Spinoza vs. the Kahal: The Zionist Critique of Spinoza's Politics

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Abstract

The 1920s and 30s witnessed an explosion of interest in Spinoza among Zionist intellectuals. The reflexive equation of nation and state has led scholars to conclude that Zionists were drawn to Spinoza because he justified state sovereignty. This assumption is mistaken. Eastern European Zionists rejected Spinoza's sovereignty-centered political thought—precisely because it denies political standing to non-sovereign bodies such as the kahal. Drawing on diasporic history, Spinoza's Zionist critics elaborated a distinctive political vision that prized national autonomy but did not equate self-rule with sovereign power. I foreground Zionist repudiation of Spinozist sovereignty to challenge reigning assumptions about the ideological sources of non-sovereign politics. Theorists influenced by German Jewish thought have predicated the cultivation of non-sovereign political imagination on a disavowal of nationalism. This opposition—between diaspora and nation, between nationalism and non-sovereignty—is false. In eastern Europe, nationalist figurations of galut *(exile) have long inspired non-sovereign, non-Spinozist political imaginaries.*

Key words: Baruch Spinoza, galut*, Jakob Klatzkin, Nahum Sokolow, Zionism*

Toward the end of *Baruch Spinoza and His Time*, the sprawling tome that Nahum Sokolow devoted to Spinoza's life and thought, one encounters an arresting juxtaposition: "Spinoza is ours and those who excommunicated him are ours. Everything is

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linked and connected."[1] Sokolow simultaneously reclaims Spinoza and his persecutors for the Jewish nation. At first glance, this move is notable for the insistence that Spinoza remains within the Jewish fold, as well as the quasi-theological, racial conception of Jewish nationhood that underwrites Spinoza's inclusion. Seventeenth-century Amsterdam, Sokolow suggests, makes visible the indomitable principle—"the eternity of Israel [*neẓah yisra'el*]"—that powers Jewish history.[2] Summarizing the epic face-off between Spinoza and the *parnasim* (community magistrates), Sokolow traces a dialectical interplay of forces:

> Here again the opposites meet: stretching the reins of the kahal to the furthest extent, and dismantling the collective to the furthest extent; it is innocent in its entirety—it is entirely guilty; the kahal is everything—the world is everything and the kahal is nothing; excommunication for an erroneous opinion—unlimited freedom for all opinions; extreme group discipline for the sake of the group's own freedom and independence—an individual's desperate discipline for the sake of his opinions and his world. These two might appear to have originated from different sources, but in truth they derive from a single source: idealism, total devotion [*mesirat ha-nefesh*], aspiration to the absolute, without limitations, without concessions.[3]

Spinoza belongs to "us," Sokolow intimates, because antagonistic political positions instantiate the same metahistorical dynamic. On closer inspection, however, the passage's significance derives less from the lengths to which Sokolow goes to rehabilitate Spinoza than from the world historical significance that he ascribes to the kahal.[4] At the denouement of this saga, the kahal—the distinctive mode of communal government that, according to Sokolow, allowed diasporic Jews to exercise self-rule—figures as Spinoza's antithesis. With this juxtaposition, Sokolow implies that modernity confronts Jews with diametrically opposed but dialectically entwined political languages, the political thought of the *parnasim* (for whom the kahal is everything) and the political philosophy of Spinoza (for whom the kahal is nothing). Given the complex historical and metaphysical entanglements that Sokolow charts, it is impossible to evaluate Spinoza's philosophy without reference to the kahal, whose authority he defied and whose legitimacy he denied.

Why would a card-carrying Zionist like Sokolow give equal billing to the kahal, a supposed relic of the powerless and apolitical *galut* (exile)? Sokolow's veneration for the kahal is hard to reconcile with

canonical accounts of Spinoza's Zionist reception. Scholars have long debated whether Spinoza harbored Zionist views, and Spinoza's putative Zionism was adduced to explain widespread interest in his work among modern Jewish nationalists. Parties to this debate generally assume that Zionists were drawn to Spinoza because they endorsed his contention that sovereign power is a sine qua non for (Jewish) self-determination.[5] For scholars who study Spinoza's reception, endorsement of the sovereign state—as a corrective to the ostensible pathologies of diasporic existence—is what makes one a Zionist.

In this article, I rebut the notion that Zionists were drawn to Spinoza because he made the establishment of a sovereign (Jewish) state a political imperative. As I demonstrate, many of the thinkers who enshrined Spinoza as a Hebrew cultural icon in the 1920s and 30s actively rejected Spinoza's political thought—precisely because it discounts non-sovereign political formations, relegating the diasporic Jewish community to the status of a private "church." Thus, I follow previous scholars in assigning diagnostic value to Spinoza's reception, but I challenge the conclusions that most have drawn regarding Zionist attitudes toward exile and sovereignty. When revisiting Spinoza's conflict with the kahal, I argue, Zionist intellectuals tended to side with the kahal, whose political thought dovetailed with their own. Wrestling with Spinoza's legacy, Zionist thinkers crafted a countervailing idiom from the testimony of diasporic Jewish history, which demonstrates that national autonomy is possible absent sovereign power.

With this challenge to regnant interpretations of Spinoza's Zionist reception, I advance two central claims. First, I craft a more nuanced account of Zionist intellectual history in the interwar period. Previous scholars mistakenly assumed that Zionist readers must have embraced Spinoza's political thought because they accepted received notions about Zionism.[6] By contrast, I excavate a stream within Zionist thought that rejects Spinozist sovereignty, given its ill fit with the trajectories of Jewish history. Here, I build on the work of historians who have documented the breadth of the Zionist "political imagination": the willingness to envision, entertain, and endorse political templates other than the nation-state.[7] Read in light of recent historiography, Spinoza's Zionist reception looks different, a relationship marked by ambivalence and conflict surrounding political fundamentals (as well as identification). Second, I establish the theoretical significance of the distinctive brand of non-sovereign nationalism that led thinkers such as Sokolow and Jakob Klatzkin to dissent from Spinoza's politics. The corpus of Hebrew Spinoza scholarship provides an instructive

introduction to this tradition, because—as we saw in the passage from Sokolow—it orchestrates a direct confrontation between competing political languages, one state-centered, the other diasporic. To counter Spinoza's justification for absolute sovereignty, Sokolow and Klatzkin advanced an emphatically political conception of *galut* as a condition that both required and enabled Jews to found institutions of self-government.

What allowed Sokolow and Klatzkin to reject foundational assumptions of modern (western) politics? Sokolow and Klatzkin reached political conclusions diametrically opposed to Spinoza's because they were immersed in the intellectual and political milieus of eastern Europe. In modern Europe, "nation-state and continental empire offered divergent options for Jewish life: acculturation and national integration as against cultural autonomy in a multinational state."[8] On the eve of World War I, the vast majority of world Jewry lived in eastern Europe. The political regimes under which eastern European Jews experienced modernization were the multinational Russian and Habsburg empires.[9] The kahal existed in attenuated form in the Russian Empire until 1844. Elements of corporate identity persisted well past the kahal's dissolution, and the kahal's legacy continued to resonate within partisan politics, providing inspiration for diaspora nationalist parties that competed with Zionism for the allegiance of Russian and Polish Jews.[10] Ashkenazi Jews living in empires and their multinational successor states developed a distinctive political vision that prized national autonomy, but did not equate self-rule with sovereign power. These legacies are present to Sokolow and Klatzkin, informing their interpretation of Spinoza's tribulations in Jewish Amsterdam.[11]

I restore eastern European discourses to the critical conversation to complicate our understanding of *galut*. Since the 1980s, theorists who identify as post- or anti-Zionists have celebrated exile and diaspora as incubators for hybrid identities immune to the snares of nationalism.[12] Theorists who mobilize *galut* as an antidote to Zionism are inspired by the luminaries of French and German Jewish thought (that is, Walter Benjamin, Hannah Arendt, Emmanuel Levinas). By contrast, I showcase a concept of *galut* derived from Zionist political thought. I do so not to exonerate Zionism but to challenge reigning assumptions about the ideological sources of non-sovereign political thought. German-influenced theorists predicate resistance to sovereignty—and, by extension, the nation-state—on disavowal of nationalism. This opposition—between diaspora and nation, between nationalism and non-sovereignty—is false. In eastern Europe, nationalist figurations

of *galut* have long inspired non-sovereign, non-Spinozist political imaginaries. Against theorists who link opposition to sovereignty to repudiation of national identity, I present Jewish nationalism as a rich resource for non-sovereign thought.

Before proceeding, a word on the Sokolow/Klatzkin pairing. The most prominent Hebrew journalist of his generation, Sokolow (1859–1936) was active in international diplomacy to promote the Balfour Declaration (1917) and served as president of the World Zionist Congress (1931–35).[13] Sokolow's *Baruch Spinoza and His Time* (1928/29) mingles biography, historical contextualization, and philosophical exegesis. Klatzkin (1882–1948) was an academically trained philosopher who studied with Hermann Cohen and received a PhD from the University of Bern.[14] Although Klatzkin published several original works of philosophy, he achieved greater prominence as an editor of multi-volume works including the *Encyclopaedia Judaica.* Klatzkin translated Spinoza's *Ethics* into Hebrew and published a monograph on Spinoza's thought. Sokolow and Klatzkin were acquainted through Hebrew literary circles. In a 1921 letter to Klatzkin, Sokolow says of himself, "I am not a scholar who sits in an endowed chair, I am a writer, just a writer."[15] Sokolow's wry self-deprecation hints at differences both stylistic and substantive in their work. Klatzkin operates at a much higher level of philosophical sophistication. Yet these differences in register and sensibility cannot obscure marked similarities in their assessments of Spinoza's political thought. I pair writers with different disciplinary orientations to show how deeply rooted reservations about Spinozist sovereignty were in the political thought of eastern European Zionists.

Spinoza: The First Zionist?

