jews would never become full and equal members of European society.

Zionism was merely one strand within a larger constellation of nationalist ideologies and movements marked by fierce internal debate. (Broadly speaking, the modifier “nationalist” indicates movements and discourses that define Jews as a national collective, as opposed to a mere “religion.”) When it came to emancipation, however, nationalists from competing camps professed a shared ambivalence regarding the value of political enfranchisement. Echoing Marx, nationalists disappointed by emancipation questioned the salience of formal political membership. Persistent antisemitism exposed what political scientists call citizenship’s “hollow promise”: Rights on paper are insufficient, even empty, given how sharply outcomes vary in societies stratified along religious, racial, and gender lines. The point of departure for political Zionists in the West and socialist Zionists in the East was the realization that Jews’ political standing was determined by factors other than citizenship status, such as civil society, economic competition, and education. At the same time, most nationalist intellectuals treated emancipation as an epochal shift on the order of the events of 70 CE. The grant of citizenship, on this view, precipitated an unprecedented transformation of Jewish identity, eroding Judaism’s national foundations. Taking a page from Spinoza, nationalists viewed emancipation as a greater threat to Jewish national independence than dispersion itself.

This ambivalence surrounding citizenship's transformational power colors the historiography of emancipation, which assumes a more critical tenor with the rise of nationalist ideologies. Simon Dubnow—who gained renown as a historian and activist promoting diasporic Jewish autonomy—offers a classic articulation of the nationalist historiography of emancipation.⁷ In Dubnow's rendition, Russian Jewry retained an unparalleled degree of inner cohesion and cultural isolation, which were buttressed by movements such as Hasidism. Living under a hostile and backward regime, Dubnow argues, Russian Jews who absorbed modernist cultural trends achieved spiritual emancipation long before they were granted political (but not civil) rights in 1905. Yet the partial grant of rights was followed by waves of increasing repression that led to mass emigration.

Although Dubnow's outlook is marked by the distinctive political trajectories of Eastern European Jews, he locates the dawn of Jewish modernity in the West. In Dubnow's periodization, Jewish modernity dates both to the French Revolution, which inaugurated the Jews' political emancipation, and the thought of Moses Mendelssohn, which instigated a spiritual emancipation. Dubnow identified as a liberal in Russian Jewish party politics, and his portrait of nineteenth-century developments exudes a modernist faith in the power of enlightenment to free Jews from benighted superstition. Moreover, as an activist who made the demand for political and civil rights a key plank of his Autonomist Party platform, Dubnow was not inclined to dismiss the significance of 1791. In his more optimistic moments, Dubnow trusts that Jews can enjoy newfound rights without sacrificing their national identity.

Dubnow's more characteristic assessment of emancipation, however, is starkly pessimistic. In "Letters on Old and New Judaism,"⁸ Dubnow mounts a fierce critique of emancipation as a form of national slavery, the latest guise of Jewish subordination. Rehearsing the history of Jews in France and Germany, he laments their willingness to commit "national suicide" in exchange for political rights (110). Even after emancipation, Dubnow argues, Western Jews were not truly equal: "True emancipation means, not only liberation of the individual human being, but also of the individual nationality" (113). To Dubnow's chagrin, many Jews willingly complied with the state's demand to adopt a "foreign" (i.e., French or German) nationality as a condition for enfranchisement. With this indictment of the concessions extracted from emancipated Jews, Dubnow flirts with political determinism. In Western Europe, Dubnow contends, the grant of formal political membership had fateful consequences. In a standard-issue nation-state that demands exclusive political

allegiance, Jewish nationality is liable to wither away. The evidence from Western Europe shows that the liberal state can indeed suppress (if not extinguish) the national spirit.

Dubnow inaugurated a historical school that treats citizenship as a catalyst for the transformations—many of them sorely lamented—that reshaped Judaism in modernity. This school is nationalist in orientation, in the sense that it posits nationality as the originary (and arguably the proper) form of Jewish collectivity. Today, Salo Baron's "Ghetto and Emancipation" (1928)⁹ is mostly remembered for its critique of the "lachrymose theory" of Jewish history. Against Dubnow and the Wissenschaft historians, Baron argues that medieval Jews' lack of "equal rights" did not constitute a disability, because no one had "equal rights" in the corporate states of the Middle Ages. In practical terms, Baron claims, medieval Jews often enjoyed greater freedoms and a higher standard of living than their Christian neighbors. Yet this controversy regarding the welfare of ghetto Jews cannot conceal a more fundamental agreement between Baron and Dubnow regarding the nature of Jewish identity. Like Dubnow, Baron concludes that "emancipation has not brought the Golden Age" (63). Baron and Dubnow arrive at this critical assessment because they both take Jewish nationality as a (historical and ideological) point of departure. Echoing Dubnow, Baron asserts that "the Jew, indeed, had in effect a kind of territory and State of his own throughout the Middle Ages and early modern period" (55). Judged against this benchmark, emancipation constitutes a loss—the loss of national autonomy—rather than a liberation. Mourning this loss, Baron hopes to resuscitate autonomy as a contemporary political ideal and complement to more familiar values of liberal equality.

