

# On-Line Supplemental Appendix

## Appendix 1: WinBUGS Code

```
cat(" model {for(j in 1:J){
  y[j]~dnorm(y.hat[j], tau.y)
  y.hat[j]<-a[Session_ID[j]]+b.selec[Session_ID[j]]*selection[j]
    +b.opp*opp[j]+b.size*partysize[j]}

  tau.y<-pow(sigma.y, -2)
  sigma.y~dunif(0, 10)
  b.opp~dnorm(0, .001)
  b.size~dnorm(0, .001)

for(s in 1:S){ a[s]~dnorm(g.a.0.hat[s], tau.g.s.0)
g.a.0.hat[s]<-g.a.glob+g.a.ball*ballot[s]+b.pool*Pool[s]+b.vote*Vote[s]
  +b.distm*distm[s]+b.regime*regime[s]+b.unitary*unitary[s]
b.selec[s]~dnorm(g.b.0.hat[s], tau.g.b.0)
g.b.0.hat[s]<-g.b.glob+g.b.ball*ballot[s]}

g.a.glob~dnorm(0, .001) b.pool~dnorm(0, .001) b.vote~dnorm(0, .001)
b.distm~dnorm(0, .001) b.regime~dnorm(0, .001) b.unitary~dnorm(0,
.001) g.a.ball~dnorm(0, .001) tau.g.s.0<-pow(sigma.tau.g.s.0, -2)
sigma.tau.g.s.0~dunif(0, 10) g.b.glob~dnorm(0, .001)
g.b.ball~dnorm(0, .001) tau.g.b.0<-pow(sigma.tau.g.b.0, -2)
sigma.tau.g.b.0~dunif(0, 10)} ", file="yaelmodelee.txt")
```

## Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Party-Level Model

Statistics	Pool	Vote	M	Ballot type	Regime
N	246	246	246	249	249
mean	0.58	1.02	34.22	0.68	0.88
min	0	0	1	0	0
max	2	2	120	2	1
variance	0.61	0.52	2307.92	0.8	0.10
Median	0	1	10.53	0	1

Statistics	Coalition	Party size	Selection	Rice	Weighted Rice
N	249	249	249	241	194
mean	0.43	43.65	4.99	0.94	0.83
min	0	2	1	0.52	0.20
max	1	418	8	1	1
variance	0.25	4551.38	4.9	0.01	0.03
median	0	19	5	0.96	0.89

## Appendix 3: Variables, Measurements and Sources

---

---

Variables, Measurements and Sources	
Rice	Defined as: $RICE_{pj} = \frac{ AYE_{pj} - NAY_{pj} }{AYE_{pj} + NAY_{pj}}, \text{ for party } p \text{ on vote } j. \quad (1)$ where I average across $j$ to get party-level Rice score index. The following specifies the data sources for the country-sessions included in the analysis:  <i>Denmark 94-95</i> : Pre-calculated Rice scores obtained from Jensen (2000).  <i>Australia 96-98</i> : Calculated using data scraped and parsed from the Australian Hansard.  <i>Iceland 95-96</i> : Pre-calculated Rice scores obtained from Jensen (2000).  <i>Chile 97-00</i> : Calculated using data obtained from John Carey's Legislative Voting Project data. ( <a href="http://www.dartmouth.edu/~jcarey/lvdatatable.htm">http://www.dartmouth.edu/~jcarey/lvdatatable.htm</a> ). 2009).  <i>Finland 95-96</i> : Pre-calculated Rice scores obtained from Jensen (2000).  <i>Israel 03-06</i> : Calculated using original data the author gathered  <i>Israel 06-08</i> : Calculated using original data the author gathered.  <i>Canada 94-97</i> : Calculated using data obtained from John Carey's Legislative Voting Project data. ( <a href="http://www.dartmouth.edu/~jcarey/lvdatatable.htm">http://www.dartmouth.edu/~jcarey/lvdatatable.htm</a> ). 2009).  <i>New-Zealand 90-93</i> : Calculated using data obtained from John Carey's Legislative Voting Project data. ( <a href="http://www.dartmouth.edu/~jcarey/lvdatatable.htm">http://www.dartmouth.edu/~jcarey/lvdatatable.htm</a> ). 2009).  <i>New-Zealand 93-94</i> : Calculated using data obtained from John Carey's Legislative Voting Project data. ( <a href="http://www.dartmouth.edu/~jcarey/lvdatatable.htm">http://www.dartmouth.edu/~jcarey/lvdatatable.htm</a> ). 2009).  <i>Sweden 94-95</i> : Pre-calculated Rice scores obtained from Jensen (2000).

