Female Representation: Between Selection Processes and Partisan Quotas.

Abstract:

Scholars disagree about the way candidate selection processes affect women’s representation. While some argue that primaries benefit women candidates, other claim the opposite. I test the effect of selection procedures on female representation and find primaries to benefit it. I caution, however, against concluding that democratic selections are beneficial. I argue that party leaders are aware of primaries’ negative effects and they offset them by adopting partisan protective mechanisms. Therefore, controlling for partisan protective mechanisms will unveil the negative effect of primaries on female representation. Using party level data from eight legislative terms of the Israeli Knesset I find support for my hypotheses.
Female Representation: Between Selection Processes and Quotas.

In the primary system, selectors select people they are fond of, without any ability to weigh in and balance the whole list. This results in lists that present too few women (Yair Sheleg, "The best systems", NRG, 2015)

Introduction

Women are still underrepresented in parliaments around the world. By February, 2015 the average percentage of female legislators in single or lower house legislatures was 22.4% (IPU). While country level predictors of female representation, such as electoral systems and culture have been examined extensively, scholars also started to pay attention to party-level characteristics. Indeed, many believe parties function as gatekeepers when it comes to women's representation. Among other party-level characteristics, such as a party's ideology or its share of women activists, scholars hypothesized that the way parties select their candidates—candidate selection procedures—has an effect on female representation. However, scholars disagree about the nature of the effect. While some argue that democratized intra-party candidate selection processes are better at securing women's descriptive representation, and selection via party elite hampers it, others claim just the opposite: that selection via inclusive democratized procedures disadvantages women and decreases representation.

This paper, adds to our scholarly focus on party level characteristics and their effect on women's representation by asking whether and how intra-party candidate selection processes affect women's descriptive representation. I hypothesize that democratized selection procedures are disadvantageous for women candidates and therefore, first look at how variation in selection processes relates to women's descriptive representation. Yet, I find inclusive selectorates to be positively associated
with women's representation, such that parties that use primaries have party slate that represent women to a better extent than parties that use restrictive party elite to select the list.

However, I caution against concluding that democratic selections are beneficial for female representation. I argue that party leaders, especially in closed list PR systems, in which pressures to present a representative list are strong, are aware of the negative effect of democratized candidate selection processes. When party leaders anticipate the adverse negative effect of primaries on female representation, they may adopt partisan protective mechanisms such as quotas or reserved places to better balance the party ticket and improve women's representation. In a sense, if democratized selection procedures such as primaries remove decision making process over list composition away from party leaders, party-level protective mechanisms, such as quotas and reserve seats invest power back at the hands of the leadership. As such, these two institutions might be substitutive, such that when primaries fail to allow a representative list, protective mechanisms enable it.

Thus, when testing the effect of selection processes on female representation one needs to account, and take into consideration, the adoption of protective means such as party-quotas and reserved places. Under this scenario, what derive the seemingly positive relationship between primaries and female representation might not be the selection procedures itself, but rather the protective mechanisms party elite adopts in anticipation of democratic selections' negative effect. Indeed, once I control for the existence of such protective mechanism, the effect of candidate selection procedure either does not exist or becomes negative, indicating that selection via primaries hampers, not improves, female representation.
I examine the effect of intra-party candidate selection processes on female representation, as well as the effect of party level protective mechanisms using data on Israeli parties. Israeli parties exhibit great variation in the way they select their lists ranging from a democratic primary in which all party members vote, to an extremely exclusive selection via a party leader. This cross-party variation enables me to empirically test the effect of selection processes on female representation. Moreover, no national legislative gender quota is in effect in Israel, and in fact the only protective means to improve gender representation are rooted in voluntary party rules. This creates variation with regards to the other main independent variable—protective mechanisms—such that some parties use them while others do not. Candidate selection processes are a party level characteristic and necessitates analysis at the party level. Examining cross-party variation in female representation while focusing on a single country enables me to hold constant various factors that have been hypothesized to affect female representation, for example the electoral system. What is more, the close list nature of Israeli electoral system plays a crucial part in my theoretical argument as it explains why party leaders worry in light of the primaries' negative effect and why they advocate the adoption of party-level protective means such as quotas.

The paper proceeds as follow: the first section delineates the main determinants of female representation, differentiating national, individual and party level characteristics. I also present the controversy in the literature concerning the effect of intra-party candidate selection processes on women's descriptive representation. In this section I also present my argument concerning the effect of democratic selection processes and how it is offset by the introduction of corrective mechanism. The third section present the research design and data, to be followed by
the results section, which includes both a quantitative analysis and a survey of the adoption of partisan protective mechanisms in Israel. The last section concludes and provide insights for future research.

**Determinants of women's representation**

Scholarly work on the factors that impact women's representation is rich and elaborate. While scholars differentiated various facets of the concept of representation and examined determinants of substantive and symbolic representation (Franceschet, Krook and Piscopo, 2012; Krook, 2009) it is the concept of descriptive representation that receives the greatest scholarly attention. This is partially due to the ease with which descriptive representation data is collected and analyzed. Notwithstanding the facet of representation scholars study, they offered various typologies for the determinants of women's representation. Thus, Krook (2009) differentiates systemic institutions (e.g., electoral systems) from practical institutions (such as selection processes), and normative institutions (e.g., political culture and norms of equality). Others classified the factors that explain female representation using the level at which they operate. For example, Wängnerud (2009) differentiates among macro-level variables (such as the electoral system, socioeconomic conditions, and political culture), meso-level factors (such as party ideology and party organization) and micro-level determinants (e.g., voter preferences or female motivation to become a candidate).