As the first (and for many years, the only) philosopher of Jewish descent to gain admission to the modern canon, Spinoza was a source of endless fascination for generations of Jewish thinkers.[16] "Indeed, the Jewish reception of Spinoza is nothing less than a prism for viewing the intellectual history of European Jews from the seventeenth to the twentieth century."[17] Spinoza's image proved mutable, as thinkers across the ideological spectrum pondered his legacy and sought his imprimatur. Zionists were no exception to this pattern. Starting with Moses Hess, Zionists repeatedly examined the relationship between Spinoza's philosophy and emergent forms of Jewish nationalism. It is scarcely surprising, then, that "Spinoza as Zionist pioneer" has become a scholarly commonplace.

Since the 1950s, scholars have debated whether one can legitimately designate Spinoza a Zionist and, if so, which school of Zionism Spinoza founded, anticipated, or unwittingly inspired.[18] Parties to this debate differ regarding whether Spinoza's "Zionism" is properly classified as genuine, proto-, counterfactual, or apocryphal. Yet they generally operate with a shared understanding of Zionism. According to this view, evidence for Spinoza's "Zionism" is found in the third chapter of the *Theologico-Political Treatise*, where Spinoza speculates regarding the establishment of a modern Jewish state. The passage reads in full:

> I think the sign of circumcision is also so important in this matter that I am persuaded that this one thing will preserve this Nation to eternity. Indeed, if the foundations of their religion did not make their hearts unmanly, I would absolutely believe that some day, given the opportunity, they would set up their state [*imperium*] again, and God would choose them anew.[19]

Scholars treat this passage as critical for deciphering Spinoza's appeal because it expresses a conviction that, on their view, is foundational for Zionism—namely, that Jews can only exercise self-rule via the establishment of a sovereign Jewish state. Although not stated expressly in the famous passage from the *Theologico-Political Treatise*, this position informs Spinoza's analysis of possible directions for modern Jewish politics.

As Israeli philosopher Yirmiyahu Yovel notes, in a framework predicated upon absolute sovereignty, there are only two conceivable ways for Jews to exercise political agency: individuals can engage politically in their states of residence or Jews can mobilize collectively to establish a Jewish state.

> The logic of Spinoza's analysis seems to favor a quasi-Zionist solution. As modern politics can no longer admit the "kingdom within a kingdom" that marked Jewish life in the Diaspora, the Jews must either relinquish all self-rule and disperse as individuals among the gentiles, or establish their own political state. From a Spinozistic point of view, the only valid way for Jewish self-rule to continue in the modern era would be within a sovereign Jewish state.[20]

Yet Yovel does not merely tease out the "logic" of Spinoza's argument. He contends that this logic explains Spinoza's appeal for Zionist intellectuals: "This implication (which Spinoza did not draw explicitly) may well have attracted Zionists like David Ben-Gurion, Nachum

Sokolov, and Joseph Klausner to Spinoza."[21] The gesture toward the establishment of a Jewish state arguably does explain Spinoza's magnetism for someone like Ben-Gurion. In 1953, Ben-Gurion anointed Spinoza "the first Zionist of the last three hundred years. Taking an unprejudiced historical view of Jewish and world history, he prophesied that the State of Israel would be reestablished."[22] Yet Yovel too hastily presumes a consensus among Zionists past and present regarding the imperatives of Jewish sovereignty. Only with the establishment of the State of Israel did Spinoza's ostensible vision for a "Jewish state" emerge as *the* criterion for his inclusion in the Zionist pantheon.[23]

Indeed, in the 1920s and 30s, Zionists were drawn to Spinoza for a host of reasons, many of them unrelated to his doctrine of sovereignty. The terms Zionists used to characterize Spinoza's putative ideology were accordingly varied. Ben Zion Dinaburg, who accords Spinoza a prominent place in his *Precursors to Zionism* anthology, comes closest to classifying Spinoza as a "Zionist." Dinaburg glosses Spinoza's disquisition on divine election and the possible restoration of the Hebrew state as "a first disclosure of some of the principles of modern Zionism."[24] Yet endorsement of sovereignty is not the primary criterion for inclusion in Dinaburg's Zionist pantheon, which includes traditionalist rabbis (such as Jonathan Eibeschutz, Levi Yitzhak of Berdichev, and Jacob Emden) who could not fathom the establishment of a modern Jewish state. Although Sokolow credits Spinoza with incipient national consciousness, he reserves the term "Zionist" for Menasseh Ben Israel, the pillar of the Amsterdam rabbinic establishment who lobbied Oliver Cromwell for the Jews' readmission to England.[25] In a similar vein, Klatzkin deems Spinoza "the first to recognize the national-territorial character of the Jewish religion, and he prophesied the redemption of the land."[26] Although Klatzkin authored the most admired Hebrew translation of Spinoza's *Ethics*, his characterization of Spinoza's position rests on a telling mistranslation. Whereas Ben-Gurion credits Spinoza with prophesying the establishment of a Jewish *state*, Klatzkin tacitly emends the relevant passage from the *Theologico-Political Treatise*, glossing it as a prophecy about the disposition of the *land*. Ben-Gurion's rendition is more faithful to the *Theologico-Political Treatise*, where Spinoza uses the Latin term "imperium." Klatzkin's mistranslation suggests that the doctrine of absolute sovereignty was hardly the most compelling facet of Spinoza's philosophy for Zionist readers.

Klatzkin was not alone in downplaying the doctrine of sovereignty. Contemporary scholars seldom tire of rehearsing Klausner's 1927 proclamation to revoke Spinoza's excommunication. At a

Hebrew University ceremony marking the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of Spinoza's death, Klausner histrionically declaimed, "The ban is nullified. Judaism's transgression against you is withdrawn and your sin against Judaism will be forgiven! You are our brother, you are our brother, you are our brother!"[27] In this speech, Klausner glosses Zionism's early achievements as a fulfillment of Spinoza's "prophecy." The first half of Spinoza's prediction (the reestablishment of the state) has already "been fulfilled . . . in our time," Klausner declares.[28] Yet Klausner is speaking in 1927, at a moment when "Judaism has begun to acquire land for herself, and a national language, even a territorial-political basis," but Jews in Palestine lack a state.[29] On closer inspection, the national revival that Spinoza heralds is predicated less on the establishment of an internationally recognized state than on Judaism's reconstitution as a "nation-religion all in one."[30] Spinoza assumes heightened significance at a moment when "Judaism has ceased to be only or primarily a religion, as Spinoza's opponents, Moses Mendelssohn and Hermann Cohen, depicted it. And Judaism is not—and never will be!—only a nation: It will be a nation-religion all in one."[31] The consummation that Klausner awaits involves the reintegration of elements sundered in emancipation's wake, at which point pantheist doctrines formerly deemed heretical can resume pride of place in the Jewish canon.

The previous survey was a necessary prelude to a detailed analysis of the political imaginary that Sokolow and Klatzkin elaborated when grappling with Spinoza. Too often, scholars read Spinoza's Zionist reception teleologically, projecting the ideological commitments that have characterized Zionism since the 1940s backward onto earlier periods. My point is not to police the anachronism that colors research on Spinoza's Zionist reception. Rather, my concern is that teleological readings of the "first Zionist" topos obscure Zionists' grave reservations about Spinoza's political thought and, consequently, downplay the theoretical stakes of this encounter.[32] Yet a lot is at stake. As readers of Spinoza, eastern European Zionists examined whether the Western traditions that Spinoza helped inaugurate provided intellectual resources for Jewish politics. Hebrew scholarship on Spinoza warrants study precisely because Zionists did not uncritically reproduce Spinoza's political doctrines. Rather, they took exception to concepts, such as sovereignty, which obscure distinctive facets of Jewish political experience. For Sokolow and Klatzkin, to whom I now turn, the encounter with Spinoza prompted a critical assessment of the norms of Western political philosophy, which they considered inadequate for making sense of modern Jewish predicaments.

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In their respective works on Spinoza, Sokolow and Klatzkin deploy moves from the autonomist political lexicon as a counterweight to Spinozist sovereignty.[33] Autonomy—"the one political aspiration that united the different strands of politics in Russia and Eastern Europe"—remains closely associated with its most influential exponent, the historian and political activist Simon Dubnow.[34] Dubnow crafted a master narrative in which the events of 70 CE did not mark the Jews' exit from history and politics. In every historical period and in every geographical location, Dubnow contends, Jews sought and achieved national autonomy. This historical finding yields a striking theoretical claim: national independence is possible absent sovereign power. Even when subject to gentile jurisdiction, Dubnow argues, Jews exercised meaningful self-rule within the kahal, a "surrogate state."[35] As an activist, Dubnow built a political party on traditions of diasporic Jewish autonomy, which he sought to update in accordance with modern norms of democracy and equal citizenship. Dubnow's signature political demands found widespread acceptance: "National-cultural autonomy became a cardinal principle of all modern Jewish movements, in their innumerable sects, schisms, and splinters."[36] In short, autonomism was an influential theoretical idiom and pervasive political demand in Sokolow and Klatzkin's milieu.[37]

Given their familiarity with these discourses and debates, Sokolow and Klatzkin were primed to question foundational assumptions about sovereignty. Their challenge to the Spinozist political vision centers on the kahal and its political standing.[38] For both thinkers, the move to revisit the kahal is prompted by what they consider flaws marring Spinoza's historiography, as expounded in the *Theologico-Political Treatise*. Sokolow and Klatzkin judge the *Theologico-Political Treatise* to be an inferior—even regrettable—work. "This book is a stumbling block on which a great man stumbled, an act unworthy of him."[39] There is an apologetic dimension to these harsh indictments. As Sokolow acknowledges, the rabbis who banned Spinoza objected less to his idiosyncratic theology than to his unfortunate excursions into the field of Jewish history, which are marred by antisemitic undertones. "That great shining sun that we call Spinoza was stained; and the marvelous philosopher's opinions with respect to his people's history are the stains."[40] To placate readers deterred by the more cringeworthy passages in the *Theologico-Political Treatise*, Sokolow uncouples the disciplines in which Spinoza labored and the literary guises he wore. Spinoza painted a tendentious portrait of Jewish history,

Sokolow explains, because he exceeded the bounds of his scholarly competence. "He was a philosopher and not a historian."[41] Klatzkin makes a similar disciplinary distinction, imploring readers to:

> . . . distinguish between Spinoza the writer-polemicist, the publicist, and Spinoza the philosopher. Do not seek the philosopher in his *Treatise*—its path is not his path—seek him in the *Ethics*. Only on this theory did his *shekhinah* [divine presence] dwell, only in this text was his thought revealed in all of its creative power and all of its power to impress—in its purity.[42]

Beyond the attempted rehabilitation of the "inspired" texts, however, lies a substantive criticism of Spinoza's philosophical training. Writing as a philosopher, Spinoza lacked the tools requisite to interpret the diasporic trajectories of Jewish history.