*Switzerland 99-03*: Calculated using data obtained from Prof. Simon Hug and Prof. Margit Tavits, with an official approval from the Swiss Parliament<sup>1</sup>.

*Norway 93-97*: Calculated using data obtained from the Norwegian Social Science Data Services<sup>2</sup>.

*Norway 97-01*: Calculated using data obtained from the Norwegian Social Science Data Services.

*Norway 01-05*: Calculated using data obtained from the Norwegian Social Science Data Services.

*U.K 92-97*: Calculated using data obtained from the Firth and Spirling data (Firth and Spirling 2003*a*; *b*).

*U.K 97-01*: Calculated using data obtained from the Firth and Spirling data (Firth and Spirling 2003*a*; *b*).

*U.K 01-05*: Calculated using data obtained from the Firth and Spirling data (Firth and Spirling 2003*a*; *b*).

*Canada 97-00*: Calculated using data scraped and parsed from the Canadian Parliament Hansard.

*Canada 00-04*: Calculated using data scraped and parsed from the Canadian Parliament Hansard.

*Ireland 89-92*: Calculated using data scraped and parsed from the Irish House of Representatives' Hansard.

*Ireland 92-97*: Calculated using data scraped and parsed from the Irish House of Representatives' Hansard.

*Ireland 97-02*: Calculated using data scraped and parsed from the Irish House of Representatives' Hansard.

*Ireland 02-07*: Calculated using data scraped and parsed from the Irish House of Representatives' Hansard.

*Israel 92-96*: Calculated using an original data set the author gathered.

*Israel 96-99*: Calculated using an original data set the author gathered.

*Israel 99-03*: Calculated using an original data set the author gathered.

---

<sup>1</sup>The author thanks Prof. Simon Hug for his help in obtaining the data.

<sup>2</sup>I thank Prof. Martin Hansen for directing my attention to this data source.

*New-Zealand 02-05*: Calculated from party-level voting data obtained from The New Zealand Parliament Hansard.

*Belgium 95-99*: Calculated using data provided by Prof. Abdul G. Noury.

*Poland 97-99*: Calculated using data obtained from John Carey's Legislative Voting Project data (Carey, John. 2009. Legislative Voting Project. <<http://www.dartmouth.edu/~jcarey/lvdatatable.htm>>. 2009.).

*Czech Republic 96-98*: Calculated using data obtained from John Carey's Legislative Voting Project data. <<http://www.dartmouth.edu/~jcarey/lvdatatable.htm>>. 2009.).

*Brazil 02-07*: Calculated using data obtained from Figueiredo and Limongi (Figueiredo and Limongi 2008)<sup>3</sup>.

*Austria 96-97*: Pre-calculated Rice scores obtained from Müller and Marcelo (2003).

*Finland 03*: Pre-calculated Rice scores obtained from Pajala, Jakulin and Wray (2005).

*Czech Republic 98-02*: Calculated using data obtained from Prof. Margin Tavits.

*France 62-67*: Pre-calculated Rice scores obtained from Bowler (2000)

*Germany 53-57*: Pre-calculated Rice scores obtained from Bowler (2000)

*Germany 57-61*: Pre-calculated Rice scores obtained from Bowler (2000)

*Germany 61-65*: Pre-calculated Rice scores obtained from Bowler (2000)

*Germany 87-90*: Pre-calculated Rice scores obtained from Bowler (2000)

*Nicaragua 00*: Calculated using data obtained from John Carey's Legislative Voting Project data (Carey, John. 2009. Legislative Voting Project. <<http://www.dartmouth.edu/~jcarey/lvdatatable.htm>>. 2009.).

*U.S 63-65*: Calculated using Poole and Rosenthal roll call data (<<http://www.voteview.com>>).

---

<sup>3</sup>The author thanks Prof. Scott Desposato for suggesting this data source. I also thank Prof. Limongi for providing the data.

*U.S 93-95*: Calculated using Poole and Rosenthal roll call data (<http://www.voteview.com>).

*Argentina 05-07*: Calculated using data received from Prof. Mark Jones.

#### Weighted Rice

The Average Weighted Rice scores are defined as (similar to Morgenstern (2004)):

$$AWRICE_p = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^n RICE_{pj} * WEIGHT_j}{\sum_{j=1}^n WEIGHT_j}, \text{ for party } p. \quad (2)$$

where  $RICE_{pj}$  is defined as in Equation 1, and  $n$  is the total number of votes. The weight of vote  $j$ — $WEIGHT_j$ —is defined as:

$$WEIGHT_j = 1 - \left| \frac{AYE_j - NAY_j}{AYE_j + NAY_j} \right| \quad (3)$$

The data specified above for the Rice score outcome variable was used to calculate the Weighted Rice score. The number of country-sessions used in the Weighted Rice model is smaller, as for those countries for which Rice score was pre-calculated I was not able to deduce the weights on each vote which measures the degree of its closeness.