I follow Wängnerud's footsteps and shortly present some of the main determinants of descriptive representation, while differentiating the level at which they operate at. At the macro level I discuss a country's electoral systems, political culture and national gender quotas as the main factors that affect female representation. At the micro level I shortly mention how female's motivation to run as
candidates affect the percentage of women elected for national parliaments. But, it is the party level that is the main focus of the paper. I, therefore, present party level characteristics such as ideology, candidate selection processes, and partisan protective mechanisms as detrimental for female representation. While this review is far from exhaustive (for a fuller overview of women's representation determinants see: Wängnerud, 2009), it provides the main building blocks for the main hypotheses of this paper, which are also presented.

One of the major explanation for women's representation relates to a country's electoral systems. Voluminous research theorizes and empirically studies how variation in electoral rules affect the number and percentage of women elected into parliament. Generally speaking one can distinguish three electoral systems' aspects that affect female representation: district magnitude (M), proportional (PR) versus plurality rules, and ballot type (closed-partisan versus open-personal).

Scholars argue that the zero sum game nature of single member districts (SMD) hampers female representation, as it means that by nominating a female candidate in a district all male candidates are blocked. On the other hand, the non-zero sum nature of multimember districts allows party leaders and voters the possibility to elect female representatives (Rule, 1987, Engstrom, 1987). In addition, smaller district magnitudes exacerbate the personal nature of the competition which requires candidates to rely more heavily on resources that favor male over female candidates such as organizational ties, economic means, personal characteristics, media exposure and even incumbency (Lawless and Fox, 2010).

While District magnitude has been regarded as one of the pillar factors to affect female representation, some scholars challenge the idea that multi-member districts help women's representation. Welch and Studlar (1990) provide evidence
from the U.K. and the United States that multi-member plurality electoral rules facilitate female representation in only a small number of cases, while Matland (1993) criticizes methodologically the findings that district magnitude help female representation and argues they are spurious in light of Scandinavian countries.

In addition to district magnitude, it has been argued and empirically established that PR systems promote greater female representation than plurality electoral rules (Diaz, 2005; Wängnerud, 2009; Norris, 2006, Matland, 1998). To begin with, districts are larger in proportional systems than in plurality (often single member) systems. In addition, it has been argued that in PR systems female candidacy is perceived as a lower risk compared to plurality contests and parties are under greater pressure to present a representative list (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler, 2005; Lakemam, 1994; Norris, 1985; Kittilson-Caul 2006; McAllister and Studlar, 2002). Matland and Studlar (1996) explain the gender gap across proportional and plurality electoral systems with the notion that representational contagion across parties in the same constituency is more likely to occur in PR systems and the cost of accommodating these incentives are lower in such systems. While most scholars advocate the superiority of PR systems in facilitating women's representation, Salmond (2006) argue that previous research overstated the effect of electoral systems on female representation.

The difference between open-personal and closed-partisan ballots constitutes the last mechanism through which electoral systems impact the percentage of female legislators. A partisan list is perceived to be beneficial for women candidates as they minimize the reliance on personal characteristics and financial resources. Indeed Ellis (2012) argues that the difference within PR systems between personal and partisan vote affect female representation. Specifically, she advocates a conditional
relationship between ballot types—whether voters are allowed to pick a candidate—and culture norms. Thus, when cultural views regarding women in traditional roles are prevalent, there is a negative effect for intra-party preference voting on female representation. The open nature of the ballot type means voters will rely more heavily on personal characteristics rather than partisan attachments when voting. Chief among these personal characteristics is the sex of the candidate. But, since cultural norms are traditional, it is likely that voters will view negatively the "women" characteristic. Selectors, who anticipate this negative effect will consequently adapt their selection and will place fewer female candidates on the party's slate.

As is evident in Ellis research (2012) political culture is an additional central macro-level determinant of women's descriptive representation. When talking about cultural effect on women representation we usually refer to the society's beliefs, values, attitudes and perceptions on gender roles and their impact on female representation (O'neill and Stewart, 2009; Diaz-Mateo, 2005; Norris and Ingelhart, 2001; Lawless and Fox, 2010; Wängnerud, 2009). In addition to the negative effect of traditional cultures on female representation, some scholars argue that the unique political culture of Nordic countries accounts for their relative high levels of women's representation (Norris, 1987, but see: Matland, 1994).

National gender quota laws constitute an additional macro-level variable that affect descriptive female representation (Jones, 1998, Schwindt-Bayer, 2009). Gender quota laws have been argued to contribute about 10% increase in women's representation (Htun and Jones, 2002). It has been argued that the effect of gender quotas depends on numerous factors among which their structure and whether they include placement mandates (Schwindt-Bayer, 2009); whether they include specification concerning rank ordering (Dahlerup, 2007) or existence of sanctions for
noncompliance (Baldez, 2007; Schwindt-Bayer, 2009; Murray, 2004). Broader factors such as the political culture (Caul, 1999; Meier, 2004) and the electoral systems in which quotas are implemented (Jones, 1998; Fréchette, Maniquet and Morelli, 2008) have also been hypothesized to affect the way quotas enhance female representation.