Baron reiterates and sharpens Dubnow's claim about the power of hegemonic political templates to determine the contours of Jewish existence. Downplaying Jewish struggles for equal rights and the fierce opposition they provoked, Baron interprets emancipation as a foregone conclusion with the rise of the modern state: "Emancipation was a necessity even more for the modern State than for Jewry," because the modern state cannot abide autonomous corporations ("Ghetto and Emancipation," 60). Baron makes an important point, which subsequent scholars have amplified, about the institutional and conceptual foundations of the modern state, which demand the abolition of corporations. More noteworthy, however, is the extent to which Baron flirts with a kind of political determinism, reserving agency for the state. Baron's deterministic streak is even more pronounced in "Nationalism and Intolerance" (1929),¹⁰ an essay that identifies "the *national structure* of the state" as the "underlying,

uniform cause” determining whether diasporic Jews have suffered or flourished (506–7). Seeking an invariant historical law to account for marked fluctuations in diasporic Jewish welfare, Baron ascribes explanatory power to state structures—specifically, the different ways in which states configure national membership. To substantiate this claim, Baron develops a threefold taxonomy: “If we now consider the treatment of Jewry under these various types of States, we shall, while leaving out all details, be able to formulate our law as follows: *The status of the Jew is most favorable in pure States of Nationalities, most unfavorable in National States, and somewhat between the two extremes in States which include part of a nationality only*” (506).

Here, the claim for political causality pushes Baron to pose a distinctively Jewish question of regime. Riffing on the classical taxonomy—monarchy, aristocracy, democracy—Baron instructs Jews to evaluate their prospects under nation-states, multinational states, and mixed regimes. For our purposes, Baron’s endorsement of the multinational state is less significant than the theoretical claim from which it derives—a theory that posits state structures as the driving force in shaping diasporic history. With this taxonomy, Baron makes explicit the political-theoretical assumptions animating most of the scholarship surveyed in this chapter.

Although Dubnow’s modernist optimism waned, his nationalist premises continued to frame influential histories of emancipation through the late twentieth century. Jacob Katz built his voluminous research around the ghetto/emancipation antithesis. In *Tradition and Crisis*,¹¹ Katz asserts that Jews constituted a unified “national body” on the cusp of modernity, which he dates to the Haskalah in the West and the rise of Hasidism in the East (8). In *Out of the Ghetto*,¹² Katz characterizes this Jewish journey as a veritable revolution, “transmuting the very nature of their entire social existence” (1). As Spinoza intimated, enfranchisement changed everything: Traditional values no longer defined communal norms, nor did they unite Jews across the globe. With Dubnow and Baron, Katz posits an organic Jewish nation whose dissolution signals the advent of modernity—with the result that French, English, and German Jews now belong to different nations. Moreover, Katz presents emancipation as a single process in which Western European patterns reproduced themselves worldwide (with the exception of the United States and the Arab world). When Katz presents Western European trajectories as paradigmatic of Jewish modernity, he makes citizenship paramount for the constitution of modern Judaism.

Yet, in *Out of the Ghetto*, Katz also voices characteristic skepticism, which recalls Marx, of the supposed benefits of formal political membership. Having

cast emancipation as a veritable revolution, Katz ultimately concedes that equal rights did not bring genuine integration. As patterns of persistent antisemitism attest, political enfranchisement was rarely a catalyst for assimilation: “Jews entered European society but did not merge with it” (216). Indeed, the political processes that promised to liberate instead placed Jews in an anomalous social position, distinguished from their neighbors by family structure, occupational patterns, and transnational loyalties. Yet enfranchisement, which inspired fierce opposition, does not merely prove a “hollow promise” but also fails to alter the deeper structures of Jewish identity: “The conception of Jews as a congregation existing merely by virtue of a common confession of faith functioned only on the theoretical level” (213). Echoing Dubnow in his more optimistic moments, Katz suggests that the religionization of Judaism was merely superficial because the state lacks the power to destroy traditional norms of communal organization and global solidarity.

Even when not expressly committed to partisan ideologies, the founding historiography of emancipation operates with nationalist assumptions. The most influential historians of emancipation presume that national autonomy is the natural state of the Jews—and hence worry that autonomy becomes impossible once being Jewish no longer defines one’s position within and relationship to the state. The persistent vacillation regarding whether politics is a catalyst for transformation—the vacillation between Spinoza and Marx, in our schema—reflects these anxieties about the prospects for diasporic independence in a world of nation-states. Although historians lament the state’s power to erode Judaism’s national foundations, they are still disappointed when the liberal state fails to protect Jews from hostile forces, whether religious, social, or economic.