Specifically, Spinoza failed to recognize that Jews remained an independent nation in dispersion, courtesy of institutions like the kahal. As Sokolow well understands, Spinoza dates the nation's demise to the fall of the biblical state. Sokolow traces this interpretive failure to Spinoza's philosophical methodology. Instead of studying Judaism's "unique national type and desire for existence," Sokolow objects, Spinoza imposed a one size fits all model, according to which the state precedes and constitutes the nation.[43] Consequently, Jews are released from halakhic obligation beyond the biblical state's borders and after the biblical state's demise, as Spinoza explicitly states in the fifth chapter of the *Theologico-Political Treatise*.[44] Sokolow objects that Spinoza "emphasizes and exaggerates this matter too much, which is something that Judaism cannot tolerate," precisely because it annuls the validity of Jewish law in diaspora.[45] Although Sokolow is determined to prove that Spinoza is a certified philosophical genius, he allows that, in Spinoza's case, philosophical sophistication did not yield sound political judgment, for it blinded him to aspects of Jewish history not readily assimilable to philosophical frameworks.

Using the historical methods that Spinoza scorned, Sokolow unearths evidence that contradicts Spinoza's fundamental political premises. In *Baruch Spinoza and His Time*, Sokolow devotes as much space to a detailed reconstruction of the Amsterdam kahal as he does to Spinoza's philosophy. The community's historical significance derives, in part, from their fierce determination, born of oppression, to exercise self-rule. Fleeing the Inquisition, which systematically sought "to destroy fraternity between Jews and to erase all memory of association and congregation, society and community," the crypto-Jews who

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fled to Amsterdam exhibited profound longings for political independence.[46] Indeed, restoring the foundations of the organized Jewish community became a consuming imperative.

> These powerful longings were not merely longings for religious practices but longings for the nation, whose miniaturization—in which she is reflected and portrayed on a small scale—is the kahal. Especially the kahal of that period, which was much more than a religious regime, and which provided a kind of framework for multifaceted public life.[47]

Here, it is the community that banned Spinoza—rather than Spinoza himself—that embodies Jewish nationalism avant la lettre.[48] In Amsterdam and other places where Spanish and Portugese Jews found refuge, the Anusim (those forced to conceal their Judaism) resuscitated "the Hebrew national spirit" by founding comprehensive networks of communal institutions.[49]

Having classified the kahal as the institutional embodiment of the diasporic Jewish nation, Sokolow proceeds to detail its inner workings. Sokolow does not slight the adhesive power of traditional piety. The kahal was "undoubtedly a religious institution," and one of its primary goals was "to protect religious freedom, to enable Jews to openly practice their religion."[50] Indeed, Sokolow credits the kahal's impressive longevity to a "spiritual bond, heartfelt collaboration, rooted deep in ancient tradition."[51] However, in keeping with the repeated insistence that Judaism is not a mere "religion," Sokolow stresses the comprehensive reach of autonomous Jewish jurisdiction. Unlike the "new [that is, post-emancipation] community, which prettifies itself with the name 'ritual-religious' (in order to indicate that it is detached from the nation)," the Amsterdam kahal encompassed all facets of social life, with a particular focus on economic regulation to mitigate poverty.[52] The elders issued "market ordinances, ordinances regarding support and charity, ordinances regarding free education, ordinances of mutual aid, regulation of competition, decrees against luxury, and many more arrangements and corrections of this kind that fall under the category of the economy."[53] On the basis of these institutions and practices, Sokolow classifies the kahal as a "constitutional regime."[54] Indeed, Sokolow refuses categorical distinctions between Jewish "self-government" and the "external government . . . which did not cease to intervene in [the kahal's] internal affairs."[55] The Amsterdam Jewish community "had policy, an element of rule and subordination, as in any state; it had obligation, positive commandment [*miẓvat aseh*], it had a structure."[56] Classifying the kahal as something akin to

Dubnow's "surrogate state," Sokolow contends that one can found a polity without the ultimate and absolute power that is sovereignty.

The Destruction of *Galut*

If Sokolow paints a comprehensive portrait of the Amsterdam kahal, Klatzkin takes Spinoza's conflict with the Amsterdam *parnasim* as the occasion to advance a theoretical generalization about *galut* as a distinctive mode of political organization. Klatzkin's analysis of Spinoza's excommunication, in *Baruch Spinoza* (1923), provides a concise introduction to his theory of diasporic political traditions. Most of Spinoza's Hebrew admirers concede that the ban was understandable, even necessary, given the tenuous political circumstances of the Amsterdam Jewish community. Klatzkin echoes the apologetic tenor of other works—contending that Christians have historically exhibited far greater zeal in the prosecution of heresy—but adds a fierce indictment of Spinoza's conduct. On Klatzkin's view, Spinoza's stubborn refusal of communal authority was hypocritical, violating his stated political principles. Fealty to the doctrines expounded in the *Theologico-Political Treatise* should have led Spinoza to accept the kahal's verdict. Citing numerous passages from the *Theologico-Political Treatise* that demand "complete submission to the state's authority—in one's deeds in any case," Klatzkin concludes that Spinoza "was judged according to the law by which he himself judges."[57] By consorting with Christians, publicly violating halakhah, and spurning rabbinic invitations to repent, Spinoza contravened his own injunctions to obedience. Of course, Spinoza's conduct only appears hypocritical if (unlike Spinoza) one considers the kahal's authority identical in kind to that of the Dutch state. Indeed, Klatzkin concludes his unsparing rendition of the excommunication with a resounding assertion of the kahal's political dignity. Spinoza's "teaching regarding worship of state and homeland, worship of legality and discipline, justifies the judgment against him. His punishment is its punishment. For, in diaspora, the Torah was the Jewish people's homeland and its laws were the laws of its state."[58]

Klatzkin elaborates a broader theory of *galut* politics upon the claim, also encountered in Sokolow's work, that the Amsterdam Jewish community constituted a "state" to which all Jews have binding obligations. The Amsterdam kahal is merely one instance of a diasporic political tradition, whose historical, political, and religious conditions of possibility Klatzkin anatomizes in his publicist oeuvre. For the most part, the

political essays collected in *Teḥumim* (Boundaries, 1925) are devoted to intramural Zionist polemics. Spinoza does not figure in these essays. Yet they are crucial for our purposes, for they elaborate the conception of *galut* that motivates Klatzkin's opposition to Spinoza's politics.

Klatzkin expounds his theory of *galut* while advancing a historical diagnosis regarding the destructive consequences of the Enlightenment and emancipation for Jewish autonomy. As Spinoza's rebellion illustrates, as early as the seventeenth century, the kahal's authority was subject to increasing challenge. Modernity, which Klatzkin dates to the Haskalah, augurs profound (and apparently irreversible) transformations in the modes of political organization that are possible in *galut*. "It is impossible to learn about the contemporary *galut* by analogy [*gezerah shavah*] to the *galut* of the period prior to the Haskalah. They are two different kinds of *galut*."[59] The contemporary *galut* proves unsustainable, Klatzkin concludes, because the lure of assimilation and the erosion of religious norms conspire to rob Jewish law of public authority.

> Our sages spoke well: Even if the nations of the world are exiled, their exile [*galutan*] is not *galut*. But for Israel—who does not eat their bread or drink their wine—their exile [*galutam*] is *galut*. And now that we do eat their bread and drink their wine—in the end, our *galut* will no longer be *galut*. That is, the end of our national foreignness which will decrease and come to an end.[60]

Here, Klatzkin bases a controversial definition of *galut* on a rabbinic midrash. On Klatzkin's rabbinic definition, expulsion from one's homeland does not exhaust the phenomenon of *galut*. Rather, *galut* involves a high degree of segregation from the dominant culture. With the removal of barriers to social integration, Jews no longer constitute an alien nation within their host communities, with the result that authentic forms of *galut* are irrevocably lost. Klatzkin depicts this epochal break as a loss to be mourned rather than a liberation from political subordination and benighted clerical rule.

For those steeped in standard historiographies, it may come as a surprise to hear a Zionist lament the demise of *galut*. For too long, we have been told that "negation of the exile" is a foundational Zionist tenet.[61] Such litanies are especially surprising coming from Klatzkin, who has been classified as an especially strident "negator."[62] This reputation is not without foundation. Having concluded that diasporic autonomy is no longer possible in Europe, Klatzkin calls for the negation of the exile in its contemporary, degraded form.[63] Unlike diaspora

nationalists, who demanded national autonomy for European Jews, Klatzkin believed that, post-emancipation, Jews had to establish autonomy on a territorial basis in the land of Israel. Yet the polemical flourishes of Klatzkin's prose should not blind us to the complexity of his position. Unlike more categorical deniers, Klatzkin does not condemn *galut* as a perverse, apolitical mode of existence. Indeed, by predicating his political analysis on a controversial periodization, Klatzkin implies that *galut* is not inherently pathological, demeaning, or oppressive. On the contrary, the premodern *galut* offered a degree of political freedom rivaling that of the ancient Hebrew state.