Micro level variables, such as voters’ preference and women's motivation to present themselves as candidates also affect the percentage of women elected to national legislatures (Wängnerud, 2009). For example, the existence of gender gap in voting, and the evidence that women support female candidates to a greater extent than male voters (Box-Steffensmeier, De-Boef and Lin, 2004; Banducci and Karp, 2000) have been linked to descriptive representation.

Besides macro and micro level predictors, meso—party level—variables have also been hypothesized to affect the degree to which women are represented in parliament. A party's ideology has been linked to its tendency to recruit and nominate female candidates. It is argued that leftist parties are more conducive for female candidacy as its ideology favors gender equality. These arguments have been presented in literature that discusses party leadership selection (Dittmar 2013; O’neill and Stewart 2009; Bashevkin, 2010; Wauters, 2012) as well as candidate selection (Caul, 1999; Matland and Studlar, 1996; Matland, 1993). Lovenduski and Norris (1993) on the other hand claim left ideology's effect on female representation is not as strong.

Party activists, journalists and even scholars often call for adoption of democratic intra-party candidate selection processes. They assert primaries enhances voters’ efficacy levels, improves political participation, and ultimately advance better political representation. However, some scholars cast doubt on this optimistic view, and specifically on the degree primaries—arguably the most democratic candidate
selection procedure—improve representation in general and female representation in particular. Focusing on the effect of the procedures by which parties determine their candidates on women's representation is relatively under-developed compared to the plethora of scholarly attention given to other determinants. Nonetheless, a controversy emerged in the literature revolving which type of selection mechanism fosters female representation. On the one hands, some argue that primaries are beneficiary, while selection via a small group of party elite disadvantages women. On the other hands, other scholars contend that usage of primaries hinders female representation, while employing a restrictive procedure by a small group of party elite is beneficiary.

Empirically, scholars found that primaries help advance women politicians. Wauters (2012) finds that usage of primaries, i.e., inclusive leader selection processes are better for female representation, while Baldez (2007) finds that in the three largest parties in Mexico in the PR tier, the primaries produce lists that exceeded the minimum 30% requirements prescribed by the gender quota law. Concurrently, scholars argue selection via a restrictive small group of party elite hurt women's likelihood of getting nominated, the main reason being that the male dominated selectors tend to nominate likeminded similar candidates to themselves and this outgroup effect (Niven, 1998) is exacerbated when selection processes are exclusively controlled by male dominated party leaders (Verge, 2010). Indeed Kittilson-Caul (2006) argued that once women break the sealing, and enter into party leadership positions, they formulate formal party rules to enhance and secure female representation. Nonetheless, since the vast majority of party elites are male, the outgroup effect will hinder female representation when selection is conducted via restrictive manners.
Whereas some scholars claimed primaries are beneficial while selection via party elite is detrimental for female representation, others argued exactly the opposite. Rahat, Hazan and Katz (2008) argue for a tradeoff between selectorate inclusiveness and the representativeness of the party's ticket. They maintain that the more inclusive the selectorate is the lower the representation of underrepresented group is. There are several reasons for primaries' disadvantage: first, coordination across a large heterogonous selectorate is difficult, as voters do not know who is likely to win and strategies, like package deals, are less likely to occur (Hazan and Rahat, 2010; Rahat, 2009). Second, some argue that primary selection requires and favors candidates with financial resources (Hinojosa, 2012), and those who are well known among the amorphous selectorate. Primaries also increase the influence of local monopolies of power and the reliance on networks and the media (Hinojosa, 2012). These requirements favor and promote men over women candidates (Poiré, 2002). Lawless and Pearson (2008) on the other hand, do not find women to win less primary races in the United States, but rather argue that women face greater primary competition than men do—a fact that might explain female underrepresentation in the American Congress. Third, Hinojosa (2012) argues that primaries are disadvantageous for women as they require women to self-nominate themselves, an act women feel less comfortable doing. Lastly, Hinojosa (2012) argues that personal characteristics, among which gender stereotypes, may be used by primary voters to distinguish among candidates, since party identification is constant across all candidates from the same party, and therefore cannot be used to differentiate among them.