## Ballot Access

Uses the index presented in Figure 2 in the paper composed from the electorate and the degree of decentralization. Data was collected from the following secondary sources: Andeweg (2000); Ansolabehere, Hirano and Snyder (2007); Bar (1996); Barnea and Rahat (2007); Baum and Robinson (1999); Bernard (1997); Bille (2001); Carty and Eagles (2003); Carty and Erickson (1991); Catt (1997); Cross (2002; 2004; 2006); De-Luca, Jones and Tula (2002); De-Winter (1988); De-Winter and Dumont (2000; 2006); Deegan-Krause (2006); Deschouwer (1992); Epstein (1967); Erickson (1997); Erickson and Carty (1991); Farrell (1994); Field and Siavelis (N.d.); Frizzell and Pammett (1997); Galligan (1999; 2002); Graham (1986); Hansen and Saglie (2005); Hazan (2002; 2006); Hazan and Voerman (2006); Hopkin (2001); Jaensch, Brent and Bowden (2004); Janda (1980); Johns (2000); Jones (2008); Katz and Mair (1992); Koole and Leijenaar (1988); Kristjansson (2002); Kuitunen (2002); Langston (2008); Leijenaar and Niemoller (1997); Lundell (2004); Marsh (2005); Meseznikov and Gyarfasova (2006); Mikulska and Scarrow (N.d.); Miller (1999); Mitchell (2006); Montabes and Ortega (N.d.); Mulgan (2004); Muller (1994); Navia (2008); Norris and Lovenduski (1995; 1997); Obler (1973; 1974); Ohman (2004); Pammett and Dornan (2001); Pedersen (2002); Quinn (2004); Rahat (2002; 2008); Rahat and Sher-Hadar (1999); Rahat and Sheaffer (2007); Rosenthal and Subrata (1969); Rush (1969); Sayers (1999); Scarrow (1996); Scarrow, Webb and Farrell (2000); Siavelis and Morgenstern (2008); Svanur (2004); Szczerbiak (2001); Thiebaut (1988); Weeks (2007); Wertman (1988); Wiberg (2000); Wuhs (2006); Young and Cross (2002) as well as Rahat's data-set on candidate-selection processes, and Crisp, Escobar-Lemmon, Jones, Jones and Taylor-Robinson (2004) data-set on candidate selection procedures. Data for Nicaragua was obtained via personal communication with Prof. Santiuste (Santiuste, Salvador. {ssanti@usal.es} 2009, March.19. Information concerning Selection Processes in Nicaragua [Personal email]. (2009, March 19)). Data for Argentina 2005 was obtained via personal communication with Prof. Jones (Jones, Mark. {mpjones@rice.edu} 2009, April. 16. Thanks [Personal email]. (2009. April. 16.)). Data for Mexico was obtained via personal communication with Prof. Langston (Langston, Joy. {joy.langston@cide.edu} 2008 November 18. Thank You [Personal email]. (2008, November 18)).

Ballot Type	<p>Measured as the degree to which voters have control over the ballot at the general election day. Codes fixed ballots as 0 when voters cannot change the list. Codes weak preferential ballots as 1 where predetermined list-order is important, but preferential vote can limit its effect. Codes strong preferential ballots as 2 where “preference votes are the sole basis on which individual legislators are chosen” (Karvonen 2004, 207). The variable was coded using Lundell and Karvonen (2003). SMD systems with a single candidate presented to the voters at election stage are classified as fixed ballots 0 since voters may not disturb a “list” at the general election stage. On the other hand, if there is an SMD system where the ballot presents multiple candidate from the same party to the voters, voters might disturb the list, and their preferential vote is the only determinant of the candidate chosen, the ballot type is coded 2. Using this logic for classifying SMD, I classify Mixed Member systems as 0, since the CLPR tier and the SMD tier are both classified as fixed ballots: 0.</p>
Pool	<p>Measures whether a candidate for national office can benefit from electoral support for other candidates in his party, possibly in other districts. It measures whether and at what level the system pools votes to calculate seat allocations. Coded 0 if votes cast are pooled across the whole party to determine the allocation of seats. Coded 1 if votes are pooled at the sub-party level and coded 2 if votes cast for a candidate contribute only to that candidate’s electoral success. Note that this definition (and as oppose to Carey and Shugart (1995)) leads me to classify SMD systems as 2 on the Pool variable because votes in SMD are pooled neither to the party or the sub-party level. I used the Political Particularism Around the World Data set (Seddon, Gaviria, Panizza and Stein 2002), as well as the Electoral Systems and the Personal Vote Data set (Johnson and Wallack 2007).</p>
Vote	<p>Measures “limitations on the number of individuals that voters can support” (Seddon et al. 2002, 12). It is coded as 0 where a voter can cast a single vote for a party, 1 where voters cast multiple votes for candidates who might not be from the same party. I coded electoral systems where voters cast a vote for a local candidate and a vote for a national candidate as 1. A code of 2 identifies systems where voters have a single vote for a single candidate. SMD electoral systems are coded as 2 as voters are given a single vote for a single candidate. This coding stands in opposition to Carey and Shugart (1995)).</p>
District Magnitude	<p>Measures the average district magnitude from the viewpoint of the individual legislator. It is a weighted average of the district magnitudes in a country. The weights are calculated by how many legislators run in districts of each size. Thus, in a country with 50 single member districts, and one 150 member national district <i>District Magnitude</i> will be equal to <math>(150*150+50*1)/200</math> equals to 112.75. Data was obtained from the Political Particularism around the World Data-set (Seddon et al. 2002) and the Electoral Systems and the Personal Vote data-set (Johnson and Wallack 2007).</p>