Diversifying Emancipation

Baron and Katz were born in Eastern Europe. Yet they wrote, respectively, in the United States and Israel, two countries in which Jews never underwent processes of legal emancipation because (male) Jews were never excluded from citizenship. In these comparatively young countries, Jews did not make the transition from privileges to rights, from subordination to equality. In the United States, the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom positioned Jews as equal citizens from the outset—although it did not insulate Jews from social discrimination, which persisted through the 1950s. Since Israel’s establishment as a Jewish nation-state, Israeli law has enshrined privileges for Jews at the

expense of non-Jewish citizens, who were subject to military rule until 1966 and still face legal, civic, and social discrimination. The ghetto/emancipation binary to which Baron and Katz recur is arguably a vestige of their Eastern European inheritance, rather than a reflection of the political conditions in the countries to which they emigrated.

Alert to these divergent historical trajectories, subsequent generations undertook comprehensive mapping projects to document the varied circumstances under which Jews across the globe gained and lost political rights. *Paths of Emancipation: Jews, States, and Citizenship*,¹³ an influential edited volume, illustrates the impetus for this new global approach. In the text's introduction, editors Pierre Birnbaum and Ira Katznelson object to the nationalist orientation that permeated Katz's work. Ideological biases led scholars of Katz's generation to paint a reified portrait of premodern Judaism as a static, traditional society that enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. Having posited a primordial Jewish nationality, Katz depicts emancipation as a unitary, linear process that shattered Jewish community everywhere. To challenge the notion that Jews everywhere constituted a nation pre-emancipation, Birnbaum and Katznelson highlight the diverse trajectories that Jews traveled in different regions. Yet their volume—which includes chapters on enfranchisement struggles in Holland, Germany, France, England, Italy, the United States, Turkey, and Russia—still takes the nation-state as the basic unit of analysis.

Reverting to our theoretical schema, one could say that Birnbaum, Katznelson et al. set out to mitigate the Spinoza-style slant of previous research. The Spinoza-inspired claim that accession to citizenship irrevocably transformed Jewish existence presupposes not only a primordial Jewish nationality waiting to be shattered but also a particular kind of modern state, one that cannot abide autonomous corporations. Yet the regimes that extended rights to Jews were not equally subversive of community and culture. Given these objections, one might wonder why Birnbaum and Katznelson retain the umbrella term “emancipation.” Yet their use of the category is not accidental. Indeed, it reflects these scholars' continued (if contentious) location within a Spinozist orbit. As in previous scholarship, the “emancipation” rubric signals that enfranchisement in its varying forms did transform Jewish existence, as the following assertion reveals: “Everything changed—from communal and social organization to religious practice to family life to migration patterns to employment to schooling to ideology to collective action” (*Paths of Emancipation*, 15). The comparative turn notwithstanding, Birnbaum and Katznelson and their collaborators follow Baron in linking these changes to variations in state forms. Indeed, the political deter-

minism evident in nationalist historiography arguably prepared the subsequent turn toward multiple pathways. If enfranchisement “changes everything,” then scholars must enumerate and evaluate the different regimes under which Jews lived. As Birnbaum and Katznelson recognize, “the type of state” in which Jews reside “played a considerable role in the strategies adopted by the Jews themselves” (36). In other words, different kinds of states incubate different forms of Jewish identity, activism, and communal organization. Proliferating case studies beyond Western Europe actually confirm the insight, foundational for Jewish historiography since Dubnow, that regime types (e.g., corporate polity vs. centralized nation-state) shape the possibilities for Jewish self-understanding.

The ambition to document diverse trajectories within a single historical phenomenon reaches its apotheosis in David Sorkin’s encyclopedic study, *Jewish Emancipation*. Taking the earlier mentioned critique of nationalist historiography as a point of departure, Sorkin aspires to present a comprehensive treatment of emancipation as a diverse global phenomenon. Although Sorkin retains emancipation as a historiographic concept, he rejects the traditional periodization as falsely implying a decisive and radical break. In contrast to narratives that begin with the French Revolution, Sorkin dates emancipation to 1550, when Jews in select European cities “began to gain extensive privileges bordering on parity with Christian burghers and merchants” (5). By pushing the periodization back to the sixteenth century, Sorkin refutes the notion that emancipation takes one form—the abolition of estates and the blanket grant of individual rights—that then repeats itself across the globe. On the contrary, Sorkin identifies two legislative models of emancipation (conditional vs. unconditional) and three geographical regions: Western, Central, and Eastern Europe. (In what reads like something of an afterthought, Sorkin identifies the Ottoman Empire as a fourth region blending equality for religious minorities with elements of corporate autonomy [the *millet* system].) In some regions (Western Europe), civil rights were attached to residency, but Jews fought for political rights. In other regions (Central and Eastern Europe), both civil and political rights had to be won. In Sorkin’s work, the term “emancipation” encompasses both the abolition of estates, which supplanted privileges with individual rights, and processes that extend privileges and move Jews into estates.

