{"id":10,"date":"2020-06-25T08:08:22","date_gmt":"2020-06-25T08:08:22","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/people.socsci.tau.ac.il\/mu\/zvikaneeman\/papers\/"},"modified":"2025-06-11T03:34:22","modified_gmt":"2025-06-11T03:34:22","slug":"papers","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/people.socsci.tau.ac.il\/mu\/zvikaneeman\/papers\/","title":{"rendered":"Papers"},"content":{"rendered":"\n \n
\n
\n

Papers<\/h1>\n <\/div>\n <\/section>\n
\n
\n

Working Papers
\n
Opportunity Hunters: A Model of Competitive Sequential Inspections ,\"  with Ran Eilat and Eilon Solan (2023) [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\"Likes,\"  with Tuval Danenberg and Daniel Spiro (2023) [pdf<\/a>]
 
\u201cThe Microfinance Disappointment: An Explanation based on Risk Aversion,\u201d with Alexey Khazanov, Omer Moav, and Hosny Zoabi (2018). [pdf<\/a>]
 <\/span>\n <\/h2>\n

\"<\/span>Opportunity Hunters: A Model of Competitive Sequential Inspections ,<\/span>\"  with Ran Eilat and Eilon Solan (2023) [pdf<\/a>]<\/span><\/span>\n
\n
\"Promises,\"  with Tuval Danenberg and Daniel Spiro (2023) [pdf<\/a>]<\/span><\/span>\n
 
\u201cThe Microfinance Disappointment: An\nExplanation based on Risk Aversion,\u201d with Alexey Khazanov, Omer Moav, and Hosny\nZoabi (2018). [pdf<\/a>]
 