## Regime Type

Indicates whether the country is a presidential, coded 0, or a parliamentary system, coded 1. The “system” variable in Keefer’s 2006 Database of Political Institutions (DPI) was used. This variable in the DPI data set has 3 codes: 2 signifies parliamentary systems, 1 codes an assembly elected president, and 0 is for presidential systems. Systems with non-elected executives, those scoring a 2 or 3 on the Executive Index of Political Competitiveness in the DPI data set, are classified as presidential systems, coded 0. Countries in which the president is elected directly or by an electoral college (whose only function is to elect the president), in cases where there is no prime minister, are also coded as 0. In countries with both a prime minister and a president, the classification into presidential or parliamentary systems considers the following factors: a) Veto power: can the president veto legislation and does parliament need a super-majority to override the veto? b) Can the president appoint and dismiss the prime minister and/or other ministers? c) Can the president dissolve the parliament and call for new elections? Thus, a country with both a prime minister and a president will be classified as a presidential system if (a) is true or if (b) and (c) are true. Systems where the legislature elects the chief executive are classified as parliamentary, coded 2, with one caveat: in cases where the legislature elects the prime minister but for a fixed period will be classified as presidential systems (0). Thus, although DPI classifies Switzerland a parliamentary, Switzerland is a hybrid type where the prime minister is elected by legislature but for a fixed period. The legislature cannot vote no confidence in the executive. Thus, in this dissertation, I coded it presidential (0).

## Unitary

Measures whether all powers reside in a central sovereign parliament such that power is not shared, coded 0. In federal systems, coded 1, power is divided between one central and several regional governments. I used the Comparative Data Set on Political Institutions (Lundell and Karvonen 2003), and PolityIV (Marshall and Jaggers 2005) as sources for this variable.

## Size

Measures the number of seats the party had in the period examined. Data was collected from Keefer’s 2006 Database of Political Institutions (DPI), Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (2000), the CIA World Fact, Adam Carr’s Election Archive [<http://psephos.adam-carr.net/>], PARLINE database on national parliaments (Inter-Parliamentary Union) [<http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp>], The African Elections Database [<http://africanelections.tripod.com/>], The Election Resources on the Internet Database [<http://electionresources.org/>], The Australian Electoral Commission Election Results Archive [<http://results.aec.gov.au/>], The Knesset Web-Site [[www.knesset.gov.il/](http://www.knesset.gov.il/)], Elections since the Italian Republic Data-set [<http://cronologia.leonardo.it/elezio2.htm>], The United Kingdom Election Results [<http://www.election.demon.co.uk/geresults.html>] and The Statistical Report on the General Elections, 1951 and 1957.

**Coalition**


Measures whether the party was in the opposition, coded 0, or coalition, coded 1, in the period examined. In presidential system, this variable examines whether this is the president's party or not. Most data comes from Keefer's 2006 Database of Political Institutions (DPI), and is supplemented using Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (2000) and the CIA World Fact Book (Central Intelligence Agency. 2009. World Fact Book, 2009. <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>> 2009, Jan. 7).

---

# Appendix 4: Permutations of expected Rice scores


Figure 1 depicts the expected Rice scores in both presidential and parliamentary systems with divergent permutations of the key control variables. Specifically, I present expected Rice scores for both opposition and coalition parties, with size of both 7 (the first quartile of size) and 46 (the third quartile), and for federal countries with an average district magnitude of 1 and average district magnitude of 14. The analysis reveals the results are robust and the conditional hypothesis gains support.