The biblical and rabbinic allusions Klatzkin employs to render this historical verdict convey his veneration for the premodern *galut*. Klatzkin calls the Haskalah a "destruction" (*ḥurban*), using a Hebrew word that evokes formative chapters in Jewish history, the destruction of the first and second temples. With the metaphor of the Haskalah as *ḥurban*, Klatzkin suggests that the loss lamented is not merely the decline in religious observance but the concomitant loss of political independence. "The destruction of our religion is the destruction of our state in *galut*, the destruction of our third temple [*bateinu ha-shlishi*], our dwelling [*bateinu*] on foreign soil."[64] In these passages, Klatzkin equates the diasporic community ("our third temple") with the ancient Hebrew state, inverting the conventional understanding of *galut* as a condition of passivity and dependence, the antithesis of the independence enjoyed in biblical times. On Klatzkin's historical narrative, it is the modern *ḥurban*, rather than the events traditionally associated with 70 CE, that constitutes the decisive political rupture.

What is the theoretical claim implicit in Klatzkin's complaint that *galut* is no longer viable once Jewish law lacks public authority? Against Spinoza, Klatzkin can classify the kahal as a "state" because he believes that a functioning polity can be erected solely on the basis of rabbinic law. Klatzkin's periodization of the *galut* rests on a theory regarding the political work that halakhah has historically performed. On Klatzkin's interpretation, rabbinic Judaism is "rich in forms [*ẓurot*]."[65] By "forms," Klatzkin intends "the barriers of the nation": religious laws, practices, and customs endowed with the capacity "to contain and absorb national life."[66] According to Klatzkin, Judaism's emphatically "formal" orientation—its prioritization of practice over doctrine and belief—preserved national identity in dispersion. Moreover, forms alone possess this preservative capacity. Unlike "content" (ideas, values, doctrine), forms enclose Jews within a discrete, bounded domain and prescribe an exhaustive network of practices that concretize the nation at every moment of one's waking (and sleeping)

life.[67] In previous generations, "a fortified wall stood between us and them and, within the wall, a Hebrew state in miniature, in Heine's incisive formulation."[68] If Spinoza dismisses halakhah as an incoherent anachronism, Klatzkin portrays halakhah as the infrastructure for diasporic self-rule.

Klatzkin's fundamental premise is that if historical conditions are favorable—if they encourage social segregation and religious observance—it is possible to erect a polity without sovereign power or territorial contiguity. "Even in *galut*, our lives were political, a kingdom within a kingdom."[69] Klatzkin seldom complains that premodern Jewish communities were weak, dependent, and vulnerable to gentile caprice. On the contrary, in the heat of polemical contestation, Klatzkin greatly exaggerates the degree of autonomy that medieval Jewish communities actually enjoyed. Nor does Klatzkin consider the lack of territorial contiguity an impediment to the establishment of a viable polity. Prior to the Haskalah, Klatzkin explains, dispersed communities did not only share one faith, they also shared "one constitution," religion uniting "the nation within a multiplicity of lands and languages."[70] On this narrative, territorial concentration becomes necessary at a specific historical moment for contingent historical reasons.

> As long as our lives were concentrated within our religious state, we did not know the danger of destruction, and the land of Israel was not a condition for the nation's existence. Since our state on foreign soil was destroyed, however, the land of Israel has become a condition for our existence.[71]

In principle, Klatzkin affirms the possibility of political independence in dispersion without sovereignty; he merely denies the current viability of this exilic political tradition.

A Non-Spinozist Zionism

In their work on Spinoza, Sokolow and Klatzkin employ political languages that bear a marked diasporic imprint. Alert to the flaws that mar Spinoza's rendition of Jewish history, Sokolow and Klatzkin undertake a revisionist study of Jewish Amsterdam that yields striking theoretical conclusions. The testimony of Jewish history—as read through autonomist traditions associated with Dubnow—leads these Zionist intellectuals to defend the possibility of a diasporic polity,

resisting key premises of the sovereignty tradition. This intellectual debt notwithstanding, Sokolow and Klatzkin rejected Dubnow's political ideology. Sokolow and Klatzkin were Zionists, not diaspora nationalists.[72] Klatzkin's veiled gibe at Dubnow, who pioneered the sociological approach to the study of Jewish history, conveys the depth of this ideological divide: "All of the solutions to national questions that are under consideration—and may come to fruition in a manner that is even more attractive than that which our good sociologists model—cannot provide a solution to our national question in *galut*."[73] Sokolow's dismissal of diaspora nationalism is even more categorical: "Jewish nationality cannot find expression in political citizenship in diaspora."[74] Although their positions on minority rights in Europe were more nuanced than these polemical broadsides suggest, Klatzkin and Sokolow both accorded primacy to territorial settlement in the land of Israel. Each thinker concluded that national autonomy was no longer viable in Europe, even while they positioned Zionism within the diasporic lineages that they enlisted while jousting with Spinoza.

How do thinkers who resist the presumption for sovereignty understand Zionism's meaning and aims? Contrary to popular expectation, the Zionism of Sokolow and Klatzkin is not "Spinozist," in the sense familiar from Ben-Gurion and Yovel. Blurring now-conventional boundaries, Sokolow and Klatzkin use elements from the autonomist repertoire to justify territorial concentration. Moreover, their thinking about regime design in Palestine also draws on diasporic precedents. In neither case is the envisioned Jewish polity modeled on the sovereign nation-state (whether the nation-states of modern Europe or the ancient Hebrew state that Spinoza anatomizes in the *Theologico-Political Treatise*). The kind of state that Spinoza helped justify proves less compelling than imperial and multinational regimes familiar from eastern Europe.

Sokolow: Spinoza vs. Menasseh Ben Israel

The autonomist flourishes in Sokolow's work are scarcely surprising once one recalls his ideological itinerary. Prior to 1906, when Sokolow left Russian Poland to devote himself to Zionist organizing, "his principal goal was to find a place for a collective Jewish national culture within a supranational Polish society."[75] Dismissing emancipation through individual rights as assimilationist, Sokolow endorsed national autonomy and, echoing Dubnow, even proposed creating a modern version of the Council of the Four Lands.[76] Once Sokolow

joined the Zionist movement, however, his institutional affiliations were impeccably mainstream. With Chaim Weizmann, Sokolow lobbied European powers to support the Balfour Declaration, and he served as president of the World Zionist Congress. Moreover, Sokolow's *History of Zionism 1600–1918* (1919) is one of the first comprehensive histories of Zionism. Yet Sokolow continued to employ autonomist tropes when writing as a committed Zionist. Sokolow was not a systematic thinker—in Klausner's characterization, he lacked a "fixed worldview"—and one cannot discount the diplomatic motivations behind *History of Zionism*, which was pitched to British supporters of the Balfour Declaration.[77] In Sokolow's narrative, Zionism has a storied lineage that stretches back beyond more familiar Jewish benchmarks such as Hibat Tsiyon, Perets Smolenskin, or Theodor Herzl to seventeenth-century England. Yet the eclecticism of Sokolow's work, which indiscriminately mingles English, French, and Jewish sources, yields striking (if idiosyncratic) conclusions.

For it is Menasseh Ben Israel (*shtadlan* [advocate for Jewish interests] and messianic theologian), rather than Spinoza (theoretical architect of the sovereign state), who emerges as Zionism's seventeenth-century Jewish progenitor. In *History of Zionism*, as in *Baruch Spinoza*, Sokolow traces formative trajectories of Jewish and world history back to the episode in which Spinoza and Ben Israel figure as dialectical twins. Unlike Ben-Gurion, however, Sokolow hails the traditionalist rabbi and pillar of the Amsterdam community as a progenitor. "Manasseh was nothing if not a Zionist, if we look upon Zionism in the light of his time."[78] The ascription of Zionism to Ben Israel is not immediately obvious, since Ben Israel's lobbying efforts targeted the Jews' readmission to England rather than Palestine. To parry this objection, Sokolow foregrounds the messianic, Palestine-centric theology that ostensibly motivated Ben Israel's diasporic advocacy.[79]

> His favorite idea was that the return of the Jews to their ancient land must be preceded by their general dispersion. The Dispersion, according to the words of the Bible, was to be from one end of the earth to the other, and must therefore include the British Isles, which lay in the extreme north of the inhabited world.[80]

In this sense, "Zionism stood at the cradle of the resettlement of the Jews in England," for England was a necessary way station en route to the restoration of theocracy in the land of Israel.[81]

By tracing Zionism's lineage back to a diasporic political campaign, however, Sokolow risks downplaying the significance of Palestine. In some passages, Ben Israel's Zionist credentials stem less from messianic fervor than from Jewish self-assertion—"clear-sighted and fearless self-defense."[82] As Sokolow acknowledges, many rabbis in the period subscribed to messianic doctrines. Ben Israel was alone, however, in launching an international campaign in defense of Jewish interests. "There was only one difference" between Ben Israel and these quietist rabbis, "the difference between passivity and activity, between purely spiritual impulses and impulses which lead to action."[83] In these passages, a Zionist is someone who advocates for national projects on a global scale and in an international forum. Thus, Sokolow can recruit a figure like Adolphe Crémieux—the French foreign minister whose namesake decree (1870) granted French citizenship to Algerian Jews—for Zionism. Crémieux's uncompromising defense of Jewish rights was "Zionistic," even though divorced from the land of Israel.[84] In a similar vein, Sokolow glosses the educational initiatives of the Alliance Israélite Universelle as "consciously or unconsciously Zionist work."[85] Although Baron Maurice de Hirsch, who sponsored colonization projects in North and South America, did not identify as a Zionist, "his activities became those of a national Jew once he was made fully conscious of the Jewish tragedy" in Russia.[86] When Sokolow aligns proponents of collective rights in diaspora with the Zionist cause, he offers a capacious (if somewhat opportunistic) definition that blurs boundaries between Zionism and the kind of diaspora nationalism that he once professed.