\n <\/p>\n <\/div>\n <\/section>\n

\n
\n

Published Papers
\n
\"The Effect of Privacy on Market Structure and Prices,\u200b\" \u200bwith Daniel Bird (2023), Journal of Law Economics and Organization  (Forthcoming) [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\"Markovian Persuasion with Two States,\u200b\"\u200b with Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Pen\u00e9lope Hern\u00e1ndez, and Eilon Solan,  Games and Economic Behavior (2023), 292-
314. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\"Communication with Endogenous Deception Costs,\", with Ran Eilat,  Journal of Economic Theory (2023), 105572. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\"What Should a Firm Know? Protecting Consumers' Privacy Rents,\" with Daniel Bird, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (2022),\u200b 257-295. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cHow Bayesian Persuasion can Help Reduce Illegal Parking and Other Socially Undesirable Behavior,\u201d with Pen\u00e9lope Hern\u00e1ndez, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (2022),\u200b 186-215. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cJudging Under Public Pressure,\u201d with Alma Cohen and Florian Auferoth, The Review of Economics and Statistics (2021), \u200b1-48. [pdf]
\n
\u201cAuctioning Class Action Representation,\u201d with Alon Klement and Moran Ofir, The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (2021), 613-631. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cGovernment Financing of R&D: A Mechanism Design Approach,\u201d with Saul Lach and Mark Schankerman, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 
(2021), 238-272. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cThe rarity of consistent aggregators,\u201d with Eyal Baharad and Anna Rubinchik, Mathematical Social Sciences (2020), 146-149. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cDifferential Performance in High vs. Low Stakes Tests,\u201d with Yigal Attali and Analia Schlosser, Economic Journal (2019). [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u201c\u200bConsumer Fraud, Misrepresentation and Reliance,\u201d with Alon Klement and Yuval Procaccia, International Review of Law and Economics 54 (2018), 95. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cGeography, Transparency and Institutions,\u201d with Yoram Mayshar and Omer Moav, American Political Science Review (2017), 1-15. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cJudicial Decision Making: A Dynamic Reputation Approach, \u201d with Alma Cohen and Alon Klement, Journal of Legal Studies 44 (2015), S133-S159. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cPersonality Traits and Strategic Behavior: an Experimental Study,\u201d with Tamar Kugler and Nir Vulkan, Journal of Economic Psychology, 42 (2014) 136-147. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u201cDoes Information about Arbitrators\u2019 Win\/Loss Ratios Improve Their Accuracy?,\u201d with Alon Klement, Journal of Legal Studies 42 (2013), 369.  [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cEx Post Renegotiation-Proof Mechanism Design,\u201d with Gregory Pavlov, Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013), 473-501. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u201cIntroduction,\u201d with Al Roth and Nir Vulkan, the Oxford Handbook of Market Design (2013), Oxford University Press. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cA Mechanism Design Approach to Legal Problems,\u201d with Alon Klement, the Oxford Handbook of Market Design (2013), Oxford University Press. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cMarkets vs. Negotiations: 3 case studies,\u201d with Nir Vulkan, the Oxford Handbook of Market Design (2013), Oxford University Press. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cSaving Rates and Poverty: The Role of Conspicuous Consumption and Human Capital,\u201d with Omer Moav, Economic Journal 122 (2012), 933-956. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u201cStatus and Poverty,\u201d with Omer Moav, Journal of the European Economic Association 8 (2010), 413-420. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cThe Quality of Information and Incentives for Effort,\u201d with Omer Moav, Journal of Industrial Economics 58 (2010), 642-660. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u200b\u201cInvestor Protection and Interest Group Politics, \u201d with Lucian Bebchuk, Review of Financial Studies 23 (2010), 1089-1119. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cMarkets versus Negotiations: The Predominance of Centralized Markets,\u201d with Nir Vulkan, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 10 (2010) : Iss. 1 (Advances), Article 6. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u201cBehaviorally Optimal Auction Design: Examples and Observations,\u201d with Vincent Crawford, Tamar Kugler, and Ady Pauzner, Journal of the European Economic Association 7 (2009), 377\u2013387. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cProducts Liability, Signaling and Disclosure: Comment,\u201d with Alon Klement, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 164 (2008), 130-133. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cCivil Justice Reform: A Mechanism Design Framework,\u201d with Alon Klement, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 164 (2008), 52-67. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cMechanism Design,\u201d International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 2nd edition, (2008) edited by William A. Darity, Jr. Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA.
\n
 \u201cCorruption and Openness,\u201d with Daniele Paserman and Avi Simhon, B.E Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy (2008): Vol. 8: Iss. 1 (Contributions), Article 50. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u200b\u201cRobustness Against Inefficient Manipulation,\u201d with Eyal Baharad, Social Choice & Welfare 29 (2007), 55-67.  [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cOn the efficiency of vote buying when voters have common interests,\u201d with Gerhard Orosel, International Review of Law and Economics 26 (2006), 536-556. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cMarkets Versus Negotiations: an Experimental Analysis,\u201d with Tamar Kugler and Nir Vulkan, Games and Economic Behavior 56 (2006), 121-134. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cOn the Generic (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design,\u201d with Aviad Heifetz, Econometrica 74 (2006), 213-233. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cAgainst Compromise: A Mechanism Design Approach,\u201d with Alon Klement, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 21 (2005), 285-314. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u200b\u201cThe Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design,\u201d Journal of Economic Theory 117 (2004), 55-77. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u201cContestable Licensing,\u201d with Gerhard Orosel, Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy 3 (2004), Vol. 3: No. 1, Article 1. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cIncentive Structures for Class Action Lawyers,\u201d with Alon Klement, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 20 (2004), 102-124. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cThe Effectiveness of English Auctions,\u201d Games and Economic Behavior 43 (2003), 214-238. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cThe Asymptotic Strategyproofness of Scoring and Condorcet Consistent Rules,\u201d with Eyal Baharad, Review of Economic Design 7 (2002), 331-340. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u200b\u201cA Theory of Post-Civil War Democratization,\u201d with Leonard Wantchekon, Journal of Theoretical Politics 14 (2002), 439-464. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cCredits, Crises, and Capital Controls: A Microeconomic Analysis,\u201d with Gerhard Orosel, Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy 1 (2002), Vol. 1: No. 1, Article 6. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cEffective Siting of Waste Treatment Facilities,\u201d with Deborah Minehart, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 43 (2002), 303-324. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cThe Scope of Anonymous Voluntary Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information,\u201d with Ehud Lehrer, Review of Economic Studies 67 (2000), 309-326. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u200b\u201cStrategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition,\u201d with Enriqueta Aragones, Journal of Theoretical Politics 12 (2000), 183-204. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cProperty Rights and Efficiency of Voluntary Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information,\u201d Review of Economic Studies 66 (1999), 679-691.  [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u200b\u201cTermination and Coordination in Partnerships,\u201d with Deborah Minehart, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 8 (1999), 191-221. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u200b\u201cThe Freedom to Contract and the Free Rider Problem,\u201d Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15 (1999), 685-703. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u200b\u201cHerding and the winner\u2019s curse in markets with sequential bids,\u201d with Gerhard Orosel, Journal of Economic Theory 85 (1999), 91-121. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u200b\u201cCommon Beliefs and the Existence of Speculative Trade,\u201d Games and Economic Behavior 16 (1996), 77-96. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u200b\u201cApproximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Common p-Beliefs,\u201d Games and Economic Behavior 12 (1996), 162-164. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cOn Determining the Importance of Attributes with a Stopping Problem,\u201d Mathematical Social Sciences 29 (1995), 195-212. [pdf<\/a>]<\/span>\n <\/h2>\n