Figure 1: Expected Rice Scores with Different Permutations of the Key Explanatory Variables




## Appendix 5: First Difference

Figure 2 presents the first differences in expected Rice Scores, while letting selection vary from its most restrictive (1) to its most democratized value (8). Specifically, it presents the posterior distribution of these first differences under Fixed Ballot and under permissive electoral systems, in both presidential and parliamentary systems. The First difference figures reveal that in both, presidential and parliamentary regimes, the difference in unity levels of parties that select via restrictive processes and those that use primaries are significantly different from zero (at the 90% level). Moreover, the point prediction is in the hypothesized direction such that parties that select via restrictive selection procedures exhibit higher unity levels compared to parties that select via primaries. For example, parties selecting via restrictive procedures in presidential systems with Fixed Ballot electoral systems will have, on average, 3.4% higher cohesion scores than parties in the same systems selecting by decentralized mechanisms. In parliamentary regimes the picture is similar: the probability that a party that uses restrictive selection procedures will have higher unity levels than a party that uses primaries is 0.95 under permissive electoral systems and 0.86 under Fixed Ballot electoral system. Hence, regardless of electoral systems, parties that use a small group of national party leaders to select their lists, will hold a more unified party voting record compared to parties that select via democratized processes.



(a) Parliamentary Systems



(b) Presidential Systems

Figure 2: First Differences in Expected Rice Score when Selection Varies in Parliamentary and Presidential Systems.

## References

- Andeweg, Rudy B. 2000. Fractiocracy? Limits to the Ascendancy of the Parliamentary Party Group in Dutch Politics. In *Parliamentary Party Groups in European Democracies*, ed. Knut Heidar and Ruud Koole. London: Routledge.
- Ansolabehere, Stephen, Shigeo Hirano and James M. Snyder. 2007. What Did the Direct Primary Do to Party Loyalty in Congress? In *Process, Party and Policy Making: Further New Perspectives on the History of Congress*, ed. David Brady and Matthew D. McCubbins. California: Stanford University Press.
- Bar, Aliza. 1996. *Primaries and Other Methods of Candidate Selection*. Tel-Aviv: Hadekel.
- Barnea, Shlomit and Gideon Rahat. 2007. "Reforming Candidate Selection methods: A Three-Level Approach." *Party Politics* 13:375–394.
- Baum, Julian and James A. Robinson. 1999. *Party Primaries in Taiwan: Trends, Conditions and Projections in Candidate Selection*. Maryland: School of Law University of Maryland.
- Bernard, Andre. 1997. The Bloc Quebecois. In *The Canadian General Election of 1997*, ed. Alan Frizzell and Jon Pammett. Toronto: Dundurn Press.
- Bille, Lars. 2001. "Democratizing a Democratic Procedure: Myth or Reality?: Candidate Selection in Western European Parties, 1960-1990." *Party Politics* 7:363–380.
- Bowler, Shaun. 2000. Parties in Legislature: Two Competing Explanations. In *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, ed. J. Dalton, Russell and P. Wattenberg, Martin. Oxford University Press pp. 157–179.
- Carey, John and Matthew S. Shugart. 1995. "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas." *Electoral Studies* 14:417–439.
- Carty, R., K. and M. Eagles, D. 2003. "Political Organization and Campaigning at the Grass Roots." *Party Politics* 9:539–652.
- Carty, R.K. and Lynda Erickson. 1991. Candidate Nomination in Canada's National Political Parties. In *Canadian Political Parties Leaders, Candidates and Organization*, ed. Herman Bakvis. Toronto: Dundurn Press.
- Catt, Helena. 1997. New-Zealand. In *Passages to Power*, ed. Pippa Norris. Cambridge: Cambridge University press pp. 137–157.
- Crisp, Brian F., Maria C. Escobar-Lemmon, Bradford S. Jones, Mark P. Jones and Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson. 2004. "Vote-Seeking Incentives and Legislative Representation in Six Presidential Democracies." *Journal of Politics* 66(3):823–846.
- Cross, William. 2002. Grassroots Participation in Candidate Nominations. In *Citizen Politics: Research and Theory in Canadian Political Behavior*, ed. Joanna Everitt and Brenda O'Neill. Oxford University Press pp. 373–385.