Not only do scholars hypothesize primaries to be unfavorable to female representation but they also claim selection via party elite might be beneficial to it. Indeed, in the U.S.A. context some scholars did not find support for the assertion that
male dominated party elite discriminate against female candidates (Darcy, Welch and Clark, 1994). It has been argued that restrictive selection procedures allow party leaders the ability to control the procedures and open, if they so wish, the race for female candidates (Caul, 1999, Matland and Studlar 1996). Similarly, Hazan and Rahat (2010) argue that small selectorates are better able to balance representation. Matland (1993) argues that one of the ways to explain differences in the effect of district magnitude on female representation between PR systems, the U.K. and U.S.A. relies on candidate selection processes. Specifically, he supports the assertion that as M increases the party's desire to balance the ballot, then in those PR multi-member systems where party leaders control selection, the closed nature of the processes will foster female nomination: "The elite may be more sympathetic to demands for greater representation than the public as a whole. Therefore, it may be easier to establish equal representation principles when only elites need to be convinced" (Matland 1993, 750-751). Hinojosa (2012) argues that exclusive selectorates are beneficial for women as they diminish the need to self-nominate—a need that characterizes, according to Hinojosa, primary procedures—and which is far easier for male to fulfill. When party leaders cherry-pick candidates, they are in a better position to choose women and promote female representation. Some justified the argument that selection via party elites is better for female representation, using the rationale presented by scholars on the effect of electoral systems on women's representation. Thus, it has been argued that similar to the arguments about electoral rules' impact, women prefer loyalty to the party than running primary campaigns based on clientalistic goods or personal reputations (Escobar-Lemmon and Tylor-Robinson, 2008). In this paper I do not address selections' level of centralization, although few scholars have argued that centralized procedures are more favorable for female representation (Castles, 1981; Norris, and Lovenduski, 1995; Leijenaar, 1993; Hinojosa, 2012; Kernel, 2008). While some parties in Israel use both centralized and decentralized procedures, none uses a solely decentralized procedures, and since
It seems most scholars consider primaries to be disadvantageous for women and party elite to benefit them. Yet, it is evident scholars disagree about the hypothesized effect of intra-party candidate selection procedures on female representation. What is clear from the literature is that while scholars present theoretical arguments that go both ways, rarely do they put these hypotheses to an empirical test. This paper amends this lacuna, by directly testing if selection procedures affect female representation, and if so in what way. Do primary benefit women and promote their representation, or do they hinder it by providing high obstacles for female candidates to surpass. I, as most of the literature, hypothesize that candidate selection processes will reduce female representation.

H1: parties that use inclusive selection processes will have less representative lists in terms of gender, compared to parties that use exclusive selectorates.

Partisan protective mechanisms, such as partisan quotas and partisan reserve seats are an additional party-level characteristic which might affect female representation. Partisan quotas are voluntary gender quotas parties adopt. They can vary within a country across the different parties that adopt them, and in effect in a single country, at a certain point in time, one party might voluntarily adopt a 40% quota, while the other might adopt none. Party level quotas were first adopted by the left Scandinavian parties (Krook, 2009), and have witnessed an increase since the 1990s, when parties in France, Sweden, Israel and Nicaragua adopted them (Jones, 1998). Party level reserved seats are position on the party's list that are reserved for a female representative had one did not win it or a better slot on the party's banner. Thus, if the most MKs are selected at the national level in each party, I regard all parties' selection processes as centralized. Thus, I have no variation on this dimension and cannot examine its effect of female representation.
7th slot was reserved for a female candidate, and no woman obtained slot 1 till 7, inclusive, then the female candidate who received the highest number of votes will be advanced to the 7th place. On the other hand, if a female candidate won the second place, no usage of the 7th place reserved seat will be made.

I hypothesize that the adoption of partisan protective mechanisms enhance female representation.

H2: parties that adopt partisan protective mechanisms will exhibit better female representation of their list, compared to parties that use exclusive selectorates.

In focusing on the meso—party level—determinants of female representation, I argue that indeed only by appropriately controlling for both selection procedures as well as partisan protective mechanisms, can one identify the effect of each on female representation. This is especially true for the Israeli system. Israel's electoral system (closed list PR with large district magnitude) incentivizes party leaders to balance their list and ensure a genderly representative party slate (Matland, 1993). If, as I hypothesize, the adoption of inclusive selection processes hampers party elites' ability to ensure a representative list, they will adopt partisan protective means to maintain the control and ability to balance the list (see: Shapira et.al., 2013) for a similar argument). I therefore hypothesize

H3: when parties are incentivized to present a balanced list, if selection processes are conducted via primaries, party elites will adopt partisan protective means to gain control and ensure a representative list.
Research design and data

Kittilson-Caul's analysis (2006) reveals within country variation, which needs to be explained by party level characteristic. To test the hypotheses of this paper, I focus, therefore, on a single case study—Israel—and examine cross-party variation in female representation. I explain this variation using the three meso level predictors presented in the literature review: intra-party candidate selection processes, partisan voluntary protective means, and party ideology. By using parties as the unit of analysis, and confining the analysis to one single country, I am able to control for national level confounding factors, such as electoral systems and political culture, and focus on the effect of selection procedures and protective mechanisms on women's representation.

I chose to use Israel for several reasons: first, Israeli parties exhibit great variation in their selection processes and their tendency to adopt protective mechanisms for ensuring representation. This variation enables me to test my hypotheses. Second, Israel's closed list PR system with its district magnitude of 120 should, according to research, incentivize parties to present a balanced list (Matland, 1993). Therefore, to the degree parties adopted primaries which, as I hypothesize, challenge the party's ability to balance its ticket, party leaders will be incentivized to adopt partisan quotas and reserved seat to ensure representation. Third, there is no gender quota law in Israel a fact that helps me control for an additional confounding factor. I, therefore, examine the effect of selection processes and partisan protective mechanisms on female representation at the party level, while examining eight consecutive legislative terms for the years 1988 till 2015. Figure 1 presents the number of female Knesset Members elected in each of the 20th Legislative terms Israel had thus far. As clearly can be seen, there is an upward trend in female
representation, stemming partially from the prominence feminist perspective received over the years, the relentless activities of women’s organizations, and the changing cultural norms in society.