Perhaps because he resists unitary, linear narratives, Sorkin exudes a pessimism about rights that recalls Marx and the “hollow promise” critique of citizenship. In *Jewish Emancipation*, Sorkin focuses single-mindedly on legal and political history, detailing “the process of gaining, exercising, retaining, and where lost, recovering rights” (1). The singular focus on rights, to the exclusion

of social and economic factors, reflects a judgment about politics as the crucial arena for understanding Jewish modernity: “Emancipation is the principal event of modern Jewish history” (354). Having expanded the geographic and temporal boundaries of the phenomenon, however, Sorkin concedes that “emancipation was ambiguous and interminable” (356). A comprehensive survey reveals that egalitarian legislation was often disregarded or implemented in haphazard and partial form. Once granted, rights were just as easily revoked. To take one example: “In Italy Jews gained emancipation five times (1796–99, 1801, 1848, 1870, 1944) and lost it four times (1800, 1813–15, 1848, 1938)” (5). Here, rights are the essence of Jewish modernity, but they are fragile and evanescent. “Jews everywhere continue to live in the age of emancipation”—which presumably means that they must engage in ceaseless contestation and political advocacy (356).

Whether intentionally or not, Sorkin tells a story riddled with disappointment. *Jewish Emancipation* opens with Nahum Goldmann’s appreciation for democracy as the regime that granted Jews equality. Yet Sorkin risks implying that no regime, democracy included, is safe or “good” for the Jews. (According to Sorkin, the United States and Israel—two countries in which Jews were never subject to disabilities—partake of the same ambiguous dynamics.) Depriving readers of the consoling fantasy of the emancipatory state, Sorkin offers Jews no respite from political struggle and no exit from modernity, in all its tragic complexity.

Trapped within “ambiguous and interminable” processes of enfranchisement, we can grasp the seemingly paradoxical nature of the historiography that identifies emancipation as the foundational event of Jewish modernity. Scholars who locate civil and political rights at the heart of Jewish modernity (Spinoza’s schema) are generally forced to conclude that—for Jews at least—rights are fragile or even empty (Marx’s schema). For modern Jews, citizenship changes everything and nothing, it would seem.

Legal Belonging in the Ottoman World

As we have seen, scholars who take exception to the ideological and geographical biases of the founding scholarship have sought to expose diverse trajectories of enfranchisement even while retaining “emancipation” as an umbrella category. Although careful not to impose a Eurocentric template on Ottoman and North African Jews, Birnbaum and Katznelson and Sorkin nevertheless concur that European and non-European Jews participated in the same historical

process. Indeed, many of the themes surveyed earlier in this chapter recur in scholarship that refracts Jews' changing relationship to the state in the Ottoman world through the emancipation prism. In the lone chapter of *Paths of Emancipation* to address Jewish citizenship outside Europe, Aron Rodrigue traces the gradual migration of modern state-building practices to the Ottoman world, depriving Turkish Jews of the autonomy they enjoyed under the *millet* system.¹⁴ Although Rodrigue characterizes the trajectory of Turkish Jews as “emancipation without liberalism” to differentiate it from European patterns, his conclusions regarding the liabilities of the nation-state echo those of Dubnow, Baron, and Katz (260). The devolution of a multinational empire into modern nation-states consigns Turkish Jews to the status of a religious minority, and this framing makes the consequent loss of communal autonomy a benchmark for Sephardic (as well as Ashkenazic) modernity.

In recent years, by contrast, historians who elevate citizenship as a key for understanding Sephardic history have dispensed with “emancipation” as a category and concept. Two related strands of Sephardi scholarship put citizenship at the heart of Jewish modernity. On the one hand, scholars such as Julia Phillips Cohen study dynamics of loyalty and belonging among Ottoman citizens. In *Becoming Ottomans: Sephardi Jews and Imperial Citizenship in the Modern Era*,¹⁵ Cohen reconstructs the manifold projects that Ottoman Jews undertook in the wake of the Tanzimat reforms—which extended equal citizenship without religious distinctions—to position themselves as a “model millet” (1). Cultivating civic loyalty in an imperial context was not without its complications: Jews simultaneously professed brotherhood with Ottomans of all faiths and sought to distinguish themselves from less “exemplary” minorities. Scholars have also showcased the experiences of Mediterranean Jews who opted for extraterritorial citizenship (e.g., European consular protection) instead of local forms of legal belonging. Both strands challenge the precedence that studies of Jewish modernity have long accorded to European models of state formation.