- Cross, William. 2004. *Political Parties*. Canada: UBC Press.
- Cross, William. 2006. Candidate Nomination in Canada's Political Parties. In *The Canadian Federal Election of 2006*, ed. Jon Pammett and Christopher Dornan. Toronto: Dundurn Press.
- De-Luca, Miguel, Mark P. Jones and María Inés Tula. 2002. "Back Rooms or Ballot Boxes? Candidate Nomination in Argentina." *Comparative Political Studies* 35:413–436.
- De-Winter, Lieven. 1988. Belgium: Democracy or Oligarchy? In *Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics*, ed. Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh. London: Sage.
- De-Winter, Lieven and Patrick Dumont. 2000. PPGs in Belgium: Subjects of Partitocratic Dominion. In *Parliamentary Party Groups in European Democracies*, ed. Knut Heidar and Ruud Koole. London: Routledge.
- De-Winter, Lieven and Patrick Dumont. 2006. Belgium: Delegation and Accountability under Partitocratic Rule. In *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, ed. Muller Wolfgang C. Strom, Kaare and Bergman Torbjorn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Deegan-Krause, Kevin. 2006. *Elected Affinities, Democracy and Party Competition in Slovakia and the Czech Republic*. California: Stanford University Press.
- Deschouwer, Kris. 1992. "Survival of the Fittest: Measuring and Explaining Adaptation and Change of Political Parties." Paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions of Workshops, Limerick, Ireland, 30 March–4 April.
- Epstein, Leon. 1967. *Political Parties in Western Democracies*. New York: Praeger.
- Erickson, Lynda. 1997. Canada. In *Passages to Power*, ed. Pippa Norris. Cambridge University Press pp. 33–55.
- Erickson, Lynda and R.K. Carty. 1991. "Parties and Candidate Selection in the 1988 Canadian General Elections." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 24(2):331–349.
- Farrell, David M. 1994. Ireland: Centralization, Professionalization and Competitive Pressures. In *How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies*. London: Sage.
- Field, Bonnie N. and Peter Siavelis. N.d. "The Genesis of Candidate Selection Procedures in Democratizing Countries: A Framework Applied to Europe and Latin America." Paper Presented at the Meeting of the Congreso de Latinoamericanistas Europeos (CEISAL), Bruselas, 11-14 April, 2007.
- Figueiredo, Argelina and Fernando Limongi. 2008. "CEBRAP Brazilian Roll Call Data Set: 1989-2008."

- Firth, David and Arthur Spirling. 2003*a*. “Divisions of the United Kingdom House of Commons, from 1992 to 2003 and beyond.”  
**URL:** <http://www.warwick.ac.uk/go/tapir/firth-spirling.pdf>
- Firth, David and Arthur Spirling. 2003*b*. “The tapiR package.”  
**URL:** <http://cran.r-project.org/doc/packages/tapiR.pdf>
- Frizzell, Alan and H. Pammett, Jon, eds. 1997. *The Canadian General Election of 1997*. Toronto: Dundurn Press.
- Galligan, Yvonne. 1999. Candidate Selection. In *How Ireland Voted 1997*, ed. Michael Marsh and Paul Mitchell. Westview Press pp. 57–81.
- Galligan, Yvonne. 2002. Candidate Selection: More Democratic or More Centrally Controlled? In *How Ireland Voted 2002*, ed. Michael Gallagher, Michael Marsh and Paul Mitchell. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Graham, B. D. 1986. “The Candidate-Selection Policies of the Indian National Congress, 1952-69.” *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 24(2):197–218.
- Hansen, Bernhard and Jo Saglie. 2005. “Who Should Govern Political Parties? Organizational Values in Norwegian and Danish Political Parties.” *Scandinavian Political Studies* 28:1–23.
- Hazan, Reuven Y. 2002. Candidate Selection. In *Comparing Democracies 2: New Challenges in the Study of Elections and Voting*. London: Sage.
- Hazan, Reuven Y. 2006. Candidate Selection. In *Candidate Selection in Israel: Reality and Ideal*, ed. Gideon Rahat. Josef Sapir Institute for the Study of Society and Economics pp. 13–35.
- Hazan, Reuven Y and Gerrit Voerman. 2006. “Electoral Systems and Candidate Selection.” *Acta Politica* 41:146–162.
- Hopkin, Jonathan. 2001. “Bringing the Members Back In: Democratizing Candidate Selection in Britain and Spain.” *Party Politics* 7:343–361.
- Jaensch, Dean, Peter Brent and Brett Bowden. 2004. “Australian Political Parties in the Spotlight.” Prepared for the Democratic Audit of Australia.  
**URL:** <http://www democratic.audit.anu.edu.au>
- Janda, Kenneth. 1980. *Political Parties: A Cross National Survey*. London: The Free Press.
- Jensen, Torben K. 2000. Party Cohesion. In *Beyond Westminster and Congress: The Nordic Experience*, ed. Knut Esaiasson, Peter Andeidar. Columbus: Ohio State.
- Johns, Gary. 2000. “Party Democracy: An Audit of Australian Parties.” *Australian Journal of Political Science* 35(3):401–425.