**Figure 1 about here**

Rahat, Hazan and Katz (2008) also examined the effect of inclusive selectorates on female representation in Israel\(^2\). However, my research adds to theirs in several respects: to begin with, the analysis presented by the authors is descriptive. Rahat, Hazan and Katz (2008) present the Women Winning Index and the Women Ranking Index in each of the three categories of the selectorate variable, failing to consider a multivariate analysis of other potential confounding factors that might affect female representation such as party ideology or religiosity. I remedy this, by providing a multivariate analysis. Secondly, the authors fail to take into consideration the effect of partisan protective measures (such as partisan gender quotas and partisan reserved places) on parties’ representation indices. In what follows I account for the existence of such protective mechanism, and discover that once I control for their effect, inclusive selectorates hamper female representation.

I operationalize the outcome variable—female representation—using the two party level measures introduced by Rahat, Hazan and Katz (2008)\(^3\). Thus, I calculated for each party in a given Knesset the Index of Representation (IR), which measures the percentage of female candidates placed in realistic positions. Similar to Rahat, Hazan and Katz (2008) I operationalize realistic positons as the number of seats the party won in the previous election. Equation 1 presents the formula for the IR measure.

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\(^2\) In fact I use their measures of Women Winning Index and Women Ranking Index as the dependent variables in the current study, as will be elaborated below.

\(^3\) See also: Hazan and Rahat (2010).
The second party level measure for women representation—Weighted Index of Representation (WIR)—weighs the index of representation by the relative positioning of women on the party's list. In other words, it gives scores for each position, such that women who are placed on higher positions, are given higher values. Each position on the list (up to the number of realistic seats) is given a value in descending order, and the Index of representation is therefore weighted by the values a party received, out of the total possible values (i.e., in case all candidates up to the realistic position were women).

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WIR = \frac{\sum W_p V_{pi}}{\sum R_p} * 100
\]  

Where, \( W_p \) is the value of the positions won by female candidates, \( V_{pi} \) is the total number of values had all realistic positions were filled with female candidates and, \( R_p \) is the number of realistic positions

Thus, if a party's realistic position equals 4, \( V_{pi} \)—the total number of values the party could have received had all its list were female—would have been 1+2+3+4=10, where 1 point is awarded for a female in the 4th position and 4 points awarded to a female in the first spot. Imagine a party, which nominated 2 female candidates, one in the first and one in the last position. Then \( W_p \)—the value of the positions won by women—equals 1 (for the fourth place) + 4 (for the first place) and the party's Weighted Index of Representation would have been: 5/10 * 100= 50% (Hazan and Rahat, 2010).
My main predictors—candidate selection processes and protective mechanisms—are also measured at the party level within each legislative term. I specifically examine the effect of the selectorate—the body of people who is eligible to take part in the selection of candidates—on women's representation. I operationalize selectorate using a three category variable, where 0 signifies selection via the most exclusive selectorate: via a small group of party elite, 1 stands for selection via party delegates (e.g., a party's central committee or convention), and 2 represents selection via the most inclusive method, i.e., primaries.

Partisan protective mechanisms were coded as two dichotomous variable whereby the first—quota-reserve—equals 1 is the party used either partisan quotas or partisan reserved seats at the legislative session examined, and the second variable—quota-dummy—only measures whether a party employed a partisan quota or not.

To follow the main findings in the literature, I also control for a party's ideology. Specifically, I include two measures. First, I control for ideology with a three category variable that differentiates left parties (-1) from center parties (0) from right wing parties (+1). Second since in the Israeli political context, the religious dimension plays a crucial role, and since scholars have discovered religiosity to affect female representation (Norris and Inglehart, 2004), I also control for whether the party is defined as a religious or a secular party. The inclusion of a party's ideology and religiosity also helps overcome a hypothetical spurious relationship between selection procedures and female representation. If a party's ideology and religiosity status affects not only its decision to nominate female candidates in realistic positions, but

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4 As mentioned in footnote 1, since no party uses a fully decentralized procedure and since nearly all Knesset Members as selected at the national level, I do not test the effect of centralization of selection procedures on female representation, and regard all parties' selection procedures as centralized.

5 Note that religious parties refer to both Jewish and Muslim parties.
also its decision to adopt democratic primaries, then failing to control for this potential third variable, might lead one to find a correlation between selection procedures and female representation, which might be spurious. By including these variables in the analysis I am able to demonstrate no such spuriousness.

Since temporal variation in parties' tendency to nominate candidates exists, I use fixed effects to account for the 8 Knesset terms I examine in the paper (1988 till 2015), where the 2003-2006 legislative term constitutes the reference group. Lastly, I use clustered standard errors around sessions to account for the non-independence of parties within the same legislative term and the possibility of contagion across them (Matland and Studler, 1993).

Unfortunately, political leaders have no incentives to publicly acknowledge and declare they use protective mechanisms to improve upon the collective choice made by their party members in the primary process. Therefore, I need to use anecdotic evidence to support my third hypothesis that party elites adopted protective mechanisms to counter the adverse effect primaries have on female representation. To this end I describe the progression of the adoption of partisan gender protective mechanisms. The historical survey demonstrates that parties that adopted primaries concurrently adopted quotas and reserved seats, and that almost all parties that adopted primaries used these protective mechanisms. It further illustrates that female candidates, who competed in primary contests often needed to utilize the protective mechanism to gain a final position on the party's list, that would win them a seat in the Knesset.

**Results**

Table 1 presents the results of six models, where the first three models uses the Index of Representation (IR) as the outcome variable, and the last three columns
present models where the weighted index constitutes the outcome variable. The first model for each of the outcome variables does not include a control for the existence of partisan protective mechanisms, the second model for each outcome includes a the quota-reserve variable, which measures whether a party employed either a quota or a reserve seat mechanism (or both), and the third columns for each outcome variable, include the quota-dummy control, which indicated whether a party employed a partisan quota or not.