Moreover, Sokolow's idiosyncratic genealogy posits continuity between Zionism and forms of diasporic Jewish politics (for example, *shtadlanut* [intercession with the ruling powers]) disdained by Zionists who conflate dispersion with passivity. Tracing Zionism back to Ben Israel does not only situate Sokolow's and Weizmann's efforts on behalf of the Balfour Declaration within a venerable history of Jewish petitions to the British.[87] Sokolow's pedigree also aligns Zionism with traditional diasporic political strategies.[88] As Sokolow concedes, Ben Israel, an archetypical *shtadlan*, "did not succeed in obtaining that formal permission for the resettlement which he wanted," and his informal accomplishments were a function of "several auxiliary causes" (for example, British public opinion and religious enthusiasm).[89] At times, Sokolow seems concerned to dispel interpretations that, noting these historical continuities, would mistake him for a diasporist. Sokolow is at pains to clarify that "Manasseh clearly rejected the idea that Israel's mission demands an everlasting dispersion."[90] Lest one

mistake Ben Israel's efforts to scatter Jews across the globe for diasporism, Sokolow assures readers that Ben Israel viewed *galut* as divine punishment. Yet these clarifications are necessary precisely because Sokolow's genealogy invites a diasporist reading.

If Ben Israel—who subscribed to messianic doctrines and employed *galut* political strategies—inaugurates modern Zionism, then Zionism does not constitute a political rupture. Nor does realization of the Zionist vision require the establishment of a novel political regime. Throughout *History of Zionism*, Sokolow professes indifference to questions of regime. "The form of the scheme is, to our mind, a secondary matter" when compared to what Sokolow identifies as core Zionist principles—a homeland in Palestine that will incubate "the rebirth of Jewish civilization."[91] Yet there is one possibility that Sokolow adamantly rules out: "the creation of an independent 'Jewish State.'"[92] "The 'Jewish State' was never a part of the Zionist programme."[93] When gesturing toward the anticipated polity in Palestine, Sokolow prefers terms such as "homeland," "commonwealth," and "autonomy."[94] Granted, Sokolow couches this denial of statist ambitions in a polemical context, exposing the fallacies of "anti-Zionists" who exploited Herzl's book title to sow misinformation regarding Zionist intentions.[95] The preference for autonomist language makes sense, however, within the broader contexts of Sokolow's political thought. In his Zionist writings, as in his exegesis of Spinoza, Sokolow consistently demurs from paradigms that predicate national existence on the achievement of sovereign power.

When read in conjunction with Sokolow's subsequent work on Spinoza, *History of Zionism* is notable for its translation of the political theory of the *parnasim* ("the kahal is everything") to a Levantine setting. Like the *parnasim*, Sokolow pursues autonomy within a broader political framework—in his case, that of liberal empire.[96] Sokolow predicates Zionism's success on "the security of public law—that is, of the recognition of the rightful claim of the Jewish people to regenerate Palestine and itself through Palestine."[97] Sokolow insists that "this idea is no new-fangled invention of Zionism" but one with ample precedent in the Near East, where European powers have long extended protection to Jews, Christians, and other minorities.[98] Indeed, Sokolow finds historical precedent for Zionist political aspirations in the Maronite autonomy established in Lebanon after the 1860 civil war.

> The autonomy granted in 1860 to the Christians of the Lebanon, owing to the efforts of England and France, was a scheme very similar to that which Zionism contemplates for the Jews in Palestine. The idea was much

> the same as that in the Basle Programme: security, guaranteed by the government of the country and other powers, for a successful settlement and the free development of a particular section of the population.[99]

With this example, Sokolow situates the Basel Program within traditions of extraterritoriality, aligning Zionism with empire rather than the nation-state. In other words, the geographical relocation to the land of Israel does not precipitate a major political-theoretical reorientation; the same conceptual frameworks shape Sokolow's political imagination. In seventeenth-century Amsterdam and twentieth-century Palestine, Jewish political aspirations center on autonomy rather than sovereignty. Contra Ben-Gurion (and Yovel), Sokolow takes Jewish Amsterdam as a point of origin not to elevate the state as the telos of Jewish modernity but to align Zionism with the very political formations whose legitimacy Spinoza denied.

Klatzkin: Refusing the Despotism of the State

Perhaps because Klatzkin was not strongly identified with a given ideological camp, his attack on "the deification or idolatry of the so-called 'total state'" seldom registers in contemporary scholarship.[100] During his lifetime, by contrast, Klatzkin was a prominent editor and publisher, counting figures including Hayim Nahman Bialik and Martin Buber as interlocutors. Klatzkin served as editor of Zionist periodicals *Die Welt* (1909–11) and the *Freie Zionistische Blätter* (1921–22) and he founded the Eshkol Hebrew publishing house.[101] Even sympathetic readers such as Hugo Bergmann judged Klatzkin's Zionism "extreme" in its insistence on the irrevocability of secularization and the irrelevance of religious values to politics.[102] Although the "extremist" label captures Klatzkin's contrarian penchant, it also risks obscuring the anti-statist thrust of his political thought. Klatzkin attacked traditions that uphold the state as telos and the nation-state as the culmination of the state form. With this critique, Klatzkin parts company with both the liberal and the absolutist Spinoza.

The central contention animating all of Klatzkin's Zionist writing is that, in secularization's wake, the "forms" of rabbinic Judaism can no longer support an autonomous polity in *galut*. Again, Klatzkin advocates formalist politics against the content-based approach (for example, prophetic ideals) of Aḥad Ha'am. The challenge, at this juncture, is to salvage Judaism's "national property, its body: its laws" and recast them in a secular guise.[103] In other words, Zionists must

identify secular, material foundations that can replicate the political function of halakhah. Klatzkin carved out a niche within Zionist circles with the claim that only land and language possess the requisite adhesive force, providing a modern, secular analogue to the rabbinic tradition. "Since the power of our religion has gone away, we have no unifying power other than the unity of land and language."[104] Thus, when Klatzkin proposes an agenda for Zionist organizing, he advocates making the Hebrew language and the land of Israel the central foci for political mobilization.[105] In his more sensationalist formulations, Klatzkin predicts that secular Jews who remain in Europe will be lost to the nation. "The meaning of the term 'Hebrew' will be one whose land is Israel and whose language is Hebrew."[106] Significantly, Klatzkin neglects to mention the state (or any other type of polity) when identifying formal foundations for national independence in a period when halakhah lacks public authority.

This silence reflects Klatzkin's judgment that the state and its temptations constitute a grave danger for Zionism (and for nationalism more generally). Klatzkin's reservations regarding western doctrines of state power color his evaluation of Spinoza, providing yet another reason to reject Spinoza's political thought. To Klatzkin's dismay, Spinoza was a proponent of absolute sovereignty, an early and influential defender of "complete submission to the state's authority."[107] To substantiate the claim that "Spinoza justifies the judgment against himself in his teachings about love of homeland and the citizen's obligation to his state," Klatzkin cites five passages from the *Theologico-Political Treatise* that enjoin unconditional obedience.[108] Klatzkin's verdict on these passages is dismissive, verging on outraged. Klatzkin objects to the "dismal" teachings of a thinker "who taught the individual's subjection to the collective, to the laws of society and state—subjection that is no different from slavery."[109] Impressed by Spinoza's defense of the freedom to philosophize, contemporary scholars have classified Spinoza as a liberal, and thereby claimed a Jewish pedigree for liberalism.[110] In this passage, by contrast, Klatzkin emphasizes the absolutist, authoritarian facets of Spinoza's political thought. "He only permits freedom of thought and expression."[111] But Klatzkin objects equally to the two political traditions—liberalism and absolute sovereignty—that Spinoza can be said to have founded. As a nationalist, Klatzkin scorns well-intentioned liberals who would kill Judaism with kindness. But nationalist convictions also inspire profound suspicion of the state and its totalizing claims.

Klatzkin reserves his most disdainful, incendiary prose for an assault on the liberal "emancipation contract" that threatens to extinguish

Jewish nationality.[112] "Better already Jews without equal rights than equal rights without Jews."[113] Klatzkin rehearses the familiar Zionist objection that emancipation's grant of formal equality proved hollow—Jews renounced national belonging without receiving substantive equality in return.[114] In passages that make for uncomfortable reading, Klatzkin sharpens and radicalizes this critique, attacking the conceptual coherence and practical utility of Zionist adoption of rights discourse. Thus, in a polemical apostrophe to the majority nations among whom Jews reside, Klatzkin requests that they not grant Jews full equality:

> We are foreign—and to the extent that it is within our power we will preserve our foreignness and the barriers between us. We do not want you to extend equal treatment to the members of your nation and the members of our nation: Nor do we demand to take an equal part with you, for complete equality deprives you of many of your national rights and insults our national personality.[115]

Zionists who adopt a consistent stance, Klatzkin explains, do not "demand full equality of rights in its standard meaning," because genuine equality entails the right—indeed, perhaps the expectation—to assimilate into the majority culture.[116] Against those who press European nations to deliver on the unrealized promise of equality, Klatzkin demands the "right to remain foreign," by which he intends a staunch insistence on Jewish difference and a studied indifference toward the prevailing political culture.[117] Klatzkin approvingly cites the rabbinic maxim "*dina de malkhuta dina*" (the law of the land is law) as a guide for Zionist politics.[118] Just as earlier generations obeyed gentile law without harboring delusions of political membership, so should Zionists refrain from investing time and energy on political reform in European countries.