“Emancipation” proves less useful as an organizing frame for historians who study extraterritoriality, because they seek to challenge the binary opposition—one either has or lacks citizenship—that animates traditional emancipation narratives. Against scholarship that emplots modern Jewish history as a movement between these two statuses, historians such as Sarah Abrevaya Stein depict “citizenship as a spectrum: a range of conditions or possibilities that Jews could access rather than a singular possession they could or could not claim.”¹⁶ Drawing on a similar archive—“the extraterritorial privileges accorded to European subjects in the Ottoman empire”—Jessica Marglin goes one step further,

proposing that we replace the term “citizen” with “legal belonging, a neutral, umbrella term that encompasses a wide range of formal bonds between individuals and states.”¹⁷ With Stein, Marglin reminds us that “legal belonging” exists on a broad spectrum. A term like “citizenship” poorly suits the nineteenth-century Mediterranean then, because populations could not be neatly divided into insiders and outsiders. In any given region, one might find citizens, nationals lacking political or civil rights, and protégés under the jurisdiction of a European consulate. (The bolder claim is that the same holds true for Europe, where women and colonial subjects had different legal statuses.)

In Stein’s work, citizenship status still serves as a privileged lens for deciphering modern Jewish history—but citizenship’s diagnostic power derives from the myriad forms that it has historically taken. With this insistence on the “messiness” of modern citizenship, Stein hopes to foreground the agency of Sephardic Jews, who emerge as savvy citizenship entrepreneurs. Although Stein resists the kind of political determinism that characterizes Baron’s work, she remains within the Spinoza schema as expanded by Birnbaum and Katznelson. Like Rodrigue, Stein frames the Sephardic twentieth century as a journey from the multiethnic Ottoman empire to a world of nation-states. In *Family Papers*,¹⁸ Stein uses the Levy family—whose history she relates from nineteenth-century Salonica through the present—to illustrate the ways that belonging differed in imperial and postimperial contexts: “As their empire and economy frayed, the Levys, like all the city’s Jews, were destined to become nationals. What kind of nationals they became was a matter of choice. They could accept the state that formed around them; they could emigrate; or they could seek the protection of a foreign power” (54). Some of Stein’s protagonists were Ottomans, some Greek citizens, and others carried European papers and may have found themselves stateless at critical junctures during World War II.

In Stein’s *Extraterritorial Dreams*, it is members of the third category of protégé—Ottoman Jews who gained the legal protection of European countries—who exemplify individual agency. Exploiting the “juridical fungibility” of an imperial context and the exigencies of great-power politics, many Ottoman Jews managed to acquire the European legal status that they judged most advantageous (9). As a form of extraterritorial membership, protégé status confounds models of territorial citizenship. The protégé detaches political status from residency—in many cases, protégés never set foot in the European countries whose papers they acquired—and necessitates a degree of legal pluralism. Moreover, putting the protégé on center stage divorces citizenship from political rights such as voting, shifting the focus to matters of jurisdiction, classification,

and status. Although some protégés betrayed an emotional and cultural investment in “Europeanness,” they harbored no illusions about civic participation in European democracies. Only in crisis moments of war or economic catastrophe did the prospect of refuge and residence in Europe become relevant. If historians of Western Europe document Jews’ profound longing to become French or German in the normative sense, Stein imputes more strategic motivations to the protégés.

Stein resists strong forms of political determinism that threaten to rob Jews of political agency. Yet she echoes some of the skeptical conclusions regarding the value of formal political membership that I grouped under Marx’s schema. Historians of Ottoman Jewry are determined to avoid a lachrymose narrative that takes the utter devastation visited on Salonican Jews during the Holocaust as a foregone conclusion. Echoing Sorkin, however, Stein emphasizes the tenuousness of any legal standing (absent deeper social and political commitments). In *Extraterritorial Dreams*, she focuses on Ottoman Jews “who held, sought, or lost the protection of a European power” (2). In turbulent periods of the mid-twentieth century, the loss of rights moves to the forefront of Stein’s narrative. Protégés who sought refuge during the Holocaust often found themselves at the mercy of individual bureaucrats, who could revoke or cancel their protected status. At this juncture, the state seems more like a bureaucratic maze than a normative community of belonging. As the widely divergent fates of protégés reveal, rights can mean everything and nothing, given historical contingencies, bureaucratic discretion, and luck.