- Johnson, Joel W. and Jessica Wallack. 2007. *Electoral Systems and the Personal Vote: Update of Database from Particularism Around the World*.  
**URL:** <http://dss.ucsd.edu/~jwjohnso/espv.html>
- Jones, Mark. 2008. The Recruitment and Selection of Legislative Candidates in Argentina. In *Pathways to Power: Political Recruitment and candidate Selection in Latin America*, ed. Peter M. Siavelis and Scott Morgenstern. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Karvonen, Lauri. 2004. "Preferential Voting: Incidence and Effects." *International Political Science Review* 25(2):203–226.
- Katz, Richard S. and Peter Mair. 1992. *Party Organizations: A Data handbook*. London: Sage Publications.
- Koole, Ruud and Monique Leijenaar. 1988. The Netherlands: the Predominance of Regionalism. In *Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics*, ed. Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh. London: Sage.
- Kristjansson, Svanur. 2002. Iceland: From Party Rule to Pluralist Political Society. In *Party Sovereignty and Citizens' Control: Selecting Candidates for Parliamentary Elections in Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway*, ed. Hanne Narud, N. Pedersen, Mogens and Henry Valen. University Press of Southern Denmark pp. 107–168.
- Kuitunen, Soile. 2002. Finland: Formalized Procedures with Member Predominance. In *Party Sovereignty and Citizens' Control: Selecting Candidates for Parliamentary Elections in Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway*, ed. Hanne Narud, N. Pedersen, Mogens and Henry Valen. University Press of Southern Denmark pp. 63–106.
- Langston, Joy. 2008. Legislative Recruitment in Mexico. In *Pathways to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America*. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University press.
- Leijenaar, Monique and Kees Niemoller. 1997. The Netherlands. In *Passages to Power: Legislative Recruitment in Advanced Democracies*, ed. Pippa Norris. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lundell, K. 2004. "Determinants of candidate selection- the degree of centralization in comparative perspective." *Party Politics* 10:25–47.
- Lundell, Krister and Lauri Karvonen. 2003. "A Comparative Data Set on Political Institutions."
- Marsh, Michael. 2005. Parties and Society. In *Politics in the Republic of Ireland*, ed. John Coakley and Michael Gallagher. London: Routledge Tylor and Francis Group.
- Marshall, Monty G. and Keith Jaggers. 2005. *POLITY IV PROJECT: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2004, Dataset Users Manual*. Arlington, VA: Center for Global Policy, School of Public Policy, George Mason University.  
**URL:** [www.cidcm.umd.edu//polity](http://www.cidcm.umd.edu//polity)

- Meseznikov, Grigorij and Olga Gyarfasova. 2006. "Slovakia: Country Report Based on Research and Dialogue with Political Parties." Report for IDEA: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
- Mikulska, Anna and Susan Scarrow. N.d. "Assessing the Political Impact of Candidate Selection Rules: Britain in the 1990s." Paper prepared for the American Political Science Association Annual Meetings, Boston, August 28-31, 2008.
- Miller, Raymond. 1999. "New Zealand and Scotland: Candidate Selection and the Impact of Electoral System Change." A Paper Presented at the Joint Sessions of Workshops of the European Consortium for Political Research, University of Mannheim, Germany, 26-31 March 1999.
- Mitchell, Paul. 2006. Ireland: 'O What a Tangled Web...'- Delegation, Accountability, and Executive Power. In *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, ed. Kaare Strom, C. Muller, Wolfgang and Torbjorn Bergman. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Montabes, Juan and Carmen Ortega. N.d. "Candidate Selection in Two Rigid List Systems: Spain and Portugal."
- Morgenstern, Scott. 2004. *Patterns of Legislative Politics: Roll-Call Voting in Latin America and the United States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mulgan, Richard. 2004. *Politics in New-Zealand*. 3 ed. New Zealand: Auckland University Press.
- Muller, Wolfgang. 1994. The Development of Austrian Party Organization in the Post-war Period. In *How Parties Organize? Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies*, ed. Richar Katz and Peter Mair. London: Sage.
- Müller, Wolfgang, C. and Jenny Marcelo. 2003. "Strong Parties? Individual Preferences and Legislative Behavior of Austrian Members of Parliament."
- Navia, Patricio. 2008. Legislative Candidate Selection in Chile. In *Pathways to Power*, ed. M. Siavelis, Peter and Scott Morgenstern. The Pennsylvania State University Press pp. 92–118.
- Norris, Pippa and Joni Lovenduski. 1995. *Political Recruitment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Norris, Pippa and Joni Lovenduski. 1997. United Kingdom. In *Passages to Power*, ed. Pippa Norris. Cambridge: Cambridge University press pp. 158–186.
- Obler, Jeffrey. 1973. "The Role of National Party Leaders in the Selection of Parliamentary Candidates: The Belgian Case." *Comparative Politics* 5(2):157–184.
- Obler, Jeffrey. 1974. "Intraparty Democracy and the Selection of Parliamentary Candidates: The Belgian Case." *British Journal of Political Science* 4(2):163–185.