Yet Klatzkin cannot dispense with rights altogether. Even in the 1920s, Klatzkin's attitude toward rights was more nuanced than one might expect from his heated denunciations of equality as an insult to Jewish dignity. Rights prove increasingly important after 1933, when Nazi violations of basic human rights pushed Klatzkin to develop a more expansive vision of minority rights as an integral component of Zionist politics. Klatzkin's most developed reflections on the regime commensurate with Zionist convictions are found in "The Present Jewish Question" (1933), a lecture delivered as Adolf Hitler's ascent plunged Zionism into political crisis. Nazism's triumph posed uncomfortable dilemmas for Zionism, in Klatzkin's view, because it

threatened to irreparably tarnish all forms of nationalism. Against Zionists tempted to place an optimistic construction on Nazi antisemitism—for example, Nazism recognizes Jewish nationality (albeit through negation) and pierces assimilationist delusions—Klatzkin cautions that Nazism only portends ill. Rather than repent of nationalism, however, Klatzkin works to insulate legitimate nationalism from the Nazi perversion, which he calls "state nationalism." Hitler's German nationalism "is caught in the conception of a fanatical state nationalism that demands the complete unity, even congruence, of the national citizen [*Volksbürger*] and the state citizen [*Staatsbürger*], in a Hegelian-inspired deification of the state."[119] As this passage reveals, Klatzkin yokes two analytically distinct tendencies under the heading of "state nationalism." First, state nationalism views the state as an end in itself, betraying profound misunderstanding of the state's historical significance. Ideally, the state should be ephemeral, "an educational transitional stage of human society."[120] Second, those who inflate the state's historical and spiritual significance posit the nation-state, in which there is a total congruence between ethnos and demos, as the perfection of the state form. Here, the worries that surfaced in Klatzkin's exegesis of Spinoza take concrete form as the "despotism of the [German] state" tramples basic Jewish rights.[121]

To pry legitimate nationalism away from the exclusionary regime with which it is increasingly associated, Klatzkin outlines a comprehensive program for Jewish politics that relies heavily on strategies (for example, minority rights) familiar from the multinational polities of eastern Europe. At this crisis moment, equal rights, national minority rights, and the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine are "three demands that form a unit."[122] Here, civic equality is the non-negotiable bedrock of any polity: "Civic equality is one of the most elementary legal norms, which is bound to no requirement other than civic duties and cannot be diminished by ethnic or racial foreignness."[123] Moreover, Klatzkin contests the notion that national minority rights are "privileges" bestowed at the majority's caprice.[124] In keeping with his nationalist convictions, Klatzkin welcomes "borders" between majority and minority nations, but they must be mutually advantageous and willed by both parties.[125] To ensure that the boundaries delineating minority nations remain egalitarian, the state must denationalize. Unlike state nationalism, whose "theoretical foundations . . . preclude any understanding of the right to life of a national minority," legitimate nationalisms do not seek expression at the state level.[126] Thus, Klatzkin calls for a sharp separation between civil and national affairs:

> The powers of the state must not extend to national concerns. Just like the separation of state and religion, the separation of state and nation must also be accomplished; just as the state was secularized, deconfessionalized, it must also be denationalized, one might also say, secularized and desacralized as a community of interests . . . . In any case, the status of state citizen need not coincide with the status of national citizen. They are two spheres which can coexist despite inevitable frictions.[127]

To combat the state despotism "that threatens the survival of most lands and peoples," national movements must resist the temptation to conflate citizenship with national membership.[128] In short, the Nazi state provides an instructive—because grossly exaggerated—example of the dangers of unitary regimes such as the nation-state.[129]

Klatzkin's recipe for a non-despotic state—based on secularization and separation—is liable to sound "liberal" to contemporary ears. Without denying that Klatzkin may be thinking of American doctrines of church-state separation, I would argue that Dubnovian autonomism is another, more proximate source. Dubnow distinguishes the state, which he classifies as an "external community" from the "spiritual community" of the nation—with the result that the state can encompass multiple nationalities.[130] "The Jew who lives a life of peace and quiet in his fatherland, can well be an English, French, or German patriot and can, at the same time, be a true and devoted son of the Jewish nationality."[131] As if citing Dubnow, Klatzkin asserts that "A German, French, etc. state citizen need not be a German, French, etc. national citizen."[132] Restoring Klatzkin to the autonomist orbit helps us grasp the nationalist motivations behind his call for separation. Klatzkin uncouples nation and state not to impose a neutral civic identity but to allow multiple nationalities to flourish. "Once a state recognizes the civic rights of the Jews," Dubnow argues, "it must also recognize their national rights."[133] In a similar vein, Klatzkin demands that Jews be incorporated into European polities as state rather than national citizens. "In countries where Jews live in significant numbers, these dividing lines must be drawn in the form of national minority rights and enshrined in international law."[134] Here, Klatzkin's intellectual and practical debt to eastern European thought becomes apparent. The minority rights framework provides Klatzkin with regime templates that avoid both the denationalizing pressures of liberalism and the totalizing tendencies of the nation-state.

The demand to give multinationalism formal expression via legal guarantees and constitutional design is incumbent upon Zionists themselves. Although Klatzkin neglects to provide a detailed

blueprint, he does offer a cursory sketch of a multinational regime for Palestine. In the 1920s, Klatzkin already betrayed acute awareness of Palestine's heterogeneous population, which he glossed as multinational (as opposed to multi-religious). Thus, in "The Arab Question or the Jewish Question?," Klatzkin contests the Zionist reliance on international diplomacy and argues on moral grounds against accepting a hypothetical British grant of hegemony.[135] The Jewish people, "which demands minority rights in the lands of the diaspora," Klatzkin contends, "may not use the ruling power of a minority against the majority."[136] Rather than ally with the British, Klatzkin argues, Zionists should honor Arab nationalism and form a regional alliance with emerging national movements. In 1933, the challenge of reconciling robust national creativity with civic equality pushes Klatzkin to a more concrete statement regarding regime design. Having defended minority rights as a requirement of justice in European countries, Klatzkin extends the analysis to Palestine, whose multinational population is incompatible with the nation-state form:

> It should be self-evident that our quest for a Jewish homeland must likewise be guided by these lines of thought—for example, with regard to the Arab nationality [*Volkstums*] in Palestine—and that Zionism in its ideological foundations, to say nothing of its real possibilities, is incompatible with the conception of a national state, with a total unity of nation [*Volk*], land, and state.[137]

For reasons principled and practical, Klatzkin contends, Zionists must opt for a multinational regime. Significantly, Klatzkin proposes the same political template for Europe and Palestine—that is, for all countries in which national diversity is an established fact. Indeed, one might wonder why Klatzkin remains invested in the establishment of a homeland in Palestine, if Jews there will live under the same regime that he proposes for Europe. As if anticipating this objection, Klatzkin denies that minority rights alone could alleviate the predicament of an interterritorial nation like the Jews, whose "zig-zag line" of distribution consigns them to the status of an oppressed minority in every European country.[138] Unlike diaspora nationalists, Klatzkin upheld territorialization as a remedy for the Jews' "anomalous" status.[139] Although Klatzkin rejects the diasporic thrust of Dubnow's political ideology, his own political thought—in its broad conceptual outlines—exhibits greater affinities to Dubnow than to Spinoza.

Conclusion

I have unpacked theoretical commitments motivating Spinoza's Zionist critics in an effort to challenge regnant assumptions about nationalism, sovereignty, and the sources of non-sovereign political imagination. The reflexive equation between nation and state led previous scholars to prematurely conclude that, as Zionists, Sokolow and Klatzkin must have embraced Spinoza's political doctrines. Yet the depth of their opposition refutes commonplaces about the categorically "negationist" and sovereigntist complexion of Zionist thought. For Sokolow and Klatzkin, Zionism does not constitute a radical break from and rejoinder to lachrymose ghetto existence. Rather, they seek to preserve the national autonomy that Jews have historically enjoyed by establishing it on territorial foundations in Palestine. Although Sokolow and Klatzkin despair of Jewish national autonomy in Europe, they articulate the demand for political independence in the land of Israel in a language that bears a diasporic imprint. This excursus into the corpus of Hebrew writing on Spinoza should help us to develop a more nuanced account of Zionist political thought, especially with respect to concepts such as exile, sovereignty, and the nation-state.

This exercise in intellectual history also has normative implications, challenging contemporary nostrums about the sources of non-sovereign political thought. In recent years, political theorists have begun to envision freedom, agency, and subjectivity without recourse to stock tropes of sovereignty.[140] Theorists of non-sovereign agency often draw inspiration from Jewish figurations of exile.[141] Yet theorists who mobilize "exile" and "diaspora" as counterweights to the sovereign paradigm have drawn almost exclusively from French- and German-Jewish thought—consigning eastern European voices to theoretical oblivion.[142] The French and German sources that have emerged as familiar touchstones reflect the experience of Jews as a religious minority in nation-states. Working within the context of the nation-state, contemporary theorists mobilize German Jewish thought as a solvent of national identity, which they indict as a catalyst to exclusionary violence. These discourses rest on a (false) opposition between diaspora and nation, between nationalism and non-sovereignty. For most contemporary theorists, it is inconceivable that committed nationalists would anatomize the inner workings of and historical conditions for non-sovereign politics.

Hebrew writings on Spinoza, by contrast, confront us with a vision of non-sovereign politics animated by nationalist convictions. Introducing eastern European voices into the critical

conversation changes our sense of the conceivable political-theoretical configurations—because we are challenged to release the reflexive equivalence between nation and state. In other words, the geographical biases that distort contemporary understandings of modern Jewish thought have concrete political implications. Eastern European conceptions of *galut* reflect Jews' standing as a minority *nation*. In this region, nationalism has historically inspired the development of non-sovereign political imaginaries. On the evidence from eastern Europe, non-sovereign modes of political organization flourished under regimes that accorded Jews national standing (instead of treating them as a religious minority). Indeed, the signature move of Spinoza's Zionist critics—the classification of diasporic communities as bona fide polities—expresses staunch nationalist commitments. Convinced that the Jewish nation never ceased to exist, Sokolow and Klatzkin strove to articulate a concept of politics according to which scattered Jewish communities constituted independent polities. The determination to attest an unbroken chain of Jewish self-rule led Sokolow and Klatzkin to reject canonical doctrines of sovereignty. Spinoza is only a "potential" national Jew, according to Sokolow, because he dates the demise of the Jewish nation to the fall of the ancient Hebrew state.[143] Once we understand exile as a concrete political status—as opposed to a spiritual disposition or philosophy of subjectivity—the reflexive association of nationalism with sovereignty is no longer credible.