Once the Western European nation-state loses its default status as the paradigmatic site of analysis, familiar assumptions like the category of citizenships are subject to revision. Yet the work of scholars such as Cohen, Stein, and Marglin nevertheless echoes some of the theoretical claims encountered in previous scholarship on Jewish citizenship. Precisely because extraterritorial legal statuses challenge models of citizenship inherited from Spinoza et al., this research amplifies the Spinoza-inspired insight regarding the decisive implications of regime type. Standard emancipation narratives presuppose a type of state in which territorial belonging is (or is alleged to be) paramount. In the multinational empires of the Islamic Mediterranean, however, carrying foreign papers was often more advantageous than formal membership in one’s place of residence. The distinctive membership dilemmas confronting Ottoman Jews—and the distinctive modes of transnational commerce and community they crafted—reflect the legal possibilities afforded by the regimes under which they lived. Moreover, scholarship on the Mediterranean foregrounds persistent quandaries

about Jews' place in a world of nation-states. In the Ottoman world, as in Europe, the dissolution of a multinational empire and its division into homogeneous nation-states alter the political calculus for Jews. Finally, scholars of Ottoman Jewry echo the Marx-inspired caution about the hollow promise of rights on paper, whether they take the form of citizenship or consular protection. Given the checkered historical record, showcasing extraterritoriality does little to alleviate persistent doubts about the value of legal rights absent a sincere commitment to social and economic integration.

Conclusion

At first blush, it could seem like the fierce debates about region and periodization that have roiled the study of Jewish emancipation are largely of antiquarian interest. Today, Jews have equal civil and political rights nearly everywhere. At the time of this writing, antisemitic incidents and the tenor of political discourse post-October 7, 2023, have shaken Jews' sense of security in countries once considered exceptional such as the United States. Yet formal political membership is neither controversial nor subject to debate in the countries where most Jews live. *Pace* Sorkin, it would seem that emancipation has ended or, at the very least, entered a decisive new phase. As Sorkin rightly cautions, once granted, rights can be infringed and revoked. This caution assumes greater resonance at a moment when antisemitism has emerged as one of the defining political controversies of our time. Yet contemporary Jewish politics transpires within a historical frame in which civil and political equality have emerged as default, universal norms.

At this juncture, what can the study of Jewish citizenship contribute to debates about the stakes of formal political membership? Spinoza and Marx took the prospect of Jewish inclusion as the occasion for a broader meditation on the modern state. In similar fashion, contemporary critics can derive theoretical conclusions from scholarship that ascribes epochal significance to Jewish enfranchisement. Two currents run through the diverse and contentious scholarship on Jewish citizenship: a critique of the dilemmas that the nation-state poses for Jews and the corollary insistence that different types of states afford radically different possibilities for Jewish identity, practice, and self-organization. With the exception of Baron, the latter (Spinoza-style) theme is rarely articulated as a political-theoretical proposition. I tried to amplify this theme and render it legible to theorists of modern citizenship. With this move, I rehabilitate foundational insights from the nationalist school of emancipation historiography about the near-existential significance of variations in state

structures. The lament for a lost corporate autonomy makes visible the far-reaching transformations attendant on the dissolution of the old and the rise of new political regimes.

Here, it is important to make distinctions between historical claims (and their accuracy) and conceptual claims (and their richness or perspicacity). As we have seen, subsequent generations challenged the historical accuracy of nationalist emancipation narratives, accusing their predecessors of operating with a reified, ideological conception of Jewish nationhood. Yet critics who corrected these historiographical lapses nevertheless vindicated the original insight about the decisive implications of political templates. From the founding histories of emancipation onward, work on Jewish citizenship has disclosed a facet of political belonging not commonly noted in scholarship on the citizenship of, say, women or racial minorities.

With a nod to Baron, I argued that the study of modern Jewish citizenship confronts us with a distinctive “question of regime.” What forms of Jewish existence are constrained and enabled by different kinds of political regimes (e.g., city-state, nation-state, federation, or multinational empire)? Baron’s work poses the question in these terms and demonstrates its importance. But none of the historians—Baron included—provides a fully worked-out theoretical repertoire to probe the question whose urgency their research demonstrates. Nor has Western political theory managed to fill the void. In modernity, regime thinking loses its centrality as the “question of the best regime”—a standard topos of ancient political thought—gives way to concepts such as sovereignty. Hobbes and Rousseau continue to operate with the classical triad (monarchy, aristocracy, democracy). In their works, however, the justification for absolute sovereignty takes precedence over the question of its embodiment in a given regime, which is treated as a secondary, technical matter. The most notable attempt to incorporate the insights of emancipation historiography into political theory—that of Hannah Arendt, to whom I turn in conclusion—underscores the lack of a robust idiom for debating what I have called the Jewish question of regime.