- Ohman, Magnus. 2004. *The Heart and Soul of the Party: Candidate Selection in Ghana and Africa*. Sweden: Uppsala University.
- Pajala, Antti, Aleks Jakulin and Buntine Wray. 2005. "Parliamentary Group and Individual Voting Behaviour in the Finnish Parliament in Year 2003."
- Pammett, Jon, H. and Christopher Dornan, eds. 2001. *The Canadian General Election of 2000*. Toronto: The Dundurn Group.
- Pedersen, Modnes. 2002. Denmark: The Interplay of Nomination and Elections in Danish Politics. In *Party Sovereignty and Citizen Control: Selecting Candidates for Parliamentary Elections in Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway*, ed. Oedersen Mogens N. Narud, Hanne Marthe and Henry Valen. University Press of Southen Denmark.
- Quinn, Thomas. 2004. *Modernising the Labour Party: Organisational Change since 1983*. New-York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Rahat, Gideon. 2002. Candidate Selection in a Sea of Change: Unsuccessfully Trying to Adapt? In *The Elections in Israel 1999*, ed. Asher Arian and Michal Shamir. New York: State University of New York Press. pp. 245–268.
- Rahat, Gideon. 2008. Candidate Selection in Israel: Between the One, the Few, and the Many. In *The Elections in Israel 2006*, ed. Asher Arian and Michal Shamir. Transaction Publishers pp. 189–208.
- Rahat, Gideon and Neta Sher-Hadar. 1999. The Party Primaries and Their Political Consequences. In *The Elections in Israel 1996*, ed. Asher Arian and Michal Shamir. State University of New-York Press.
- Rahat, Gideon and Tamir Sheafer. 2007. "The Personalization(s) of Politics: Israel 1949-2003." *Political Communication* 24(1):65–80.
- Rosenthal, Howard and Sen Subrata. 1969. "Candidate Selection and Voting Behavior in France." *Public Choice* 6:71–92.
- Rush, Michael. 1969. *The Selection of Parliamentary Candidates*. London: Nelson.
- Sayers, Anthony, M. 1999. *Parties, Canddiates and Constituency Campaigns in Canadian Elections*. Canada: UBC Press.
- Scarrow, Susan E. 1996. *Parties and Their Members: Organaizing for Victory in Britain and Germany*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Scarrow, Susan E., Paul Webb and David M. Farrell. 2000. From Social Integration to Electoral Contestation: the Changing Distribution of Power within Political Parties. In *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial democracies*, ed. Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Seddon, Jessica, Alejandro Gaviria, Ugo Panizza and Ernesto Stein. 2002. "Political Particularism around the World." Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper 463.

- Siavelis, Peter M. and Scott Morgenstern, eds. 2008. *Pathways to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America*. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Svanur, Kristjinnsson. 2004. "Iceland: Searching for Democracy along Three Dimensions of Citizen Control." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 27:153–174.
- Szczerbiak, Aleks. 2001. *Poles Together? Emergence and Development of Political Parties in Post-communist Poland*. Hungary: Central European University Press.
- Thiebaut, Jean-Louis. 1988. France: The Impact of Electoral System Change. In *Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: the Secret Garden of Politics*. London: Sage.
- Weeks, Liam. 2007. Candidate Selection: Democratic Centralism or Managed Democracy? In *How Ireland Voted 2007: The Full Story of Irelands General Election*, ed. Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Wertman, Douglas A. 1988. Italy: Local Involvement, Central Control. In *Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics*. London: Sage.
- Wiberg, Matti. 2000. The Partyness of the Finnish Eduskunta. In *Parliamentary Party Groups in European Democracies*, ed. Knut Heidar and Ruud Koole. London: Routledge.
- Woldendorp, Jaap, Hans Keman and Ian Budge. 2000. *Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945-1998): Composition-Duration-Personnel*. The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Wuhs, Steve. 2006. "Democratization and the Dynamics of Candidate Selection Rule Change in Mexico, 1991-2003." *Mexican Studies* 22(1):33–55.
- Young, Lisa and William Cross. 2002. "The Rise of Plebiscitary Democracy in Canadian Political Parties." *Party Politics* 8:673699.