Against ethical critiques that invest political hope in affirmation of the self's hybridity, Klatzkin and Sokolow confront contemporary readers with the prospect that (Jewish) nationalism can inspire a search for non-sovereign political templates. After Donald Trump, Brexit, and the COVID-19 border closures, declarations of sovereignty's obsolescence in a globalizing world seem premature. At a moment when sovereignty shows few signs of waning, Jewish politics have devolved into a stalemate that pits chauvinistic ethno-nationalism on one side, against ecstatic universalism advanced in the name of justice on the other. Precisely because they resist the binary oppositions animating current ideological configurations, the traditions that I have excavated offer a more powerful rejoinder to hegemonic assumptions of modern western political thought. Without demanding that we interrupt, disenchant, or abandon powerfully felt national attachments, eastern European Jewish thought offers a historically grounded demonstration that the nation-state does not exhaust the possibilities for self-determination.

Notes

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1 Nahum Sokolow, *Barukh Shpinozah u-zemano* (Paris, 1928/29), 367.
2 Ibid., 362–63.
3 Sokolow, *Barukh Shpinozah*, 362–63. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are mine.
4 "Kahal" designates the autonomous Jewish community of the medieval and early modern periods, or in some cases, the community's leadership council.
5 For Spinoza's theory of sovereignty, see Jonathan Havercroft, *Captives of Sovereignty* (Cambridge, UK, 2011).
6 For example, that Zionism "aimed to solve the Jewish problem by means of the restoration of Jewish sovereignty in Palestine." See Ben Halpern, *The Idea of the Jewish State* (Cambridge, MA, 1961), xiii.
7 Michael Brenner, *In Search of Israel: The History of an Idea* (Princeton, 2018); Dmitry Shumsky, *Beyond the Nation-State: The Zionist Political Imagination from Pinsker to Ben Gurion* (New Haven, 2018); David Myers, "Rethinking Sovereignty and Autonomy: New Currents in the History of Jewish Nationalism," *Transversal* 13, no. 1 (2015): 44–51; Noam Pianko, *Zionism and the Roads Not Taken: Rawidowicz, Kaplan, Kohn* (Bloomington, IN, 2010).
8 Malachi Hacohen, *Jacob and Esau: Jewish European History Between Nation and Empire* (Cambridge, UK, 2019), 15.
9 Gershon David Hundert, "Re(de)fining Modernity in Jewish History," in *Rethinking European Jewish History*, ed. Jeremy Cohen and Moshe Rosman (London, 2014), 133–46.
10 Israel Bartal, "From Corporation to Nation: Jewish Autonomy in Eastern Europe 1772–1881," *Jahrbuch des Simon-Dubnow-Instituts* 5 (2006): 17–31.
11 Klatzkin, who studied with Cohen and wrote in German, arguably occupies a more complicated cultural-geographical location. Without denying Klatzkin's immersion in German philosophy, I amplify his eastern European influences. Here, I follow Joseph Klausner, *Filosofim ve-hoge de'ot* (Jerusalem, 1956), 145: "Klatzkin is essentially a Hebrew writer not a German writer." For the political significance that Klatzkin ascribed to eastern Jewry, see Jakob Klatzkin, *Teḥumim* (Berlin, 1925), 50–51, 91.

12 For early iterations of this topos, see Danny Gutwein, "Bikoret 'shlilat ha-galut' ve-hafratat ha-toda'ah ha-yisra'elit," in *Kinus u-pizur, be-hokrah le-Yosef Gorny*, ed. Eliezer Ben-Rafael (Jerusalem, 2009), 201–19.

13 Ella Bauer, *Between Poles and Jews: The Development of Nahum Sokolow's Political Thought* (Jerusalem, 2005).

14 Yotam Hotam, *Modern Gnosis and Zionism: The Crisis of Culture, Life Philosophy, and Jewish National Thought* (New York, 2012); Gideon Katz, "Bein khilayon kosmi le-teḥiyah le'umit: Iyyun be-haguto shel Jakob Klatzkin," *Da'at* 63 (2008): 131–46.

15 Simon Ravidovitch, ed., *Sefer Sokolow* (Jerusalem, 1942), 183.

16 Daniel B. Schwartz, ed., *Spinoza's Challenge to Jewish Thought: Writings on His Life, Philosophy, and Legacy* (Waltham, MA, 2019); Jan Eike Dunkhase, *Spinoza der Hebräer* (Göttingen, 2013); Daniel B. Schwartz, *The First Modern Jew: Spinoza and the History of an Image* (Princeton, 2012); Paul Mendes-Flohr and Steven L. Weinstein, "The Heretic as Hero," *Jerusalem Quarterly* 7 (1978): 57–63.

17 Schwartz, *First Modern Jew*, 4.

18 David Novak, *Zionism and Judaism: A New Theory* (Cambridge, UK, 2015); Warren Zev Harvey, "Spinoza's Counterfactual Zionism," *Iyyun* 62 (2013): 235–44; Jacob Adler, "The Zionists and Spinoza," *Israel Studies Forum* 24, no. 1 (2009): 25–38; Steven B. Smith, *Spinoza, Liberalism, and the Question of Jewish Identity* (New Haven, 1997); Leo Strauss, "Progress or Return? The Contemporary Crisis in Western Civilization," *Modern Judaism* 1, no. 1 (1981): 17–45; S. Daniel Breslauer, "Baruch Spinoza: What Manner of Zionist?," *Hebrew Studies* 18 (1977): 127–31; Shlomo Pines, "Histabrut ha-tekumah shel medinah yehudit lefi Yosef Ibn Kaspi ve-lefi Shpinozah," *Iyyun* 14 (1964): 289–317.

19 Benedictus de Spinoza, *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley, 2 vol. (Princeton, 2016), 2: 124.

20 Yirmiyahu Yovel, *Spinoza and Other Heretics*, 2 vol. (Princeton, 1989), 1: 197. See also Smith, *Spinoza, Liberalism*, 204.

21 Yovel, *Spinoza and Other Heretics*, 197.

22 Schwartz, *Spinoza's Challenge*, 124.

23 On this point, see Schwartz, *First Modern Jew*, 124.

24 Ben Zion Dinaburg, "Mevasrei ha-ẓiyonut," in *Sefer ha-ẓiyonut*, 2 vol. (Tel Aviv, 1938), 1: 90.

25 Sokolow, *Barukh Shpinozah*, 98, 142, 187.

26 Jakob Klatzkin, *Barukh Shpinozah: Ḥayav, sefarav, shitato* (Tel Aviv, 1953), 50.

27 Joseph Klausner, *Me-Aplaton ad Shpinozah: Masot filosofiyot* (Jerusalem, 1955), 329.

28 Ibid., 328. See also 295–96, 319, 328, 340. To the best of my knowledge, Klausner never calls Spinoza a "Zionist," though he does relate an anecdote about Leo Pinsker's discovery of the relevant passage from the *Theologico-Political Treatise*, which supposedly convinced Pinsker of the possibility of establishing a Jewish state.

29 Ibid., 328.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 In foregrounding Zionist reservations about Spinoza, I follow Daniel Schwartz, who captures the profound ambivalence that colors Spinoza's Zionist reception. See Schwartz, *First Modern Jew*, 114. Building on Schwartz's work, I probe the substantive disagreements about foundational political concepts (for example, sovereignty) that account for this ambivalence.
33 Following Myers, "Rethinking Sovereignty," I position "autonomism" and "autonomy" as counterweights to sovereignty.
34 Simon Rabinovitch, *Jewish Rights, National Rites: Nationalism and Autonomy in Late Imperial and Revolutionary Russia* (Stanford, 2014), 250.
35 Simon Dubnow, *Nationalism and History*, ed. Koppel S. Pinson (Philadelphia, 1958), 330.
36 Lucy S. Davidowicz, *The Golden Tradition: Jewish Life and Thought in Eastern Europe* (Boston, 1968), 57.
37 Dubnow cites Klatzkin in his encyclopedia entry on "Jewish Autonomy." Edwin Robert Anderson and Alvin Saunders Johnson, ed., *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, 15 vol. (New York, 1931–32), 8: 391–94. Dubnow and Klatzkin presumably traveled in similar circles in 1920s Berlin. In those years, Klatzkin oversaw the publication of the *Encyclopedia Judaica* (working in conjunction with Nahum Goldmann). The prepublication sample volume and the *Encyclopedia* itself both featured an essay on "autonomy" written by Dubnow. For Dubnow's contributions to the *Encyclopedia Judaica*, see Arndt Engelhardt, "Palimpsests and Questions of Canonisation: The German-Jewish Encyclopedias in the Weimar Era," *Journal of Modern Jewish Studies* 5, no. 3 (2006): 301–21. For the literary milieu in which Dubnow and Klatzkin likely crossed paths, see Simon Rabinovitch, "The Dawn of a New Diaspora: Simon Dubnow's Autonomism, from St. Petersburg to Berlin," *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook* (2005): 267–88.
38 Interestingly, this theme is less prominent in Dubnow's own (comparatively brief) writing on Spinoza. In his survey of seventeenth-century Amsterdam, Dubnow notes the extensive autonomy enjoyed by the community council (*mahamad*). When relating the story of Spinoza's excommunication, however, Dubnow glosses the conflict as one that centers on freedom of thought rather than sovereign vs. autonomist conceptions of politics. Dubnow does not hesitate to draw nationalist conclusions from Spinoza's plight, but again, they surround the nation's ability to encompass competing and controversial schools of thought rather than the conditions for diasporic self-rule. Shimon Dubnov, *Divrei yemei am olam* (Tel Aviv, 1957), 519–22. An excerpt from Dubnow's capsule summary appeared alongside entries by Sokolow and Klatzkin in a 1932 festschrift marking the three hundredth anniversary of Spinoza's

birth. Siegfried Hessing, ed., *Spinoza dreihundert Jahre Ewigkeit: Spinoza Festschrift 1632–1932* (Den Haag, 1962).