Like Spinoza and Marx before her, Arendt drew theoretical conclusions about the value of formal political membership from “so small (and, in world politics, so unimportant) a phenomenon as the Jewish question.”¹⁹ In *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, she famously derived “the existence of a right to have rights” from the crisis that befell Jews and other stateless peoples during World War II (296). Stripped of citizenship, Arendt demonstrates, Jews found that the human rights meant to protect them in such an eventuality were worthless because no country was willing to honor them. Arendt wrote *Origins* after the

Holocaust—the historical event that arguably justified the profound pessimism of emancipation historiography. Moreover, Arendt situates herself within traditions of emancipation historiography, citing Baron and Katz approvingly (xii). In *Origins*, Arendt devotes a chapter to “the equivocalities of emancipation,” narrating “the simultaneous decline of the European nation-state system and growth of antisemitic movements” (11, 9). Arendt’s argument about the causes of antisemitism is predicated on the Jews’ tenuous position in a specific regime, the nation-state. Express commitments to equality notwithstanding, Arendt argues, nation-states needed the Jews (specifically, Jewish bankers) to remain “outside the social body and within the sphere of the state” (30). (The historical validity of Arendt’s claims regarding the vicissitudes of Jewish wealth has been largely discredited.) Despite the limitations of Arendt’s historical research, her approach echoes Baron and Katz in that she foregrounds the constraints that the nation-state placed on Jewish self-understanding and organization.

When Arendt derives theoretical conclusions from the Jewish case, however, she elides distinctions between nation-states and other kinds of states, praising citizenship in the abstract. The plight of refugees prompts Arendt to endorse citizenship as an essential constituent of the human: “The calamity of the rightless is not that they are deprived of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”—oppressed within a given state—“but that they no longer belong to any community whatsoever” (295). Here, formal membership in a political community is a necessary condition for realizing supposedly natural human rights. Indeed, statelessness or expulsion from the polity is tantamount to expulsion from the human: “Only the loss of a polity itself expels him [man] from humanity” (297). Writing as a theorist, Arendt uncouples the abstract concept of citizenship from the concrete regimes that enfranchised Jews. The nature of the commonwealth—nation-state vs. multinational federation vs. empire—remains unspecified and proves less important than the fact of citizenship as such. Of course, Arendt reaches this conclusion because she writes at a juncture when the alternative to citizenship is statelessness—rather than a primordial Jewish autonomy. For refugees fleeing political repression and violence, membership in any polity—nation-state, federation, or multinational empire—is undoubtedly preferable to the alternative.

As a contribution to the study of emancipation, however, Arendt’s unqualified endorsement of citizenship is curious. With the jump from the nation-state to formal membership in a generic polity, Arendt diverges from her historical sources. Indeed, Arendt appears to have repressed key points of Baron’s non-lachrymose conception. The historiography of emancipation accords decisive

importance to the *type* of polity in which Jews reside. Although most of the scholars surveyed treat enfranchisement as an epochal break, they are not especially invested in citizenship as such. (The early proponents of *Wissenschaft*—who struggled to secure equal standing—prove an exception.) Rather, they examine the prospects for Jewish identity and existence afforded by the *kinds* of regimes in which Jewish enfranchisement was or was not conceivable. Indeed, given the anti-lachrymose thrust of canonical narratives, it is scarcely surprising that scholars downplay the importance of legal citizenship status. If Jews who lacked equal rights enjoyed a robust national existence in the Middle Ages, one could argue, formal political membership is less salient than Arendt contends. As Baron claimed, the idioms of liberal citizenship (rights, equality) do not fully capture the conditions that reshaped Jewish politics in modernity and must be supplemented with concepts such as autonomy.

This excursus into Arendt's work illustrates the lack of a language for translating the insights of Jewish citizenship studies into the idioms of political theory. In other works, such as *On Revolution*,²⁰ Arendt displays a keen appreciation for thinkers like Montesquieu who grapple with concrete challenges of regime design. Yet she proves less adept when navigating the distinctive regime dilemmas posed by Jewish history. This lacuna may stem from her admirable commitment to refugees. On a deeper level, however, it reflects a paucity of theoretical resources. Although Arendt immersed herself in emancipation historiography, she had trouble grasping its central findings as political-theoretical propositions. Jewish struggles with and over citizenship focus attention on aspects of political belonging that Western political theorists—preoccupied with the choice between liberal and republican visions of citizenship—tend to overlook. Studying modern states from a Jewish vantage point should prompt contemporary theorists to develop a richer language in which to assess the profound implications—beyond economic benefits and parliamentary participation—of state structures for minority communities.

Framed in this way, the historiography of enfranchisement speaks directly to political controversies roiling the Jewish world today. At a moment when virtually all Jews enjoy equal rights (*qua* Jews), the type of regime nevertheless remains a live question. Caution is required, lest we succumb to a political determinism that downplays the significance of grassroots agency, mobilization, and contestation. As history demonstrates, Jewish enfranchisement was not self-evident, despite the egalitarian underpinnings of modern citizenship theory: Jews and their allies had to fight to secure equal standing. With these caveats in mind, I nevertheless argue that contemporary ideological configurations reflect

the type of states in which Jews currently live. In a period when Jewish citizenship is largely taken for granted, formal membership is less consequential for the shaping of Jewish identity than the *kind* of state to which Jews belong.