\"The Effect of Privacy on Market Structure and Prices,\u200b\" \u200bwith Daniel Bird (2023), Journal of Law Economics and Organization  (Forthcoming) [pdf<\/a>]<\/span><\/span>\n
\n
\"Markovian Persuasion with Two States,\u200b\"\u200b with Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Pen\u00e9lope Hern\u00e1ndez, and Eilon Solan,  Games and Economic <\/span>Behavior (2023), 292-
314. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\"Communication with Endogenous Deception Costs,\", with Ran Eilat,  Journal of Economic Theory<\/span> (2023), 105572. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\"What Should a Firm Know? Protecting Consumers' Privacy Rents,\" with Daniel Bird, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics<\/span> (2022),\u200b 257-295. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cHow Bayesian Persuasion can Help Reduce Illegal Parking and Other Socially Undesirable Behavior,\u201d with Pen\u00e9lope Hern\u00e1ndez, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics <\/span>(2022),\u200b 186-215. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cJudging Under Public Pressure,\u201d with Alma Cohen and Florian Auferoth, The Review of Economics and Statistics<\/span> (2021), \u200b1-48. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cAuctioning Class Action Representation,\u201d with Alon Klement and Moran Ofir, The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization<\/span> (2021), 613-631. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cGovernment Financing of R&D: A Mechanism Design Approach,\u201d with Saul Lach and Mark Schankerman, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics<\/span> 
(2021), 238-272. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cThe rarity of consistent aggregators,\u201d with Eyal Baharad and Anna Rubinchik, Mathematical Social Sciences <\/span>(2020), 146-149. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cDifferential Performance in High vs. Low Stakes Tests,\u201d with Yigal Attali and Analia Schlosser, Economic Journal <\/span>(2019). [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u201c\u200bConsumer Fraud, Misrepresentation and Reliance,\u201d with Alon Klement and Yuval Procaccia, International Review of Law and Economics <\/span>54 (2018), 95. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cGeography, Transparency and Institutions,\u201d with Yoram Mayshar and Omer Moav, American Political Science Review<\/span> (2017), 1-15. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cJudicial Decision Making: A Dynamic Reputation Approach, \u201d with Alma Cohen and Alon Klement, Journal of Legal Studies<\/span> 44 (2015), S133-S159. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cPersonality Traits and Strategic Behavior: an Experimental Study,\u201d with Tamar Kugler and Nir Vulkan, Journal of Economic Psychology<\/span>, 42 (2014) 136-147. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u201cDoes Information about Arbitrators\u2019 Win\/Loss Ratios Improve Their Accuracy?,\u201d with Alon Klement, Journal of Legal Studies<\/span> 42 (2013), 369.  [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cEx Post Renegotiation-Proof Mechanism Design,\u201d with Gregory Pavlov, Journal of Economic Theory<\/span> 148 (2013), 473-501. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u201cIntroduction,\u201d with Al Roth and Nir Vulkan, the Oxford Handbook of Market Design (2013), Oxford University Press.<\/span> [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cA Mechanism Design Approach to Legal Problems,\u201d with Alon Klement, the Oxford Handbook of Market Design<\/span> (2013), Oxford University Press. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cMarkets vs. Negotiations: 3 case studies,\u201d with Nir Vulkan, the Oxford Handbook of Market Design <\/span>(2013), Oxford University Press. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cSaving Rates and Poverty: The Role of Conspicuous Consumption and Human Capital,\u201d with Omer Moav, Economic Journal<\/span> 122 (2012), 933-956. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u201cStatus and Poverty,\u201d with Omer Moav, Journal of the European Economic Association<\/span> 8 (2010), 413-420. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cThe Quality of Information and Incentives for Effort,\u201d with Omer Moav, Journal of Industrial Economics<\/span> 58 (2010), 642-660. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u200b\u201cInvestor Protection and Interest Group Politics, \u201d with Lucian Bebchuk, Review of Financial Studies<\/span> 23 (2010), 1089-1119. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cMarkets versus Negotiations: The Predominance of Centralized Markets,\u201d with Nir Vulkan, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics<\/span> 10 (2010) : Iss. 1 (Advances), Article 6. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u201cBehaviorally Optimal Auction Design: Examples and Observations,\u201d with Vincent Crawford, Tamar Kugler, and Ady Pauzner, Journal of the European Economic Association <\/span>7 (2009), 377\u2013387. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cProducts Liability, Signaling and Disclosure: Comment,\u201d with Alon Klement, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics<\/span> 164 (2008), 130-133. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cCivil Justice Reform: A Mechanism Design Framework,\u201d with Alon Klement, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics <\/span>164 (2008), 52-67. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cMechanism Design,\u201d I<\/span>nternational Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 2nd edition,<\/span> (2008) edited by William A. Darity, Jr. Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA.
\n