39 Klatzkin, *Barukh Shpinozah*, 51.
40 Sokolow, *Barukh Shpinozah*, 1–2; see also p. 19, 63, 96, 352, 366.
41 Ibid., 142.
42 Klatzkin, *Barukh Shpinozah*, 51.
43 Sokolow, *Barukh Shpinozah*, 142.
44 Spinoza, *Collected Works*, 142–43.
45 Sokolow, *Barukh Shpinozah*, 142.
46 Ibid., 144.
47 Ibid. Contemporary scholars have demonstrated that Sokolow's characterization closely echoes the self-understanding of Amsterdam Jews, who defined the kahal as a polity, republic, or commonwealth. Anne O. Albert, *Jewish Politics in Spinoza's Amsterdam* (London, 2022). Indeed, Albert contends that Spinoza's peers pioneered the concept of the diasporic Jewish community as state-like, a conception whose twentieth-century career this article traces.
48 Sokolow, *Barukh Shpinozah*, 258, 259, 266, 277.
49 Ibid., 266, 268.
50 Ibid., 354.
51 Ibid., 353.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., 355.
54 Ibid., 356.
55 Ibid., 354.
56 Ibid., 353.
57 Klatzkin, *Barukh Shpinozah*, 22.
58 Ibid., 23.
59 Klatzkin, *Teḥumim*, 77.
60 Klatzkin, *Teḥumim*, 54. Klatzkin alludes to Midrash Eichah Rabbah 1:28.
61 Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, "Exile within Sovereignty: Critique of 'The Negation of the Exile' in Israeli Culture," in *The Scaffolding of Sovereignty: Global and Aesthetic Perspectives on the History of a Concept*, ed. Zvi Ben-Dor Benite, Stefanos Geroulanos, and Nicole Jerr (New York, 2017), 393–420.
62 Christoph Schmidt, "Sof ha-derekh, o ha-shelav ha-aḥaron shel hitnatkut ha-dimyon meha-meẓiyut be-odisiyah shel ha-post ẓiyonut." *Mi-karov* 16 (2005): 36–47, at 37, 44; Arthur Hertzberg, *The Zionist Idea* (Philadelphia, 1997), 315; Shalom Ratzaby, "The Polemic about the 'Negation of the Diaspora' in the 1930s and Its Roots," *Journal of Israeli History* 16, no. 1 (1995): 19–38, at 27.
63 Klatzkin, *Teḥumim*, 45, 59, 67, 68, 69, 75, 81.
64 Ibid., 54.
65 Ibid., 47.
66 Ibid.
67 Klatzkin advocates a formalist orientation in opposition to the content-based approach of Aḥad Ha'am and his cultural Zionist disciples.

68 Klatzkin, *Teḥumim*, 49.
69 Ibid. For the "state within a state" topos, see Jacob Katz, *A State Within a State: The History of an Anti-Semitic Slogan* (Jerusalem, 1969).
70 Klatzkin, *Teḥumim*, 49, 65.
71 Ibid., 94.
72 For Dubnow's Zionist reception, see Israel Bartal, "The Legacy of Dubnov and Eastern European Jewry in Israeli Scholarship," *Jewish Quarterly Review* 112, no. 2 (2022): 218–23.
73 Klatzkin, *Teḥumim*, 75. For the critique of diaspora nationalism, see also p. 117, 160.
74 Nahum Sokolow, *History of Zionism: 1600–1918*, 2 vol. (London, 1919), 1: 194.
75 Bauer, *Between Poles and Jews*, 17; see also p. 65–66.
76 Ibid., 74.
77 Ravidovitch, *Sefer Sokolow*, 285.
78 Sokolow, *History of Zionism*, 17; see also p. 26.
79 For Sokolow's messianism, see Arieh Saposnik, *Zionism's Redemptions: Images of the Past and Visions of the Future in Jewish Nationalism* (Cambridge, UK, 2021), 75–111.
80 Sokolow, *History of Zionism*, 17–18.
81 Ibid., 17.
82 Ibid., 16.
83 Ibid., 18.
84 Ibid., 181.
85 Ibid., 205.
86 Ibid., 252.
87 If Sokolow embraced great power politics, Klatzkin was a fierce critic of Zionism's devolution from a "people's movement" to "a matter for diplomacy." See Klatzkin, *Teḥumim*, 157. Klatzkin's opposition to reliance on international diplomacy was motivated by a moral critique of imperialism, as well as an insistence on Jewish self-reliance.
88 Arie M. Dubnov, "On Vertical Alliances, 'Perfidious Albion,' and The Security Paradigm: Reflections on the Balfour Declaration Centennial and the Winding Road to Israeli Independence," *European Judaism* 52, no. 1 (2019): 67–110.
89 Sokolow, *History of Zionism*, 17.
90 Ibid., 33.
91 Ibid., 307, 310.
92 Ibid., xxiv–xxv.
93 Ibid., xxv. See also Brenner, *In Search of Israel*, 91–92.
94 Sokolow, *History of Zionism*, xxviii.
95 Ibid., xxiv.
96 For Sokolow's liberal imperialism, see Saposnik, *Zionism's Redemptions*, 99.
97 Sokolow, *History of Zionism*, 308.
98 Ibid., 311.

99 Ibid.
100 Jakob Klatzkin, *Die Judenfrage der Gegenwart* (Vevey, 1935), 20.
101 Hotam, *Modern Gnosis and Zionism*, 123–24; Arndt Engelhardt, "To 'Fish from the Pearls of the Jewish Spirit': The Cultural Agenda of the Eschkol Publishing House," *Naharaim* 12, no. 1–2 (2018): 31–56.
102 Hugo Bergmann, "Le-she'alat le'umiyut Yisra'el," *Miklat* (1922): 14–26.
103 Klatzkin, *Teḥumim*, 83.
104 Ibid., 65.
105 Ibid., 84–85. Klatzkin's political essays, which are written in a highly self-conscious, allusive literary Hebrew, enact these programmatic statements. Gideon Katz, "In the Eye of the Translator: Spinoza in the Mirror of the Ethics' Hebrew Translations," *Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy* 15, no. 2 (2007): 39–63; Oded Schechter, "Ha-muḥlat shel Auschwitz ve-Shpinozah: Ha-kod ha-metafisi-ontologi shel ha-ḥiloniyut ha-le'umit," *Mi-ta'am* 1 (2005): 97–120; Schmidt, "Sof ha-derekh"; Franz Rosenzweig, *Franz Rosenzweig: His Life and Thought* (Philadelphia, 1953).
106 Klatzkin, *Teḥumim*, 61.
107 Klatzkin, *Barukh Shpinozah*, 22.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid., 22–23.
110 Lewis Feuer, *Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1987); Smith, *Spinoza, Liberalism.*
111 Klatzkin, *Barukh Shpinozah*, 22.
112 Klatzkin, *Die Judenfrage*, 23.
113 Ibid., 28.
114 Klatzkin, *Teḥumim*, 91.
115 Ibid., 72.
116 Ibid., 86, 73.
117 Ibid., 86.
118 Ibid., 87, 95.
119 Klatzkin, *Die Judenfrage*, 13.
120 Ibid., 19.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid., 35.
123 Ibid., 20.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid., 21.
126 Ibid., 13.
127 Ibid., 19.
128 Ibid., 20.
129 Klatzkin's opposition to the nation-state also found expression in internationalism, with which he consistently aligned Zionism. Klatzkin, *Die Judenfrage*, 17–18: "All nationalism loses its legitimacy unless it is subordinated to the idea of an international community." See also p. 36.
130 Dubnow, *Nationalism and History*, 110.

131 Ibid., 109.
132 Klatzkin, *Die Judenfrage*, 19.
133 Dubnow, *Nationalism and History*, 110.
134 Klatzkin, *Die Judenfrage*, 30.
135 Sokolow's scant remarks on "the Arab Question" take the form of banal platitudes about cooperation and friendly relations. Echoing liberal imperialist tropes, Sokolow enlists the Jews—"being themselves a combination of East and West"—for a civilizing mission that will restore the region's former glory via the introduction of modern amenities. See Sokolow, *History of Zionism*, 300–1.
136 Klatzkin, *Tehumim*, 149. Perhaps because he was a critic of Aḥad Ha'am, Klatzkin is not usually associated with the Zionist left. However, a German version of this essay was published as "Zeitfragen II: Araber- oder Judenfrage in Palästina?," *Freie Zionistische Blätter* 3 (1921): 1–15 alongside works by prominent leftists (Hans Kohn, Hugo Bergmann, Nahum Goldmann).
137 Klatzkin, *Die Judenfrage*, 21.
138 Ibid., 33.
139 Ibid.
140 Sharon Krause, *Freedom Beyond Sovereignty: Reconstructing Liberal Individualism* (Chicago, 2015).
141 Peter E. Gordon, *Migrants in the Profane: Critical Theory and the Question of Secularization* (New Haven, 2020); Seyla Benhabib, *Exile, Statelessness, and Migration: Playing Chess with History from Hannah Arendt to Isaiah Berlin* (Princeton, 2018); Judith Butler, *Parting Ways: Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism* (New York, 2012); Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, *Exile and Binationalism: From Gershom Scholem and Hannah Arendt to Edward Said and Mahmoud Darwish* (Berlin, 2012).
142 The exception are scholars working in the region. Balázs Trencsényi et al., *A History of Modern Political Thought in East Central Europe*, 2 vol. (Oxford, 2018), vol. 2.
143 Sokolow, *Barukh Shpinozah*, 142.

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