Today, Jews are full citizens in Israel, North America, and Europe—yet their modes of identity and communal organization radically diverge. As codified in the 2018 Nation-State Law, the State of Israel defines itself as the nation-state of the Jewish people. The law reflects the hold that a shared national identity—which is Jewish, rather than Israeli—has over Israeli Jews. In the United States, the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom has allowed Judaism to thrive as a private religious (or ethnic) identity. For most American Jews, national autonomy no longer registers as a desideratum. (The Satmar Hasidim, who used property ownership and religious freedom protections to create an exclusively Haredi town, constitute a notable exception). New modes of Jewish identity have begun to percolate in the smaller communities of Central Europe, whose concepts are taken not from the nation-state but from the symbolic and institutional structures of the European Union. Developments in Europe hold out the prospect of a new political grammar, in which the range of available Jewish ideologies expands beyond ethno-nationalism (Israel) and liberal individualism (North America) to encompass transnational federations built on communal autonomy.

In short, contemporary Jewish politics confirms the continued primacy of state structures. At a moment when questions once thought settled (e.g., the justification for liberal democracy) have been reopened, these insights are more important than ever for Jews and non-Jews alike. Studying the history of the Jews' vexed relationship to the state pushes us to talk about citizenship in ways that go beyond standard considerations of rights and equality, liberalism, and republicanism. Jewish Studies can contribute a profound appreciation for the ways in which political regimes shape our conceptual apparatus, spiritual imagination, sense of self, and possibilities for communal organization. To realize this promise, scholars must hone a critical vocabulary that can translate historiographical claims regarding the decisive implications of state forms into theoretical discourse. Making the modern Jewish "question of regime" legible to a wide audience is the urgent task for which this chapter has laid the scholarly groundwork.

Recommended Readings

- Baron, Salo W. "Ghetto and Emancipation," in *The Menorah Treasury*, ed. Leo W. Schwarz (Jewish Publication Society, 1966), 50–63.
- Baron, Salo W. "Nationalism and Intolerance," *Menorah Journal* 16, no. 6 (1929): 503–15.

- Birnbaum, Pierre, and Ira Katznelson, eds. *Paths of Emancipation* (Princeton University Press, 1995).
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- Dubnow, Simon. *Nationalism and History* (Jewish Publication Society, 1958).
- Katz, Jacob. *Out of the Ghetto* (Harvard University Press, 1973).
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- Marglin, Jessica. "Extraterritoriality and Legal Belonging in the Nineteenth-Century Mediterranean," *Law and History Review* 39, no. 2 (2021): 679–706.
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- Sorkin, David. *Jewish Emancipation* (Princeton University Press, 2019).
- Stein, Sarah Abrevaya. *Extraterritorial Dreams* (University of Chicago Press, 2016).
- Stein, Sarah Abrevaya. *Family Papers* (Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2019).

Notes

1. *Theologico-Political Treatise*, in *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, Vol. 2, ed. Edwin Curley (Princeton University Press, 2016), 289.
2. David Sorkin, *Jewish Emancipation* (Princeton University Press, 2019), 29, 33.
3. See Mendes-Flohr, "The Emancipation of European Jewry: Why Was It Not Self-Evident?" *Studia Rosenthaliana* 30 (1996): 7–20.
4. See *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert C. Tucker (W. W. Norton, 1978).
5. Sorkin, *Jewish Emancipation*, 149–50.
6. "Scholarship and Emancipation," in *The Jew in the Modern World*, ed. Paul Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz (Oxford University Press, 2011), 254.
7. See esp. *Nationalism and History: Essays on Old and New Judaism*, ed. K. S. Pinson (Jewish Publication Society, c. 1958).
8. *Nationalism and History*, 100–115.
9. *Menorah Treasury*, ed. Leo W. Schwarz (Jewish Publication Society, 1966), 50–63.
10. *Menorah Journal* 16, no. 6: 503–15.
11. Schocken, 1957.
12. *Out of the Ghetto* (Harvard University Press, 1973).
13. Princeton University Press, 1995.
14. "From Millet to Minority," *Paths*, Ch. 8.
15. Oxford University Press, 2014.
16. *Extraterritorial Dreams* (University of Chicago Press, 2016), 9.
17. "Extraterritoriality and Legal Belonging in the Nineteenth-Century Mediterranean," *Law and History Review* 39 (2021): 680, 682.
18. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2019.
19. *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (Harcourt Brace, 1979), viii.
20. Viking, 1963.