 \u201cCorruption and Openness,\u201d with Daniele Paserman and Avi Simhon, B.E Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy (2008)<\/span>: Vol. 8: Iss. 1 (Contributions), Article 50. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u200b\u201cRobustness Against Inefficient Manipulation,\u201d with Eyal Baharad, Social Choice & Welfare<\/span> 29 (2007), 55-67.  [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cOn the efficiency of vote buying when voters have common interests,\u201d with Gerhard Orosel, International Review of Law and Economics<\/span> 26 (2006), 536-556. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cMarkets Versus Negotiations: an Experimental Analysis,\u201d with Tamar Kugler and Nir Vulkan, Games and Economic Behavior<\/span> 56 (2006), 121-134. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cOn the Generic (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design,\u201d with Aviad Heifetz, Econometrica <\/span>74 (2006), 213-233. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cAgainst Compromise: A Mechanism Design Approach,\u201d with Alon Klement, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization<\/span> 21 (2005), 285-314. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u200b\u201cThe Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design,\u201d Journal of Economic Theory<\/span> 117 (2004), 55-77. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u201cContestable Licensing,\u201d with Gerhard Orosel, Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy<\/span> 3 (2004), Vol. 3: No. 1, Article 1. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cIncentive Structures for Class Action Lawyers,\u201d with Alon Klement, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization<\/span> 20 (2004), 102-124. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cThe Effectiveness of English Auctions,\u201d Games and Economic Behavior <\/span>43 (2003), 214-238. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cThe Asymptotic Strategyproofness of Scoring and Condorcet Consistent Rules,\u201d with Eyal Baharad, Review of Economic Design<\/span> 7 (2002), 331-340. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u200b\u201cA Theory of Post-Civil War Democratization,\u201d with Leonard Wantchekon, Journal of Theoretical Politics 14<\/span> (2002), 439-464. 
\n
\u201cCredits, Crises, and Capital Controls: A Microeconomic Analysis,\u201d with Gerhard Orosel, Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy<\/span> 1 (2002), Vol. 1: No. 1, Article 6. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cEffective Siting of Waste Treatment Facilities,\u201d with Deborah Minehart, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management<\/span> 43 (2002), 303-324. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cThe Scope of Anonymous Voluntary Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information,\u201d with Ehud Lehrer, Review of Economic Studies<\/span> 67 (2000), 309-326. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u200b\u201cStrategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition,\u201d with Enriqueta Aragones, Journal of Theoretical Politics <\/span>12 (2000), 183-204. [pdf]
\n
\u201cProperty Rights and Efficiency of Voluntary Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information,\u201d Review of Economic Studies <\/span>66 (1999), 679-691.  [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u200b\u201cTermination and Coordination in Partnerships,\u201d with Deborah Minehart, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy<\/span> 8 (1999), 191-221. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u200b\u201cThe Freedom to Contract and the Free Rider Problem,\u201d Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization<\/span> 15 (1999), 685-703. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u200b\u201cHerding and the winner\u2019s curse in markets with sequential bids,\u201d with Gerhard Orosel, Journal of Economic Theory<\/span> 85 (1999), 91-121. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u200b\u201cCommon Beliefs and the Existence of Speculative Trade,\u201d Games and Economic Behavior<\/span> 16 (1996), 77-96. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
 \u200b\u201cApproximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Common p-Beliefs,\u201d Games and Economic Behavior<\/span> 12 (1996), 162-164. [pdf<\/a>]
\n
\u201cOn Determining the Importance of Attributes with a Stopping Problem,\u201d Mathematical Social Sciences<\/span> 29 (1995), 195-212. [pdf<\/a>]
\n <\/p>\n <\/div>\n <\/section>\n \n \n \n \n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Papers Working Papers Opportunity Hunters: A Model of Competitive Sequential Inspections ,”  with Ran Eilat and Eilon Solan (2023) [pdf] “Likes,”  with Tuval Danenberg and Daniel Spiro (2023) [pdf] \u201cThe Microfinance Disappointment: An Explanation based on Risk Aversion,\u201d with Alexey Khazanov, Omer Moav, and Hosny Zoabi (2018). [pdf]  “Opportunity Hunters: A Model of Competitive Sequential Inspections ,”  with Ran … Continue reading “Papers”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":1,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-10","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/people.socsci.tau.ac.il\/mu\/zvikaneeman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/10","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/people.socsci.tau.ac.il\/mu\/zvikaneeman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/people.socsci.tau.ac.il\/mu\/zvikaneeman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/people.socsci.tau.ac.il\/mu\/zvikaneeman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/people.socsci.tau.ac.il\/mu\/zvikaneeman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=10"}],"version-history":[{"count":166,"href":"https:\/\/people.socsci.tau.ac.il\/mu\/zvikaneeman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/10\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":470,"href":"https:\/\/people.socsci.tau.ac.il\/mu\/zvikaneeman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/10\/revisions\/470"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/people.socsci.tau.ac.il\/mu\/zvikaneeman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=10"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}