As can be seen from Table 1, when one does not take into consideration the existence of partisan protective mechanism, it seems the effect of the inclusiveness of the body of selectros who chooses the party's candidate is positive. Specifically, it seems selection via democratic primaries enhances female representation as more female candidates are selected to realistic list places. This is especially true for the IR measure, where the coefficient of primaries is positive and statistically significant at the 0.1 level (for the weighted model, the positive point prediction does not gain statistical significance). Disregarding partisan protective means, one would then conclude that democratized selection procedures, which ensure the participation of a wide and diverse selectorate, are beneficiary for female representation.

Table 1 about here

However, as the rest of the models in Table 1 reveal, one should not examine the effect of selection processes on representation without concurrently controlling for the existence of partisan protective mechanisms or lack thereof. Once I control in the analysis of the existence of partisan quotas or partisan reserve seats (or both), we clearly see that whereas the protective mechanisms fulfill their purpose and greatly enhance women's representation, primaries' effect is negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
Thus, we find support for H2. Specifically, the existence of partisan quotas or reserved seats increases the Index of Representation by 15% and the Weighted Index of Representation by 12.5% holding all other variables constant. Controlling for these protective mechanisms exposes the true effect of democratic selection procedures on female representation, as primaries reduce the Index of Representation by 9.5% (significant at the 0.05 level) and the Weighted Index by 9.7% (significant at the 0.1 level), holding all other covariates constant. When we control only for the existence of partisan quotas, we see the same results, whereby the quota enhances female representation, while primaries hinder it. Thus, I conclude that once we control for partisan protective mechanisms we discover that using democratic selection procedures that allow an inclusive amorphous selectorate to take part, hamper female's ability to get nominated to realistic position on Israeli parties' tickets. I, therefore, find support for H1.

Interestingly, in the Israeli context, while the effect of a party's religiosity is clear, a party's ideological stance does not bear an impact on female representation, controlling for other predictors. Thus, while in all the models presented in Table 1, being a religious party reduced indexes of female representation by a magnitude of 8% to 9.5% and all results are statistically significant, the effect of a party's ideology is only significant and in the hypothesized direction in one model. In the other five models, it seems leftist parties do not nominate women candidates to a greater extent than right parties, holding all other variables constant.

The analysis thus far supports the first and second hypotheses. Thus, we find that the adoption of partisan protective mechanisms enhances female representation, and that once we take into consideration the adoption of such mechanisms, the separate impact of inclusive selection procedures is negative. And specifically,
primaries impede women from being nominated to realistic positions on the parties' lists. The fact that selection's effect on female representation is positive, if one does not control for protective mechanisms, and is negative when one does control for them, is the result of a strong positive correlation between selection procedures and adoption of partisan protective mechanisms: Kendalls' Tau-b correlation is 0.65. This correlation supports hypothesis 3. Indeed I argue in the third hypothesis of the paper that party leaders, being aware of primaries' adverse effect on female representation, will adopt the protective mechanisms to re-gain control and ability to ensure a representative list. In what follows I shortly describe the adoption of protective mechanisms by Israeli parties, while emphasizing how they coincided with the adoption of primaries.

**Historical progression of partisan protective mechanisms in Israel**

As mentioned before, Israel did not legislate a national female quota law, and left the decision of whether to adopt protective mechanisms or not to parties' discretion. Indeed through the 1970s, most Israeli parties did not adopt official protective mechanisms (Shapira, et. al., 2013)\(^6\). By the 1970s left parties started to adopt (though not always implement) protective mechanisms, for example Mapam party determined, prior to the 1973 elections, that one position out of the eight realistic positions will be reserved for a female candidate (Shapira, et. al., 2013), while Labour decided prior to the 1977 elections to adopt a 20% quota, and specifically to nominate 10 women in the first 50\(^{th}\) realistic positions\(^7\).

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\(^6\) Requests, though, to adopt an official partisan quota were apparent during this time period, for example in 1955 Female Mapai's activists demanded an official 25% quota. Needless to say this request was not accepted.

\(^7\) Since most female candidates were placed low on the party's list, only three Labour female MKs were elected.
During the 1980s we see mixed strategies with regards to adoption of partisan protective mechanisms. Thus, while Labour put on hold its 20% quota prior to the 1981 and 1984 elections (Goldberg and Hoffman, 1983), Mapam, by 1988 improved its efforts as it reserved one out of the first four positions to women. Nonetheless, Mapam only won 3 seats in the 1988 elections, resulting in no female MK from Mapam. Most other parties during this time period did not adopt any partisan quotas or reserved seats, for example, Mafdal continued not to utilize any protective mechanism and neither did Raz and Likud.

By 1992 Labour, decided to adopt primaries to select its Knesset's list. Concurrently, it decided to lift the suspension on its partisan gender quota and place a 10% quota. Specifically it ensured one female candidate in every tenth place, with a reserve seat mechanism for positions 9, 18, 27 and 37 (Shapira, et. al., 2013). Labour continued to constitute a 10% quota prior to the 1996 elections (Golan and Hermann, 2005), where in the first 40 positions of the party's list positions 9, 18, 27 and 37 were reserved, again (Ben-David, 2005). Golan and Maor (2006) argue that "had there not been ensured representation, women's representation in realistic places would have been reduced to just one" (1). Likud first adopted party primaries to select their list prior to the 1996 elections, which coincided with their first adoption of female quota: they used a minimum quota of one female representative in every tenth position (Golan and Hermann, 2005)\(^8\). Similar to Likud, Meretz adopt, for the first time, party primaries to select its list for the 1996 elections. Concurrently Meretz reserved three seat for female representation (till the 13\(^{th}\) slot) (Shapira, et. al., 2013).

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\(^8\) Since Likud formed a joint list with Gesher and Tzomet, only positions 16 and 25 were allotted for females at the end.
By 1999 Labour increased the number of reserved seats to 5 positions till the 30th slot, where two women will be nominated in each tenth on the party's ticket. Once again Golan and Maor (2006) argue that only one female Labour MK did not need the protective mechanism to ensure her election. The Mafdal party reserved the eighth position for a female, while Meretz established a rule of three women in the first ten positions, and five women in the first 15 slots, effectively adopting a 30% quota (Golan and Hermann, 2005). Note that Meretz selected its candidates prior to the 1999 elections via its central convention and its council and no women needed to use the partisan protective mechanism to get elected. Indeed Meretz elected four female MKs of the ten seats it won, which was above the 30% quota (Golan and Hermann, 2005). Likud maintained its 10% quota and reserved positions 10, 20, 30 and 35 for female candidates. Hadash also used a quota, whereby three out of the first ten positions will be reserved for women, but they failed to adopt a reserved seat mechanisms that guarantees women be positioned in realistic slots (Shapira, et. al., 2013).

By 2003 Labour party allotted two positions for female representatives in the first tenth, one woman in the second tenth and two women in the third and fourth tenth, respectively. While prior to the 1999 Knesset Mafdal reserved the eighth position for a women, and since it received only five seats no women was elected from Mafdal, prior to the 2003 elections, Mafdal reserved the fifth position for a female candidate. Likud continued to employ its one every tenth position minimum quota, reserving spots 11, 21, 31 and 36 for women (Barzilai, 2002), and Meretz maintained its 30% quota by deciding to ensure at least one woman is positioned till the fifth slot, three women till the tenth, and four women till the twelfth. Other parties, that did not employ primaries, like Shinui, did not adopt protective mechanisms to
ensure female representation. Nonetheless, Shunui was able to elect 3 females out of the 15 representatives it won.

Prior to the 2006 elections, Meretz improved its quota from 30% to 40% whereby the third and fifth position for every five places were reserved for female candidates (Shapira, et. al., 2013). Mafdal continued to reserve the fifth position, and Likud determined that positions 10, 20, 24 and 29 will be reserved for women. Labour reserved positions 5, 9, 12 and 15 for female candidates (NRG, 2006). Other parties such as Kadima and Yisrael Beytenu did not use any protective mechanisms.

Meretz and Likud maintained their protective mechanisms prior to the 2009 elections, whereby Meretz used a 40% quotas and Likud enforcing its 10% quota (each party with the same reserved positions as it used in 2006). Labour also continued to use a 20% quota (Shapira, et. al., 2013). On December, 17th 2008, Kadima selected its list for the 2009 elections using primaries for the first time. They concurrently adopted partisan protective mechanisms and reserved positions 22 and 27 for women (Shapira, et. al., 2013). Similarly, Balad—an Arab party—decided to reserve one out of every three seats for a female candidate (Rofe-Ophir, 2008).

Prior to the 2013 elections, Labour continued to use the 20% quota, reserving positions 5, 9,14,19,24, and 29 for female candidates (Labour Party, 2012), while Likud continued to reserve positions 10, 20, 24 and 29 for women. The Jewish Home party used primaries for the first time to select its list and concurrently adopted protective mechanisms to ensure female representation, whereby the 4th and 8th positions were reserved for female candidates (Shapira, et. al., 2013).

The historical progression of the protective mechanisms' adoption, the facts that many times their usage temporally coincided with the adoption of primaries and that almost all parties that adopted primaries used partisan protective mechanisms
facilitate the possibility that party leaders anticipated the adverse effect of primaries
on female representation, and reacted accordingly. Face value, if party elites believed
primaries to be a democratic tool that facilitates and enables female representation,
they need not have adopted these protective measures. However, party leaders, having
been incentivized to present representative lists (especially as the actions of women's
organizations in Israel, such as Naamat and Wiso, intensified) and realizing primaries' 
harmful impact, opted to use protective mechanism to ensure their own control over
the list, and guarantee a 'sufficient' number of female representatives.

Furthermore, as is evident from the historical review above, female MKs in
parties that used primaries often needed to take advantage of their party's protective
mechanisms to ensure their election. Golan and Maor (2006) argues that based on the
fact that many female MKs from parties that utilized primaries owe their elections to
the protective mechanism parties adopted further indicate that "women had difficulty
competing in the primaries with incumbents, i.e., better connected and wealthier male
candidates" (1). As oppose to the reliance of female candidates who compete in
primaries on protective mechanisms, when selection occurred in more restrictive
processes, for instance in Meretz prior to the 1999, the protective mechanisms the
party adopted were not needed, and women were able to get nominated to realistic
positions by themselves, and get elected into parliament.

Conclusions

Areła Golan—a candidate from Strong Israel, a party that did not cross the
threshold—told in an interview about female representation in Israel that the
primaries are a kind of a reality show contest. They hinder female representation
because "the minute the media does not like someone, there is no equal opportunity;
the minute the candidate doesn't have a lot of money to spend on the primaries, there
is no equal opportunity” (Walla, 2008). During the same broadcast said Michal Yudin—founder of WePower (an organization in Israel devoted to helping women gain political power)—that party leaders need to stop pushing women further down the party' list into non-realistic positions, that give them slim chances of getting elected (Walla, 2008). Indeed politicians, reporters, female activists, parliament-members and even scholars disagree over the usefulness of primaries—arguably the most democratic candidate selection procedure—for female representation. While some believe male dominated party elites block women and primaries assist their representation, others claim quite the opposite: that primaries impede women's representation, while party elites, given they are incentivized to present a representative list, can promote female candidates easily.

In this paper, I test how intra-party candidate selection processes affect female representation. I hypothesize that inclusive candidate selection processes, and especially primaries will put greater barriers for women's representation. I use Israeli parties which exhibit cross-party variation in the way they select their lists to test how the manner by which they select affect the representativeness of their lists. I found, that if one does not take into consideration the existence of protective mechanisms, it seem inclusive-democratized selection processes are beneficial for female representation. However, I caution that we cannot test the effect of selection procedures without controlling for the existence of partisan protective mechanisms such as quotas. If parties that use primaries also adopt protective mechanisms, and if these protective mechanism positively affect women's representation, then the seemingly positive relationship between inclusive selectorates and female representation might be spurious. True enough, once I control for the existence of partisan protective mechanisms the true nature of selections' effect on women's
representation unveils: primaries reduces female Indexes of Representation. The correlation between selection processes and partisan protective mechanisms, as well as the historical progression of their adoption in Israel anecdotally support the argument that party leaders anticipate the undesirable impact primaries have on female representation, and consequently they opt to use partisan protective mechanisms.

The main conclusion of this paper is that while primaries seem to be a more democratic processes they are certainly not so with respect to women's representation. What is left to study in future research is what characteristic of the primary system hinders female representation: is it indeed the coordination issue, or is it the characteristic and resources required from a primary candidate to win the selection contest that hinders female representation.

Furthermore, while my analysis found protective mechanisms to benefit female representation, and even enable it in cases parties select via primaries, some politicians, reporters and even scholars argue for the uselessness of protective means such as partisan quotas. Gershoni (2015) argued that the various protective mechanisms, "terns the primaries' 'democratic celebration'…into a sad farce".

Interestingly, in Labour's primaries prior to the last elections (held in March 17th, 2015), Labour selected 3 female candidates in the first 10 list positions (+Zipi Livni), without needing to use the reserved seat mechanism (additional 3 women entered the list's realistic positions via protective mechanisms, totaling six women candidates in the first 20 positions and 8 female MKs that were finally elected from the Labour party). Ayelet Shaked from the Jewish Home party was also selected to the party's second position (came first in the primaries) without having to rely on partisan's protective mechanisms. But, while Labour's and maybe the Jewish Home's
primary results might challenge this article's conclusion that primaries hinder female representation, Likud's primaries results for the 2015 do not. Likud's list included only 3 female representatives in the first 20 list positions, and only one female was selected to the first ten positions after the primaries were held. Netanyahu was well aware of the list's underrepresentation and he used his authority to nominate a female candidate for position 23.

Indeed, Yael Dayan, a former Labour MK said in an interview that while she is extremely satisfied with the fact that women candidates were selected by their own merit, without needing the usage of protective mechanisms, "it turns out that to reach this moment, we needed a few legislative terms with protective mechanisms, that meant to prove the male chauvinistic public that women belong at the top, equal to male" (Bender, 2015). It will indeed be interesting to examine in the future whether the institutionalization of partisan protective mechanisms facilitates a learning process that eventually renders their own usage unnecessary.

While adopting a selection process that enables a wide inclusive selectorate to take part in determining the party's list might appear to be more democratic and accommodating to women's representation, it seem inclusive selection processes, and specifically primaries, are unfavorable to women. Not only is it easier for a party leader that is so incentivized to ensure a representative list, but the primaries' candidacy qualifications, such as financial resources, media exposure and incumbency disadvantage women candidates. Therefore, if parties decide to use inclusive selection procedures, they must concurrently provide protective mechanisms, in the case those are not specified by national law, to ensure women's representation. Despite primaries' adverse effect on women's representation, appropriately enforced and rightly devised
partisan protective mechanisms offer the opportunity to enhance female descriptive representation.
References


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Figure 1: The number of female Knesset Members in the Knesset 1949-2015.
Table 1: Selectorate and protective mechanisms effect on female representation.

<table>
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<th>Variable</th>
<th>IR No quota</th>
<th>IR Quota reserve</th>
<th>IR Quota dummy</th>
<th>WIR No quota</th>
<th>WIR Quota reserve</th>
<th>WIR Quota dummy</th>
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<td>9.37**</td>
<td>9.77**</td>
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<td>(4.48)</td>
<td>(3.91)</td>
<td>(4.48)</td>
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<td>(4.32)</td>
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<td>(0.98)</td>
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<td>(1.79)</td>
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<td>(2.22)</td>
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** significant at 0.05 level  *significant at 0.1 level